Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, Ukraine has been embroiled in a now six-year war with Moscow and its proxies in Ukraine’s eastern territories. Over this period Russian-backed separatists as well as Russian forces have employed a hybrid system of warfare encompassing fronts across land, sea, and cyber environments. In response, both NATO and Western partners have supplied Ukraine with a myriad of economic and resource-focused assistance packages to help Kyiv hold the line and bolster their defensive capabilities. It was in this context that the 2014 and 2015 Minsk I & II agreements were brokered to establish a pathway to peace and the cessation of violence, which has clamed thousands of lives and displaced millions. This article will explore how the Minsk protocols have held up in the face of over half a decade of warfare and whether or not respective stakeholders have taken action toward the goals and strategies espoused by the agreements. Specifically, it is crucial to understand what NATO’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine has been since 2014 as well as what these policy responses have looked like. Not only a war for Kyiv to grapple with, the current hostilities in Eastern Ukraine have reintroduced the spectre of war on NATO’s border—a war that has and will continue to require modern, holistic, and nuanced policies from NATO.

Since the creation of NATO in 1949, its main power rests in Article 5, establishing collective defense. For member states, NATO ensures the security of Europe and Northern America. However, for a non-member state such as Georgia, what does NATO mean to Georgia and its citizens? Back in 1921, the Soviet Union annexed Georgia and took its independence for 70 years. Many former states occupied by the Soviet Union have been able to join NATO or the EU – but not Georgia or Ukraine. Meanwhile, the re-emergence of an aggressive Russia is a real existential threat towards Georgia, and NATO can provide a security shield against it. Being part of NATO means cooperation and integration in European and Atlantic states and open negotiations with Russia. If Georgia is a NATO member state, Putin will no longer be able to pressure Georgia. Georgia also remains important for Black Sea regional security, which is an important issue for NATO. Therefore, NATO is not just helpful for Georgia, but Georgia for NATO as well. Integration into NATO is not that easy for Georgia, which is still plagued by occupied territories and conflicts within its borders. However, there are always solutions if we research well. NATO’s open door in 2020 is the biggest chance for Georgia’s NATO membership since the Bucharest Summit in 2008, when Russia was afraid of losing control of Georgia and used armed forces against it. As NATO welcomes Georgia’s course towards democracy, human rights, international law, rule of law, and NATO itself, NATO’s open door policy in 2020 should be an opportunity for Georgia to get closer to the organization and ensure future membership.

The NATO-Georgia relationship has proven to be solid and mutually beneficial. Tbilisi meets the requirements to fully be integrated into the NATO political system and command structure. Yet, despite Georgia’s forceful plea for membership, greater regional dynamics inhibit the fulfilment of Tbilisi’s transatlantic ambitions.

Russian presence in the Caucasus constitutes the main obstacle. Moscow seeks to maintain a coercive presence in and around the region so as to manage escalation in peacetime, close off the area in crisis and rapidly intervene in case of conflict before Western involvement. To fulfil these ambitions, Russia pursues a multi-domain strategy in the Caucasus. Land forces are stationed around Georgia, ready to deploy under short notice; air bases host advanced fighter jets capable of carrying out deep strikes against Tbilisi; and warships dominate the surrounding Black Sea and Caspian Sea.

I consequently argue that the immediate political environment is too hostile for a formal membership offer to be issued. NATO should, thus, look for alternative, more compromising ways of integrating Georgia: ones that uphold the same mutual benefits as membership.

In turn, each NATO member state could bilaterally assist and supply Georgia with defensive arms, military advisers, and encourage standardization and interoperability with NATO. Under a NATO framework, a comprehensive Black Sea strategy, the establishment of a regional HQ in Romania, and the enhancement of current training, intelligence sharing, and aid programs could indirectly, yet substantially, decrease pressure on Georgia and move the partnership forward.

Recently, relations between the United States and Europe have been marked by a series of challenges – from trade to tensions over burden sharing, climate change, the Middle East, Iran, or China. While convergence ideally ought to be the means and the end of our endeavours within the transatlantic Alliance, these obstacles have been challenging yet fundamental elements underpinning the process of designing a modus vivendi of our own – and this is from where NATO’s strength emanates. The core argument of this paper is that the lessons that we shall draw from a history of convergence and divergence must orient the US-Europe partnership towards employing wisdom and strategy in renewing a common transatlantic agenda. As we may notice both the momentum and political commitment of defence initiatives in Europe, we should seize a moment to reflect upon pragmatic capacity-building and the potential to reconcile 2% and European strategic autonomy (ESA) under the umbrella of transatlantic burden sharing and, eventually, within the framework of increased US-EU and inherently EU-NATO cooperation. The trajectory of the relationship between the US and Europe has experienced ups and downs before, and the fact that we are facing quite challenging times right now is not an anomaly. What is imperative though is that we should be wise enough to learn from our common past to see that when we are unified we stand stronger than ever and are able to discern that complex and unpredictable times (alongside disruptive actors) require a reinforced transatlantic partnership.

Turkey found its need to join the NATO Alliance as a safeguard against the Soviet threat during the Cold War. However, after the fall of the Soviet Union and the creation of the Russian Federation, close relations, both economic and diplomatic, developed between Russia and Turkey. Despite many points of tension, including Turkey’s fatal downing of a Russian jet on its border with Syria in 2015, and a lack of a shared vision for the future of bilateral relations, Turkey felt that it received significant support from Russia following the 15 July 2016 coup attempt in Turkey—support it did not feel from Western, NATO countries. This coincided with Russia’s re-emergence as one of the most important figures in the Middle East since the Cold War and the Western alliance with the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) in fighting the Islamic State in Syria. As Turkey’s relations with the West deteriorated, coupled with its ambitions to fulfil its national defence needs, Turkey thus turned to Russia to realize its defence capabilities, eventually purchasing and receiving the S-400 air-to-surface missile earlier this year. This article will briefly discuss Turkey’s historical role in NATO, its post-Cold War relations with Russia, and its present situation in global politics in order to better understand not only Turkey’s controversial S-400 purchase but also its continuous commitment to NATO in spite of this. Amid many questions as to whether or not Turkey is leaving NATO, this article concludes that it is unlikely that Turkey will leave or turn its back on Allies.

This paper revisits old concepts and arguments that have surrounded NATO since its formation. This paper will revisit three of the five hypotheses of the Olson-Zeckhauser (OZ) Model of alliance burden sharing and use Poland and the Netherlands as case studies. We are interested in European dynamics and thus have not included the US or Canada in our statistical analysis. The data we used is from the Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2010–2017). The hypotheses we will re-test from the OZ model are as follows: hypothesis 1: correlation of size of GDP to percentage of GDP spend on defense; hypothesis 2: correlation between GNP and quota fulfilment; hypothesis 3: negative correlation between national income and infrastructure expenses. To conclude, we will revisit the issue of free riding and discuss some of the alternatives to the 2% GDP benchmark measurement.

As NATO’s greatest responsibility is to prevent conflict and maintain peace, the Alliance set a goal for its members to spend at least 2% of GDP on defense at the 2014 Wales Summit. Since then, all NATO members have increased defense spending, but according to the 2018 NATO report, only seven of 29 allies are currently meeting the recommended spending target of 2% of GDP. Only six European countries, Greece, the UK, Estonia, Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania, meet the 2% threshold, which has been the main focus and criticism of US President Donald Trump, who has criticized NATO countries for failing to meet this target. NATO Allies agreed to submit defense spending plans by the end of 2017 that will outline their plans for achieving the 2% target by 2024. Currently, only 15 of 29 countries have announced clear plans. Although NATO faces numerous and complex security challenges, the Alliance encourages the member states to meet the political goals they have set as a means to continue to guarantee peace and security.

Germany is the largest European economy, which means that is has the potential to be the largest military donor in Europe, as well; however, Germany’s past does not allow it to imagine being the biggest ‘military machine’ in Europe. Since the end of the Cold War and thus Germany’s unification, questions about its military force and expenditures have not been on the top of its agenda, to say the least. Recently, however, the question has been brought up not just in Germany but internationally. German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who has held the chancellorship for over 15 years, has shown that she does not view Germany as a military machine nor that she would imagine it to be one. Furthermore, Merkel has recently announced that she will not run for office in the next general elections in Germany in 2021. Therefore, questions remain as to what would happen to Europe and the transatlantic relationship in general if Donald Trump followed through with his statements, and additionally, how Germany’s position might affect the future of transatlantic relations.

Today, every aspect of human life is part of cyber space, even the ones we are not aware of. This makes us all combatants, and geography becomes unimportant. Consequently, the need for strong and unified cyber security is crucial, and ‘cyber defence’ is a key aspect of this. NATO has recognised the importance of incorporating cyber defence into the Alliance’s operations; however, little has been done to turn NATO’s Cyber Defence Pledge into action. This paper considers the cyber issues most relevant to NATO and advocates for the creation of the Cyber Security Doctrine, Grand Cyber Security Strategy, and the Cyber Joint Task Force. These three suggestions are crucial for developing the policies and procedures within which the Alliance will create its cyber ‘muscle memory’ and ultimately increase its strength within the cyber domain so that NATO’s cyber defences are equal to its defences in the air, on land, and at sea.