Understanding Turkey’s Commitment to NATO in Light of the S-400 Issue
Turkey found its need to join the NATO Alliance as a safeguard against the Soviet threat during the Cold War. However, after the fall of the Soviet Union and the creation of the Russian Federation, close relations, both economic and diplomatic, developed between Russia and Turkey. Despite many points of tension, including Turkey’s fatal downing of a Russian jet on its border with Syria in 2015, and a lack of a shared vision for the future of bilateral relations, Turkey felt that it received significant support from Russia following the 15 July 2016 coup attempt in Turkey—support it did not feel from Western, NATO countries. This coincided with Russia’s re-emergence as one of the most important figures in the Middle East since the Cold War and the Western alliance with the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) in fighting the Islamic State in Syria. As Turkey’s relations with the West deteriorated, coupled with its ambitions to fulfil its national defence needs, Turkey thus turned to Russia to realize its defence capabilities, eventually purchasing and receiving the S-400 air-to-surface missile earlier this year. This article will briefly discuss Turkey’s historical role in NATO, its post-Cold War relations with Russia, and its present situation in global politics in order to better understand not only Turkey’s controversial S-400 purchase but also its continuous commitment to NATO in spite of this. Amid many questions as to whether or not Turkey is leaving NATO, this article concludes that it is unlikely that Turkey will leave or turn its back on Allies.
By Emine Gulnihal Yolcu
The Cold War ended 30 years ago, but still its ghosts are all over the world. While the existence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been questioned due to changes in the world order, the growing insecurity and political turmoil around the world has necessitated the maintenance of this collective defence mechanism.
NATO was founded as a collective defence institution so that Allies could work together against the spread of the Soviet threat in 1949. From the start, it became important that “allies act coherently, effectively and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational and strategic objectives.”[i] NATO owes its continuing existence to interoperability, which is based on “shared common doctrine and procedures, each other’s infrastructure and bases, and to be able to communicate.”[ii] Allies have worked together in joint operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and the Mediterranean in order to reduce the tension and eliminate the threat of terrorism. These operations helped not just Allies’ ability to interact with each other, they also helped the Alliance’s ability to act in coherence with partners.
Turkey found its need to join the NATO Alliance against the Soviet threat during the Cold War. On the one hand, the Soviet Union’s claim over Turkey’s straits and Eastern Anatolia made Turkey a natural ally of the Western bloc. On the other hand, NATO was the leading actor capable of making Turkey more democratic and Western. Turkey signed the North Atlantic Treaty on 22 October 1951, and it became NATO’s south-eastern border with the USSR.
After 40 years, the Soviet Union collapsed, the Berlin Wall fell, and the bipolar world order was gone. The two security blocs, NATO and that of the Warsaw Pact, began to acknowledge each other and welcomed the new world order. But, this did not mean that the world became more peaceful than it was before. It was not easy to adjust to the new world for the Eastern bloc or for NATO. Because the structure of the international order changed, NATO’s existence and its identity as a defender of the Western bloc was quickly called into question.
NATO’s existential crisis, however, did not last long, and it eventually used this change in the international order to its advantage and started its enlargement process towards former Soviet states. NATO started negotiations with Russia after the Cold War. NATO tried to reconcile with the newly founded Russian Federation, which joined the Partnership for Peace Program in 1994, as well as with other former Soviet states. In 1997, NATO and Russia signed the Founding Act as a part of NATO’s post-1991 strategy of cooperation with Russia in order to “seek the widest possible cooperation among participating states of the OSCE with the aim of creating in Europe a common space of security and stability, without dividing lines or spheres of influence limiting the sovereignty of any state.”[iii]
The 9/11 attacks in 2001 shook the world and changed the global understanding of terrorism as a group of militants related to the Afghanistan-based terrorist organization Al-Qaeda carried out this operation in the United States. After the attacks, the Bush administration invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and declared a “war on terrorism,” which was also strongly supported by Russia. At that time, Russia was suffering from Islamic extremism in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The idea of assisting a global leader in Afghanistan was seen as an opportunity by Russia. NATO and Russia took further steps during the Rome Summit in 2002 and signed a declaration in order to “stand together against common threats and risks which to their security”.[iv]
Enlargement and Russia’s Re-emergence
From the Turkish view, NATO’s enlargement process started with its reconciliation with Russia, a decision that it perceived would not have any role in helping strengthen collective defence, the fundamental role of NATO.[v] In general, Turkey supported NATO’s enlargement in 1999, 2004, and 2008, but Turkey was nevertheless cautious.[vi] The enlargement process could cause an imbalance in the level of security between old and new member states,[vii] because new members were still recovering from the remnants of the Soviet, communist state. Another issue for Turkey was that the enlargement process would cause Turkey to share its strategic position and geographic importance on the Black Sea with new members in the Alliance.[viii] Turkey could not see the benefits of the enlargement process in helping decrease tensions between the West and Russia, while it seemed the only purpose of this process was to antagonize Russia.[ix] In addition to this, close Russia-Turkey relations, both economic and diplomatic, developed after the Cold War could be affected by rising Russian aggression and nationalist attitudes.[x]
While the enlargement process did not directly antagonize Russia, Russia was nevertheless wary of NATO’s expansion. The process, which Russia had no say in, started with the admission of the Baltic States (Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia), which are not members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). However, when NATO started negotiations with Ukraine and Georgia, which are considered part of Russia’s “near abroad,” Russia became agitated. Vladimir Putin expressed his concerns about the enlargement process, saying, “expansion means destruction of mutual trust and it does not have any relation with the modernization of the alliance or with ensuring security in Europe.”[xi] Putin’s words and concerns were realized in the Color Revolutions in 2005, which damaged Russia’s security in its near abroad.
NATO’s enlargement towards Ukraine and Georgia caused Russia to feel threatened by Western countries. Russia started to act aggressively and defended Russian ethnic minorities in Ukraine and supported the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia. These supports paved the way for the Five-Day War and later the illegal annexation of Crimea. During these incidents, Turkey tried to preserve balance between its NATO Allies and Russia. On the one side, Turkey continued to maintain and improve its relations with Russia despite these developments, which sparked criticism from both Turkey’s regional partners and Allies, in order to preserve its economic relations with the Kremlin.[xii] On the other, Turkey had also realized that Russia had gained undue influence in the Black Sea region, and therefore, Turkey started to improve its relations with Ukraine, Georgia, and other regional countries.
In 2014, together with the illegal annexation of Crimea, Russia, again, became a major threat to the international order and security. The NATO-Russian Council based on the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) a forum for consultation and cooperation created by the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, was suspended, and the dialogue between NATO and Russia was terminated. One year later, Russia appeared as a major actor in the Middle East. Russia, which was previously excluded from the major players of the international community, re-emerged as an important actor following Russian involvement in the Syrian crisis and Turkey’s downing of a Russian jet over the Turkish-Syrian border in December 2015.
Turkey’s Crisis and Russian Reassurance
In July 2016, Turkey faced one of the most tragic moments in its history. A faction in the Turkish army, allegedly Gulenists, followers of cleric Fethullah Gulen, attempted a coup d’état in “total disregard of the nation’s will and against the Government.”[xiii] Despite the fact that NATO Allies and Western countries condemned the attempted coup, the fact that the leader of the Gulenists, which the Turkish government classified as the Fethullah Terrorist Organization (FETO) after the coup attempt, is currently living in the United States became a point of contention in US-Turkey relations. As the threat emanating from FETO was recognized as a major security threat to Turkey, US-Turkey relations, and thus NATO-Turkey relations, began to deteriorate.
In this environment, Turkey saw the greatest support from the Russian Federation. Although prior to this Russia-Turkey relations had been strained by the jet crisis, after the attempted coup the Russian Federation presented its intelligence services to assist Turkey’s investigation. This coincided with Russia’s re-emergence as one of the most important figures in the Middle East since the Cold War and the Western alliance with the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) in fighting the Islamic State in Syria. Turkey perceives the YPG as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which Turkey, the EU, and the US all consider to be a terrorist organization. Further, during this period the Turkish government accused American Pastor Andrew Craig Brunson of conspiring with the PKK and FETO, and this situation caused tensions to rise between the United States and Turkey.
Turkey, despite its a long history and partnership with the US since the Marshall Plan during the 1950s, started to doubt the West’s, as a whole, support, and the West began to perceive Russia’s strong interest in Turkey with suspicion, despite Russia’s own problems with Turkey in the past.
Turkey’s S-400 Purchase
These close relations between Russia and Turkey bring us to Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 surface-to-air missile. Due to its strategic position, Turkey is often in need of defence systems. When the Syrian Civil War broke out, Syrian government forces threatened NATO’s Southern flank, and three NATO allies (Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States) decided to deploy their Patriot batteries at Kahramanmaras, Adana, and Gaziantep under Article 4 of NATO’s treaty for defence purposes.[xiv] These Patriots operated between 2013 and 2015.
As Turkey’s own request to buy Patriots from the United States was not fulfilled, in April 2017 Turkey signed the purchase agreement with Russia in order to increase its air defence security. The Turkish government felt that its security concerns were not understood thoroughly and not answered in time by the US, unlike Russia. The US was only obliged to consider selling Patriot missiles to Turkey after the S-400 deal was completed, which did not alleviate Turkey’s concerns about the possible delivery time, price, and technology transfer of the Patriot missile systems. Nevertheless, Turkey was asked to drop its S-400 purchase from Russia, which Turkey did not accept. In August the same year, American President Donald Trump signed into law the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) amid Turkey’s intentions to purchase the S-400 system. The law foresees the imposition of sanctions on persons and institutions engaged in significant exchanges with the defence or intelligence sectors of the Russian Federation. US lawmakers declared that these sanctions would be applied when Turkey’s S-400 transaction was completed. Later, US officials declared that the sanctions will be applied when the air defence system is activated.
Congress halted the delivery of the F-35 fighter aircraft to Turkey under the National Defense Authorization Act adopted in 2018. The United States has repeatedly objected to Turkey’s purchase of the Russian-made air defence systems because the S-400 is not compatible with NATO security standards and might compromise the operation of the F-35 jets. Following this argument, the Russian Federation could interfere in NATO’s security.
This year, Turkey completed its purchase of the S-400 from Russia. Turkey had purchased other military equipment from non-NATO ally states, such as Israel and South Korea, before.[xv] However, Russia is not a “normal” non-NATO member state, and as such, Russian interest in Turkey is not an issue that can be ignored. This is why Russia-Turkey relations should be examined closely: every time that Turkey does not have strong support from the West, Turkey is getting closer to Russia. The decision to impose sanctions and block Turkey’s participation in F-35 program will only help Russia interfere not only in NATO-Turkey relations but also in Turkey-West relations.
Without a doubt, Turkey is a key partner and Ally in NATO. It has the second largest army in NATO. Turkey’s membership in NATO was in line with its close relations with the US and ambitions for Westernization. Thus, since the 1950s, any time that Turkey had a problem with the US, there has also been a larger question of Turkish presence in the Alliance. In 1964, the US failed to understand the “Turkish concern for the security of the Turkish community on Cyprus” as it was understood in the “Johnson Letter.”[xvi] Ten years later, incidents that threatened the Turkish community on the island caused Turkey to intervene in 1974. The intervention led to US sanctions on Turkey. Forty-five years later, much has not changed in the situation between the US and Turkey. Turkey is again facing US sanctions as its concerns are again misunderstood.
The Future of Turkey, NATO, and the S-400
Turkey’s geostrategic position, with two straits, surrounded by the Black Sea, the Aegean Sea, and the Mediterranean Sea, makes it an important ally in NATO. The same position has also put Turkey in danger from Russia, especially during the Cold War. Although there is no more Soviet Union, Putin’s statements towards NATO show that Russia is still a hostile power. Now, it is more important than ever to focus on Russia’s next move.
In this sense, Russia’s S-400 trade with Turkey should be examined closely. Turkey’s relationships with many NATO member states are in jeopardy. Its bilateral relations with the US, Germany, and France have already significantly deteriorated, which has led to many questions on Turkey’s existence in NATO. Turkey’s fundamental problem lies in its desire to solve both the problems inside and outside its borders, which necessitates hard work for Turkey. Turkey is currently trying to find a balance between being a NATO ally and a sovereign country. Despite the fact that Turkey has the second largest army in NATO and fulfils its duties within the Alliance, this does not mean that Turkey’s interests are compatible with other Allies. This is the fundamental problem here, and it has harmed cooperation and interoperability among Allies. Turkey’s concerns are not shared and understood by other Allies, namely by the US, Germany, and France. On the other hand, it is perceived that Russia understands Turkey’s concerns, and Russia helps Turkey improve its security by selling air defence systems to Turkey.
The S-400 issue caused the deterioration of relations between the US and Turkey, similar to Cyprus issue in the 1970s. At the time of the Cyprus crisis, however, Russia was not involved in the problem. Now, Russia’s involvement pushes Turkey’s limits about how far Turkey can move away from the Alliance and tries to turn Turkey into a “troublemaker in NATO.”[xvii] Even if Turkey does not use the S-400 systems, having purchased the S-400 has become a turning point for Turkey’s role in the Alliance.
When these systems are activated, it is very likely that US officials will impose CAATSA sanctions on Turkey. The possible activation of S-400s will put a barrier between Turkey and other Allies. On the other hand, if these systems are not used, it will show that Turkey is not determined to pursue its independence, despite CAATSA. At this point there is no loss for Russia, since it has already gotten what it wants: to deepen the dispute among NATO Allies. Ultimately, Russia realizes Turkey’s geostrategic importance and wants more than anything to protect its interests in the Black Sea and the Middle East.[xviii]
Besides political reasons, there is a military aspect of this purchase. Since it will not be integrated into NATO defence systems, the S-400 missiles will not be useful for Turkey in the long run as there will be no technological transaction from Russia, which would have been an important step for Turkey in terms developing of “its robust air defense capabilities.”[xix] Further, the purchase should not cause Turkey to act aggressively towards Allies that have expressed their views that Turkey might leave the Alliance, since it is unlikely that Turkey will leave or turn its back on Allies. Turkey should keep every diplomatic channel open.[xx]
Both Turkey and the US have pushed the limits and paved the way for Russia to act as it wishes. As every step Allies take separately is a win for Russia, Allies should stand and act together. As Kasapoglu wrote in his report on the procurement of the missiles, the S-400 became a “geopolitical test,”[xxi] and it is up to Allies to decide whether or not they will win.
About the Author
Emine Gulnihal Yolcu is currently working as a job coach in a project dealing with Syrians under temporary protection and other disadvantaged groups in Turkey. She holds her BA in Political Science and International Relations from Marmara University and MA in International Relations from Kadir Has University. Her research interests are mainly focused on Turkish foreign policy and Russian foreign policy.
Notes
[i] NATO, “Interoperability: Connecting NATO Forces,” last updated 6 June 2017, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_84112.htm.
[ii] Ibid.
[iii] “Founding Act on Mutual Relations,” NATO Review 45, no. 4 (July-August 1997).
[iv] “Rome Summit Declaration”, NATO, May 28, 2002, last updated 14 January 2004, https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2002/0205-rome/rome-eng.pdf.
[v] Suha Bolukbasioglu, “The Enlargement of NATO and The Turkish Public Opinion,” NATO, accessed 28 November 2019, https://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/97-99/bolukbasioglu.pdf.
[vi] Tarik Oguzlu, “Turkey and NATO: An Ambivalent Ally in a Changing Alliance,” Uluslararası İlişkiler 9, no. 34 (Summer 2012): 112.
[vii] Bolukbasioglu, “The Enlargement of NATO”.
[viii] Oguzlu, “Turkey and NATO,” 112.
[ix] Bolukbasioglu, “The Enlargement of NATO.”
[x] Oguzlu, “Turkey and NATO,” 112.
[xi] Vladimir Putin, “Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy,” 10 February 2007.
[xii] Mitat Celikpala, “Viewing Present as History and the State and Future of Turkey-Russia Relations,” Center for Economic and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM), June 2019, 14.
[xiii] QA-28, 19 July 2016, Statement of the Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tanju Bilgiç, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/qa_28_-19-july-2016_-statement-of-the-spokesperson....
[xiv] NATO support to Turkey: Background and timeline, last updated 19 February 2013, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_92555.htm?
[xv] Can Kasapoglu, “Turkish-Russian Defense Cooperation: Political-Military Scope, Peospects and Limits,” Center for Economic and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM), April 2019, 4.
[xvi] Kemal Kiriscioglu, “The End of the Cold War and Changes in Turkish Foreign Policy Behaviour,” Foreign Policy Institute, 29 November 2016, accessed 25 November 2019, http://foreignpolicy.org.tr/the-end-of-the-cold-war-and-changes-in-turki....
[xvii] Vladimir Frolov, “Our Man in NATO: Why Putin Lucked Out With Recep Erdogan”, The Moscow Times, 15 April 2019, accessed 18 November 2019, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/04/15/our-man-in-nato-why-putin-luck....
[xviii] Hilmi Hacaloglu, “Türkiye’nin S-400’le İmtihanı,” Amerika’nın Sesi, 18 November 2019, accessed 18 November 2019, amerikaninsesi.com/a/turkiye-nin-s400-imtihani/5170310.html.
[xix] Kasapoglu, “Turkish-Russian Defense Cooperation,” 24.
[xx] Ibid.
[xxi] Ibid.