The United States and Europe – Between convergence and divergence towards a renewed transatlantic agenda

Recently, relations between the United States and Europe have been marked by a series of challenges – from trade to tensions over burden sharing, climate change, the Middle East, Iran, or China. While convergence ideally ought to be the means and the end of our endeavours within the transatlantic Alliance, these obstacles have been challenging yet fundamental elements underpinning the process of designing a modus vivendi of our own – and this is from where NATO’s strength emanates. The core argument of this paper is that the lessons that we shall draw from a history of convergence and divergence must orient the US-Europe partnership towards employing wisdom and strategy in renewing a common transatlantic agenda. As we may notice both the momentum and political commitment of defence initiatives in Europe, we should seize a moment to reflect upon pragmatic capacity-building and the potential to reconcile 2% and European strategic autonomy (ESA) under the umbrella of transatlantic burden sharing and, eventually, within the framework of increased US-EU and inherently EU-NATO cooperation. The trajectory of the relationship between the US and Europe has experienced ups and downs before, and the fact that we are facing quite challenging times right now is not an anomaly. What is imperative though is that we should be wise enough to learn from our common past to see that when we are unified we stand stronger than ever and are able to discern that complex and unpredictable times (alongside disruptive actors) require a reinforced transatlantic partnership.

By Raluca-Andreea Manea

The partnership between the United States and Europe has been both the foundation as well as the driving force behind transatlantic security for the past 70 years. Both divided and united by the Atlantic, the bond between the two sides has grown into what all of us know today as the “trans-Atlantic” Alliance – overcoming limits and transcending divisions, geographical or policy-related. Recently, relations between the United States and Europe have been marked by a series of challenges – from trade to tensions over burden sharing, climate change, the Middle East, Iran, or China – but, so far, the transatlantic bond has proven both strength and resilience, two traits that have grown embedded in the trajectory of this common path. This is not to infer that the mood or dynamics in the transatlantic relationship were all rosy before 2016 – not at all, if we look back to the Suez rift in 1956, recall the memories of the 2003 war in Iraq or the quarrel over US eavesdropping on top German officials, and not least, the United States’ repeated calls for a Europe that upgrades its responsibility for its own defence.

This paper argues that these obstacles have been challenging yet fundamental elements underpinning the process of designing a modus vivendi of our own – and this is from where the Alliance’s strength emanates. It is, of course, alleged that convergence ideally ought to be the means and the end of our endeavours within the Alliance. However, such an outlook does not necessarily imply that divergence automatically rules out the achievement of our mission – just as a difference of opinion does not hamper a debate, but at times might eventually lead the debate in a better direction. Thus, the main question is how to navigate through convergence and divergence in view of pushing our ship, the Alliance, through the winds of change. Accordingly, the core argument of this paper is that the lessons that we shall draw from a history of convergence and divergence must orient the US-Europe partnership towards employing wisdom and strategy in renewing a common transatlantic agenda.

Such a reflection could not come at a more opportune moment than our celebration of the 70th anniversary of NATO, which unquestionably stands out as the most successful story of the partnership between the US and Europe. The North Atlantic Alliance is perhaps the most vivid testimony of resilience and strength, having outlived the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union and managing to conceive a meaning for itself at moments in which its raison d’etre was questioned. Today, compared to the singular Soviet threat in the Cold War years, the Alliance is both a witness and a player within a complex and ever-changing environment. In facing these winds of change, let us act as experienced sailors that calibrate their sails as they discern that there is no means to change direction.

A shared commitment to a rules-based international order

The partnership between the United States and Europe stretches back to the First World War and the transformation of the United States’ stance from its position of neutrality (subsumed by its traditional isolationist orientation) to its declaration of war against Germany in April 1917 and, eventually, the release of the notorious Fourteen Points in January 1918.[i] Firmly attached to his conviction that the safety of the United States rested on the prerequisite that “the world must be made safe for democracy” while nevertheless failing to gather Congressional support for signing the United States into the League of Nations, President Woodrow Wilson played a crucial role in directing the foundations of the post-WWI order. Some of the key principles enshrined in the Fourteen Points – freedom of the seas, equality of nations, self-determination and territorial integrity, multilateralism and collective security, disarmament/arms control ­– eventually emerged as the linchpin of the rules-based international order.[ii] The departure from America’s traditional non-entanglement to engagement in European affairs thus signalled the beginning of the intertwined history of the United States and Europe – a relationship whose preamble, one may argue, was written by Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt but institutionalized during the tenure of Harry S. Truman. Having committed the United States not only to its mission as a global superpower but also to the post-WWII reconstruction of Western Europe, Truman presided over the creation of a system of collective security that not only emerged out of a ravaging world war but was also successful in averting the outbreak of another catastrophe. On the same note, this unprecedented commitment translated into the Marshall Plan. The emergence of NATO not only bestowed an essential contribution upon European reconstruction but also firmly rooted the bond between America and Europe, ultimately evolving into a robust transatlantic relationship. Notably, in tandem with having their partnership strengthened whilst being on the same side during the entirety of the Cold War, the United States and its (Western European) allies further succeeded in using their joint bargaining power in view of advancing the fundamental values of their partnership to the degree of permeating the Iron Curtain, with the signature of the Helsinki Accords in 1975 standing as evidence.[iii]

The United States and Europe have been the leading contributors to the global governance regimes that emerged in the 1940s and continue to shape the international order today. A product of American-British diplomacy, one should note that the Atlantic Charter replicated and reinforced many of the principles that crafted the foundation of the post-WWI architecture – self-determination, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of nations, freedom of the seas or disarmament.[iv] The reason the Charter ought to be admired, though, is its visionary character and thus anticipation of the emergence of two key multilateral governance structures modelled along “a wider and permanent system of general security” and the “collaboration between all nations in the economic field”, embodied in the United Nations and the Bretton Woods System (what we know today as the International Monetary Fund – IMF, the World Bank, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development – IBRD), respectively. While these organizations have not escaped criticism over time, it goes without saying that their foundational place in the rules-based international order is unquestionable. However, as these structures turn 74 and 75 years, respectively, it is equally comprehensible that they both require reform – and it is at this point that the once converging interests of the two sides of the Atlantic seem to visibly diverge. Most recently, transatlantic trade dynamics have been jeopardized not only by the unfortunate tariffs battle between the US and EU but also by the disagreements over the World Trade Organization (WTO) reforms.[v] The decoupling of US-EU trade rationales alongside tariff charades and visible US disengagement from the multilateral model are likely to have an adverse impact upon transatlantic trade, with potential repercussions at the global level not only menacing the global economic architecture that is nevertheless under further pressure from actors vividly intent on changing the rules of the game (China, in particular) but also to the potential detriment of the US and its allies if they do not return to the negotiating table.

From a wider perspective, what is ultimately at the very core of the partnership between the United States and Europe is the rules-based international system, underpinned by shared values such as democracy, freedom, and international cooperation. As open societies and this overall system are being challenged by disruptive and assertive international actors (China and Russia being just two of them), it is now more important than ever that the transatlantic partnership remains firm and focused and for Allies to act (and react, likewise) with wisdom and strategy. The United States and European Allies are stronger when they act together – and it is this logic, which has been confirmed time and time again, that shall guide the future of the US-Europe relationship. 

Transatlantic defence between 2% and the European impetus towards strategic autonomy

Defence spending and the 2% pledge is one of the most significant points of divergence between Allies, eventually setting the stage for heated talks between the two sides of the Atlantic. While the burden sharing debate is a longstanding one, it is important to highlight that the 2014 Wales Summit Declaration amounted to Allies’ first official joint public commitment to institutionalize and abide by the 2% target on defence expenditures, out of which a minimum of 20% shall be consigned for investments in new equipment and R&D. This major achievement can be properly understood only if placed in the broader context underpinned by the crumbling and volatile security landscape in Europe following the illegal seizure of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the threats facing the overall Euro-Atlantic security configuration and permeating the Eastern Flank of the Alliance. It is at the same moment that the NATO Heads of State and Government approved the NATO Readiness Action Plan (RAP) and moved towards integrating deterrence and defence as the core elements of the strategic posture of the Alliance (as reconfirmed by the Warsaw Summit in 2016).[vi] The variations in expenditure among Allies are ultimately self-explanatory if we consider the essential fact that defence indisputably stays a national prerogative, integrated thus into the wider architecture of individual national priorities for budget planning and influenced by the circumstances at hand. From this standpoint, the sudden explosion of the US defence budget after 9/11 seems as understandable as the decline in European defence investments after the 2008 financial crisis, which prompted not only major budget cuts but also re-calibration of resources towards other sectors. As per the latest figures released prior to the 2019 London Summit, nine Allies have met the 2% benchmark, and the projected national plans for defence budgets foresee a majority of Allies reaching 2% by 2024. According to the numbers, in the last five consecutive years, there has been an increase in the defence budgets of European member states and Canada.[vii]

While the debate grew more and more heated as the transatlantic defence expenditure gap widened, tensions over burden sharing reached their climax with the election of US President Donald Trump. Faced with criticism, pressure, and often mixed signals from the other side of the Atlantic, European Allies have elevated defence to the core of their strategic priorities up to the point of bringing into the spotlight the notion of “strategic autonomy”. With a clear level of political ambition embedded in the EU Global Strategy, the last three years have witnessed concerted efforts at the European level to boost security and defence through a series of practical initiatives such as PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation), the E2I (European Intervention Initiative), or the EDF (European Defence Fund). At first glance, these developments exhibit a Europe that has finally come to terms with its own defence responsibilities and thus delivered on the relentless calls for assuming more responsibility and complying with a fairer share of the transatlantic burden. Nevertheless, on the opposite side, last year’s NATO Summit in Brussels reflected unprecedented friction between the United States and its counterparts, not least featuring a war of words showcased by the American president, who lambasted his counterparts once more over defence spending. In preserving a single-minded and stubborn standpoint, there is a strong likelihood that the United States will jeopardize its own bargaining power as well as its potential to shape the overall debate on European defence.

In a changing and more challenging security environment, strategic planning at the level of the Alliance inherently requires sound financial resources, which in turn require commensurable political will. However, the degree to which an increase in expenditures is an ultimate guarantee of effectiveness is questionable. This quandary was outlined by a report of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly released in November 2018 under the input versus output dilemma. The latter delves into the imperative of reconsidering the substantive rather than the mere material dimension of collective defence – namely, the dilemma between costs and capabilities (and of translating costs into effective capabilities so as to ensure that we would not fall in the trap of meeting a benchmark for the sake of the façade or for eventually succeeding in giving satisfaction to President Trump) versus reinforcing the Alliance through alternative means of “contribution” (i.e. providing human resources for  deployments and missions). The projects under development within the framework of the European defence initiatives may stand as further evidence for the argument in favour of substantive measures oriented towards effective capacity-building. One of the most eloquent examples is the military mobility project under the aegis of PESCO, which is needless to say highly relevant to NATO from an operational viewpoint – i.e. what value added could we otherwise attach to purchasing assets in order to meet formal targets if no arrangements are in place for facilitating rapid and smooth movement at potential critical junctures? As we may notice both the momentum and political commitment of defence initiatives in Europe, we should seize a moment to reflect upon pragmatic capacity-building and the potential to reconcile 2% and European strategic autonomy (ESA) under the umbrella of transatlantic burden sharing and, eventually, within the framework of increased US-EU and inherently EU-NATO cooperation.

Bringing North America and Europe together for 70 years – The linchpin of the US-Europe partnership

NATO can be regarded as the backbone as well as the most successful story of the US-Europe partnership, continuing to provide the ultimate platform for dialogue, cooperation, and coordination between the two sides of the Atlantic. The resilience and perpetual adaptation of the Alliance shall stand as inspiration for every setback that seems to question our joint mission. While it is unlikely that all divergences between Europe and the US will ever be solved overnight, this is not the case, nor should it be. The trajectory of the relationship between the US and Europe has experienced ups and downs before, and the fact that we are facing quite challenging times right now is not an anomaly. What is imperative though is that we should be wise enough to learn from our common past to see that when we are unified we stand stronger than ever and are able to discern that complex and unpredictable times (alongside disruptive actors) require a reinforced transatlantic partnership.

Raluca-Andreea Manea is a young professional and graduate student in international relations and European studies, currently pursuing an MA in International Public Affairs at the University of Bucharest and an Executive Degree in Diplomacy with a specialisation in International Organisations at the European Academy of Diplomacy in Warsaw (class of 2019-2020). She wrote her BA thesis on divergent threat perceptions and the security dilemma in NATO-Russia relations, and her areas of interest include multilateral diplomacy and foreign and security policy, with a focus on EU and transatlantic affairs. Most recently, Raluca was part of the OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Mission (EAM) in Romania for the 2019 Presidential Elections as an Executive Assistant to the Head of Mission. Since July 2019, she has been the Community Manager of Atlantic Forum. As a young professional, she developed expertise in political analysis and communication having worked for over a year and a half with the European Commission Representation in Romania and completing a series of internships at the Embassy of Romania to the Czech Republic, the Romanian Parliament, and the European Institute of Romania.

[i] Learn more about the impact of the Fourteen Points on European architecture in the “Wilson’s Fourteen Points and their Consequences for Europe” brief by Bendan SIMMS and Constance SIMMS, published in Aspen Review (Issue 01/2018), available here: https://www.aspenreview.com/article/2018/wilsons-fourteen-points-consequ....

[ii] See the full text of President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, delivered on 8 January 1918, available here: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp.

[iii] The full text of the Helsinki Final Act is available here: https://www.osce.org/helsinki-final-act?download=true.

[iv] The full text of the Atlantic Charter is available here: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_16912.htm?.

[v] To learn more about the tensions over the reform of the World Trade Organization, see Stewart M. Patrick, “Trump’s Search for Absolute Sovereignty Could Destroy the WTO,” World Politics Review, 25 March 2019, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/insights/27692/wto-reforms-are-neede....

[vi] See the full text of the Wales Summit Declaration here: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm; furthermore, on burden sharing, it is worth reading the report of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Cooperation (DSCTC) of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, “Burden Sharing: New Commitments in a New Era,” 17 November 2018, 

[vii] Check out the Press Conference of Secretary General Stoltenberg ahead of the NATO London Meeting, 29 November 2019, transcript available here: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_171460.htm?selectedLocale=en.