In many ways, NATO’s Operation Unified Protector in Libya was one of a kind. It was the first time that the US “led from behind”, and the first time after the end of the Cold War that there was no post-conflict engagement on the ground in the aftermath of a NATO air campaign.

But, it also showed some shortcomings of NATO: first, it was marked by political disarray among European allies. Second, a lack of up-to-date intelligence on the cultural and social terrain emerged, with dire consequences for the legitimacy of the intervention. Third, this article will argue that the rapid disengagement after the aerial campaign was the result of a lack of planning for “the day after” and the main cause of the chronicization of the conflict.

Now, ten years later, not only can the successes and shortcomings of Operation Unified Protector be assessed objectively, but it is also possible to investigate the operation’s significance for NATO adaptability. This article will examine some lessons learned for NATO.

In the first place, the disarray among Allies (and the use of the North Atlantic Council as a 'second-rank' forum to inform all Allies of decisions taken by a small group) is being addressed by Secretary General Stoltenberg’s insistence on NATO becoming a “more political” alliance. This is an invitation to Allies to treat the North Atlantic Council as a privileged forum to discuss political issues, and to find common ground between their respective security priorities and positions.

In the second place, the Comprehensive Approach has formalized useful practices for post-conflict engagement, such as Knowledge Development and Civil-Military Cooperation: thus respectively addressing the lack of intelligence and the necessity of establishing closer ties with actors on the ground to avert instability.