Operation Unified Protector: The first (and last) of its kind

In many ways, NATO’s Operation Unified Protector in Libya was one of a kind. It was the first time that the US “led from behind”, and the first time after the end of the Cold War that there was no post-conflict engagement on the ground in the aftermath of a NATO air campaign.

But, it also showed some shortcomings of NATO: first, it was marked by political disarray among European allies. Second, a lack of up-to-date intelligence on the cultural and social terrain emerged, with dire consequences for the legitimacy of the intervention. Third, this article will argue that the rapid disengagement after the aerial campaign was the result of a lack of planning for “the day after” and the main cause of the chronicization of the conflict.

Now, ten years later, not only can the successes and shortcomings of Operation Unified Protector be assessed objectively, but it is also possible to investigate the operation’s significance for NATO adaptability. This article will examine some lessons learned for NATO.

In the first place, the disarray among Allies (and the use of the North Atlantic Council as a 'second-rank' forum to inform all Allies of decisions taken by a small group) is being addressed by Secretary General Stoltenberg’s insistence on NATO becoming a “more political” alliance. This is an invitation to Allies to treat the North Atlantic Council as a privileged forum to discuss political issues, and to find common ground between their respective security priorities and positions.

In the second place, the Comprehensive Approach has formalized useful practices for post-conflict engagement, such as Knowledge Development and Civil-Military Cooperation: thus respectively addressing the lack of intelligence and the necessity of establishing closer ties with actors on the ground to avert instability.

Operation Unified Protector: A limited success

NATO’s Operation Unified Protector (OUP) was certainly one of a kind. It was the first time that the US “led from behind”, and the first time after the end of the Cold War that there was no post-conflict engagement. This shift was a relative success in three areas.

First, OUP included a significant development in so far as it showed the enhanced weight of European countries’ military efforts and the US “leading from behind”. This is particularly significant, since it underlined that Europe is indeed capable of defending its own strategic interests without necessarily relying on a transatlantic partner. It also showed that the US, as a global superpower, is less inclined to become entangled in military efforts with little strategic significance.

To be sure, the US initially provided a large share of the necessary resources and capabilities to establish the no-fly zone, sustain the arms embargo, and conduct tactical airstrikes. But, as reported by Vice Admiral Gortney, the objective was to work towards a smooth transition of the Command and Control (C2) responsibilities to NATO.[i] The handover was described by Lieutenant-General Charles Bouchard, Commander of OUP, as a “hail Mary pass”[ii] because of its fluidity.

In sum, NATO was capable of conducting an efficient and coordinated campaign—notwithstanding the political and fiscal constraints weighing down on its members and the difficulties of integrating non-NATO nations.

Second, the operation could rely on strong cooperation with regional partners, punctuated by political, diplomatic, and economic support to the National Transitional Council (NTC). In addition to that, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan provided NATO with significant military support, contributing combat aircraft and arming and training rebel forces[iii] while offering a valuable source of ground intelligence.

This underlined the positive role that NATO efforts in building partnerships could have in future interventions: not only did partners help reduce operational costs, but they also improved the perceived legitimacy of the Alliance. Initially, Western powers were wary of the need for Arab states’ political support to legitimize their military operation and push away potential criticism of the operation as a ‘neocolonial project’. They later correctly recognized that “brotherly Arabs with pre-existing ties to elements of the opposition, shared language, and awareness of Islamic traditions''[iv] would be culturally and politically preferable to Western parties. The most remarkable element of this collaboration was its rapidity, made possible by previously established military-to-military cooperation relationships and joint exercises.[v]

Third, OUP was a “light-footprint” aerial operation, much less costly than operations entailing boots on the ground. In fact, Unified Protector was economically efficient, costing only a few billion dollars—a fraction of what was spent in Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq.[vi] The total cost of the 24/7 deployment of NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Aircrafts (AWACS) was estimated at 5.4 million €/month. In addition, the complementary cost for the structural and personnel augmentation in the involved headquarters was estimated at 800,000 €/month.[vii]

Although it was not the first time that NATO undertook an air campaign, it was the first time that this approach was intentionally pursued as a strategy. In fact, UN Resolution 1973 forbade any deployment of NATO troops on the ground. This approach resonated quite well with the purpose of protecting the Allies’ security interests while also keeping defence budgets low. With the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan fresh in the minds of politicians and the general public alike, the use of air power—akin to interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s—was both reassuring and effective.

The shortcomings of the operation: Political disarray and lack of information

However successful, Operation Unified Protector also showed some shortcomings that will need to be addressed by future planners.

The first of these shortcomings was the disarray among Allies. Overly enthusiastic reports of how the European members of the Alliance took over the operation are not quite convincing. On the contrary, a certain level of disunion and even acrimony emerged. For example, anti-interventionist Germany could not reach a consensus with France and the UK. Overall, it appeared clear that European allies would have been incapable of conducting the operation without substantial US support.[viii]

OUP was conducted by a restricted coalition of Allies, and meaningful consultations and decisions were undertaken by those nations before being presented to the North Atlantic Council.

On the positive side, countries such as Germany or Poland, regardless of their political and ideological objections to the intervention, did not actively oppose it. This ostensibly avoided a repeat of the laboured debate leading up to the 2003 Iraq war and made the Alliance at least appear united.[ix] Furthermore, maintaining the support of the most sceptical countries required extra precautions in the conduct of military actions, with NATO placing considerable restrictions on air strikes to avoid civilian casualties.[x]

The second problem was the absence of good strategic and tactical intelligence on Libya. Reportedly, in the early phases of the conflict, the military had to gather information from Wikipedia and maps dating back to World War II.[xi]

Since Ghadafi’s reconciliation with the West in 2003, he had not been perceived as a possible threat.[xii] Furthermore, “research activity within the country had been difficult for decades, because the regime [...] made life difficult for foreigners attempting to shed light on local conditions”.[xiii]

Third, the Joint Force Command (JFC) Naples, the Operational Command in charge of the mission, did not have a specific area of focus, nor did it employ cultural advisers to build up significant regional expertise.[xiv]

The Alliance tried to fill the gap relying on the improvised cultural advice from NATO officers who had worked in Tripoli as defence attachés—who had outdated or limited knowledge—or on officers from Jordan, Qatar, and the UAE, ignoring that Libya’s cultural terrain differs greatly from that of the Gulf states. The result was that nobody predicted several of the turns the operation took. Ghadafi’s obstinate grasp on power, the resilience of its armed forces, and their ability to blend in urban areas and the uprising that swept Tripoli all came as a surprise.

Allied Strategic Communications, which aimed at obtaining the support of the population, seemed equally botched. For example, the Alliance actuated the policy of dropping leaflets hours before strikes in order to warn civilians. Despite UN investigations confirming that NATO “conducted a highly precise campaign with a demonstrable determination to avoid civilian casualties”,[xv] the Allied policy of not confirming responsibility for the deaths backfired and gave way to the inflation of numbers by foreign media.[xvi] Or, when the press in Allied and Arab countries developed a critical attitude towards OUP, questioning the legality of regime change and accusing NATO of exceeding its mandate,[xvii] the sole response was to relentlessly repeat the content of Resolution 1973.

In comparison, “the Libyan regime’s strategic communication proved to be a lot more resilient and creative than NATO’s”[xviii]: Ghadafi stirred anti-colonial resentment,[xix] proving to be more attuned with local sentiments.

The final—and possibly the most problematic—aspect of Unified Protector was the lack of planning for “the day after”.

On 31 October 2011, OUP was brought to an end. The National Transitional Council called for NATO to maintain air patrolling until the end of the year to protect against the smuggling of weapons and to guarantee the security of Libyans from the remnants of Ghadafi’s forces.[xx] Yet, it maintained an ambiguous position about the acceptability of international support in security terms, firmly rejecting the presence of any military personnel on the ground, including UN observers.[xxi]

To be sure, this position resonated well with Resolution 1973—which barred the deployment of “occupation forces''—and with the lack of appetite by the US, UK, and France for a ground campaign. At the same time, though, it made it impossible to tackle the security issues that emerged in Libya shortly after the fall of Ghadafi’s regime. As Libya’s armed forces had imploded, security fell into the hands of multiple militias, which continued to proliferate and refused disbandment as long as no military or police force could take over.[xxii]

In the next few months, attacks on the Red Cross and the Tunisian Consulate, a brief occupation of Tripoli airport by militias and, finally, the attack on the US Consulate in Benghazi, resulting in the death of the Ambassador and three people from his staff,[xxiii] indicated the implosion of Libya’s security.

In hindsight, it is possible to see in this early post-war, inter-militia turmoil the signs that Libya was on track to become a failed state. For its part, the NTC was in no position to take ownership of the challenging post-conflict situation: a US State Department representative described NTC officials as “observers and chroniclers rather than the authors of the unfolding developments.”[xxiv]

This leads us to the question: did Unified Protector cause a permanent shift in the model of out-of-area interventions?

Eradicating the threat but pulling out of peacekeeping: A new model for NATO interventions...

To be sure, the reasons for keeping Western involvement in Libya limited were sound. Apart from Resolution 1973 provisions and the lack of political will, another motivation was summarized by Rory Stewart, then Member of the UK Parliament, who said the urge to engage in “state building” or “stabilisation” had to be resisted, because “there is a real limit to how much the West knows about Libya, still less to how much we can do to fix fundamental structural problems if they emerge. [...] Too many Western ‘advisers’ risk making things worse: making the government appear like a foreign puppet [and] stirring Islamist resentment”.[xxv]

Therefore, arguably, the biggest impediments were neither military nor political-economic in nature: it was the lack of knowledge and expertise.

Precisely because they did not know enough about Libya’s specific history, culture and population, observers failed to see that when “military planning is not followed by thorough post-conflict planning, the successes of the former might be easily supplanted by more challenges”.[xxvi] In other words, although it is true there was little interest by foreign powers in “nursing” the Libyan state because of shrinking military budgets, it is also true that no clear plan could emerge to tackle the specific issues of the country, as potential intervening powers knew very little about it. In short, there were neither the intention nor the means to avoid the chronicization of the conflict.

Since then, “the intervening powers have recognized that the transition [...] was a failure, and that they themselves were partly to blame for not investing enough capacity and effort into rebuilding the Libyan society”.[xxvii] Even President Obama recognized that intervening in Libya in order to avoid a massacre was the right thing to do and later admitted that conducting a military operation without sufficient follow-up was probably his biggest foreign policy regret.[xxviii] This further demonstrates that by neglecting to follow up on the military intervention, the international community has made the already dangerous situation in Libya intractable.

At the time, though, analysts’ calls for the elaboration of a plan for national reconciliation[xxix] were not seriously taken into account. This is problematic as, in relation to OUP, NATO was accused of only serving as a tool for defending the security interests of its members. Once these interests were secured, there was allegedly no purpose in dealing with the consequences of toppling a 40-year-old regime. It appeared that alliances and coalitions created for humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping [...] were simply interest-related.[xxx]

Therefore, it is not surprising that the “expeditionary” character of OUP raises the question of whether NATO interventions are changing from lengthy peacekeeping missions to shorter operations, predominantly concerned with eliminating a specific threat. This question is even more pressing considering the relative success of the operation, which represented an attractive model for achieving limited goals with limited financial and time resources, no casualties, and little collateral damage.

Some authors suggest that the style of intervention adopted in Libya is likely to be replicated in the future, as it allows NATO “to eliminate a perceived threat as efficiently as possible.”[xxxi] Under this perspective, interventions—although portrayed as a humanitarian endeavour—are designed to quickly remove identified risks to NATO’s interests without any ambition to rebuild societies or foster democracy, due to the high costs associated with a peacekeeping operation.

... or an unfortunate contingency?

The fact that the sudden end of the operation resulted in a power vacuum and widespread violence—the opposite of what NATO would desire in its neighbourhood—makes this idea simply not convincing. On the contrary, the fallout of the Libyan crisis actually calls for scrupulous post-conflict planning in future interventions.

OUP, for its part, happened in an unfavourable international setting, marked by the backlash of the 2008 financial crisis, the fresh wounds of Iraq and Afghanistan, and the consequent rejection of lengthy peacekeeping.

On the one hand, the air campaign as such can be deemed as effective: Unified Protector likely prevented a massacre in Benghazi. But, on the other, it also made self-evident that such crises cannot be dealt with only through military measures. Rather, they demand systemic responses involving international institutions, states, and NGOs that should work coherently towards a defined end-state, in a clearly defined political, legal, and ethical framework.[xxxii]

This is all the more important as it is possible that NATO will be ever more engaged with threats coming from different regions and calling for non-Article 5 interventions. In part, we can derive this conclusion from the 2010 Strategic Concept, with its acknowledgement that threats in the post-Cold War order are fluid and transnational. In part, it is made obvious by the structural incapacity of other international organizations (such as the UN) to deal autonomously with these threats. This leaves NATO as the only organization with the necessary political, administrative, logistic, and military apparatuses to rapidly organize and deploy a contingent wherever it may be needed.

In conclusion, it is simply not possible to hold a military campaign responsible for solving complex situations with political roots and implications. Carl Bildt said once in relation to the post-conflict in Bosnia that he could not “bomb the people of Bosnia into friendship”.[xxxiii] OUP made it painfully clear that you cannot bomb any people into friendship. And this is a lesson that NATO has learned.

How is NATO implementing its lessons learned?

As noted, the first major problem that occurred during the planning of OUP was the political confrontation among allies. NATO is an alliance of democracies, with their own threat perceptions and ways to confront them. Therefore, a certain degree of disagreement is built into its very structure.

But occasional divergences do not necessarily implicate paralysis. Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has been a strong advocate of the idea of a ‘more political Alliance’, meaning that Allies must find “the political will to use NATO to decide and, when necessary, to act for our shared security”.[xxxiv] To achieve that, a series of measures have been discussed, including more frequent meetings of foreign ministers and the possibility of establishing “Coalitions of the Willing” to circumvent potential obstructionism for interventions.[xxxv] This means that the North Atlantic Council should become the privileged forum for discussing (and deciding upon) security matters.

The problem of shrinking military budgets has also been addressed. The commitment made during the Wales Summit in 2014 “to reverse the trend of declining defence budgets”[xxxvi] has been met with efforts by many Allies to reach the guideline of spending 2% of their GDP on defence.[xxxvii]

The second and the third problems of OUP go hand in hand: the lack of intelligence during the operation translated into the impossibility of planning for “the day after”. As NATO intends to tackle security issues in geographically and culturally distant regions, it could no longer afford to postpone the enhancement of its intelligence-gathering techniques.

NATO has taken on this challenge through the development of the Comprehensive Approach, answering the need for a multilateral, coherent framework for the political, military, and socio-economic aspects of a crisis. Stemming from the realization that “military means, although essential, are not enough on their own to meet the many complex challenges to our security”,[xxxviii] the main goals of the Comprehensive Approach are to improve the application of the Alliance’s crisis management instruments and cooperation with partners as well as to enhance NATO’s ability to support stabilization and reconstruction.[xxxix]

This holistic approach brought with it the development of new practices and especially Knowledge Development (KD) and Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC). KD, as “a process [...] to provide the decision makers with a comprehensive understanding of complex environments”,[xl] is needed to overcome the lack of meaningful intelligence that emerged during the Libyan campaign. For its part, a “HUB for the South” was established in Naples in 2017[xli] to gather knowledge and expertise on the MENA region and Africa through autonomous research and activities involving local stakeholders.

CIMIC, instead, focuses on developing synergic cooperation relationships between the military contingent and all other actors operating on the ground—from NGOs to local authorities—in order to avert instability and foster organic recovery.[xlii] This series of practices is supposed to enable NATO to intervene in post-conflict scenarios with increased situational awareness, thus making it possible to make a positive impact and address the receiving country towards stabilization while also retaining ownership of the process.

Finally, OUP underlined the relevance of partnerships in supporting NATO activities, thanks to the functional synergy between NATO air strikes and the troops sent by the UAE and Qatar.[xliii] This political-diplomatic effort not only makes the Alliance more and more global, as per the wishes of Secretary General Stoltenberg.[xliv] It also permits the Alliance to “externalize” security challenges to regional actors that are more closely concerned, with a diminished need for direct Allied involvement and a consequent reduction of the cost of security.

Furthermore, joint exercises and training are still the diamond tip of NATO’s partnership. For example, the Mediterranean Dialogue Work Programme (within the framework of the Mediterranean Dialogue) includes Military Education, Training and Doctrine as well as Civil Emergency Planning and Crisis Management. All these activities should ensure the readiness of partners in the area, and consequently reduce their reliance on NATO.

What to expect in the future?

Considering these developments, it is arguable that the mission in Libya was an exception rather than the new rule, and that its “expeditional” character was the effect of a very specific conjuncture rather than the result of a radically changed NATO posture towards crisis management.

In 2011, the fallout of the global international crisis, the military overstretch of the US, the disinterest of public opinions in front of yet another humanitarian crisis, and the lack of a theoretical approach to operating in complex environments all factored into the short, decisive military campaign without the recognition of a specific “responsibility to rebuild”.[xlv]

Now, these challenges are being progressively addressed, and the Alliance is developing an array of crisis management instruments that will, in turn, empower it to face the insidious and complex scenarios of the 21st century as a global, political-military actor, engaged with projecting stability and guaranteeing security.

To be sure, humanitarian interventions should be rare and driven by precise interests and a clearly defined end-state rather than being moral crusades against any dictator in the world. At the same time, though, the show of military capacity has the ambiguous role in international politics of being a threat to life and order but also, in some cases, the only valid instrument to protect.

In this sense, NATO will likely grow increasingly capable at handling crises everywhere in the world, thus making it—as former Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen wished a decade ago—a truly “global security forum”.[xlvi]

Notes

[i] OASD (PA), “DOD News Briefing with Vice Adm. Gortney”, 20 March 2011.

[ii] Lt.Gen. Bouchard, “Coalition Building and the Future of NATO Operations”, 14 February 2012.

[iii] This was necessary because, of the 250,000 Libyan rebels registered with the Warrior Affairs Commission, a large number was hardly militarily trained. Although basic military training was a part of Libya’s school curriculum, it was of little utility in a context of internal and mostly urban combat. Furthermore, the rebels had virtually no Command and Control structure, making for a copious, but “patchy” force. “Distribution of Warriors According to Age Group and Educational Level”, Tripoli, Lebanon: Warrior Affairs Committee, June 2012.

[iv] Bruce R. Nardulli, “The Arab States’ Experiences”, in Precision and purpose: Air Power in the Libyan Civil War, ed. Karl P. Mueller et al., 339–372 (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2015), 368.

[v] Ibid.

[vi] Ivo Daalder and James Stavridis, “NATO’s Victory in Libya”, Foreign Affairs 91, no. 2 (2012): 2–7.

[vii] NATO, “Operation Unified Protector Final Mission Stats”, 2 November 2011.

[viii] Graeme P. Herd and John Kriendler, Understanding NATO in the 21st Century: Alliance Strategies, Security and Global Governance (London: Routledge, 2014), 3.

[ix] Jeffrey H. Michaels, “Able but Not Willing: A Critical Assessment of NATO’s Libya Intervention”, in The NATO Intervention in Libya: Lessons Learned from the Campaign, ed. Kjell Engelbrekt, Marcus Mohlin, and Charlotte Wagnsson (London: Routledge, 2014), 26.

[x] R. Laird, “French Libya Lessons Learned: Better Targeting, Flexible RoEs, Limits to Armed UAVs”, AOL Defense, 23 September 2011; C. Coughlin, “Inside the Art Deco War Room for NATO in Libya”, The Telegraph, 14 May 2011.

[xi] “The Military Intervention and Transition in Libya”, High-level expert meeting, The Hague, 29 June 2015.

[xii] John A. Tirpak, “Lessons from Libya”, Air Force Magazine, December 2011, 36.

[xiii] Florence Gaub, “The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Libya: Reviewing Operation Unified Protector”, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, June 2013, 16.

[xiv] Idib., ivi

[xv] “Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya,” New York, UN Human Rights Council, 2 March 2012, 2.

[xvi] See, for example, “Civilian Cost of NATO Victory in Libya”, Russia Today, 20 October 2011, https://www.rt.com/news/libya-nato-civilian-deaths-323/.

[xvii] For example, the pan-Arab daily Al-Quds al-Arabi wrote: “It is obvious that, by targeting residential buildings, NATO seeks to assassinate and physically liquidate the Libyan leader. [...] UN Security Council Resolution 1973 does not provide for the assassination of the Libyan leader or the overthrow of the ruling regime”; quoted in BBC Monitoring, “Pan-Arab Daily Criticizes NATO for Targeting ‘Residential Buildings’ in Libya”, 21 June 2011.

[xviii] Gaub, “The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Libya”, ix.

[xix] “Gaddafi in ‘Excellent Health’: ‘Organizing Libya’s Defence’, Spokesman Says”, National Post, 6 September 2011.

[xx] “Qatar Admits It had Boots on the Ground in Libya; NTC seeks further NATO help”, Al Arabiya, 26 October 2011, https://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/10/26/173833.html.

[xxi] “Libya’s Interim Leaders Reject UN Military Personnel”, BBC News, 31 August 2011, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14726292.

[xxii] Gaub, “The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Libya”.

[xxiii] Chris Stevens, US Ambassador to Libya, killed in Benghazi attack”, The Guardian, 12 September 2012, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/12/chris-stevens-us-ambassado....

[xxiv] See the 21 August 2011 email from Huma Abedin to Hillary Clinton, available at foia.state.gov.

[xxv] Rory Stewart, “Less is More: Libya”, 11 September 2011, https://www.rorystewart.co.uk/less-is-more-libya/.

[xxvi] Gaub, “The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Libya”, iii.                       

[xxvii] Sergei Boeke and Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn, “Transitioning from Military Interventions to long- term Counter-Terrorism Policy”, Leiden University - Institute of Security and Global Affairs, 2016, 54.

[xxviii] Thomas Friedman, “Obama on the World”, The New York Times, 8 August 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/09/opinion/president-obama-thomas-l-frie....

[xxix] See, for example, Riccardo Alcaro, “Opting for second best in Libya?”, Istituto Affari Internazionali, IAI Working Papers, Rome, May 2011.

[xxx] Philip Spassov, “NATO, Russia and European Security: Lessons Learned from Conflicts in Kosovo and Libya”, Connections 13, no. 3 (Summer 2014): 34.

[xxxi] Matthew C. Morgan, “Producing new spaces of violence: Libya and the changing style of NATO interventions after the global financial crisis”, Geopolitics, 2017, 2.

[xxxii] J.B. Hehir, “Military Intervention and National Sovereignty'', in Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention, ed. J. Moore, 29–54 (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998).

[xxxiii] Carl Bildt, “Article by the High Representative, Carl Bildt: ‘I Can’t Bomb the People of Bosnia into Friendship’”, 9 February 1996, http://www.ohr.int/?p=58117.

[xxxiv] Euronews, “NATO must become more political and global, says alliance chief Jens Stoltenberg”, 6 June 2020, https://www.euronews.com/2020/06/08/nato-must-become-more-political-and-....

[xxxv] Alexandra Brzozowski, “New NATO report recommends more political role for the Western alliance”, Euractiv, 12 January 2020, https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-and-security/news/new-nato-repo....

[xxxvi] NATO, “Wales Summit Declaration: Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales”, 5 September 2014, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm.

[xxxvii] NATO, “Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg ahead of the meetings of NATO Defence Ministers”, 25 June 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_167065.htm.

[xxxviii] NATO, “A ‘Comprehensive Approach’ to Crises”, 26 June 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_51633.htm. 

[xxxix] NATO, “Allied Joint Doctrine”, Edition E Version 1, February 2017.

[xl] From the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps - ITALY Website: http://www.nrdc-ita.nato.int/33/knowledge-development.

[xli] Alessandra Giada Dibenedetto, “Projecting stability to the South: the role of NATO Strategic Direction-South Hub”, Centro Studi Internazionali, 22 November 2019, http://cesi-italia.org/en/articoli/1050/projecting-stability-to-the-sout....

[xlii] More information available from the NATO Cimic Handbook, 11 February 2020, https://www.handbook.cimic-coe.org/1.introduction/1.1nato-and-a-comprehe....

[xliii] Frederic Wehrey, “The Libyan Experience”, in Precision and purpose: Air Power in the Libyan Civil War, ed. Karl P. Mueller et al., 43–68 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015).

[xliv] NATO, “Adapting NATO for 2030 and Beyond”, Speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the 66th Annual Session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 23 November 2020, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_179665.htm.

[xlv] Expression by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), “The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty”, IDRC, 2001.

[xlvi] NATO Should be Global Security Forum: Rasmussen”, Reuters, 7 February 2010, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE61607K.