Operation Unified Protector: Strategic lessons learnt
23 March 2021 will mark 10 years since the beginning of Operation Unified Protector (OUP), a NATO-led operation including France, the UK, and the US against the Libyan Armed Forces led by Muammar Gaddafi that was carried out to protect Libyan civilians and civilian-populated areas. United Nations Security Council resolutions 1970 and 1973 concerning the Libyan Civil War were implemented on 26 February and 17 March 2011, respectively. The operation ended with the establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya and imposing sanctions on the Gaddafi regime. While the operation contributed to the Gaddafi regime’s eventual downfall, it should be mentioned that this was an unintended consequence, which should have been expected following the initial uprising.
This article will examine the main strategic lessons that NATO personnel have learnt throughout this operation including improving coordination between air and naval forces; structural problems within Allied Joint Force Command Naples; lack of cultural advisers for the region; clear political-military gap in the operation; the need to improve strategic communication; and the lack of strategic vision in the region.
The above-mentioned strategic lessons, along with recommendations, will be discussed in this article.
By Khalisa Huseynova
1. Introduction
On 31 March 2011, a multi-state NATO-led coalition, including the US, UK, France, Canada, and Italy, began Operation Unified Protector in Libya. The operation was carried out in order to implement United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1973, which formed the legal basis for military intervention in the Libyan Civil War by demanding “an immediate ceasefire” and authorized the international community to establish a no-fly zone in order to protect civilians by using all means necessary short of foreign occupation.[i]
The Libyan government’s response to the operation was completely ineffectual, especially taking into consideration the fact that Gaddafi’s forces were not able to shoot down a single NATO plane even though the military arsenal of the country possessed 30 heavy SAM batteries, 17 medium SAM batteries, 55 light SAM batteries, and 440–600 short-ranged air-defense guns.[ii]
The operation ended with a NATO victory that led to the establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya and imposing sanctions on the Gaddafi regime. While the operation contributed to the Gaddafi regime’s eventual downfall, it should be mentioned that this was an unintended consequence, which should have been expected following the initial uprising.
The main strategic lessons that NATO personnel learnt throughout this operation, along with recommendations, will be discussed in this article.
2. Operation Unified Protector: Strategic lessons learnt
Although NATO succeeded in its operation, there were other important issues throughout the operation that will be discussed below.
2.1) Coordination between air and naval forces
During the OUP naval and air forces worked collaboratively. For instance, in March 2011, French and Italian aircraft carriers Charles de Gaulle and Giuseppe Garibaldi, respectively, demonstrated the value to the Alliance of maritime organic air power for surgical strikes ashore. In July 2011, US Military Sealift Command ship USS Big Horn refueled[iii] as well as resupplied the Canadian HMCS Charlottetown with its embarked helicopter for extended surveillance. In Misrata, four warships were fired upon and then fired back at Qaddafi’s forces onshore. They also fired illumination rounds for airstrikes and addressed the threat posed by small regime vessels that were seeking to mine and booby-trap Misrata’s harbor to stop the flow of aid and other supplies to the city.[iv] Additionally, during the OUP, NATO Maritime assets directly aided the rescue of over 600 migrants in distress at sea.[v] The main military targets were located primarily along Libya’s coast, which was well within the reach of land-based aircraft. Additionally, Gaddafi’s army was entirely unprepared for the NATO intervention.[vi]
However, in terms of coordination between naval and air forces, one of the main issues was that the operational capabilities among NATO member states were insufficient. For example, the US provided 80 percent of refueling support during the course of OUP, urging France, Germany, and the Netherlands to announce cooperative tanker purchases.[vii] Additionally, France’s SCALP naval cruise missiles were not fully ready in time for the Libyan crisis.[viii] The UK was having shortage problems in key armaments categories, especially with advanced short-range munitions.[ix]
2.2) Structural problems within Allied Joint Force Command Naples
The Allied Joint Force Command Naples (JFC Naples), one of NATO’s three operational commands, played a major part in OUP. Its main task was to coordinate the military actions that were required in order to implement UNSC Resolution 1973.
JFC Naples replaced AFSOUTH (Allied Forces Southern Europe) in 2004, which focused on providing flexible structures in the field of organizing peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations but without a specific area in mind. Even though JFC Naples had been running NATO Training Mission in Iraq, Kosovo Force (KFOR), as well as Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean,[x] their expertise was not enough to conduct strong kinetic actions. Because the Libyan crisis relied on kinetic actions rather than peace enforcement, JFC Naples’ lack of specialist expertise and equipment were nearly irrelevant for OUP. During the operation, the actions implemented by JFC Naples were improvised on a large scale.
2.3) Lack of cultural advisers for the region
The lack of a civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) structure—i.e., a nationally or multi-nationally sponsored entity that offers recognized expertise and experiences to the benefit of the Alliance[xi]—as well as NATO’s reliance on assumptions and expectations instead of focusing on professional advice resulted in the Alliance’s inability to understand the situation on the ground.[xii] And that was, in my opinion, one of the biggest mistakes. One of the reasons for that can be the fact that the main areas on which CIMIC focused were intelligence and information operations. Due to the short period of preparation for the operation, NATO forces were not able to effectively analyze, disseminate, and in the end, apply the intelligence gathered. The same can be said of NATO’s cultural knowledge of the region; the information that was gathered for this particular field was not fully structured and most of the time was inaccurately disseminated to the local people living in Libya.[xiii] Additionally, Libya itself had been very little studied and analyzed over the past decades.[xiv] Cultural advisors could have made a big contribution to the general understanding of the region, its tribes, and cultural elements, which would have helped to hasten the progress of the operation.
2.4) Clear political-military gap in the operation
A main feature of OUP was the large political-military gap between NATO and its member states. Taking into consideration the legal interpretations of UNSCR 1973,[xv] OUP could not overthrow the Libyan regime. However, a gap between political and military motives became clear when NATO foreign ministers along with partner countries participating in the OUP mission started to endorse the Contact Group known as The Friends of Libya group—an international collective established in order to support the Libyan National Transitional Council in their efforts to overthrow the Gaddafi regime.[xvi] The group included Western nations and members of the Arab League.[xvii] Such misunderstanding led to the impression that NATO’s OUP operation was only focused on changing the Libyan regime and not on protecting civilians, though JFC Naples had continued to strictly interpret UNSCR 1973 as limited to protecting civilians. In addition, there was a big gap between NATO member states, where some members approved of the operation and others had mixed views.
2.5) The need to improve strategic communication
Strategic communication was one of the main issues with which NATO had been struggling throughout the operation. One of the factors that contributed to the lack of strategic communication with civilian organizations in the region was NATO’s inability to directly communicate with local actors.[xviii] Meanwhile, Arab[xix] and Russian media outlets were broadcasting information about the number of civilians who were killed or wounded by NATO air strikes,[xx] which further complicated the media coverage of the situation. Although the NATO operation very likely saved a large number of civilian lives, further negative developments in Libya massively obscured the importance of the operation.
2.6) Lack of strategic vision in the region
Germany’s decision to abstain from voting on UNSCR 1973 was primarily linked to its internal policy. The strategy developed by Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle (FDP) and Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU) assumed that such a stance on the situation would bring support to the government coalition parties before important local elections. Such a strategy had already proved successful during the 2002 elections, where the SPD/Green Party coalition led by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, who opposed the international intervention in Iraq, won the parliamentary elections owing to his anti-military and anti-American rhetoric.[xxi] But repeating this strategy in 2011 was highly criticized by both coalition and opposition parties and led to a heated debate on Germany’s position in NATO, the EU, and the UN, as many representatives of the parties had pointed out that such a decision could cause Germany to become isolated in the EU and NATO in the area of foreign and security policies.[xxii]
Germany’s decision affected NATO’s consensus principle. Such disagreements are consistently used by Russian President Vladimir Putin to discredit NATO, who in this case used the Alliance’s response in Libya as proof that the West cannot be trusted to implement its Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle. This prohibited the West from enacting a similar response against Syrian Dictator Bashar al-Assad. Meanwhile, China accused Western powers of developing their own economic and political interests and asserting that the Alliance had failed to protect human rights in Libya. Additionally, India, Brazil, and South Africa argued that NATO had abused the Security Council mandate in Libya and questioned the motives of the intervening parties.[xxiii]
Although Allies have agreed on the importance of the MENA region, a coherent strategy for this region was never implemented by NATO countries. During the Cold War, Western countries saw the region from the perspective of their own local interests (e.g., for its natural resources), while the US saw it through the lens of the Cold War and emphasized the Communist threat. Also, throughout the Cold War the United States and its NATO allies even publicly split on how to address the problems of the MENA region. Such different priorities and conflicting threat perceptions led to the lack of cooperation in this region. Mainly, NATO countries focused on developing cross-purpose strategies rather than a coherent Alliance strategy.[xxiv]
Since the collapse of the USSR, the members of the Alliance have still been conducting different analyses of the region. These analyses also have not been about the region itself but about the specific parts in which NATO member countries were interested.
3. Possible solutions to key strategic gaps
First, during any operation NATO personnel should analyze all possible forces that can be used during the operation by using modeling and simulation methods. In general, the use of modeling and simulation tools for NATO has to be a coordinated effort between NATO, member states, and industry. During OUP, even though NATO suffered no casualties and the air force secured the lives of many civilians, the fact that the naval force also had a significant impact on the operation[xxv] also needs to be taken into consideration. As simulation methods have already been used in various NATO Air Command and Control (C2) processes, it is crucial to develop such methods particularly in NATO Allied Maritime Command in order to identify potential gaps or weak points.[xxvi]
Second, in order to tackle operational problems in the future, the Alliance should establish regional emergency operations centers for the main three operational commands in order to coordinate actions (manning and equipping) in case of new operations. That way, the responsibility of preparing the operation would not directly fall on NATO HQ. Although the NATO Response Force was enhanced with the VJTF (Very High Readiness Joint Task Force) in 2014 following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and enhanced threats to Baltic and Polish security,[xxvii] there are significant risks with the use of VJTF. These include a) achieving consensus on deploying the NRF, which becomes a more complicated process with the growing number of NATO Allies, and b) the risk that one or more Allied forces assigned to the VJTF could stand in the way of a consensus on the decision to deploy, which would potentially render the NRF ineffective.[xxviii] Such a decision could also lead to the structure’s failure, as NRF is comprised of specific units that are strongly connected.
Third, it is very important to hold regular trainings for NATO personnel on cultural awareness as well as conduct analyses on sensitive regions. Even though NATO member states are conducting such trainings, they do not occur on a regular basis, they are not structured, and there is no NATO doctrine on cultural understanding. In the coming years NATO should focus on conducting more in-depth analyses on understudied regions as well as to build up a Cultural Awareness Doctrine.
Fourth, the Libyan operation showed the large gap in political-military relations within NATO and the need for close cooperation between Allies. This problem is more complicated than the other problems, in my opinion. This gap has its roots in the establishment of the Alliance. Due to the fact that throughout the Cold War period member states had experienced only existential threats, they still managed to unite despite political, financial, and capability problems.[xxix] But today, NATO forces work together on more difficult missions. Such issues require more gradual resolve. One of the main factors is the level of resources. In order to develop the military capabilities of member states and establish more equal relations between member states in terms of financing, it is a must for member states to develop their military and technology spheres.
Fifth, in 2014, NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (STRATCOM) was established in Riga, Latvia. It is multinational NATO-accredited international military organization that is not part of the NATO Command Structure or subordinate to any other NATO entity. As such the Centre does not speak for NATO.[xxx] There are multiple tasks that this organization is working on, including preventing disinformation, data manipulation, among others. Although it has been recommended that STRATCOM could help communicate information to the public in case of operations, such an organization seems too general as it focuses on the general issues that NATO faces in the communication sphere and is not able to provide as much information as the world community needs. Therefore, it is better to establish an Emergency Strategic Communication Center that will directly work with the world media and provide constant updated information on the missions or operations, as well as strengthen the cyber security of the mission.
Finally, as former US President Barack Obama answered in response to what was his worst mistake was while in office during his BBC interview on April 11, 2016: “Probably failing to plan for the day after, what I think was the right thing to do, in intervening in Libya.”[xxxi] This situation can only be changed with collaborative work between Libyan civilians and government, and also with the crucial help of cultural advisors in order to create a constant dialogue for peaceful developments.
4. Conclusion
Although Operation Unified Protector succeeded in its mission to secure the lives of civilians, it faced significant problems such as the coordination of air power, the structural problems of JFC Naples, the lack of cultural advisers for this region during the operation, the clear political-military gap in the operation, the need to improve strategic communications, and the lack of a strategic vision in this region.
Therefore, this article recommends using modeling and simulation models before conducting an actual operation, establishing an Emergency Operations Center for the main three operational commands in order to coordinate actions, holding regular trainings for NATO personnel on cultural awareness as well as conducting analyses on sensitive regions, establishing more equal relations between the members states in terms of financing for member states to develop their military and technology spheres, establishing an Emergency Strategic Communication Center, and creating a constant dialogue for peaceful development.
About the Author
Khalisa Huseynova is a political researcher with five years of experience in the security field. She holds a BA in Political Science from APA and earned qualification degrees in Religion, Conflict and Peace from Harvard Divinity School as well as in Global Diplomacy from SOAS University of London. She is founder of “Guide to the education magic” educational program and “Sciences in sight” research platform.
Her scientific works have been presented at different conferences including the International Conference on Sustainable Development Goals and the 2nd International Forum of the Caucasus Studies Scholar, among others. She was nominated for “Influencer of the year” at the Eurasian Innovation Awards in October 2019. In July 2020 she was awarded with the Diana Award for her mentoring program “Guide to the education magic.” In February 2020, she received a research grant to study “Women and World War II in Soviet Azerbaijan” from The Heinrich Boll Foundation.
Notes
[ii] Anthony H. Cordesman, “The North African Military Balance”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 29 March 2005, 33–36.
[iii] Kim Dixon, “Military Sealift Command ship supports Operation Unified Protector,” Military Sealift Command Press Release, 2 May 2011.
[iv] Christian F. Anrig, “Allied Air Power over Libya,” Air and Space Power Journal (Winter 2011): 89–109.
[v] NATO, Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR Final Mission Stats, 2 November 2011, Fact Sheet.
[vi] International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Chapter Five: Middle East and North Africa,” The Military Balance 110, no. 1: 240–244.
[vii] “NATO Trio Team Up to Boost Air Refueling Capacity,” Agence France-Presse, 18 April 2012, www.defensenews.com/article/20120418/DEFREG01/304180013/NATO-Trio-Team-U....
[viii] Richard Scott, “MBDA Completes First Scalp Naval Test-Firing,” Jane’s International Defence Review, 17 June 2010.
[ix] Richard Polmar, “Navy Replenishing Tomahawk Stockpile Used in Libya,” Defense Daily International, 14 June 2012.
[x] Grant T. Hammond, “Myths of the Air War over Serbia: Some ‘Lessons’ Not to Learn,” Aerospace Power Journal (Winter 2000), http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj00/win00/hammond.htm.
[xi] NATO Definition of a Centre of Excellence (CoE), Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence, https://www.cimic-coe.org/about-ccoe/sponsoring-nations/
[xii] Nikolaus Brandstetter, “Did the NATO Intervention in Libya Fail?” IndraStra Global, 20 April 2015, 3–5.
[xiii] Ibid., 6–8.
[xiv] Florence Gaub, “Operation Unified Protector,” NDC Research Report, Research Division, NATO Defense College, 2012, 4.
[xv] “NATO: Statement on Libya”, 14 April 2011, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_72544.htm.
[xvi] BBC News, “Libya conflict: NATO’s man against Gaddafi,” 26 June 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ world-europe-13919380.
[xvii] “World powers agree to set up contact group to map out Libya's future,” Daily Telegraph, 29 March 2011.
[xviii] Brandstetter, "Did the NATO Intervention in Libya Fail?" 8-9.
[xix] "Libya intervention threatens the Arab spring," Al Jazeer, 22 March 2011. https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2011/3/22/libya-intervention-threaten...
[xx] “Civilian cost of NATO victory in Libya,” Russia Today, 20 October 2011, http://rt.com/news/libya-nato- civilian-deaths-323/.
[xxi] "German leader says no to Iraq war," The Guardian, 6 August 2002.
[xxii] Justyna Gotkowska, “Germany’s stance on the Libyan crisis as a function of German internal policy,” Centre for Eastern Studies, March 23, 2011.
[xxiii] Geir Ulfstein and Christiansen Hege Føsund, “The Legality of the NATO Bombing in Libya,” Cambridge University Press 62, no. 1 (January 2013): 161–63.
[xxiv] William Stivers, “Eisenhower and the Middle East,” in Reevaluating Eisenhower: American Foreign Policy in the 1950s, ed. Richard A. Melanson and David Mayers, 192–219 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987).
[xxv] “Libya foes step up air war as ground battle stalls,” France 24, 30 July 2019, https://www.france24.com/en/20190730-libya-foes-step-air-war-ground-batt....
[xxvi] Lieutenant Colonel Andreas Schmidt, "How can Modelling and Simulation Support Integrated Air and Missile Defence?" 12 June 2019, https://www.japcc.org/.
[xxvii] Robert J, Hendricks, "Response Forces Galore: A Guided Tour," Clingendael Institute, 1 November 2014.
[xxviii] Deni R. John, "Disband the NATO Response Force," Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) Security Studies at the US Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), 14 October 2020.
[xxix] James Appathurai, “Closing the capabilities gap,” NATO Review, 1 September 2002.
[xxx] NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, https://www.stratcomcoe.org/about-us.
[xxxi] “President Obama: Libya aftermath 'worst mistake' of presidency”, BBC News, 11 April 2016.
Image source: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_72265.htm
