From the United States to the Baltics, the spread of disinformation has become a rising concern to NATO member states as adversary-backed information warfare has become a more recognized tactic of grey zone or below-threshold incursions. These disinformation campaigns, launched most often by Russia and China, present an unconventional and asymmetrical threat to NATO by blending in with domestically generated content on social media and raising complex legal and political questions regarding the role of the state in intervening in privately-owned platforms. These disinformation campaigns have also increased the political polarization present within many NATO countries, introducing more uncertainty into military structures controlled by civilian governments. This paper will argue that the effectiveness of these disinformation campaigns is the result of both member states' political-legal frameworks for regulating Internet content and their divided societies. Borrowing from Carl von Clausewitz's writings on war as a clash of wills, this paper will also argue that the proliferation of disinformation will weaken the military preparedness of the Alliance by degrading the will of its member states to use military force, a key aspect of NATO's deterrence model. As such, this paper will conclude by offering a potential solution based on utilizing NATO's partnerships, namely replicating Sweden's Psychological Defence Agency across member states.