NATO and Russia: Is there space for dialogue?
NATO-Russia relations, 1991–2021
After the end of the Cold War in 1991, NATO adopted the New Strategic Concept, which called for cooperation with former adversaries to strengthen security throughout Europe. As Russia became a successor of the Soviet Union, NATO looked for different kinds of cooperation paths. These included the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991 (renamed Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in 1997), the Partnership for Peace (PfP) created in 1994 (which evolved into the Partnership for Peace Intensified and More Operational in 1999), and the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) in 1997 (replaced by the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) in 2002). In 2010, for the first time the Strategic Concept did not recognize Russia as an enemy. However, in 2014, NATO suspended its practical cooperation with Russia due to the illegal annexation of Crimea and military aggression in the East of Ukraine.[i] From the Russian side, it became ever more apparent that its attitude towards NATO had remained the same for the last two decades. Russia still considers NATO as an opponent, and with the flow of time, it is less prone to compromise; therefore, one can assume that its attitude towards NATO will not improve in the near future.
From an organizational point of view, the picture of NATO-Russia relations looks promising as both sides have agreed to steps to boost collaboration; nevertheless, an inside look on the outcomes of these decisions presents an opposing picture. From the very beginning, NATO and Russia have had disagreements about the concept of Russia’s “near abroad”, which Moscow defines as its area of influence. Any cooperation between NATO and post-Soviet states is considered as a threat to Russian domestic security and a justification for potential “defensive actions.” In addition, Russia has demanded to be included in NATO affairs as proof of goodwill. Such inclusion, from the point of view of Russian politicians, should precipitate further consultations with Russia before NATO undertakes decisions[ii] as well as veto rights.[iii] In reality, NATO member states saw a potential threat in Russia obtaining any veto rights due to the protection of member states’ interests and the disruption of NATO’s activities. Additionally, before the 2000s, NATO member states did not consider Russia as an equal, which can be seen in the example of the intervention in Kosovo in 1999.[iv] NATO did not consult Russia due to its weakness as a global superpower, which led to conflict and a new breach in their relations. Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 and its illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 began another period of NATO-Russia relations in which their differences were amplified and the dichotomy strengthened; consequently, this period led to the gradual decline of the relationship. The main question of whether this relationship can be reestablished remains open.
Forms of NATO cooperation
NATO seeks to strengthen security and establish stability in the world. Its scope has broadened from Europe to the entire world thanks to globalization; therefore, NATO is open to all partnerships that would contribute to its goal. These partnerships differ according to their end goal: “dialogue and cooperation with partners can make a concrete contribution to enhance international security, to defend the values on which the Alliance is based, to NATO’s operations, and to prepare interested nations for membership.”[v] Since 2014, the “Interoperability Platform” has served as a permanent format for cooperation in crisis management where interested states can join proposed initiatives. In addition, the Alliance “enhances opportunities” for a specific country to adjust its partnership with NATO to its realities and expectations.[vi] Thus, NATO offers collective and individual projects and formats for its current and potential partners.
NATO identifies three pillars of cooperation: practical, political, and military cooperation. The Alliance provides limited access to its processes, procedures, and structures to engage partners in current affairs and allow them to contribute to NATO’s activities. These key areas include consultation, interoperability, contributions to NATO-led operations and missions, defense reform, and institution and capacity-building. Consultations include meetings of NATO and partner country representatives at different levels to discuss political developments and elaborate on a common approach to address them. Interoperability encourages partners to adjust to NATO standards, doctrines, procedures, and equipment to facilitate cooperation. Furthermore, NATO started the Partnership Interoperability Initiative to increase the inclusion of states that wanted to deepen their cooperation with the Alliance. Contributions to NATO-led operations and missions can take place in various forms depending on a mission in which partners participate as equal members. Within the defense reform, institution and capacity-building framework, partners implemented the Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building and benefit from the Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative. As a result, NATO involves its partners in day-to-day activities together with member states, with guidelines for improvements if some state has a willingness to deepen the cooperation or, potentially, join NATO in the future.[vii]
Talking specifically about Russia, up until 2014, Russia had the most developed form of cooperation with NATO among third states due to its role in international security.[viii] However, all practical cooperation and military activities were cancelled due to the illegal annexation of Crimea and military aggression in the East of Ukraine. In October 2021, the only active pillar of cooperation was political cooperation through the presence of diplomatic representations; nevertheless, Russia suspended its diplomatic mission to NATO and called on NATO to close its office in Moscow, too.[ix] During the last NATO Summit in Brussels in June 2021, Heads of State and Government identified Russia as a threat because of its violation of existing security agreements and international law and reaffirmed their willingness to continue the current policy. They state, “We have suspended all practical civilian and military cooperation with Russia, while remaining open to political dialogue. Until Russia demonstrates compliance with international law and its international obligations and responsibilities, there can be no return to “business as usual”. We will continue to respond to the deteriorating security environment by enhancing our deterrence and defence posture, including by a forward presence in the eastern part of the Alliance.”[x] Therefore, NATO member states are clear about their position on Russia, while joint practical cooperation and military activity remain out of the question for the near future.
In addition, the pandemic established limitations on in-person communication and encouraged shifting to digital formats, which complicates the situation through emotional and attention barriers.[xi] In any case, increased cooperation with NATO is not one of Russia’s foreign policy priorities; thus, one can conclude that the scope of its political direction is limited to the status quo.
NATO’s and Russia’s values
Values are part of the foundation of political actors and determine the possible scope of responses and aid in making decisions. NATO is a global organization with a purpose “to guarantee the freedom and security of its members through political and military means”. In its code of conduct, there are five underlying values of the Alliance: “integrity, impartiality, loyalty, accountability, and professionalism.”[xii] In 2015, the NATO fact sheet stated that “Member states are committed to individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. These values are at the heart of NATO’s transatlantic bond.”[xiii] Consequently, NATO emphasizes democratic values at the core of its functions.
In contrast, Russia has no defined set of values; however, one can assume that Putin and his close surroundings would be the best source of reference as they have been in power for almost the entire length of the NATO-Russia relationship. During his Valdai speech in 2013, Putin elucidated his view of changing global order and the place of Russia in it: “Our movement forward is impossible without spiritual, cultural, national self-determination, otherwise we will not be able to withstand external and internal challenges, we will not be able to achieve success in the conditions of global competition[xiv]… the main thing that will determine success is the quality of people, the quality of society, intellectual, spiritual, moral.”[xv] After analyzing the background of this speech, one can conclude that Russia identifies itself with conservative values, especially the Russian Orthodox Church. It wishes to unite people to preserve their culture and traditions in times of globalization. Nevertheless, it is also possible to explain these statements from the political perspective. Currently, one can observe the Western tendency to promote the democratization and liberalization of societies. Post-Soviet countries develop their relationships with the former Western bloc and implement reforms to deepen cooperation if they are not yet members of the EU or NATO; meanwhile, Russia tries to maintain its influence over its “near abroad”.
From Russia’s desire to preserve the difference between us (the keepers of tradition) and them (people who accept novelty), it is evident that current politicians have invested in the establishment of a new dichotomy in order to distance itself from liberal democracies, which are mostly members of NATO or the EU.[xvi] For the past decade, Russia has tried to build a support bloc to strengthen its ideology; meanwhile, NATO has boosted its relationships with all countries regardless of their ideology in order to maintain global security. As a result, even though NATO is open to dialogue with Russia when it ceases its violations of international law and military aggression in the “near abroad,” Russia is not interested in getting closer with NATO because it is trying to restore its position in the international political arena by putting itself in opposition to NATO with its progressive values. However, the current situation is different from that of the Cold War, because the world is not bipolar anymore; thus, even if Russia succeeds in defining two blocs and juxtaposing them, it will not become the only decision-maker.
The Role of China in the NATO-Russia relationship
According to the Communiqué from the 2021 NATO Summit in Brussels, Heads of State and Government have a realistic view of China. On the one hand, NATO is aware of the potential benefits that deepening cooperation can bring to both sides. On the other hand, NATO understands the challenges of this partnership. The Alliance does not consider China as a threat at the moment, but it is concerned about China’s partnership with Russia.[xvii]
In the last decades, China has drastically increased its role in international security. It has also demonstrated its dissatisfaction with some neighbors and willingness to interfere in their domestic affairs, including through military escalation. Its behavior as a superpower correlates with that of Russia, while cooperation between these countries puts global security into question. Even though one can see the internal struggle between Russia and China, they still find ways to cooperate in order to boost their relationship. The existence of this partnership in itself is not threatening to NATO’s goal; however, increasing military[xviii] and economic engagement[xix] demonstrate that cooperation with Russia drives China further away from NATO.
China is a wild card for NATO, because there is no information on how much China will support Russia in its violations, or whether it will commit open violations itself and ultimately will be formally recognized as a threat. On the one hand, China can multiply Russia’s destructive impact on global security; on the other hand, it can act in line with NATO values—even though this is extremely unlikely due to China’s national interests—and remain a strategic partner on both sides. Therefore, it is important for NATO to consider China as a separate political actor from Russia while defining possibilities for cooperation but as an amplifier of Russian aggression during the threat and risk evaluations. China and Russia have deepened their alliance over the past years. Therefore, even though China is not involved in all threats from Russia that concern NATO, there is a potential that China will support Russia if a conflict with NATO arises. Consequently, additional evaluation of the Chinese threat will only boost NATO’s preparedness to respond, even if the response will not be needed.
Potential models of cooperation: strengths and shortcomings
This analysis of forms of cooperation and diverging values demonstrates the present tension in NATO-Russia relations. Currently, there are three potential models of cooperation: preserving the status quo, stopping political cooperation, and developing additional unique ways to involve Russia.
The preservation of the status quo is the most likely model as NATO has made it clear that it will not look for compromises but will wait for Russia to stop its illegal activity before renewing cooperation. The previous status quo was beneficial to NATO because it allowed for keeping links to Russia through the presence of communication channels. However, the Alliance has put itself in a position in which Russia is the one to define the future of this cooperation. Thus, the main shortcoming of this model is the lack of flexibility from NATO’s side. In addition, the model has not demonstrated any improvement, but only deteriorated since 2014; therefore, one can argue that it will not bring the desired results in the future. Moreover, Russia’s decision to move further away from NATO and suspend political representations is a definitive clue for NATO that dialogue is no longer possible. A positive side of this decision is the possibility to observe Russia’s future foreign policy and respond unpredictably as the two sides no longer communicate.
The second option is to develop additional unique ways to involve Russia. This model will prove complicated due to the suspension of political ties between Russia and NATO; however, a unique status for Russia according to NATO could motivate it to compromise and reconsider its foreign policy. The shortcoming of this model is that it cannot guarantee a positive response from Russia while leaving more questions than providing answers, especially in the values realm; therefore, it is also highly unlikely to be implemented, especially with Russia trying to increase the gap in its relations with NATO. Russia is formally recognized as a threat to global security, and this status does not justify awarding it additional benefits. NATO could undermine Russia by improving its relations with its friends; however the Alliance should be careful not to give Russia even more leverage over NATO.
Conclusion
As a result, the difference between Russia’s values and its politics from those of NATO increases skepticism about the possibilities for NATO-Russia relations. NATO is open to the reestablishment of practical cooperation and military activity as soon as Russia stops violating international law and acts in line with NATO guidelines. On the contrary, Russia tries to build new alliances on the basis of conservatism to create an opposition bloc to NATO. Such actions cast doubt on whether Russia wishes to get closer to NATO. The future of the NATO-Russia relationship is unclear; however, it does not foresee much change. NATO’s position is to provide a situation-based response to Russia’s actions while demanding it stop violations. Consequently, the Alliance gives the freedom to Russia to decide its future. Currently, two developments are possible: preservation of the status quo or compromising NATO values to show Russia the willingness to cooperate. The most likely outcome is that NATO will continue its reactive policy and wait. Therefore, to answer the main question of the article, the space for cooperation still exists but remains very limited and vague until future developments.
Notes
[i] Raluca Iulia Iulian, “A QUARTER CENTURY of NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS,” CBU International Conference Proceedings no. 5 (August 2017): 633.
[ii] Igor Ivanov, “Error on error. It is still possible to prevent foreign aggression in Syria,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta (Federal Issue) no. 6170 (September 2013), https://m.rus.rusemb.org.uk/article/osibka-na-osibke-predotvratit-inostrannuu-agressiu-v-sirii-ese-mozno-igor-ivanov-prezident-rossijskogo-soveta-po-mezdunarodnym-delam-ministr-inostrannyh-del-rossii-1998-2004gg.
[iii] Victor Zamyatin, “Moscow will not be given the right to veto NATO decisions,” Day no. 234 (2001), https://day.kyiv.ua/ru/article/den-planety/pravo-veto-na-resheniya-nato-moskve-ne-dadut.
[iv] Iulian, “A QUARTER CENTURY of NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS”.
[v] “Partnerships: projecting stability through cooperation,” NATO, accessed November 12, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natohq/topics_84336.htm?selectedLocale=en
[vi] Ibid.
[vii] Ibid.
[viii] Iulian, “A QUARTER CENTURY of NATO-RUSSIA.”
[ix] David Herszenhorn, “Russia shuts diplomatic mission to NATO,” accessed November 27, 2021, https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-shuts-diplomatic-mission-nato/.
[x] “Brussels Summit Communiqué,” NATO, accessed November 12, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm.
[xi] Lauren Girardin, “The 7 Barriers to Digital Communication,” accessed November 12, 2021, https://www.govloop.com/community/blog/7-barriers-digital-communication/.
[xii] NATO, “Code of Conduct.”.
[xiii] NATO, “Fact Sheet: December 2015,” https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2015_12/20151130_1512-10things-eng.pdf.
[xiv]”Наше движение вперёд невозможно без духовного, культурного, национального самоопределения, иначе мы не сможем противостоять внешним и внутренним вызовам, не сможем добиться успеха в условиях глобальной конкуренции.”/“Meeting of International Discussion Club “Valdai”,” President of Russia, September 2013, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19243.
[xv] “Главное, что будет определять успех, – это качество людей, качество общества интеллектуальное, духовное, моральное.” President of Russia, September 2013, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19243
[xvi] Nicolai N. Petro, “Russia’s Mission,” Columbia Journal of International Affairs (November 2018).
[xvii] “Brussels Summit Communiqué,” NATO, accessed November 12, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm.
[xviii] Emanuele Scimia, “Beijing and Moscow towards a ‘near' military alliance,” accessed November 27, 2021, https://www.asianews.it/news-en/Beijing-and-Moscow-towards-a-near%27-mil....
[xix] Kinling Lo, Jun Mai, “China looks for firmer legal ground for economic ties with Russia,” accessed November 27, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3157603/china-looks-fi....
Image: https://otan.delegfrance.org/Meeting-of-the-NATO-Russia-Council-31-May-2018
This publication was co-sponsored by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
