What can NATO learn from EU CSDP missions and operations?
It is clear now more than ever that managing crises successfully is difficult. Despite the scepticism around the effectiveness of EU missions and operations, joint forces of both the European Union and NATO have worked together on several occasions, sometimes with great success. This paper highlights the theoretical aspects of the EU’s Common Defence and Security Policy (CSDP) that could be useful in combination with NATO hard-power capabilities. The main focus will be around the “regional” and “comprehensive” approaches expressed in the European Global Strategy (EUGS) and their role in creating a wider strategy to manage crises. After the launch of NATO2030, these approaches could be helpful for developing NATO’s strategy and giving a unique, outside perspective of the organization.
By Edoardo Del Principe
EUGS, what is new?
The need for renewed soft- and hard-power capabilities as outlined in the EU’s updated European Global Strategy (EUGS) has created further room for EU-NATO cooperation.
Since 2016 the EU has changed its approach to global affairs. Following the Brexit referendum, many steps have been taken to push the Union into a new stage of its foreign policy. To this end, former High representative (HR) Federica Mogherini, with the help of scholars and specialists, released the updated EUGS, the primary handbook on European foreign policy, in 2016. The document was updated from its previous version, from 13 years before, and made significant changes in the international relations doctrine promoted by EU agencies and missions around the world within the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). CSDP is part of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (PESC) and also includes the EU’s civil and military missions around the world. The PESC is the main guide for formulating the EU’s foreign and security policies, and its views are represented in person by the HR and expressed in European documents like the EUGS. The first theoretical point, which is the core of the others, renewed the EU’s point of view on hard and soft power. According to the former HR,[i] both cannot be used separately, because the strength of one depends on the other. To be a security provider, the EU must be effective in its diplomatic skills as well as maintain its credibility to endure sanctions or protect its allies. The perception of the Union as an international actor depends not only on the fruitful partnerships it establishes with third countries or other regional and international organizations, such as NATO, but also the capability to defend itself autonomously and protect European interests.
One of the tenets of the EUGS is the so-called “comprehensive approach”, a new way of thinking about conflict and crisis. European Defence and Security Policy must provide solutions for present-day international issues. Former HR Mogherini thought that the EU needed to develop a more sophisticated approach to work within and outside the European framework. To define a common strategic vision, shared analyses must be developed between EU bodies and member states, third countries, and other international organizations and actors like NATO. These analyses are used to develop the EU’s global approach to international issues and develop missions and operations under the CSDP hat. The word “global” is sometimes used instead of “comprehensive” to define the 360-degree view through which these missions should be conducted. This means that CSDP missions should cover as many areas as possible and operate in harmony with other operations, including NATO operations, in order to reach better outcomes in the long term. These mission are used to reinforce rule of law in a partner state, like EUCAP Sahel did with capacity building plans; to mobilize national and multilateral forces to help pre-existing international operations, like France did with EUFOR RCA; or to monitor and assist military and civil personnel in post-conflict scenarios, like EULEX Kosovo, in order to make sure that the partner state will one day be autonomous.
To have a stronger, more secure, and cohesive Union, the EU’s External Action Service (EEAS) must work with its neighbourhood to make it safer for the people who live in it. The EUGS promotes the idea that in a globalized world, borders do not stop issues. Because of this, it is in the interest of the EU to work with other countries to have more stable and collaborative relations with them. In this sense, the Union launched the idea of a regional strategy. The best example is the EU’s relations with the G5 Sahel. From the Malian crisis and the rise of extremist groups, the Sahel region has encountered deep security troubles with the inability to control countries’ borders, which made it easier for groups to expand their influence and criminal affairs. Following the initial French support to its former colony, the EU initiated cooperation with the country, and from this wave of international cooperation, Mali, Mauritania, Chad, Niger, and Burkina Faso launched the G5 Sahel: a regional initiative to share a common policy on trans-border problems like terrorism and climate change. The EU project, with its CSDP missions in Mali and Niger, aims to create a regional security framework for the Sahel. Policy harmonization among the five countries means that the EU development and capability programs created under the CSDP are more likely to reach positive outcomes. Promoting efficient and more accountable governance of partners is also a key part of cooperation. On the one hand, partner states’ good conduct and respect for human rights is a symbol of the good work of European civil and military personnel; on the other, it is necessary for the future stability of the region that central authorities have absorbed new hard and soft skills.[ii]
A successful example of NATO-EU cooperation
In the EUGS, NATO is perceived as the key partner for the peace and future wellness of the Union. Western countries, before being allied on a military level, share a common base of values, culture, and a socio-economic paradigm that makes this partnership a necessary tool to preserve the status quo. Because of this natural relationship based on countries that collaborate in both the Atlantic and European levels, EU operations and missions continue to succeed within the NATO framework. One of the best examples of success is the joint NATO-EU operation in Somalia.
Because of the increasing piracy attacks on cargo vessels in and outside Somalia’s waters, the international community highlighted the necessity for a safer Western Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea. Many actors were interested in the issue, from Saudi Arabia to China, to the US and Europe. Without going in-depth into regional issues, in 2009, NATO launched Operation Ocean Shield as part of Enduring Freedom in the Horn of Africa to support the EU’s Operation Atalanta. Ocean Shield’s main goal was to protect the ships of Operation Allied Provider, which transported relief supplies for the World Food Programme’s mission in the region. NATO vessels conducted intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions in a vast portion of waters from the Arabian Sea to the Strait of Hormuz. Ocean Shield was able to counter Somali pirates and had a deterrent role with its permanency on the high seas. From its launch, the number of attacks fell dramatically, with 385 attacks from 2010 to 2014, to just five from 2015 to 2019.[iii] NATO also conducted a capacity-building project to provide training, educational courses, participation in military exercises, and advice on security sector reforms with the goal of enhancing partners’ ability to defend against internal and external threats. However, this part of the mission had several structural problems, including the lack of a centrally coordinated strategy and the inability to support African Union (AU) members with equipment; for example, NATO was unable to provide the Somali Coast Guard with boats or radar to prevent piracy attacks.[iv]
NATO’s deficiency turned into an opportunity for EUCAP and EUTM Somalia, as well as the EU’s Operation Atalanta. Part of the success of the international coalition to fight piracy must be given to the EU’s capacity to create a comprehensive approach to the scenario. As reported in the House of Lords, the EU had “the ability to bring together cross-Government action in a coordinated and comprehensive approach” and “adds particular value when there is a need for a mix of military, civilian, development, political, and diplomatic tools, all of which are being used in Somalia. The result is the long-term disruption of pirate activities.”[v] In the Somali case, the European approach perfectly filled all the missing spots left behind by the NATO operation. While Ocean Shield ended in 2016, the EU mission is still operating. EUCAP Somalia, with a 66 million euro budget for 2020,[vi] is working to support maritime police units, to develop the Somali Coast Guard, and to support broader police development in the country. EUTM, with an 11.4 million euro budget for 2020,[vii] is increasing the capabilities of the Somali defence sector to enable Somali authorities to progressively take over their own security responsibilities. The partnership in Somalia between EU CSDP and NATO operations highlights the strengths and weakness of both. While EU mandates do not have hard power capabilities to provide security as NATO does, they can instead reach long-term deals with third countries to ensure development and capability plans. On the other hand, while NATO has the power to launch military operations to support partner states, it does not have an integrated approach to issues and cannot reach a deal with other countries to provide all the necessary goods and services. In the Somali case, NATO spent over 1 billion USD for naval operations and just 24 million for capacity-building projects in 2012.[viii]
NATO2030 and the EU
Speaking to the geopolitical impact of COVID-19, on 8 June 2020 NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg launched “NATO2030” to renew the way the Alliance thinks and acts. Stoltenberg highlighted the transnational feature of modern threats like terrorism or COVID-19. These threats need modern answers, and that is why over the following years NATO is going to take a global approach to issues. This does not necessarily mean a more global presence but a wider and more sophisticated way to analyse and face current challenges like arms proliferation, China shifting the balance of power in Asia and Africa, non-state actors promoting disinformation and propaganda, and strengthening the resilience of our societies and our economies. This is where further cooperation with the EU comes in.
Over the past ten years, NATO has strived to become more politically engaged in order to not only be perceived as a military player but also as an international actor. It wants to strengthen its relations with like-minded countries like Japan, South Korea, and Australia that represent and fight for common values like freedom and democracy. On the political level, further cooperation with the EU will make the Alliance safer and stronger: peace is not granted, and European countries know this very well. The EU is a key partner in areas like the Baltic states and in assisting NATO in Africa. Its role is expecting to increase in budget and personnel. NATO is expected to rotate more people and assets in relation to European progress, especially from Germany, in the defence sector. Stoltenberg remarked that he does not know how NATO will be in ten years but that the Alliance needs to improve the way it looks at problems to help the perception of the Alliance as a more modern and effective institution, not anchored to old schemes.
What can NATO learn from EU CSDP?
Border control and assistance is fundamental
Under the framework of CSDP, the EU developed and improved several types of missions dedicated to civil personnel over the last decade: for example, border assistance missions (EUBAM), which help local forces exercise more effective control on borders with training, monitoring, and providing technology. In the globalized world we know, there are many trans-border problems like terrorism, migrant flows, or climate change. Having control over territory is key for central authorities that want to restore security in the country. In particular, when there is the involvement of non-state actors, the control of borders is fundamentally limited to the proliferation of arms or other illegal trafficking that benefits these types of organizations. Successful EUBAM missions, like in the case of Niger and Mali, de-escalated conflicts with central states, which took back control over portions of the nation through expanding their influence and assistance. Using the previous experience of European partners, NATO could develop a border control unit with 360° operability to launch in conflict scenarios or to help member state like the Baltic republics or Poland to improve their resilience and capacity to monitor the space domain as well as land or territorial waters. This could help NATO maintain its rotation of on-the-ground personnel, with training and assisting partners that have more efficient and tech-related control over borders.
Stronger partners means a stronger Alliance
EU foreign policy is also particularly active in capacity building and training missions. These types of missions are aimed to be “trainers of trainees” to reinforce the capacity of local forces to train better units and create a virtuous cycle for the full imposition of the rule of law. NATO could use its previous experience with the NATO school and the Defence College to establish mobile or permanent training facilities in critical areas that need to work with and without the Alliance. Speaking about NATO2030 could be useful to harmonize practices and equipment between member states as well as partners ready to join NATO forces when necessary. Taking inspiration from former European HR Federica Mogherini, having a safer neighbourhood makes the EU, or in this case, the Alliance, safer. NATO could become a full security provider in all domains with its hard power capacities, developing technologies, sharing new ideas, and formulating regional strategies. For example, closer partnerships with South Korea, Japan, New Zealand, and Australia could create a regional framework where NATO provides a hub to discuss a common security policy in the Asia-Pacific area.
NATO needs a comprehensive approach
It is clear from previous experiences in Somalia and Afghanistan that military power alone is not enough to face economic and political issues that arise from conflicts. The idea of integrating civil society will require a higher level of coordination, so it will become essential to have a sort of civil-military cell to coordinate efforts. European countries’ experience with civil planning and conduct capability (CPCC), military planning and conduct capability (MPCC), and joint support coordination cell (JSCC) could help to better integrate and manage civil and military forces at the decision-making level as well as on the ground to create a comprehensive approach.
Civil experts could be integrated at different levels:
● In creating civil supporting missions, NATO could develop a civil cell alongside military operations. This civil cell would be comprised of experts that support local authorities in having a more efficient policy in the security and defence sector to help the current operations achieve better and long-lasting results.
● In creating a NATO-EU joint cell, NATO could develop a civil-military cell where EU civil missions are integrated within the spectrum of NATO military operations. The EU’s EEAS representatives or the HR could be called to prepare ad-hoc civil support missions to help NATO when necessary. Since most European countries are involved in the Alliance, it is easier to share information and analysis in order to develop a comprehensive approach.
About the Author
Edoardo Del Principe is a research assistant for the UK Defence Forum and weekly contributor to IsAG (Pubblicazioni - IsAG). He is formerly a junior analyst for the Italian army. He holds a master’s degree in International Relations from Università degli Studi di Perugia with the highest grade. His final thesis was about EU security and defence policies, in particular its foreign policy on the Mediterranean Sea. He is a proud supporter of Eurodèfense and has been a rock guitarist since the age of fourteen.
Notes
[i] Martin Banks, “Mogherini: EU should make better use of 'unique mixture' of hard and soft power,” The Parliament Magazine, 8 November 2016, https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/news/article/mogherini-eu-should-ma....
[ii] Bernardo Venturi, “An EU Integrated Approach in the Sahel: The Role for Governance,” IAI Papers 19 | 03 (February 2019)-:11.
[iii] Statista Research Department, “Number of actual and attempted piracy attacks in Somalia 2010-2019,” Statista, 8 June 2020, https://www.statista.com/statistics/250867/number-of-actual-and-attempte....
[iv] James M. Bridges, “Safe Seas at What Price? The Costs, Benefits and Future of NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield,” “ Research Division, ” NATO Defense College, Rome, -no. 95 (September 2013): 5.
[v] UK parliament, “Report, Brexit: Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operations,” 15 May 2019.
[vi] EEAS, “Fact Sheet - EUCAP Somalia,” 2019, https://www.eucap-som.eu/fact-sheet/.
[vii] EEAS, “Factsheet,” EUTM Somalia, last updated August 2019, https://www.eutm-somalia.eu/documents/.
[viii] James M. Bridges, “Safe Seas.”, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/169344/rp_95.pdf, 5.
IImage: https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/lords-selec...
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