NATO and the EU: The need for a common counter-terrorism strategy
In light of recent terrorist attacks, such as Christchurch and Halle, which have spurred copycat terrorism in Europe and the world, a common counter-terrorism strategy between the EU and NATO has never been so important. In 2019, EU member states reported a total number of six completed, failed, or foiled right-wing terrorist attacks. This marked a stark rise in right-wing terror attacks in Europe. Online spaces in particular have provided these groups with a wide range of propaganda platforms to strengthen and build relations with like-minded individuals abroad.[i] However, while the joint declarations of the EU and NATO in 2016 and 2018 institutionalised a strategic cooperation in the area of “hybrid threats”, a formal cooperation structure that combines both the areas of counter-terrorism and cyber security remains absent.[ii] This is particularly exacerbated by a focus on non-domestic terrorism, and the lack of a common definition of the term “right-wing terrorism” that includes differentiated methods that consider the reactionary effect it has had on society. These considerations need to be consolidated into policy-making and cooperation between the EU and NATO in order to prevent perpetuating a cycle of violence.
By Annika Vollmer
Despite the overall decrease in the number of terrorist attacks since 2018, there has been an increase in right-wing terrorist attacks in the European Union (EU). This trend corresponds to a greater worldwide wave of violent incidents, most significantly those of Christchurch (New Zealand), Poway and El Paso (USA), Baerum (Norway), and Halle (Germany). These recent cases have highlighted the acutely mobilising effect one attack can have internationally and the significant influence of online platforms in the radicalisation of individuals. Online spaces enable transnational online communities with a wide range of possibilities to build relations with like-minded individuals and create an environment that galvanizes acts of violence.[iii] For example, the perpetrator of the Baerum attack, Philip Manshaus, claimed that the incidences in El Paso and Christchurch inspired his actions.[iv]
The ambiguity of the term ‘terrorism’ and missing standardised measures to classify violent acts not only diminish the danger these patterns of violence present but also reduce the amount of pressure placed on international organisations to develop distinct measures to counteract them. Regardless of the various definitions of terrorism, there seem to be some common elements, i.e., premeditated intentions to instil fear and to affect a certain political outcome in the process.[v],[vi] However, missing institutional benchmarks prevent a more regulated understanding and application. The term ‘right-wing terrorism’, has also been used interchangeably with many other concepts, including ‘far-right’, ‘extremism’, ‘hate crime’, etc. In terms of the EU, this is reflected in the different number of right-wing attacks reported and classified as such by member states. For example, in the year 2019, member states identified a total number of six completed, failed, or foiled right-wing attacks, whereby an additional two attacks were not classified as terrorism under national law—despite being committed by right-wing extremists and claiming the lives of three people.[vii] Furthermore, another fifty-seven were classified under the group of ‘Ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism’—under which attacks motivated by right-wing ideological elements also fall.[viii] In comparison, NATO does not provide a comprehensive list of officially classified right-wing attacks. In the same year, only the Christchurch attack received a comprehensive statement by General Jens Stoltenberg in which this incident was identified and classified as right-wing terrorism.[ix]
The aim of this paper is to underline the limitations of the cooperation structures between the EU and NATO, specifically in terms of their counter-terrorism strategies. This paper argues that the ambiguity of the term ‘right-wing’ and ‘terrorism’, as well as the institutionalised emphasis on non-domestic terrorism has limited the ability of the EU and NATO to counteract this pattern of violence. After outlining the formal cooperation frameworks between these two entities, the distinct organisational structures of right-wing terrorism are identified, and the limitations of inter-institutional cooperation are discussed. Finally, the last section draws upon some conclusions as well as policy recommendations for future international cooperation.
Formal structures of NATO-EU cooperation
The framework for NATO-EU counter-terrorism cooperation is institutionalised through the two joint declarations of 2016 and 2018.[x] It is divided into seven areas, including the two sub-sections on ‘hybrid threats’ and ‘cyber security and defence’. The framework is based on the principles of openness, transparency, inclusiveness, and reciprocity, with the aim to exclude the prejudices of single member states’ security and defence policies. The 2018 joint declaration particularly pinpoints counter-terrorism as an evolving security challenge within EU member states. Despite this, cooperation remains narrow, and proposals are limited to more extensive forms of communication, such as joint analysis projects, common concepts and standards as well as exploring new ways to share information on terrorist threats.[xi],[xii]
Establishing a common EU defence and security policy has been a difficult process; however, EU member states have standardized their response in the form of two institutions: the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the Internal Referral Unit (IRU). Conceived in 2017, PESCO was designed to instigate steps towards permanent defence cooperation among member states through binding commitments.[xiii] The IRU intends to tackle the online dispersal of terrorist propaganda.[xiv],[xv] In collaboration with Europol, the IRU unit plays a crucial role in monitoring terrorist groups online as well as providing and establishing a Code of Conduct.
In contrast, NATO’s traditional counter-terrorism strategy is limited to areas of operation, which currently include Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, and the Mediterranean. Consequently, the objectives of NATO’s ‘Defence against Terrorism Programme of Work’ (DAT POW) and the traditional approach of the organisation are more broadly focused on countering terrorist threats in the Middle East and providing solutions tailored to that threat rather than domestic terrorism. DAT POW determines on-the-ground operational and digital solutions against asymmetric threats and works towards enhancing information-sharing and mutual assistance in preventing attacks.[xvi],[xvii] It is a unique programme developed through common funding and with projects led by individual nations. Additional steps have also been taken towards increasing NATO’s competences. The 2010 Strategic Concept expanded the policy guidelines mandated by the Lisbon Summit to include the notions of prevention and resilience as well as the necessity for enhanced cooperative security in countering terrorism.[xviii] [xix] Meanwhile, the ‘Defence Against Terrorism Centre of Excellence’ (CoE), established in 2007, seeks to provide key decision-makers with a common interpretation of the term ‘terrorism’ and common counter-terrorism strategies.[xx]
The ability to anticipate intentions and mitigate the effects of terrorist attacks significantly depends on the capacity to understand the real nature of the terrorist threat against international and national targets as well as the vulnerabilities therein. While NATO provides a distinguished forum in which consultations, intelligence exchange, and shared assessments can be carried out, its traditional approach and the advisory function of the CoE demonstrate that expeditionary lessons can still be drawn in order to facilitate a more cooperative, cohesive, and productive counter-terrorism strategy between NATO and the EU.
The distinct organisational structures of right-wing terrorism
In order to combat the organisational structures of right-wing terrorism, tailored and cohesive preventative measures should be adopted between the EU and NATO. Some of the more distinct organisational structures of right-wing terrorism include ‘lone actor’ roles for individuals, tactical inspiration, ideological justifications, and the social support they garner from online communities.[xxi] Especially in terms of their lone actor perpetrators, right-wing terrorism differs from other forms of terrorism, such as the terrorist groups and networks built by Islamist groups. The unique dispositions of this form of terrorism suggest some possible policy recommendations to develop NATO-EU cooperation, which will be presented in the final section of this paper.
While individual and isolated perpetrators are difficult to detect in a coordinated manner, the past years have shown us the effects of copycat culture, i.e., the contagious and mobilising effect one right-wing attack has on another attack. What the attacks of El Paso, Christchurch, Halle, and Baerum demonstrate is a clearer pattern of violence that can be monitored. For one, the perpetrators were active in subcultures in unedited online forums, such as Gab, Voat, 4chan, or 8chan.[xxii] These platforms present content related to right-wing ideology and provide the ideological justification for such violent methods. For another, they had similar modus operandi in which they announced their intent online, posted manifestos prior to the attack, and sometimes even used helmet cameras to live stream their actions on these websites. The tactical inspirations taken from previous attacks give way to more specific preventative and monitoring measures that the EU and NATO could adopt to counter specific forms of terrorism. Countries such as New Zealand and Australia have already targeted terrorists’ use of the internet by criminalising the distribution and possession of manifestos and compelling tech companies to remove violent material.
The limitations of NATO-EU cooperation
Despite the distinct organisational structures and unique patterns of violence, it is clear that there remain some challenges to a comprehensive approach towards counter-terrorism. Some of the main issues of NATO-EU cooperation are the lack of a common definition of the term, limited common defence policy understanding, a particular focus on jihadist terrorism and the Middle East, as well as a holistic approach that encompasses structures that foster social cohesion.
The first challenge in regard to countering right-wing terrorism—and by extension NATO-EU cooperation—is the ambiguity associated with the term terrorism. In the EU’s 2001 Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, the act of terrorism is delineated into three parts: its context, its aim, and eight specific acts, which were deemed necessary to be penalised.[xxiii] Similarly, the 2012 NATO agreement on Policy Guidelines on Counter Terrorism (CT) addressed some of the same markers. However, neither definition differentiates between the political backgrounds associated with the attacks nor the required response to them. As the previous section demonstrated, the distinct organisational structures and patterns of violence would endorse a more differentiated approach. Furthermore, both the EU and NATO use such terms as ‘right-wing’, ‘far-right’, ‘terrorism’, ‘extremism’, or even ‘hate crimes’ interchangeably, thereby limiting the practitioner’s capacity to deal with the threat.
This ambiguous understanding of right-wing terrorism not only exacerbates dissension in basic political and strategic objectives, but it also produces an unclear overview of the threat. While both the capacities developed in PESCO and DAT POW provide some standardized methods for identifying acts of terrorism, the counter-terrorism strategies in these organizations mostly focus on the exchange of information, which for the most part remains at the discretion of the member states. Depending on the member state, certain cases are classified, investigated, and prosecuted as hate crimes rather than as terrorist offences. Some examples of this are the two cases in Germany in 2019. Besides missing a clear definition of which acts should be considered as ‘terrorism’ under constitutional law, Germany also classified two major attacks perpetuated by right-wing extremists that claimed the lives of three people as non-terrorist acts.[xxiv] Another factor that contributes to this ambiguity is that the actions of ethno-nationalist and separatist movements, which are often motivated by right-wing ideologies, are not classified as right-wing terrorism. This distorts the danger of attacks from this political spectrum and the necessity for increased efforts to prevent them.
Another limitation of EU and NATO cooperation is that their strategies in multiple ways focus on very different aspects of counter-terrorism. For one, right-wing terrorism is overshadowed by a seemingly larger scale of terrorism, e.g., higher causality jihadism and countering the activities of groups such as ISIL and Al-Qaida. Besides the fact that cooperation structures within and between the EU and NATO are on a voluntary basis, the 2020 EU Security Union Strategy[xxv], IRU evaluation reports[xxvi] as well as NATO’s traditional focus on jihadist terrorism and the Middle East demonstrate a limited concern for home-grown terrorist networks. Similarly, the DAT POW programme of NATO particularly focuses on preventing the misuse of easily available off-the-shelf technology and on-the-ground operational solutions against asymmetric threats in conflict zones. In terms of cyber security solutions, the EU framework includes security methods to combat radicalisation and recruitment online. Yet, even there the emphasis is placed on tech companies removing jihadist-related content.[xxvii] In contrast, NATO’s mandate against the spread of violent extremism focuses on malicious cyber activities, biometrics for identifying insurgents, and technologies for an early-warning system, thereby excluding the potential of collective cyber security defence systems.[xxviii]
Finally, inter-institutional cooperation structures do not sufficiently address the social dimension in terms of fostering social cohesion at the local, the national, and the international level. Right-wing ideologies and propaganda—as most forms of extremism—live off of some sort of concept of supremacy.[xxix] Diversity in society and communities of migrants feed the supremacy of their position and what they consider to be their ‘natural right’ to dominate the rest of society. Forums and online platforms provide individuals with the opportunity to isolate themselves with like-minded individuals and exclude opposing views. There is a myriad of ways in which the EU works towards promoting social cohesiveness amongst its member states, such as through its cohesion policy or instrument for pre-accession (IPA) programme. NATO also has committed itself to recognising the importance of political and social factors in its approach to security.[xxx] However, in terms of counter-terrorism measures, these are missing. Especially in light of increased migration to the EU and the traction this brings with it, the necessity to emphasise this area of cooperation is significant.
Conclusions and policy recommendations
The aim throughout this policy paper was to underline the counter-terrorism strategies of the EU and NATO, specifically in the prevention of right-wing motivated attacks. Thereby, this paper argued that the ambiguity of the term as well as the lack of political will on the part of member states to focus on this spectrum of political violence has facilitated limited and disjointed forms of cooperation. Throughout the paper, the framework of cooperation was outlined, the distinct organisational structures and patterns of violence of right-wing terrorism discussed, and the limiting factors to cooperation determined.
As demonstrated, the cooperative framework between the EU and NATO carries two main challenges: the ambiguity of what should be identified and classified as ‘right-wing terrorism’ and the unwillingness of member states to focus on violence coming from this side of the political spectrum. Regarding the former aspect, the ambiguity associated with the term not only limits these institutions’ ability to deal with the threat, but it also produces an unclear overview of it. This corresponds quite clearly with the latter inhibiting factor: the unwillingness of member states to engage with right-wing violence to the same extent as with jihadist terrorism. Without measures that clearly differentiate and engage with these differences, it remains difficult to develop a comprehensive strategy that significantly prevents perpetuating the cycle of violence observed over the past years.
Whether within the EU or NATO, the ambiguity of the term ‘terrorism’, the corresponding limits of these organizations’ strategies, the minimal political will of member states, and numerous horizontal non-institutional arrangements all make counter-terrorism policies less consistent and hamper the development of a more strategic approach. Subsequently, these factors need to be addressed in future policy-making.
While this paper only very briefly described the unique organisational features and patterns of violence in right-wing terrorism, it demonstrates the possibility of delineating the differences between types of political extremism in order to form more specific strategies for counter-terrorism. First and foremost this can be achieved with a definition that not only addresses terrorism in general but also includes the features of its different forms. In addition, the frameworks of both the EU and NATO should incorporate specific standardized measures from which member states can classify and identify the respective types of terrorism.
In addition, in order to harmonise basic political and strategic objectives, a shift should take place away from horizontal arrangements and towards a more institutionalised approach. A significant limitation within formal NATO-EU cooperation is namely the member states’ choice in these types of arrangements. When it comes to cooperation, EU member states have chosen to focus on horizontal non-institutional arrangements, i.e., informal arrangements.[xxxi] They allow for relatively flexible and independent commitments that can tackle specific national challenges and are more equipped to achieve common goals in which cooperation within the institutionalised framework of NATO is not possible. While this approach allows for EU member states to have more extended arrangements with countries, such as the US or Iceland, Norway and Switzerland, other partnerships are limited to achieving a ‘targeted dialogue’, such as with Russia. For early detection, resilience building, and reintegration in society, this approach comes with too many variations—both in terms of law enforcement and judicial cooperation—and without the necessary institutionalised standards and practices to combat terrorism comprehensively.
About the Author
Annika Vollmer is currently working as a Strategic Convening trainee in the Brussels office of the transatlantic think tank The German Marshall Fund of the United States. She works alongside an international team to coordinate and execute the fifteenth edition of Brussels Forum, a preeminent platform that brings global leaders, policymakers, and experts across all fields to debate the most pressing global challenges. Previously, after completing a bachelor’s in European Studies at Maastricht University, she graduated cum laude from the University of Leiden with a master’s degree in International Relations. Throughout the master’s program she focused on the emergence and prevention of global conflicts, as well as the role of rebel groups in intra-state conflicts.
Notes
[i] EUROPOL, “European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report”, accessed 7 July 2020, https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/european-....
[ii] EEAS, “EU-NATO Cooperation”, accessed 6 July 2020, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/28286/eu-nato-....
[iii] EUROPOL, “European Union Terrorism Situation.”
[iv] Jason Burke, “Norway mosque attack suspect ‘inspired by Christchurch and El-Paso shootings’”, The Guardian, 11 August 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/11/norway-mosque-attack-suspe....
[v] Javier Rupérez, “The United Nations in the Fight Against Terrorism”, United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee, accessed 3 August 2020, https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/2006_01_26_cted_lec....
[vi] Tore Bjørgo and Jacob Aasland Ravnda, “Extreme-Right Violence and Terrorism: Concepts, Patterns, and Responses”, ICCT Policy Brief, September 2019, https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Extreme-Right-Violence-and-Te....
[vii] EUROPOL, “European Union Terrorism Situation.”
[viii] EUROPOL, “European Union Terrorism Situation.”
[ix] NATO, “Joint Press Point by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and Prime Minister of New Zealan Jacinda Ardern in Wellington, New Zealand”, last updated 12 August 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_168252.htm?selectedLocale=ru
[x] “Joint declaration on EU-NATO cooperation,” European Council, accessed 20 July 2020, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/36096/nato_eu_final_eng.pdf.
[xi] Niklas Helwig, “New Tasks for EU-NATO Cooperation”, SWP, January 2018, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2018C04_....
[xii] EEAS, “EU-NATO Cooperation”.
[xiii] EEAS, “Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) – factsheet”, November 2019, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/pesco_factsheet_november_2019.pdf.
[xiv] European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and social committee and the committee of the regions”, accessed 30 July 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/communication-eu-security-uni....
[xv] Council of the European Union, “Response to the terrorist threat and recent terrorist attacks in Europe”, accessed 28 July 2020, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/fore....
[xvi] NATO, “Defence Against Terrorism Programme of Work (DAT POW)”, last updated 3 July 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50313.htm.
[xvii] NATO, “Countering Terrorism”, last updated 10 December 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_77646.htm.
[xviii] Stefano Santamato, “The New NATO Policy Guidelines on Counterterrorism: Analysis, Assessments, and Actions”, INSS, February 2013, https://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/inss/Strategi....
[xix] Stefano Santamato, “The New NATO Policy Guidelines on Counterterrorism: Analysis, Assessments, and Actions”, INSS, February 2013, https://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/inss/Strategi....
[xx] Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, “About COE- DAT”, http://www.coedat.nato.int/functions.html.
[xxi] CTED, “Member States Concerned by the Growing and Increasingly Transnational Threat of Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism”, April 2020, https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/CTED_Trends_Alert_E....
[xxii] Bjørgo and Ravnda, “Extreme-Right Violence and Terrorism.”
[xxiii] Oldrich Bures, “EU Counterterrorism Policy: A Paper Tiger?” Terrorism and Political Violence 1, no. 18 (2006): 57–78.
[xxiv] EUROPOL, “European Union Terrorism Situation”.
[xxv] European Commission, “Communication from the Commission”.
[xxvi] EUROPOL, “EU Internet Referral Unit – Highlights”, accessed 30 July 2020, https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/eu-internet-referra....
[xxvii] CTED, “Member States Concerned by.”
[xxviii] NATO, “Defence Against Terrorism Programme”.
[xxix] EUROPOL, “European Union Terrorism Situation”.
[xxx] NATO, “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept”, last updated 25 June 2009, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm.
[xxxi] Bures, “Europol’s Fledgling Counterterrorism Role”.
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