Hybrid threats: An avenue for a more solid NATO-EU cooperation
By Elena Denisa Petrescu
The concept of hybrid threats has gained considerable coverage within the repertoire of both the European Union (EU) and NATO during the last decade, particularly after Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. The blended tools and techniques that Russia has implemented in Crimea have shown that the new security challenges of the twenty-first century no longer fit into the traditional scrapbook of warfare. They are wide, more diverse, and multi-faceted than in the previous century, and empowered by the current technological breakthrough. Crimea and, above all, the current COVID-19 pandemic has made clear that systemic vulnerabilities could effectively be exploited by malicious actors, leading to a substantial erosion of the quality of political institutions in democracies and their trust in what has been labelled as the liberal order. In this paper, I will examine the state of the NATO-EU cooperation in terms of combating hybrid threats and sketch some possible ways to strengthen it, particularly in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, in order to examine the roots of cooperation between NATO and the EU and to gain a clearer insight into the subject, I would like to briefly conceptualise the term “hybrid threats” according to both organisations.
Hybrid threats in the EU and NATO
Whereas many attempts to standardize the concept have been pursued by both the EU and NATO as well as by scholars in security studies, the volatile and context-adaptive nature of this new kind of security threat make a universal definition of “hybrid threats” difficult to formulate. Nevertheless, both organisations recognize that hybrid threats can be displayed via a diverse palette of military and/or non-military instruments, ranging from intelligence and disinformation campaigns on social media to malign cyber operations and economic blackmail, using both covert and/or overt tactics.[i] Both the EU and NATO also recognize that hybrid threats are volatile, adaptive, and highly sensitive to systemic vulnerabilities in democracies, and that their pivotal aim is to influence the decision-making process to favour “the agent’s strategic goals while undermining and/or hurting the target”.[ii] To facilitate a basic common understanding, the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE) defines hybrid threats as “coordinated and synchronised actions that deliberately target democratic states’ and institutions’ systemic vulnerabilities, through a wide range of means”.[iii] This definition has been embraced by both organisations, and it highlights two relevant aspects of this new kind of security threat: that it is directed against democracy, which is the core value and political system of both NATO and the EU, and that it takes advantage of vulnerabilities through multi-faceted operational procedures. Vulnerabilities could be metamorphosed into a variety of formats: they could range from social polarisation, collective memories, and legislation to geostrategic factors, technological disadvantages, or ideological differences.
The roots of NATO-EU cooperation on hybrid threats
Judging by the complex character of hybrid threats, confronting them requires a coordinated and multidisciplinary approach. This assumption is at the basis of the NATO-EU Joint Declaration, adopted during the Warsaw Summit in July 2016. The Joint Declaration officially expresses the joint commitments to “counter hybrid threats, including by bolstering resilience, working together on analysis, prevention, and early detection, through timely information sharing and, to the extent possible, intelligence sharing between staffs; and cooperating on strategic communication and response”.[iv] Since the implementation of the Joint Declaration, collaboration in the field of countering hybrid threats between the two blocs has constantly improved. The EU Hybrid Fusion Cell and the NATO Hybrid Analysis Branch, for example, started to cooperate on information exchange. For example, staff from both branches work together in conducting an annual Parallel and Coordinated Assessment.[v] Moreover, cross-participation in different events, such as the NATO Defence Policy and Planning Symposium have increased transparency and raised mutual awareness on the ways resilience and hybrid threats have been addressed in the defence planning processes of both institutions. In the same fashion, a joint staff workshop on EU-NATO cooperation in civil protection and crisis response was held in February 2019.
A more recent example of a joint initiative aimed at enhancing EU-NATO cooperation on countering hybrid threats and strengthening resilience was the NATO-EU biannual meeting, celebrated this year on 19 May. It was held in an unprecedented video-teleconference format and approached an unprecedented moment in modern history: the COVID-19 pandemic and the consequences it generated for the international security system. On this occasion, representatives of the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) and the NATO International Military Staff (IMS) exchanged best practices on harmonising medical advice and enhancing logistical and intelligence cooperation.
Hybrid threats in times of pandemic and the need for stronger links of cooperation
Considering the highly dynamic nature of hybrid security challenges and the recent increase in their employment by various actors, the need for further sectorial joint cooperation between the EU and NATO has been augmented. If the illegal occupation of Crimea in 2014 or the Islamic State campaigns far beyond Syria and Iraq were not enough to prove the hybridity of the current security environment and reinforce the need to enhance transatlantic efforts to confront them, the challenges of COVID-19 certainly did. In times of harsh collective anxieties and massive discontent with restrictions on fundamental rights imposed all across the democratic world, NATO and the EU’s credibility have been put at stake.
A phenomenon that has gained influence during the COVID-19 pandemic is the so-called “infodemic” as the World Health Organization (WHO) has coined it,[vi] which has led to the active dissemination of conspiracy theories about the origins of the new coronavirus as well as fictitious narratives about the presumed malevolent response of the EU and NATO. Many adversarial narratives such as that the virus is being used as a bioweapon by the United States or the fact that the EU and NATO are not lifting a finger to tackle the issue but are conspiring against the most vulnerable have been massively diffused through the media since the beginning of the pandemic.[vii] In times when billions of people across the world are being confined to home and are consuming online content like never before, the deliberate spread of misleading information has become a prodigious phenomenon and powerful weapon in moulding perceptions, fears, and anxieties and, on a larger scale, shaping collective identities. The COVID-19 pandemic has created an unprecedented systemic vulnerability, in this case informational, that is used by interested actors, such as pro-Kremlin entities, to undermine public opinion and, in particular, trust in NATO and the EU. Considering precedent examples, such as Crimea, this situation has all the elements to metamorphose into a broader issue, having detrimental effects on the credibility of transatlantic efforts.
This is why, more than ever, NATO and the EU should take joint measures to tackle these new kinds of security threats and enhance their capabilities to prevent them from transforming into larger issues. The current situation has indeed demonstrated that there is not only a question of cross-organisational cooperation to enhance defence-related capabilities but also an internal challenge that both the EU and NATO need to promptly address. In the next paragraph, I will sketch some concrete actions that NATO and the EU could jointly embrace to strengthen efforts in this area.
Joint staff trainings
An initial challenge when it comes to cooperation between large and diverse organisations is the lack of knowledge of the other’s mechanisms and internal procedures. That is why a pivotal initiative that NATO and the EU could take to foster mutual understanding and collaboration is the organisation of joint trainings for specialized departmental units. Scenario-based trainings could be a useful instrument through which representatives from both organisations could share their reflections and strategic tools to respond to hybrid threats. As it already did it in the past, Hybrid CoE could be the official host for this kind of exercise as a neutral and expert-based network. In order to increase reaction capabilities, the joint exercises should become a recurrent element of future NATO-EU deliberations, not a sporadic workout.
Simulations in the format of the NATO annual Crisis Management Exercise (CMX) could also be held in a joint session. Through this type of collaborative exercise, the specialised staff from both organisations could assess the strengths and weaknesses of their individual crisis management capabilities and learn from the procedures implemented by the other side. They could also strengthen joint capacities to prevent and counter critical situations that may affect them both.
Enhancing information-sharing mechanisms and situational awareness
Situational awareness about potential hybrid threats should be advanced through open source information-sharing between the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell and its NATO counterpart. In a more concrete sense, both specialised departmental units should periodically exchange their own analysis of potential hybrid threats and propose sets of recommendations.
Strategic communication on disinformation and fake news
Starting from the premises that the so-called “infodemics” were perpetrated by pro-Kremlin entities against both organisations and that they share the objective of undermining Western values, NATO and the EU should develop joint strategies of communication to combat them. Coordinated campaigns intended to dismantle disinformation should be a priority on the agenda. Those campaigns should be focused on two main dimensions: making sense and being effectively promoted. The first dimension would suppose a brainstorming process aimed at bringing the situation to light, or, more specifically, “sifting through relevant information, building an accurate picture of what is happening, and communicating that analysis to political decision-makers”.[viii] The second one would imply drafting clear, fact-based communications assets for the wider public, aimed at disassembling disinformation and fake news from their roots, building trust in both organisations in particular, and in the democratic system and values in general. Only through continued shared efforts both at the internal and external level is this phenomenon to be, if not entirely eradicated, at least properly combated.
About the Author
Elena Denisa Petrescu is an international relations and European studies graduate, with a background in political communications and policy analysis. She is a fellow of the European Academy of Diplomacy (Warsaw), where she is pursuing intensive postgraduate training in international security, while simultaneously completing her final year as an MA student in International Public Affairs at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Bucharest. Currently, she is working for the Embassy of Mexico in Romania as a Political Communication and Press Officer, where she is in charge of monitoring the media, drafting political and policy-related reports, and preparing internal and external communications assets. Elena had also experience in the NGO field, serving as a research assistant at Initiativa Romania and, more recently, as a Delegations Coordinator for the International Association of Political Science Students (IAPSS), where she is in charge of managing IAPSS presence at international conferences and establishing new inter-institutional partnerships.
Notes
[i] NATO, “Warsaw Summit Communiqué,” 9 July 2016, accessed 22 July 2020, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_ texts_133169.htm#hybrid.
[ii] Ibid.
[iii] “Countering hybrid Threats,” European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE), accessed 24 July 2020, https://www.hybridcoe.fi/hybrid-threats/.
[iv] Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Warsaw, 8 July 2016, https://www.consilium. europa.eu/media/21481/nato-eu-declaration-8-july-en-final.pdf.
[v] NATO, Fourth progress report on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by NATO and EU Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017, released on 17 June 2019, accessed 25 August 2020, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_06/190617-4t....
[vi] WHO, Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) Situation Report 13, released in February 2020, accessed 5 August 2020, https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/situation-reports/2....
[vii] EEAS Special Report Update: Short Assessment of Narratives and Disinformation Around the Covid-19/Coronavirus Pandemic, 24 April 2020, accessed 5 August 2020, https://euvsdisinfo.eu/eeas-special-report-update-2-22-april/.
[viii] Arjen Boin et al., “Making sense of sense-making: the EU’s role in collecting, analysing, and disseminating information in times of crisis,” Stockholm: The Swedish National Defence College, 2014, p. 5.
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