Russia and NATO in a post-INF world: One year after withdrawal
Hailed as a landmark decision on US-Soviet arms control, the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) banned land-based missiles with a range of 500-5,500 kilometres. That is, until in August 2019 when President Trump, supported by his NATO allies, withdrew the US from the treaty, citing Russia’s development of the Novator 9M729 land-based cruise missile as a violation of the agreement’s range stipulations. Trump’s decision came after more than a decade of mutual allegations from the US and the Russian Federation, the rise of non-signatories as credible missile powers (most notably China and North Korea), and the development of various new technologies (including hypersonic missiles, nuclear-powered cruise missiles, and nuclear-capable underwater drones). The termination of the INF Treaty has brought the issues of missile balance and deterrence back to the heart of European security, bearing direct consequences for security in the Baltic region, where Russia is continually increasing its anti-access area-denial (A2AD) capabilities, and within the Black Sea region, where Russia is modernising its frigates to deter the deployment of American arms. It is against this backdrop that I shall reflect on NATO-Russia relations since the demise of the INF Treaty, the prospects for future arms control talks—particularly with regard to New START, which will expire in 2021 unless the US and Russia agree to extend it—and NATO’s options for fostering stability in Europe in the face of Russian capacity-building.
By Mats van Dijk
Hailed as a landmark decision on US-Soviet arms control, the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty banned the possession, production, and testing of land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with a range of 500–5,500 kilometres (310–3,420 miles), as well as the possession or production of the launchers needed for such missiles. By May 1991 the treaty had led to the destruction of 2,692 short- and intermediate-range missiles, and it continued to ensure the compliance of both nations through mutual inspections for decades after. That is, until in August 2019, when US President Trump, supported by his NATO allies,[i] formally withdrew the United States from the treaty.
Since the termination of the INF Treaty, the issues of missile balance and deterrence have returned to the centre of European defence and security discussions. It is against this backdrop that I shall reflect on NATO-Russia relations. In particular, this paper focuses on the changed security situation as a consequence of the INF Treaty’s demise, NATO’s options for fostering stability in Europe in the face of Russian capacity-building, and the prospects for future arms control talks—especially with regard to the New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty), which will expire in 2021 unless the US and Russia agree to extend it.
The INF Treaty and its demise
The INF Treaty was concluded against the background of NATO’s Double-Track Decision on December 12, 1979. From this date forward, NATO adopted a two-pronged approach toward the Soviet Union: on one hand, NATO affirmed its commitment to the mutual limitation of intermediate-range ballistic missiles; on the other hand, NATO threatened to deploy more mid-range nuclear weapons in Europe in case of Soviet disagreement so as to guarantee mutually assured destruction. This decision was prompted primarily by a concern about the conventional and nuclear build-up of the Soviet Union and its consequences for European security. It led to long negotiations, which ultimately resulted in the signing of the INF Treaty almost eight years later. For decades, this treaty was at the heart of European security and NATO’s approach to the Soviet Union and its Russian successor state.
Today, the INF Treaty is lost, and NATO is faced with a resurgent Russia. Ultimately, Russia’s development of the Novator 9M729 (SSC-8 Screwdriver[ii]) land-based cruise missile, which according to Washington violates the agreement’s range stipulations, seems to have been the straw that broke the camel’s back. Trump presented Russia with an ultimatum to cease its Novator missile project within 60 days. When after this term passed it was clear that Russia had not desisted, the US announced that it would also no longer comply with the treaty. Though, formally, both parties were compelled to give a six-month notice in case of withdrawal, with Trump’s decision of noncompliance the treaty effectively ended in February 2019 (rather than on the official date in August 2019).
Trump’s decision to withdraw the US may have come as a surprise, but it was based on more than a decade of mutual allegations of noncompliance from the US and the Russian Federation. Another reason that has been cited is the rise of non-signatories of the treaty as credible missile powers: while states such as China and North Korea (and, it seems, Russia) were freely developing arms forbidden under the INF Treaty, the US was bound to the regulations of the INF Treaty. The US, in other words, was effectively fighting with one hand bound behind its back and, by withdrawing from the INF Treaty, chose to untie that hand. Furthermore, the development of various new technologies (including hypersonic missiles, nuclear-powered cruise missiles and nuclear-capable underwater drones) that are not covered by the treaty’s terms indicate a need for a wholly new arms agreement.
The security consequences in Europe
The termination of the INF Treaty has raised concerns over a new arms race between the US and Russia. With both countries now unambiguously producing and testing missiles that would have been banned under the treaty, as well as Trump’s recent announcement that the US will withdraw from the 1992 Open Skies Treaty (OST) that allows for members—including Russia—to conduct unarmed surveillance flights in one another’s airspace, the relations between the US and Russia are unstable to say the least.
The principles of missile balance and deterrence are still very much at the heart of European security. Thus far, the US’s withdrawal from the INF Treaty seems to favour Russia. One must add, of course, that Russia was ostensibly developing the banned missiles either way—the main difference being that now Russia no longer has to develop them clandestinely and can deploy them without facing international reprimands, while the US may now also develop them legitimately. The consequences of Trump’s decision should therefore not be overstated. Another point is that, at least when it comes to land-based missiles, Russia simply has the geographical advantage. The missiles covered under the treaty, with a range of 500–5,500km, are more useful to Russia than to the US: Russia can deploy them virtually anywhere alongside its western border, and it would be able to target a host of potential NATO adversaries. Think, for instance, of the 3M-14 Kalibr (SS-N-30A) cruise missiles that Russia’s navy has been using in Syria from 2015 onward: a land-based variant, with a range of over 500km (310 miles) is claimed to be in production.[iii] In turn, the US is confined to air- and seaborne missile systems or to deploying land-based systems to established bases in Allied countries.
Either way, the INF Treaty’s undoing has far-reaching consequences for Europe’s security dynamics. Three regions in particular are affected: the Baltic region, where Russia is continually increasing its anti-access area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities; the Black Sea region, where Russia is expanding and modernizing its fleet to deter the possible deployment of US or NATO arms along its periphery; and Ukraine, where after years of voluntary compliance with the INF Treaty a debate has surfaced over whether it should enhance its own security by producing missiles previously forbidden by the INF Treaty. Needless to say, these three regions are interconnected, as a geostrategic shift in one of them also bears consequences for the others.
Baltic region
The Baltic states and Poland make up the Alliance’s northern/eastern border and are perceived to be most at risk of Russian hostility. Ever since the illegal annexation of Crimea and the conflict in the Donbass region of Ukraine that started in 2014, NATO has made a priority out of strengthening its deterrence and defence posture in these four countries. Most notably, the Alliance has done so by increasing its permanent military presence and visibility through its enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) and by improving the strength and readiness of its NATO Response Force (NRF), which is to be deployed in case of crises.[iv] In addition, a US-funded Aegis Ashore missile defence system is under construction in Poland and will work together with the Aegis Ashore system that is already operational in Deveselu, Romania.[v]
Nevertheless, analysts are worried NATO’s regional deterrence capabilities are insufficient. Russia has been continuously expanding the missile arsenal in its Kaliningrad exclave, in its Western Military District, and of its Baltic Fleet ever since the mid-2000s. Amongst its latest innovations, which were announced by Putin on 1 March 2018,[vi] are various missiles that have been specifically designed to overcome advanced missile defence systems. With the INF Treaty gone, Russia is now fully capable of exploiting these technological advances by deploying more short- and medium-range missile systems that can reach the Baltic states. If these new missiles are as invulnerable to interception as is claimed, this would present Russia with a significant offensive advantage—and that is without taking into account Russia’s faster decision-making and its clear advantage in terms of proximity. If Russia wanted to invade the Baltic region, it would be able to strike a devastating first blow. Hypothetically, the Novator 9M729 (SSC-8 Screwdriver) missiles could then target infrastructure needed for NATO to send reinforcements (e.g., the two highways leading to the Baltic states that cross the so-called “Suwałki Gap” between Kaliningrad and Belarus[vii]) or—this was one the main reasons of concern over their development—other European capitals in a move to intimidate NATO into accepting a fait accompli.[viii] Either way, Russia’s defence systems—most notably the S-400 Triumf (SA-21 Growler) anti-air system based in the Baltic fleet—would severely complicate NATO’s ability to deploy reinforcements to the Baltic region. Though not impenetrable, Russia’s modernized A2/AD bubble certainly raises the price of credible support to the Baltic states, as the strategic balance has tilted in Russia’s favour.[ix]
Black Sea region
In the Black Sea region, too, Russia is increasing its presence. Russia’s navy is being expanded with new ships, and its existing frigates are being modernized. At the time when these naval reforms were announced in 2019, 12 of the Black Sea fleet’s ships were equipped with various types of 3M-54 Kalibr (SS-N-27 Sizzler) cruise missiles with short-, medium- and long-range capabilities; in the years to come, this figure will be doubled, and the modernized frigates will also be equipped with newly-developed 3M22 Zircon (SS-N-33) hypersonic missiles with a range of 500-1,000km. The decision to outfit these ships with hypersonic missiles, according to Izvestia, can be seen as an asymmetric response to Trump’s withdrawal from the INF Treaty, as the US is expected to deploy offensive weapons to Romania.[x] More generally, this expansion is part of the ongoing State Armament Programme, which aims for the share of modern ships in the Russian Navy to exceed 70 percent by 2027. As Putin recently remarked, Russia’s navy, ever-growing and outfitted with the latest technology, “helps maintain a strategic balance and stability worldwide.”[xi]
The Black Sea fleet is expected to play a critical deterrence role in the region. With its wide range of missiles, Russia’s Black Sea fleet can take aim against strategic NATO targets in Southern, Southwestern, and Central Europe—including, with the addition of the hypersonic missiles, missiles that may be able to bypass the Aegis Ashore system in Romania. Moreover, Russia’s naval base in Tartus, Syria, allows ships to refuel and re-arm, thus enabling them to operate not only in the Mediterranean and Black Sea but also in the Red Sea, as well as the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. This base has been vital to Russia’s ongoing operations in Syria, as well as in the brief naval portion of the conflict with Georgia in 2008. In December 2019, Russia announced that it would invest roughly half a billion dollars in the port, indicating that they have long-term plans in the Mediterranean.[xii] All in all, the Black Sea fleet, with its modernized outfit, will be equipped for a wide variety of operations. This gives Russia an unprecedented advantage in the region and radically changes the geopolitical game overall, forcing NATO—and the US in particular—into an intense competition to regain balance.
Ukraine
Caught in between the developments in both these regions, concerns about missile balance and its consequences for regional deterrence logically also extend to Ukraine. Here, a debate about Russia’s short- and medium-range missile capabilities has ensued ever since the annexation of Crimea and its subsequent armament. Of particular concern to Ukraine are the 9K720 Iskander (SS-26 Stone) missile systems placed in Crimea. The INF Treaty’s demise has aggravated these worries, as Russia is now free to further expand its arsenal of missiles capable of striking various regions of Ukraine.
Interestingly, Ukraine, upon gaining independence in 1991, housed about one-third of the Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal, making it the third biggest nuclear power at the time. However, under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum Ukraine (and Belarus and Kazakhstan) gave up these nuclear weapons in exchange for security assurances from Russia, the US, and the UK (and, in looser terms, China and France). These assurances, which included an affirmation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, have since been violated by Russia; despite the best intentions, support from the other signatories can be argued to have been deficient in the face of Russia’s hybrid aggression.
In light of the INF Treaty’s termination, and with this painful historical lesson in mind, it should come as no surprise that Ukraine is considering expanding its own missile capabilities. In March 2019 Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry stated that, with both the US and Russia abandoning the treaty, it has the right to develop its own intermediate-range missiles.[xiii] As a successor state to the Soviet Union, it had hitherto agreed to fulfil the same obligations under the treaty as the US and Russia and had ceased its production of such missiles (even if Ukraine did not formally consider itself a signatory of the treaty in the first place[xiv]).
Volodymyr Horbulin, a security advisor to the Ukrainian president, has been a firm supporter of the idea to produce intermediate-range missiles for years. According to Horbulin, the development of such capabilities would take up to five years and, more importantly, strong political will.[xv] Yet it seems that this scenario has become more viable in the current post-INF security situation, as the alternative of investing in missile defence technology has been rendered largely ineffective. A militarily more self-reliant Ukraine should in itself be of no concern to NATO, even if such missiles could theoretically be used against its European member states. However, it will certainly upset Russia—and this, in effect, may incite a response from Russia that could be a cause for further complications in the arms dialogue between NATO and Russia. An alternative would be for NATO to deploy missiles in or around Ukraine that could support Ukraine in the case of a Russian incursion. This, however, is problematic given the fact that Ukraine is not a NATO member and is strictly not protected under Article 5 (“Collective defence”) of the North Atlantic Treaty.
Prospects for deterrence and arms control
In this post-INF reality, NATO is forced to rethink its Double-Track Approach, both in terms of its plan for deterrence and for diplomacy.
Deterrence: bolstering NATO’s credibility
To deter Russia from attacking its European member states, especially the Baltic states, it is of the utmost importance that NATO continues to bolster its reinforcement capabilities. This means, first and foremost, that it should improve its readiness and mobility, as is largely already laid out in the RAP, to back up its credibility as an alliance.
Another key part of improving NATO’s credibility may be to increase its short- and medium-range conventional missile capabilities in the area so as to offset some of Russia’s A2/AD capabilities. Nuclear deterrence experts Luis Simón (IES/RUSI) and Alexander Lanoszka (University of Waterloo) have made a strong case for the deployment of a small number of such missiles to strategic sites in Allied countries—for example, in Poland—as well as several other arguments:
a) land-based missiles, especially if mobile and concealed, are harder to track than surface-ships and planes and cannot be targeted by Russia’s S-400 Triumf (SA-21 Growler) system;
b) placing missiles in proximity fills the time and escalation gap between the light capabilities NATO currently has in place (the four multinational battle groups and the missile defence structure) and the heavier capabilities it has further away (predominantly US, UK, and French long-range missile and air power), thus offsetting Russia’s “local escalation dominance”;
c) this would help steer NATO away from land warfare, in which it would be at a disadvantage against Russia (which is not to say that boots on the ground, such as the enhanced Forward Presence, are not important for assurance and actually holding a territory);
d) missiles can be deployed in the region for an indefinite time with relative cost-efficiency, whereas Russia may simply wait out the eFP battle groups’ withdrawal—Russia will always remain the neighbour of the Baltic states, whereas NATO’s eFP is strongly dependent on political will;
e) this would force Russia to make more costly defensive investments and take a more defensive strategy, thus shifting the strategic balance and improving NATO’s position in possible arms control negotiations.[xvi]
The key here, as it was with the eFP upon its deployment, is to deploy only a limited number of missiles so as to stay under the threshold of what may be considered by Russia to be offensive. Furthermore, the range of these missiles should be communicated transparently: for instance, if they can reach not only the Baltic states but Ukraine as well, this may rekindle the conflict with Russia that arose over Ukraine’s possible accession to NATO in 2014. This means that such deployments must necessarily be coupled with dialogue with Russia, which brings us to the second leg of the Double-Track Approach, diplomacy.
Diplomacy: prospects for future arms control agreements
Regardless of whether NATO is to deploy more arms to Russia’s vicinity, it should engage Russia in arms control talks. The termination of the INF Treaty has raised concerns about such talks, particularly surrounding the New START. The New START, the last remaining bilateral arms agreement between the US and Russia, will expire in February 2021 unless both parties agree upon renewing it for up to five years. As such, the negotiations concerning New START are now seen as a potential crossroads in US-Russian—and, by extension, NATO-Russian—arms control and overall relations. Negotiated by Obama and Medvedev in 2010, New START limits both countries’ strategic nuclear missile launchers and imposes strict verification measures that include satellite monitoring and up to 18 on-site inspections each year.
Both Russia and the US would benefit from a renewal of the treaty and have expressed their wishes to extend it. Its terms, however, are still a matter of contention. Whereas the US wants to expand the treaty by including newly-developed nuclear systems into its terms and improving verification measures, Russia seeks to preserve the treaty in its current form, as this would help preserve the status quo that recently shifted in its favour. In addition, the US, concerned with the arms build-up in the South China Sea, has stressed repeatedly their desire to include China as a third signatory and may be unwilling to accept a renewal without China’s assent. The meeting in Vienna on 22–23 June 2020 between the US and Russia may in this regard be indicative of the expansion of such treaties: China was sent an open invitation to join the talks but refused to attend. An unambiguous statement followed in early July: “For them [the US], hyping up the China factor is nothing but a ploy to divert world attention, and to create a pretext, under which they could walk away from the New START, as they have done on so many other arms control treaties. The real purpose is to get rid of all possible restrictions and have a free hand in seeking overwhelming military superiority over any.”[xvii]
Russia, in an ironic twist of fate, has arguably been employing its own variation of NATO’s dual-track approach: by greatly expanding its arsenal, it is forcing the US to engage in talks over New START but from a less advantageous bargaining position. One matter that will undoubtedly be brought to the table during these discussions concerns missile defence systems. Throughout his presidency, Putin has repeatedly brought up this issue. He reiterated this during his address to the Federal Assembly in March 2018, claiming that, ever since the US’s withdrawal from the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty in 2002, Russia has wanted to reach an agreement with America for the sake of preserving strategic stability and preventing an upward spiral of arms spending.[xviii] More broadly speaking, this is in line with Putin’s recurrent accusations that the US, having by far the biggest defence budget for such systems, is trying to preserve a unipolar world order by holding the reins in missile defence and claiming its role as the supreme police force in the international sphere.[xix] All this supports the argument made in a recent report by the Development and Peace Foundation: in order to secure the earnest participation of Russia, future arms control agreements must seriously address Russia’s concerns over the current arms regime, which it considers US-biased and in contradiction to its own national security interests.[xx]
Meanwhile, as all eyes are focused on the US and Russia (and China), an interesting initiative on arms reduction was launched in March 2019 by Heiko Maas, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, and has been endorsed by the foreign ministers of Sweden and The Netherlands. A high-level conference was held in Berlin that focused on challenges and opportunities in arms control negotiations. A follow-up is scheduled for November 2020, three months ahead of the New START’s prospective end date, which means that it could provide valuable input for the US-Russian negotiations.
All in all, while the recent tensions between the US and NATO vis-à-vis Russia make the outcomes of the New START negotiations highly uncertain, the importance of such dialogue should be underlined all the more.
About the Author
Mats van Dijk is a young student/professional from The Netherlands. He is a graduate student in International Relations and Russian and Eurasian Studies at Leiden University and has a background in history. His main areas of interest include Russian politics and foreign policy, European security, military strategy, and transatlantic relations.
Notes
[i]NATO, “NATO and the INF Treaty,” accessed 16 June 2020, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_166100.htm.
[ii]Throughout this article, missile types will be called by their Russian name, with NATO’s reporting name following in brackets.
[iii]“Russia may develop land-based Kalibr cruise missile by end of year – source”, TASS, 7 February 2019, accessed 28 July 2020, https://tass.com/defense/1043620.
[iv]NATO, “Readiness Action Plan,” accessed 3 July 2020, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_119353.htm.
[v]NATO, “Ballistic Missile Defence,” accessed 3 July 2020, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49635.htm. Note that the US-Romanian and US-Polish agreements about the construction of these bases date back to September 2011 and thus precede NATO’s Readiness Action Plan.
[vi]Vladimir Putin, “Poslanie Prezidenta Federal’nomu Sobraniyu [Presidential address to the Federal Assembly],” 1 March 2018 (in Russian), accessed 17 June 2020, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957. Also available in English: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957.
[vii]Sebastien Roblin, “The Suwalki Gap: The 40-Mile Line NATO is Ready to Go to War with Russia Over,” National Interest, 13 April 2019, accessed 3 July 2020, https://www.nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/suwalki-gap-40-mile-line-nato....
[viii]Heinrich Brauss and Christian Mölling, “Abschreckung und Rüstungskontrolle. Europas Sicherheit ohne INF-Vertrag: Politische und strategische Handlungsoptionen für Deutschland und die NATO [Deterrence and Arms Control. Europe’s Security without the INF Treaty: Political and Strategic Options for Action for Germany and NATO],” DGAP Kompakt no. 1 (2019): 2 (in German.)
[ix]Similar arguments have been made even before Russia’s recent innovations. See, e.g.: Fabrice Pothier, “An Area-Access Strategy for NATO,” Survival 59, no. 3 (May 2017): 73–80.
[x]Aleksey Ramm and Bogdan Stepova, “Sila s morya: chernomortsy poluchat noveyshie fregaty [Power from the sea: The Black Sea will receive the latest frigates],” Izvestiya, 31 March 2020 (in Russian), accessed 24 June 2020, https://www.iz.ru/992410/aleksei-ramm-bogdan-stepovoi/sila-s-moria-chern....
[xi]Vladimir Putin, “Remarks at the keel-laying ceremony for new warships,” 20 July 2020, accessed 28 July 2020, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/63688.
[xii]Henry Foy, “Russia to invest $500m in Syrian port of Tartus,” Financial Times, 17 December 2020, accessed 24 June 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/f52bdde6-20cc-11ea-b8a1-584213ee7b2b.
[xiii]“Ukrayina maye parvo stvoryuvaty suchasni raketni kompleksy dlya samozakhystu – Poroshenko [Ukraine has the right to create modern missile complexes for self-defence – Poroshenko],” Ukrinform, 6 March 2019 (in Ukrainian), accessed 4 July 2020, https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-polytics/2654518-vihid-rosii-z-raketnogo....
[xiv]Ibid.
[xv]Volodymyr Horbulin, “Gorbulin o novykh raketakh, Putine, vyborakh i Zelenskom [Horbulin on new rockets, Putin, elections and Zelenskyy],” Kirichenko Talk, YouTube (in Russian), accessed 6 July 2020, https://www.youtu.be/Esl6X1_YBOo.
[xvi]Luis Simón and Alexander Lanoszka, “The Post-INF European Missile Balance: Thinking About NATO’s Deterrence Strategy,” Texas National Security Review 3, no. 3 (Summer 2020), https://tnsr.org/2020/05/the-post-inf-european-missile-balance-thinking-....
[xvii]“China reiterates it will not join so-called China-U.S.-Russia arms control negotiations,” CGTN, 8 July 2020, accessed 13 July 2020, https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-07-08/China-will-not-join-U-S-Russia-arm....
[xviii]Putin, “Poslanie Prezidenta Federal’nomu Sobraniyu.”
[xix]Arguably the most striking example of this rhetoric is found in Putin’s speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference, after which Russia took a much more assertive stance in the political arena. See: Vladimir Putin, “Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy,” 10 February 2007, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034.
[xx]Angela Kane and Noah Mayhew, “Global Trends Analysis. The Future of Nuclear Arms Control: Time for an Update,” Stifting Entwicklung und Frieden/Development and Peace Foundation, 22 June 2020, https://vcdnp.org/the-future-of-nuclear-arms-control-time-for-an-update/.
Image source: https://www.csis.org/analysis/leaving-inf-treaty-now-right-call