Towards a more secure Euro-Atlantic Region: The New Strategic Concept

By Esra Polat

The Euro-Atlantic region

The liberal international order has supported states’ tendency toward cooperation in order to maintain peace and prosperity globally, including arms control and nuclear deterrence policies. NATO and the EU were designed under such a world order. Under this order, it is impossible to deny the advantages of intergovernmental cooperation. However, the emergence of a new war in the European continent has led states to question the EU’s Defence and Security Policy, which relies on the US and NATO’s military capabilities. In addition to this, cyber and hybrid threats by the People’s Republic of China as well as continuation of nuclear and missile programmes by Iran and North Korea draw attention to maintain Euro-Atlantic Security.[i]

Similarly, recent developments in the Euro-Atlantic region have shaped NATO’s New Strategic Concept, which was adopted at the Madrid Summit in June 2022. According to the 2022 Strategic Concept, Russia is “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security, peace, and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.”[ii] 

This contrasts NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept, in which NATO appeared as a more reconciliatory intergovernmental organization within the stability of the international liberal order. Russia has been perceived as a partner of NATO to assist in security since the end of the Cold War and dissolution of the Soviet Union. Partnership has been a tool for more than 30 years in the fields of non-proliferation and arms control as well as nuclear issues. Military to military cooperation and support for NATO-led operations were the preferred policy instruments; hence, the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) was established as a result of the NATO-Russia Summit on 28 May 2002.[iii] The NRC was a mechanism of consultation and joint decision-making in order to facilitate cooperation between NATO and Russia. Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 raised tensions between NATO and Russia.[iv] In 2018, the use of a military-grade nerve agent to attack a Russian dissident in Salisbury, UK, was condemned by the Allies. The number of personnel in the Russian Mission at NATO Headquarters was decreased from 30 to 20 personnel[v]; later, in 2021, eight members of Russian Mission to NATO were identified as Russian intelligence agents, and the number was decreased from 20 to 10 personnel. A decade ago, NATO actively sought cooperation with Russia, particularly on missile defence. In contrast, currently, NATO no longer considers the Russian Federation as a partner in any shape, although it remains open to communication and mitigating possible risks with Russia.[vi]

The current agenda requires new strategies and resilience in respect to determining NATO and its member states’ foreign policy strategies against emerging threats from the Russian Federation in the Euro-Atlantic area.

History of arms control in the Euro-Atlantic 

For 50 years the United States and Russia had treaty-based bilateral arms control procedures in place. However, the Cuban Missile Crisis provided a clue to the US and the Soviet Union about the potential for a nuclear war. Both states had the nuclear power to erase the entire human population. By the early 1960s, ballistic missiles and thermonuclear warheads had produced an unparalleled level of quasi-certainty, speed, and reaction, to which radiation added an air of dread. Nuclear weapons had previously been viewed as tools for waging wars. With nuclear weapons, deterrence evolved into a planning-intensive strategy in which the danger of ultimate retaliation took centre stage. Since then, deterrence has been a vital factor in global politics as conflict between nuclear states is rarely contemplated in modern times. This nuclear deterrence strategy, however, was based on the idea that politics would play a role in a potential nuclear conflict.xv By the late 1960s, both sides talked about “peaceful coexistence” rather than constant hostility. In this context, both states sought to compromise on arms control. The first negotiations on arms control date back to 1967 and eventually resulted in the implementation of the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) signed in 1972. These agreements also established the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which restricted each side’s strategic missile defences to 100 interceptors. In 2002, the US withdrew from the ABM Treaty. The second treaty formed in this period was the second Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II) signed in 1979. In comparison with SALT I, SALT II never was ratified by the US Congress due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.[vii] SALT I and SALT II are the most important documents related to disarmament during the Cold War era.

Additionally, several transatlantic defence policies were implemented through multilateral agreements during the Cold War. These formal agreements remained in place for many decades.[viii] The most notable of these is the 1967 Harmel Report.[ix] The Harmel Report, named after Belgian prime minister Pierre Harmel, effectively established deterrence and détente as fundamental NATO principles and provided the framework for the organization’s preliminary efforts toward a more cooperative approach to security concerns.[x] Harmel proposed good diplomatic relations and defence with members of Warsaw Pact countries. The report analysed events over the past 20 years and their effects on NATO. The Harmel Report led to the formation of a number of initiatives that ceased the arms race and eased East-West tensions. Increasing allied consultation on the bilateral US-Soviet relationship within the context of transatlantic security is one of the key features among the initiatives outlined in the Harmel Report. In 1987, during the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, the US administration relied on the principles outlined in this report.[xi] Consequently, the Harmel Report is crucial as it promotes dual track deterrence and détente. In addition, the Harmel Report paved the way for East-West détente in the beginning of the 1970s, which led to the establishment of the 1975 Helsinki Summit and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

As the Soviet Union disbanded, the Soviet Union and the United States signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START) on 31 July 1991. The treaty oversaw the reduction of US and Russian nuclear weapons. START I was crucial to constructing a framework that offered stability and predictability for significant reductions. Although the US and Russia agreed to implement START II, the agreement was never implemented. Later, in 2003, the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT), i.e., the Moscow Treaty, entered into force. On 5 December 2009, START I expired. As the treaty expired, the US and Russia began negotiations that resulted in the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START).[xii] 

A new strategic treaty, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), was signed between the United States and Russia in 2011. In compliance with the New START, Russia and the United States were limited to an equal number of deployed strategic warheads and weapons carrying them, e.g., intercontinental ballistic missiles. In order to prove compliance, strict counting rules and transparency requirements were implemented.[xiii] The duration of the treaty was ten years from its entry into force (i.e., February 2021). Following this, the United States and the Russian Federation agreed to extend the treaty through 4 February 2026.[xiv]   

Nuclear deterrence and the Euro-Atlantic

Arms control is a dynamic topic in the Euro-Atlantic region. Tensions remain high, while the potential for armed conflict is rising. The current arms control crisis has two main focuses: Russia’s violation of key arms control treaties and obligations and China’s isolationist policies with regard to arms control architecture. The Euro-Atlantic has a network that includes arms control Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs). These commitments might be multinational, bilateral, legally binding, politically binding, or unilateral. When investigating Russia and China’s foreign and internal policies, it is clear that both countries continue to invest in the modernization of their armed forces as well as nuclear arsenals.  

In the current order, there are other states that have nuclear capabilities, including Russia and China, which are conspicuous states when it comes to nuclear deterrence. Furthermore, in the new Strategic Concept, Russia and China have been labelled as challenges to the Alliance’s unity. The possibility of a military alliance between Russia and China would be able to upset the balance in the Euro-Atlantic region. Notwithstanding China’s tendency to avoid cooperation with Western Allies, there is not a guarantee that China will not implement its aggressive style of “wolf-warrior diplomacy” against NATO states. While there has been a major risk of nuclear war since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the consequences of future nuclear weapons use has been deliberately left ambiguous by the Biden Administration.[xv]  

In the 2022 Strategic Concept, the agreements made at the Madrid Summit provide a solid basis for further modifying NATO’s deterrence and defence posture in response to the changing Russian threat. For NATO Allies, this implies that any choices made on arms control must take into account the needs of Allies’ deterrence and defence policy.

To sum up, the 2022 Strategic Concept can be a guide for NATO’s nuclear deterrence policy as well as arms control. Taking into account all of these global challenges from the Cold War period until now, diplomats should focus on the usage of nuclear deterrence to avoid a humanitarian crisis and retain global peace.

Policy Recommendations

Following the introduction of the 2022 Strategic Concept, the following policy recommendations can be considered:

Firstly, arms control should be evaluated as a policy instrument. For NATO Allies, this means that any decisions that are made on arms control must take into account the priorities of the Allies’ deterrence and defence policies. NATO Allies should fulfil the security, stability, and verification criteria on weapons control. Moreover, through NATO, European Allies may utilise other member states’ knowledge and influence, since the transatlantic alliance is the foundation of Euro-Atlantic security. Thirdly, prioritizing weapons control on NATO’s agenda would require strengthening this function and expanding the scope of the Special Advisory and Consultative Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Committee (ADNC).

Along with strengthening its relationship with the EU in cyberspace and space, NATO should enhance public-private and non-profit collaborations between its member nations. NATO Edge 2022 is the most recent example of cooperation with the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCI Agency) on the topics of digital transformation, innovative partnerships, technological resilience, and agile acquisition.[xvi] It is the most effective tool that needs to be improved for dealing with specifically the cyber threats posed by China.

The US and its allies should coordinate efforts to establish standards and ban certain weapons systems, as well as speak with one voice at multilateral conferences on disarmament or the UN. Over the coming ten years, NATO Allies will have to re-explain how the deterrence and political détente principles of the Harmel Report are constant. Despite the many challenges presented by the shift to a multipolar world, the non-nuclear-oriented security environment provides opportunities for Europeans to take a leading role in arms control.

According to some scholars, like Andrea Chiampan,[xvii] NATO must focus on arms control in future; others think that NATO’s future grand strategy is in developing resilience strategies. Although maintaining security is a priority for NATO in the Euro-Atlantic, the Alliance faces a variety of issues and challenges in both areas, through nuclear deployments and proliferation to threats from conventional forces, hybrid forces, and non-state actors.  Through NATO and within the already-established institutions for weapons control and non-proliferation, European Allies can maximize their knowledge and influence.

In summary, prospects for arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation present both a struggle and a chance for NATO. Regarding the 2022 Strategic Concept, strategic stability has been damaged as a result of the deterioration of the arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation architecture. The broader security environment has gotten worse due to the Russian Federation’s violations and poor fulfilment of its arms control obligations and commitments.  Arms control is a significant topic, particularly for a world that has overcome two world wars.

About the Author

Esra Polat is currently a master’s degree student studying international relations at Padova University in the Department of European and Global Studies, specializing in European Policies. She is interested in intergovernmental organizations. During her studies, she works with the European Student Think Tank to help young people’s voices be heard in global politics.

Notes

[i] NATO, “NATO 2022 Strategic Concept,” 29 June 2022, Articles 13, 18, and 41, https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept.

[ii] Ibid.

[iii] NATO-Russia Council, “About NRC,” NATO, https://www.nato.int/nrc-website/en/about/index.html.

[iv] NATO, “NATO-Russia Council,” last updated 1 September 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50091.htm.

[v] NATO, “Relations with Russia,” last updated 14 July 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50090.htm.

[vi] “NATO 2010 Strategic Concept.”

[vii] Daryl Kimball and Kingston Reif, “U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control Agreements at a Glance,” last reviewed October 2022, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/USRussiaNuclearAgreements.

[viii] Anna Péczeli, “The future of arms control in a multilateral and multi-domain environment,” NDC Research Paper, 2021, p. 51–61.

[ix] Andrea Chiampan, “NATO’s Future Challenges and Opportunities in Non-strategic Arms Control,” NATO and The Future of Arms Control, no. 21, November 2021: 29–39.

[x] NATO, “Harmel Report,” https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67927.htm.

[xi] Daryl Kimball, “The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty at a Glance,” last reviewed August 2019, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/INFtreaty.

[xii] Daryl Kimball, “START I at a Glance,” last reviewed April 2022, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/start1.

[xiii] Martin Russell, “The New START Treaty between the US and Russia,” European Parliament Research Service, PE 690.523, March 2021, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/690523/EPRS_BRI(2021)690523_EN.pdf.

[xiv] Shannon Bugos, “New START at a Glance,” Arms Control Association, April 2022, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/NewSTART.

[xv] Eric Schlosser, “What if Russia uses nuclear weapons in Ukraine?” The Atlantic, June 2022, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/06/russia-ukraine-nuclear-weapon-us-response/661315/.

[xvi] NATO Communications and Information Agency, “NATO Edge,” https://natoedge.nato.int.

[xvii] Chiampan, “NATO’s Future Challenges and Opportunities,” 29.