The Southern Flank: Opportunities and challenges for the Atlantic Alliance

By Aldo Carano

The 2022 Strategic Concept: What’s new for the Southern Flank? 

The 2022 Strategic Concept reflects the necessity of the Atlantic Alliance to respond to an evolving and more insecure international order. Russian aggression in Ukraine constitutes a major challenge coming from such instability and international competition. The impact of a war on European soil is clear. The evolving international order and the Russian war in Ukraine led NATO to focus on collective defence and deterrence in the new Strategic Concept approved in Madrid in June 2022[i]: Russia takes the first place among the list of international challenges in the section devoted to the “Strategic Environment”. For the first time, the threat of China’s rise and the growing tensions and competition in the Indo-Pacific were added to the Strategic Concept, giving the Alliance a broader global mission.

However, some dossiers and issues cannot be merely addressed by collective security and defence. For this reason, the Alliance needs (though deepened in the Strategic Concept) to strengthen its two other core tasks: crisis prevention and management and cooperative security.[ii] While collective security emphasizes reaction (to a possible threat), crisis prevention and management and cooperative security entail continuous and incremental engagement.[iii] Such approaches may be suitable for contexts characterized by multiple fluid and unconventional challenges. The Southern Flank of NATO, i.e., the Mediterranean basin, offers a valuable example of a region in which NATO has confronted the aforementioned challenges: terrorism and wars, unstable states, socio-issues, migration, and climate change.

The 2022 Strategic Concept offers a clear portrait of how such challenges may be addressed and of NATO’s new 360°-degree commitment. The Alliance takes into account multiple factors affecting security in North Africa and the Middle East. These are outlined in point 11 in the section describing the Strategic Environment[iv]:

Conflict, fragility and instability in Africa and the Middle East directly affect our security and the security of our partners. NATO’s southern neighbourhood, particularly the Middle East, North Africa and Sahel regions, faces interconnected security, demographic, economic and political challenges. These are aggravated by the impact of climate change, fragile institutions, health emergencies and food insecurity. This situation provides fertile ground for the proliferation of non-state armed groups, including terrorist organisations. It also enables destabilising and coercive interference by strategic competitors.

Alongside the necessity of facing new and aggravated challenges, NATO continues to give crucial importance to combatting terrorism. Counterterrorism remains central to defence and collective security as part of NATO’s 360-degree view. The Alliance acknowledges both the importance of combatting terrorism, to react against it, and the necessity to fight against it also in unconventional fields with new and more lethal technologies.[v]

Given the importance of the strategic environment of the Southern Flank and countering terrorism, the Strategic Concept outlines different responses to be shaped by NATO’s different tasks: deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security. Under the aspect of deterrence and defence, NATO will continue to apply a deterrence of denial against terrorist threats, combined with attack prevention and measures of protection, starting from NATO countries’ populations. The importance of broader support in the fight against terrorism is also stressed by the reference to the EU and the UN as crucial partners.[vi] The same approach is proposed in the crisis management and prevention section, where the Allies commit to “ensure the resources, capabilities, training and command and control arrangements to deploy and sustain military and civilian crisis management, stabilisation and counter-terrorism operations, including at strategic distance”. But what about in ordinary and non-critical times? As outlined, NATO will continue to promote “political dialogue”. To understand how this political dialogue is structured, we should recall two pillars of NATO’s Southern Flank policy: the Mediterranean Dialogue (1994) and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (2004).

Cooperation and dialogue in the South: The Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative

The term “Southern Flank” appears almost at the beginning of NATO’s life, in the 1950s.[vii] Thinking about the Southern Flank has been always important in order to include member states in the Mediterranean area, such as Spain, Italy, or Turkey, and many others in the following decades. After the Cold War and many decades of existential challenges coming from the Eastern Flank, the South acquired more importance. The Mediterranean area was recognized as crucial to the stability and security of the Euro-Atlantic community in order to avoid instability in the MENA area or prevent the spread of terrorism across Europe.

For this reason, NATO launched the Mediterranean Dialogue in 1994.[viii] The purpose was to invite Mediterranean non-member states to contribute to regional security. In February 1995, a first group composed of Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia joined the Dialogue, followed by Jordan in November of that year and Algeria in March 2000. The Dialogue takes place in two different formats: a bilateral one (NATO+1), gathering the Allies and a single partner, or a multilateral one (NATO+7), gathering the Allies and all the parties of the Dialogue.[ix] The Mediterranean Dialogue is founded on six principles: non-discrimination, self-differentiation, two-way engagement, non-imposition, diversity, and complementarity to other international initiatives in the region. These principles are fundamental to engage in real diplomatic dialogue between NATO and its Southern partners and to fully respect different political views. The aim of such a Dialogue is to produce mutual benefits for security and stability. Mediterranean Dialogue partners share expertise, best practices, and knowledge with NATO in preventing and countering violent extremism, the protection of critical energy infrastructure, missile defence or cyber security.[x]

The dramatic geopolitical shift caused by the 9/11 attacks enormously increased the role of the Southern Flank. In Afghanistan, NATO countries took the command of first two rotations of the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, and in 2003 NATO took command itself deploying the 1GNC as a NATO Combined Joint Taskforce (CJTF). The corps became a “High Readiness Forces (Land) Headquarters” (HRF(L) HQ) as part of NATO’s Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). The first deployment within this framework took place between February and August 2003 when the corps operated as ISAF’s headquarters in Afghanistan (HQ ISAF-3), following the command periods of the United Kingdom (ISAF-1) and Turkey (ISAF-2). The War on Terror and the ISAF mission raised the issue of deepening relations with Middle Eastern countries, especially in the Gulf area. Many Gulf States gave significant contributions to ISAF: Bahrain deployed special forces in Afghanistan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) provided specialised troops, Kuwait provided air access and parking, and Qatar offered the Allies the use of an air base.[xi] In this spirit, NATO countries invited Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, the UAE, and Oman to the Istanbul Summit (2004). The main outcome of the Summit was the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI). Currently, four countries participating in the Gulf Cooperation Council – Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE – have joined the Initiative, while Oman and Saudi Arabia participate in selected activities within the ICI framework. A crucial role in the build-up of the Initiative was played by Ambassador Alessandro Minuto Rizzo, Deputy Secretary General of NATO.[xii] The principles regulating the Initiative are the same as those of the Mediterranean Dialogue, in the spirit of open and respectful cooperation. The ICI boosted the cooperation between NATO and Gulf Countries. The UAE joined ISAF in 2008, while Qatar joined Operation Unified Protector in Libya, which will be detailed below. Kuwait signed the first transit treaty with the Alliance in the region in 2012. The greatest outcome of ICI is the NATO-ICI Regional Centre, established in Kuwait City in 2017, which acts as a hub for the enhancement of practical cooperation between NATO and its Gulf partners.[xiii] It aims to improve the common understanding of security challenges and, through increased interoperability and standardization, enable closer cooperation. The hub promotes practical cooperation in various areas including strategic analysis, civil preparedness, military-to-military cooperation, and public diplomacy. Its activities are open to all countries participating in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative as well as Oman and Saudi Arabia, which have not joined ICI, but are willing to continue to cooperate on a case-by-case basis.

The Libyan crisis and Operation Unified Protector

Amid the dramatic geopolitical shift provoked by terrorism and other transnational challenges, the 2010 Strategic Concept recognized that responsibility for the security of the Euro-Atlantic area had moved away from Europe to the periphery. Collective defence and deterrence were maintained, as usual, but the new challenges, coming from the outside, required crisis management and cooperative security. Within this context, the Southern Flank played a significant role. The test for this approach came very soon: in 2011, the North African and Syrian shores were enflamed by the so-called “Arab Springs”. Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Syria saw massive protests and political unrest against decades-long regimes. In Syria, the Arab Spring brought about one of the most complex and vicious civil wars in the 21st century; in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood, after the removal of Mubarak, seized power only to eventually lose power after a military coup. Libya, however, offered the most significant challenge to NATO.

In 2011, Operation Unified Protector was launched against the Qaddafi regime and conducted through a “Coalition of the Willing” of NATO countries, initially without the direct involvement of the Alliance. Operation Unified Protector aimed to support the anti-Qaddafi rebels. The operation started on 23 March 2011, enforcing UN Security Council resolutions 1970 and 1973. The first steps were a naval arms embargo, the establishment of a no-fly zone and air strike against pro-Qaddafi Libyan Armed Forces. Unified Protector showed from the beginning the weak points within the Alliance, starting from the lack of unity among NATO members. While the United States, France, and the United Kingdom were the main supporters of the operation and the coalition of the willing (both politically and militarily), other Allies were quite sceptical. Germany refused to back UN Resolution 1973 and did not participate in the operation; Poland criticised the intervention, stating that it was “mainly based on oil interests”. This lack of unity also explains why the operation was conducted by single governments without the involvement—at least at the beginning—of the Alliance, triggering state-led operations like Operation Odyssey Dawn (by the US), Operation Harmattan (by France), Operation Ellamy (by the UK), and Operation Mobile (by Canada), with the support of Italy, Spain, Belgium, Norway, and Denmark.

After this phase, NATO finally seized command of the operation. On 24 March, the Alliance took command of the no-fly zone, and three days later, the responsibility for military operations was transferred to NATO.[xiv] Once the main goal of the operation—the removal of Qaddafi—was reached, the subsequent events dramatically showed the insufficiency of such extended interventions. The opposition was fragmented and was never able to form a unified government. The Tripoli government, recognized by the international community and supported by most NATO Allies, like Italy and Turkey, was not able to extend its sovereignty over the Libyan national territory as a whole. In such chaos, the military strength allowed General Qalif Haftar to rule the Eastern side of Libya from Tobruk. This fragmentation allowed Russia, relaunching its role in the Mediterranean after its intervention in Syria (September 2015), to spread its influence in Libya, supporting Haftar and deploying the Wagner Group’s contractors, especially around oil fields.[xv] The instability also allowed the Islamic State to infiltrate the country, taking Benghazi, one of the country’s main cities. Another impact was the massive migration crisis, due in part to the failure of the Libyan state.

Today, the fragmentation of Libya continues to reverberate within the Alliance: while Turkey is one of the main political sponsors and military allies of the Tripoli government, France, alongside regional powers like Egypt, exercise its traditional influence in the Mediterranean, supporting Haftar. In conclusion, NATO’s intervention in Libya shows two weaknesses that must be turned into lessons to be learned. The first one is that the mere deployment of air assets and air strikes may allow the Alliance to win quite easily without suffering dramatic losses; however, the lack of a local political and ruling class, land patrolling, and a unitary and sovereign government may lead to chaos. The second one is that internal unity is, once again, one of the greatest challenges for NATO: the risk is a “NATO à la carte”, where the members commit only when and where they have significant interests.[xvi]

NATO Hub for the South and new geopolitical challenges

For the Southern Flank, the most significant measure taken by NATO in recent times in the context of the mounting instability and fight against al-Qaeda and ISIS as part of the Global Coalition against the Islamic State is the creation of the Hub of the South in 2017, under the direction of the Joint Allied Command in Naples. The main purpose of the Hub is to lay the basis for “contact, consultation, and coordination”. According to Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, “this will help us to coordinate information on crisis countries such as Libya and Iraq, and help us address terrorism and other challenges stemming from the region.”[xvii]

The Hub works on many different topics: conflict, the fight against terrorism, socio-economic issues, technology and innovation as well as the goals of NATO’s 2030 Agenda, such as the Women, Peace and Security Initiative.[xviii] Dialogue and cooperation are implemented owing to the fact that non-military entities, coming from civil society, are recognized as stakeholders in cooperation and peace processes. Through the Hub (and previously existing structures of dialogue and cooperation), NATO has the instruments to go beyond its historical and traditional mission of defence and collective security for members. NATO could adopt the instruments of preventive diplomacy, dialogue, and strengthening its partner in order to prevent, limit, and overcome threats and challenges. For instance, to address developments in local politics, dialogue with civil society and grassroots organizations regarding security needs and grievances may be possible solutions. This is essential to ensure sustainability and the development of healthy civil-military relations. Moreover, the dialogue should escape the logic of ad hoc projects and instead focus on long-term processes, aiming to build permanent relations with partners. In this way, NATO would not behave in a simple reactive (by responding to a threat) or negative (by denying that a threat or an attack could take place) manner but in a cooperative and positive (in terms of the creation of security) manner. Through dialogue structures and the Hub, the Allies would not simply resolve existing crises but avoid the rise of new ones.

Alongside NATO’s growing commitments in the South, its competitors have increased their presence in this region. Amid the lack of stability in the MENA, Russia and China have expanded their influence in the South and, in some cases where there is an absence of effective political and military authorities, filled voids of power. Through its naval base in Tartus, Syria, Russia maintains an informal military presence in Libya, Mali, Sudan, and other African countries thanks to Kremlin-linked private military contractors (the most famous of these is the aforementioned Wagner Group), while China expands its influence via economic means, providing financing, purchase of sovereign debts, and building of infrastructure in the region.[xix] However, the possibility that, in the future, China would strengthen its economic penetration through political and military means – posing a direct threat to Europe – is still a matter of speculation.

Conclusion and recommendations

In a context where the most dramatic geopolitical shift taking place today is that of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the strengthening of the Eastern Flank is a necessity. It is not only an issue of defence and collective security but also solidarity, ethics, and common sense. However, the improvement of security in one area should not jeopardize other crucial areas from where less conventional or traditional (although not less severe) threats may emerge. Therefore, in the Southern Flank, NATO must continue and improve its goal to project stability. Stability is at risk when the other side of the Mediterranean is troubled; there is no “Fortress Europe”.

The Alliance may continue to deepen and diversify its dialogue with MENA partners, showing interest not only in traditional security issues but also cooperation and development. This could help NATO to be “more attractive” and to contain the influence of Russia and China.[xx] In this sense, NATO could strengthen its focus on civil society, non-military actors, and new generations of future leaders and citizens. In addition, since NATO is a fundamental component of the international liberal-democratic world order, it should deepen its relations with other multilateral parties, such as the African Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council. Finally, the importance of the MENA may be underlined through the creation of a NATO special envoy, a figure through who the dialogue may be “institutionalized”.

About the Author

Aldo Carano is a second year master’s degree student in European and International Studies at the School of International Studies of the University of Trento. From September–December 2022, he will work as an intern for the Italian embassy in Ukraine. His main research interests are transatlantic relations and NATO, US–EU relations, and bilateral relations between the US and European partners. He is passionate about the history of international relations, diplomacy, and geopolitics. He is a Junior Fellow at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and a member of AESI (European Association of International Studies). During an AESI conference at the Library of the Italian Parliament, he discussed the role of NATO for European security.

Notes

[i] NATO, “NATO 2022 Strategic Concept,” 29 June 2022, https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept.

[ii] Ibid.

[iii] F. Borsari, “Ignore NATO’s Southern Flank at Your Peril,” CEPA, 11 August 2022, https://cepa.org/ignore-natos-southern-flank-at-your-peril/.

[iv] NATO, “NATO 2022 Strategic Concept.”

[v] Ibid.

[vi] Ibid.

[vii] I. Fuente Cobo, “NATO and the ‘Southern Flank’. Balance and future prospects in light of the Madrid Summit 2022,” Atalayar, 9 July 2022, https://atalayar.com/en/content/nato-and-southern-flank-balance-and-future-prospects-light-madrid-summit-2022.

[viii] NATO, “Mediterranean Dialogue,” last updated 23 June 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52927.htm.

[ix] Ibid.

[x] Ibid.

[xi] Fuente Cobo, "NATO and the ‘Southern Flank.’”

[xii] NATO, “Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI),” last updated 1 September 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52956.htm#:~:text=The%20Istanbul%20Cooperation%20Initiative%20(ICI,opportunity%20to%20cooperate%20with%20NATO.

[xiii] Ibid.

[xiv] NATO, “NATO and Libya – Operation Unified Protector,” last updated 27 March 2012, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/71679.htm.

[xv] R. Uniacke, “Libya could be Putin’s Trump card,” Foreign Policy, 8 July 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/08/wagner-group-libya-oil-russia-war/

[xvi] Fuente Cobo, "NATO and the ‘Southern Flank.’”

[xvii] Ibid.

[xviii] NATO, “The Southern Hub,” https://thesouthernhub.org/topics.

[xix] Borsari, “Ignore NATO’s Southern Flank.”

[xx] Ibid.