The Ukraine Watershed for Strengthening NATO-EU Cooperation
By Lee David Turpin
The Russian military invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 marked a watershed moment in European defence. The challenge for European states not only encompassed Russia’s disregard for international law and the principles of the United Nations charter but also its renewed threat to the Euro-Atlantic area more widely. In its revised Strategic Context adopted in June 2022, NATO Allies and partners have shown common resolve and sought to intensify unity, including with the European Union (EU) and its member states. This has encompassed imposing robust sanctions on Russia and providing military, financial, and political support for Ukraine in defending itself.[i] It has also meant the reinforcement of deterrence on NATO’s Eastern flank, through increases in the size of both permanent military presence stationed in front-line states and rapid-response forces based further West.[ii] There have also been promises of significant financial investments in defence from European states, with European governments announcing increases of nearly €200 billion to their defence budgets, as well as initiatives from the European Commission to both support Ukraine and bolster European defence capabilities.[iii]
The unprecedented flurry of this activity illustrates the extent to which the European security and defence environment has been shaken by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. This article will focus on the impact of these events on NATO and EU cooperation and argues that there is an opportunity presented to cast off the NATO-EU institutional rivalry. Thus far, this has hampered the effectiveness of these organizations, but there are now clear incentives to embrace mutually reinforcing cooperation. First, it provides an overview of the NATO-EU relationship, including its key challenges. Next, it discusses the development of NATO-EU cooperation in light of Russia’s war on Ukraine. As adversaries systematically seek to sow division and the United States pivots to the Indo-Pacific region, it highlights that European states are increasingly incentivised to contribute more to their own defence and strengthen the European pillar within NATO.
The NATO-EU Relationship
NATO and the EU share a majority of members, have common values, and face similar threats and challenges in terms of security and defence, not least including those arising from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This is apparent in the recently updated key strategic documents of both NATO and the EU, in the form of NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept and the EU’s Strategic Compass for Security and Defence.
NATO's 2022 Strategic Concept, adopted at the Madrid Summit, re-committed the Alliance to its core task of collective defence. It does so explicitly in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, highlighting that Russia is viewed as the “most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.”[iv] Only months earlier, in March 2022, the EU's Strategic Compass document was published. This set out a plan of action for strengthening the EU's security and defence policy by 2030 and was no less forthright in acknowledging the threat posed by Russia to European security. Indeed, it recognized that the “war on Ukraine is the most serious security crisis in Europe in decades”.[v] Both documents claim values based on human rights, fundamental freedoms, and commitment to rules-based international order. In addition, the prospect of EU member states Sweden and Finland joining NATO only serves to reinforce the already significant overlap in NATO/EU members (their accession to NATO will mean 23 of 27 EU member states are NATO members).[vi] Furthermore, in June, Denmark voted to drop its EU security and defence opt-out in a referendum.[vii]
While the EU’s Strategic Compass makes clear EU ambitions to make “a quantum leap to become a more assertive and decisive security provider”, the EU has also acknowledged the primacy of NATO in the sphere of collective territorial defence. Furthermore, it has pledged to “help to strengthen NATO and become a stronger Transatlantic partner”.[viii] This illustrates a key tension at the heart of the NATO-EU relationship: enhancing the capacity of the EU to complement NATO without metaphorically stepping on its toes.
Challenges and Opportunities of NATO-EU Cooperation
The dilemma was summed up succinctly over 20 years ago, when then US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright warned against the dangers of ‘the 3 Ds’ of a European Security and Defence Policy; decoupling European decision-making from Alliance decision-making, duplication of European security and defence structures with NATO structures, and discrimination against NATO members that are not part of the EU.[ix] Such warnings have been echoed many times since, including in 2021 by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, following the decision of five EU member states to launch a ‘crisis reaction force initiative’.[x]
However, it is also important to recognize that there is support for EU involvement in security and defence matters that enhances European capabilities, where the aforementioned pitfalls can be avoided. This is especially vital in reference to the long history of US dissatisfaction with the level of burden-sharing among NATO Allies. Complaints from Washington regarding European allies’ contributions, particularly regarding defence spending, were perhaps most direct during the Trump presidency, but they are certainly long-running and span multiple US administrations.[xi] Even during the height of the NATO military operation in Afghanistan, at the 2006 Latvia Summit, then-US President George W. Bush urged Allies to increase their defence spending and repeated similar sentiments at NATO’s 2008 summit in Bucharest, Romania.[xii] Matters related to burden-sharing were later brought to a head during NATO’s 2014 Wales Summit, where the pledge that 2% of GDP was to be spent by NATO members on defence was first formalized.[xiii] This came against a backdrop of years of steady decline in European defence spending generally, as well as the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea. Notably, then-US President Barack Obama commented that NATO Allies needed to “step up” and do their “fair share” on defence.[xiv] As US Secretary of Defence Austin put it in 2021, a “stronger and more capable European defence” would be supported by the US if it “contributes positively to the transatlantic and global security that’s compatible with NATO”.[xv]
Alongside the potential for the EU to enhance European capabilities to contribute within NATO, it has also been acknowledged that the EU as an actor possesses a unique range of instruments that can complement NATO capacities. This has been expressed through the EU’s ‘comprehensive approach’ to crisis management and operations, which entails the application of both military and civilian mechanisms to deal with security and defence challenges.[xvi] This has been noted as particularly relevant for NATO-EU cooperation as the organizations possess different tools and instruments and can wield these in the pursuit of shared objectives.[xvii]
Bearing the combination of challenges and potential synergies discussed above in mind, the NATO-EU relationship has been progressively built upon since their first official meeting in May 2001. While there have certainly been important challenges along the road since this time, there has also been a long track record of cooperation, including personnel exchanges, joint exercises, and mutually reinforcing operations. This latter point was perhaps best evidenced through the EU (Operation Atalanta, 2008–present) operating alongside NATO (Operation Ocean Shield, 2009–2016) to deter, prevent, and suppress acts of piracy and armed robbery to international shipping off the Horn of Africa.[xviii] While these operations lacked a formal link, effective mechanisms for informal information exchange and cooperation were developed.[xix] It also demonstrated the added-value of the EU to complement NATO efforts through its ‘comprehensive approach’ toolkit. Namely, the EU was able to couple the deployment of its military mission with the training of Somali armed forces, humanitarian aid, and development assistance to Somalia, as well as active diplomacy with neighbouring states to allow for the prosecution of captured pirates.[xx]
In terms of institutionalized NATO-EU cooperation, this is guided by the principles enshrined in the 2016 Warsaw and 2018 Brussels Joint Declarations on NATO-EU cooperation. These outlined seven concrete areas of cooperation between the two organisations; countering hybrid threats, operational cooperation, cybersecurity and defence, defence capabilities, defence industry and research, exercises, and supporting Eastern and Southern partners’ capacity-building efforts. From these, 74 goals were identified for implementation to build cooperation in these key areas. However, as evidenced by the jointly published progress reports produced annually, from 2018–2021, progress in NATO-EU cooperation was more incremental than transformational in terms of the strategic partnership. This was recognized by the NATO 2030 Reflection Group, appointed by the NATO Secretary General to help strengthen the future political dimension of the Alliance, which reiterated that “although NATO and the EU have devised detailed mechanisms for cooperation, these have not always worked as well as hoped”.[xxi] This was perhaps particularly disappointing given some optimistic and symbolic rhetoric pointing towards the importance of NATO-EU cooperation.
Renewed Impetus for NATO-EU Cooperation in 2022
Prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, NATO-EU cooperation had been facing a number of important challenges. There was discord among Allies regarding Turkey’s purchase of Russian S-400 missiles, and the Cyprus problem again becoming prominent, historically a key barrier to NATO-EU intelligence-sharing arrangements.[xxii] In addition, relations between the UK and its EU allies were at a low ebb, not only following disagreements surrounding Brexit but also the AUKUS security arrangement, which soured relations with France.[xxiii] Meanwhile, discussions surrounding what has intermittently been called European ‘strategic autonomy’ had been getting louder and more frequent, not least following the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan, where European Allies complained at the lack of coordination and communication from the United States.[xxiv]
While the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 did not make such issues disappear, it reduced their salience relative to the renewed sense of threat to the Euro-Atlantic area posed by Russia. If one of Russia's goals with its invasion of Ukraine was to sow division within NATO and the EU, then the action has backfired in a rather spectacular fashion. As NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg noted, rather than less NATO, “more NATO” has been witnessed. This has occurred through enhanced deployments on the Eastern flank and promises of defence investments, alongside the two additional applicants to join the Alliance.[xxv] We may also add to this ‘more NATO-EU’ cooperation, with its impetus visibly reinvigorated and practical results evident. This encompasses a number of fronts, including political dialogue, staff dialogue, and the development of defence capabilities.
NATO-EU political dialogue has intensified both behind the scenes and in front of the world in the media. On the actual day of the Russian invasion, Secretary General Stoltenberg held a joint press conference with President of the European Council Charles Michel and President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen.[xxvi] The following day, Presidents Michel and von der Leyen took part in an extraordinary virtual summit of Heads of State and Government of NATO Allies, plus Finland and Sweden, to discuss the Ukraine crisis. This paved the way for NATO-EU participation at respective ministerial meetings and a propagation of informal NATO-EU talks. In addition, long-established political consultations intensified on a number of levels, including regular meetings between the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC).[xxvii] The result of this has not only been seen in coordinating actions and building mutual understanding and trust, but enabling public communications to be better coordinated, mutually amplifying, and commonly reinforced.
Alongside these high-level political meetings, NATO-EU staff dialogue has also been extended following the invasion. NATO staff and EU staff have reported working together on a number of areas of concern relevant to the crisis, such as humanitarian assistance, cyber, and countering foreign information manipulation.[xxviii] This not only applies in reference to Russia but also to adversaries providing the Kremlin with political support and amplifying its messaging. While much of this exists through regular ad-hoc meetings, including discussions surrounding the tactics, techniques, and procedures of hostile actors in the information sphere, the outcome has been reinvigorated cooperation.
Finally, in terms of defence capabilities, military mobility has been identified as the “flagship area” for mutually reinforcing NATO-EU cooperation. This is due both to the shared interest in this capacity, as well as the different tools and instruments available to the EU and NATO respectively.[xxix] In this sphere of capability development, the Commission put forward an ‘Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0’ in November 2022 to help enable European armed forces to respond more rapidly and at the scale of the crises. Specifically, it aims to “bolster the EU's ability to support Member States and partners as regards transport of troops and their equipment” and “reinforce cooperation with NATO”, as well as other strategic partners.[xxx]
This builds upon an earlier Mobility Action Plan from 2018, as well as existing European moves in terms of building European defence capabilities.[xxxi] That includes the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), established by the European Council in 2017, a mechanism to deepen cooperation between willing member states, with the possibility for third-party states to be involved, too.[xxxii] Indeed, the among the members of the Military Mobility PESCO project are Canada, the United States, and Norway, alongside EU states. Furthermore, the European Defence Agency's programme on “Optimising Cross-Border Movement Permission procedures in Europe” and the EU’s Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) address the area of military mobility.[xxxiii] In a broader sense, too, the Ukraine crisis seems to have brought about something of a realization that increased defence spending by European states is vital for the strength of NATO’s posture. The EU can play a role in encouraging this, as well as attempting to ensure that its mechanisms such as the EU Capability Development Plan and CARD are coherent with overlapping and ongoing NATO defence planning processes.[xxxiv]
Conclusion
Russia’s war on Ukraine has had an important impact on the re-calibration of NATO-EU cooperation. Since February, among many other critical developments, NATO-EU cooperation has been intensified to unprecedented levels. This has included enhanced dialogue and plans to develop capabilities. It has furthermore been made apparent that the EU provides an avenue to potentially enhance and contribute towards NATO efforts, particularly if coherence, complementarity, and interoperability can be assured. Such moves are particularly essential for the long-term health of the Alliance in light of unsustainable levels of burden-sharing within NATO.
It is also important to note that the development of enhanced NATO-EU cooperation has also occurred at a time when this is being incentivized by other events, including increasing demands on US defence resources and clear overreliance on the US within NATO. This includes the long-touted US “Pivot to Asia”, as Washington devotes greater attention and resources to the Indo-Pacific region, while issues in North Africa and the Middle East continue to demand US and EU attention. Taken together, there are a multitude of incentives for mutually reinforcing NATO-EU cooperation to develop further. In order to meet the challenge of providing deterrence against Russia while enhancing the ability to tackle other threats on the global scale, such cooperation will be decisive. Furthermore, in facing the crisis in Ukraine, NATO and the EU have shown the political will to develop this, with elements of progress already made. While the initial signs are promising for the future shape of NATO-EU cooperation, it is ultimately down to policymakers in NATO and EU member states to take full advantage of this window of opportunity.
About the Author
Lee David Turpin is a postdoctoral researcher of international relations. His research focuses on multilateral security cooperation, EU-NATO relations, and national strategic cultures in Europe. He completed his ESRC-funded PhD at Lancaster University in 2018, with his doctoral thesis focusing on national contributions towards the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy. He has since published on the UK role in EU defence, EU-NATO cooperation, and European Strategic Autonomy.
Notes
[i] NATO, “NATO's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine”, last updated 18 October 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_192648.htm ; European Council, “EU response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine”, last updated 20 October 2022, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-response-ukraine-invasion/
[ii] Ibid.
[iii] European Commission, “EU steps up action to strengthen EU defence capabilities, industrial and technological base”, 18 May 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_22_3143
[iv] NATO, “NATO 2022 Strategic Concept,” 29 June 2022, https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept
[v] European Union, “A Strategic Compass for the EU”, 21 March 2022, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-eu-0_en
[vi] NATO, “Finland and Sweden submit applications to join NATO” 18 May 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_195468.htm
[vii] A. Murray, “Denmark votes to drop EU defence opt-out in 'historic' referendum”, BBC News, 1 June 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61644663
[viii] Ibid.
[ix] M. Albright, “Press Conference by US Secretary of State Albright at NATO HQ”, Brussels, 8 December 1998 https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1998/s981208x.htm
[x] J. Stoltenberg, “Speech by NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg at the German Atlantic Association 'NATO Talk' Conference 2021”, Berlin, 19 November 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_188772.htm
[xi] D. Trump, “Remarks by President Trump at Press Conference After 2018 NATO Summit”, Brussels, July 12 2018, https://nato.usmission.gov/july-12-2018-remarks-by-president-trump-at-press-conference-after-2018-nato-summit-in-brussels/
[xii] S. Collinson, “Trump Is Not the First US President to Bemoan NATO Spending”, CNN 4 July 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/04/politics/trump-us-presidents-nato-defense-spending/index.html
[xiii] NATO, “Wales Summit Declaration”, 5 September 2014, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm
[xiv] B. Obama, “Obama Warns NATO Allies to Share Defense Burden: ‘We Can’t Do It Alone”, Atlantic Council, 3 June 2014, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/obama-warns-nato-allies-to-share-defense-burden-we-can-t-do-it-alone/
[xv] L. Austin, “Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III Holds a Press Conference at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium”, 22 October 2021, https://nato.usmission.gov/news-10222021/
[xvi] EU, “The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises”, 11 December 2013, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52013JC0030
[xvii] NATO, “NATO 2030: United for a New Era”, 25 November 2020, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-Final-Report-Uni.pdf
[xviii] C. Gebhard and S. J. Smith, “The two faces of EU-NATO cooperation: Counter-piracy operations off the Somali coast”, Cooperation & Conflict 50, no. 1 (2015): 107–127.
[xix] Ibid.
[xx] Ibid.
[xxi] Ibid.
[xxii] I. Toygür et al., “Turkey’s foreign policy and its consequences for the EU”, EU Directorate-General for External Policies, Report prepared for the European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs, February 2022, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2022/653662/EXPO_IDA(2022)653662_EN.pdf
[xxiii] C. Kupchan, “Europe’s Response to the U.S.-UK-Australia Submarine Deal: What to Know”, Council on Foreign Relations, Brief, 22 September 2021, https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/europes-response-us-uk-australia-submarine-deal-what-know
[xxiv] M. Lowen, “Afghanistan crisis: How Europe's relationship with Joe Biden turned sour”, BBC News, 3 September 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-58416848
[xxv] J. Stoltenberg, “Speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Kultaranta talks in Finland”, 12 June 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_196300.htm
[xxvi] European Council, “President Michel and EC President von der Leyen meet NATO Secretary General on Ukraine”, 24 February 2022, https://newsroom.consilium.europa.eu/events/20220224-president-michel-and-ec-president-von-der-leyen-meet-nato-secretary-general-on-ukraine
[xxvii] European Council, "EU- NATO cooperation: seventh progress report", 20 June 2022, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/06/20/eu-nato-cooperation-seventh-progress-report/
[xxviii] Ibid.
[xxix] Ibid.
[xxx] European Commission, Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0, https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/action-plan-military-mobility-20_en
[xxxi] Ibid.
[xxxii] European Council, Decision Establishing permanent structured cooperation (PESCO), 11 December 2017 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32017D2315
[xxxiii] Ibid.
[xxxiv] Ibid.
Image: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm
