Perspectives for NATO-EU outer space cooperation in face of the new international order
By Karolina M. Siekierka
NATO and the EU have continuously adapted to the ever-changing international order. The Euro-Atlantic security environment is constantly challenged by—among others—hybrid threats, migration, and terrorism. The number of insecurities and threats has only increased due to Russian aggression towards Ukraine, supported by a handful of states on the international level, openly or not.
Advanced space capabilities, including space-related technology, have a variety of benefits—from the prevention of the negative effects of climate change to banking and science support, as well as advantages in case of armed conflict. The information gathered through satellites is crucial for NATO and EU activities, as it improves and facilitates decision-making in several dimensions.
NATO’s approach: Towards prevention and building common security
NATO first acknowledged the strategic importance of independent access to space vis-à-vis the increasing competition between actors—international, national, or private companies—as well as the perceived need for declaring the Alliance’s interest in outer space in its 2010 Strategic Concept. In point 14, the authors ascertained that “a number of significant technology-related trends” such as “technologies that impede access to space” are most likely to affect NATO’s operations due to their impact on a global scale.[i]
The 2010 Strategic Concept was a turning point for NATO and its future space policy. Although the Alliance waited many years to fully dive into the topic, point 14 signalled that NATO recognized the emerging concern and perceived access to space as an important issue for the future. In response, NATO had to slightly change its deterrence and defence approach and consider the growing risks and security of its Allies and their critical infrastructure.
While NATO member states brought the subject to the Alliance level, any related policies remained dispersed for many years. Before developing a comprehensive common approach within NATO, some Allies were gradually building their national outer space policies and strategies. At that time the benefits of cooperation between states, all with very different levels of technological development and situational awareness, were not entirely grasped.
On the Alliance level, the militarization of space was not yet fully acknowledged. When it came to the new challenges in the international security environment, the Alliance focused on cyberspace and cybersecurity, ensuring the integrity of critical systems in this regard. However, one could notice the growing importance of both subjects—outer space and cybersecurity—among policymakers and within the scientific community around that time. This was due to a common acknowledgment of the rapid change in the international security environment.
For many years after the adoption of the Strategic Concept in 2010, NATO did not expand on the matter of threats from outer space. The Alliance returned to the subject in 2018. As said in the Brussels Summit Declaration, the Leaders of—back then—29 member states recognized space as a highly dynamic and rapidly evolving area and agreed on developing a NATO Space Policy.[ii] At this point the Allies linked outer space to hybrid threats. The next year, the Alliance adopted its Space Policy and declared outer space as the fifth operational domain, next to air, land, sea, and cyber.[iii] The purpose of such a step was to strengthen NATO’s defence abilities, since any conflict in space would directly or indirectly affect every subject concerning NATO, operating in space or not. The reasons for the adoption of the policy were as follows, among others:
− increase in the number of actors, both private and national, in space;
− continual development of commercial and military space services;
− expansion of the global space industry and growing reliance on space services for civil, commercial, and military use;
− growing anti-satellite threats from Russia and China; worry about their intentions and impact on geopolitical structures;
− insecurity concerning the genuine and dual use of satellites.
NATO has already been the victim of real-world anti-satellite activities. For instance, back in 2019, the Norwegian government alleged that Russia disturbed NATO’s communications systems during an Alliance exercise at that time.[iv]
Allies’ biggest concerns in outer space were and are—as the Space Policy was updated in 2022—naturally related but not limited to the security of the Allies. Some of the policy’s main points are as follows:
− the pledge of providing equal access and free use of space for all;
− compliance with international law;
− integration of outer space within the Alliance’s broad approach towards deterrence and defence;
− use of space for peaceful purposes, for NATO—to support its ability and capabilities in case of crisis or conflict;
− integration of space and space-related concerns into NATO’s core tasks—collective defence, crisis management, cooperative security;
− exchange of information and political-military consultations between the Allies on “deterrence and defence-related space developments”[v];
− enhancement of NATO’s abilities to identify and characterize threats in space;
− identification of current and future threats to NATO’s operations and missions to enable effective protection, deterrence, and defence;
− cooperation between Allies in the development of technology, capabilities, and the ability to fully interoperate on the technical level and for the operational planning and conduct of varied missions;
− conducting joint exercises and evaluations;
− cooperation with selected actors on space and space-related aspects.
What is important is that the Allies underlined that NATO “is not aiming to develop space capabilities of its own”.[vi] This is due to NATO’s core task—collective defence—and that the Alliance does not have its own armed forces; hence, it does not own any satellites. NATO’s space activities and declarations rely on data, technology, and services provided by the Allies, whose capabilities differ from one another. This dependency is a possible source of NATO’s weakness, as some systems might be more resilient than others. In its Space Policy, Allies stressed a variety of space-related threats—from low-level to high-level risks, which create dangerous effects and could influence their military, peacekeeping, or humanitarian operations. As stated, among the many threats to the Alliance, “space systems originate in the cyber domain and are likely to increase”.[vii]
Following the 2019 Space Policy, two years later at the Brussels Summit the Allies agreed that any “attack[s] to, from, or within space [that] present[s] a clear challenge to the security of the Alliance” as well as overall to “Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security, and stability”[viii] could result in the invocation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Allies did not clarify, however, which actions in space would invoke Article 5, thus, decisions will be made on a case-by-case basis. The decision concerning Article 5 is a bold revision of NATO’s previous approach to space, as the Alliance fully recognised the security implications of the rapid advancement of space-related technologies.
Moving on to the new Strategic Concept, adopted during the Madrid Summit in June 2022, the Allies reaffirmed and identified China and Russia as the actors who pose the greatest danger to the Alliance and “conduct malicious activities in […] space”.[ix] This time, however, Leaders also added “authoritarian actors” to the list, without directly naming them. Nevertheless, after analysing the documents available from public sources, it is clear that by “authoritarian actors” Allies meant, among others, Iran and North Korea, who were mentioned elsewhere in the concept.
The 2022 Strategic Concept asserts that the current security environment is no longer at peace and that the probability of an attack against NATO member states, their territorial integrity, and sovereignty increased significantly over the last 12 years. This represents an important shift within NATO: in the previous concept, Leaders jointly agreed that the international community was at peace and that a threat of attack of any kind against NATO was low.
Furthermore, the new Strategic Concept underlines the key role of space by fully integrating space-related activities and engagement into NATO’s deterrence and defence posture. The document also stresses the risk of the limitation of NATO’s operability in space due to significant investments in space-related technologies by the Alliance’s competitors. Last but not least, as the current space infrastructure of the 30 member states is susceptible to attack, Leaders highlighted the need for the continuous development of space-related technology. The 2022 Concept includes a commitment to “enhance [the Allies’] ability to operate effectively in space […] to prevent, detect, counter and respond to the full spectrum of threats, using all available tools”.[x]
To provide NATO with essential support, the Allied nations created a NATO Space Centre at NATO’s Allied Air Command in Ramstein, Germany (2020), and the NATO Centre of Excellence in Toulouse, France (2021). To this day, some of the Allied countries have adopted national space strategies—the United States and France[xi] included—and increased their space-related budget, recognizing the transformation of space into a battleground, or even created space forces.
European Union: Better late than never
The EU is an international organisation focusing on political and economic cooperation; therefore, member states did not undertake extensive security and defence cooperation. Although the EU and NATO have different aims and tasks, they work in close collaboration in security matters.
Since 2019, EU member states have been devoted to strengthening the organisation’s role in the field of the access and use of space and promoting international cooperation. Leaders regularly discuss the EU’s role in the global space economy as well as ways to boost its importance in shaping international regulatory systems.
In a 2020 report on the EU’s strategic autonomy in the security environment, the EU itself admitted that the organisation had “been slow at realising the potential of more involvement in key innovative areas such as space”, risking its marginalisation “in its access to added value in the global markets in an increasing number of sectors”.[xii] Before 2020, security in cyberspace was a greater concern to the EU. Nevertheless, like NATO, cyberspace became the fifth domain of warfare within the EU’s policy and strategy, alongside sea, land, air, and space.[xiii] Thus, even though the EU did not elaborate on its ability to operate in and access to outer space as much as cybersecurity, the issue was acknowledged before threats in cyberspace unfolded.
The EU indicates that the term “defence” has evolved dynamically, especially today, due to the rapid development of technologies and the relative unpredictability of actions of international actors in the international arena. Defence is comprised of more and more domains. In order to prevent potential threats, the EU plans to enhance its capabilities to detect space debris to avoid collisions and keep its territory safe, increase investments in defence research, develop capabilities in civilian and defence domains, and support other countries through the exchange of information. This way, the organization also promotes rules-based multilateral governance in the matter of security. The EU points out that its space systems are civilian, used for nothing but crisis management and potential foreign operations and missions.
In a paper published in February 2022, Josep Borrell, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission, stated that the EU has to assure its “ability to operate securely and constantly [defend] the infrastructures essential to our societies, including against threats in outer space”.[xiv] This is why—in contrast to NATO—the EU attaches particular importance to the matter of space debris, particularly those close to Earth.
The EU pays close attention to the political and military situation in space and space-technology investments of international actors. This is not only to mark its importance and role on the international scene but also to increase its strategic autonomy. The EU has access to many space activities thanks to France’s overseas department in French Guiana. This is where a military command centre (the Guiana Space Centre), a French-European spaceport, the so-called Europe’s Spaceport, is located.[xv]
The EU realizes its space policy through its three flagship programs: Copernicus, Galileo, and Eunos. The first one is a European Earth Observation system aimed at supporting changes within the environment. The following, Galileo, is a global satellite navigation and positioning system that supports the European economic sector, such as agriculture. Lastly, Egnos, European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service, aims at improving the navigation services for aviation, maritime, and land-based matters.[xvi]
NATO-EU cooperation: The EU’s reliance on NATO’s defence capabilities within the new international order
Among NATO’s 30 member states, 21 countries are members of the European Union; therefore, those two organizations work in close cooperation, comprehensively achieving the various strategic interests of the countries involved. In this way, these 21 states pursue their political and military interests via differently principled and tasked institutions.
As the increasing militarisation of space creates challenges to transatlantic security, both NATO and the EU emphasise in their official documents—strategies, declarations, and reports—the importance of cooperation between the two organisations in the areas of space and space-related technologies. However, for now, NATO does not plan to develop its own space capabilities. The Alliance’s leaders in space issues—such as the United States and France—are focused on developing their own technologies and supporting NATO and EU operations and missions as well as partially discarding technical capacity and enhancing knowledge‐sharing; thus, close cooperation and the further development of space policies and actions seem to be only at the preliminary level. This is particularly evident in how late both institutions adopted their space policies regarding individual member states.
The authors of the 2022 Strategic Concept not only recognized the risks that come from space, which—carried out by other actors—undermine NATO and EU member states’ security but also partially foresaw NATO’s counter-measures, expressed in such actions as the development of military and non-military tools. As said in the document, those actions will be “in line with [our] international commitments”, which includes EU cooperation. NATO and the EU are not only marked by close partnership and cooperation in the security of the Euro-Atlantic area but also rely on one another in the matter of space cooperation. At present, cooperation is dominated by knowledge-sharing and is not really related to technical development. Without the latter, it is difficult to ensure the security and stability of 36 states combined.
The EU is focused on preventing potential environmental threats and risks throughout Copernicus, Galileo, and Eunos programmes; NATO analyses from where and in what way the threats may come. In theory, both organisations’ actions are complementary. In the matter of space capabilities, the Alliance closely watches the activities of China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran; however, it seems that ever since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, NATO has discontinued the development of its space policy. One could expect that in the near future, the Alliance and the EU will get back to discussing further cooperation in the view of collective defence in space, resulting in the adoption of a joint strategy and a guide, including long-term technology investments and action plans as well as a division of activities as the institutions take different views and progress in matters of space security.
Given that Sweden and Finland have begun their accession process and are very likely to become NATO members, one should include their national space policies info in this paper.
Sweden focuses its national space policy on research, technology development, and social development. Their national space policy devotes close attention to knowledge society and innovativeness and competitiveness of the industrial sector. The state aims to create more jobs and attract people—youth in particular—to educate themselves in science and technology. Overall, the main goal for Sweden is to make the state a leading knowledge centre. Swedish space policy does not mention NATO. It states, however, that the Swedish National Space Agency “should participate in and benefit from European cooperation in the space sector”, especially in the Galileo program.[xvii]
While the national economy is the priority for Sweden, for Finland, it is atmospheric research as well as competency in use of electronics and software in space components.[xviii] On the international level, Finland addresses such issues as climate change mitigation, the situation around the Arctic region, the development of satellite communications, and cybersecurity, or even health. Finland focuses on a bettering its understanding of the operational environment.
Both Sweden and Finland are thus much closer to the EU, than to NATO on the subject of space. Nevertheless, NATO could significantly benefit after Sweden’s and Finland’s accession when it comes to effective operations in space due to the technical development of these countries. One could expect that after the accession of both states, there will be no re-orientation towards NATO but rather a share of know-how between its member states. Until then, Sweden and Finland work in close cooperation with the EU.
To conclude, threats to the space systems of the EU and NATO member states continue to grow. Both NATO and the EU seek to engage with their closest partners—in this case, with one another—to avoid mirroring potential missions and operations. Although both institutions declare close cooperation in the matter of outer space, neither has pointed to areas where they might work together. Once these areas are identified, they would add value to the already existing basis for cooperation and could strengthen Euro-Atlantic security.
States should take into consideration the adoption of new, updated guidelines for outer space activities at the UN level and adjust these to the new international realities.
About the Author
Karolina M. Siekierka is the NATO Youth Delegate of Poland, a Senior Programme Specialist at Business & Human Rights Programme, UN Global Compact Network Poland, and Head of Research and Project Coordination at the Institute of New Europe, 2021–2022. She is a graduate of the Department of International Relations, specializing in Security and Strategic Studies, at the University of Warsaw. She was an MA Exchange Student in Science Politique and International Security at the Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1) and the Institut d’Etudes Politique de Paris (Sciences Po Paris). Her research interests include the role of NATO in the security environment, French domestic and foreign policy, the Yemeni civil war, and human rights. She is the author and co-author of several publications in these fields, including “Francuski podbój kosmosu – trzeci największy gracz w the New Space Race”, “Zaangażowanie Republiki Francuskiej w wojnę domową w Jemenie”, and “The future of France in the Indo-Pacific region in relation to the upcoming independence referendum in New Caledonia”.
Notes
[i] “Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization”, NATO, accessed November 2, 2022, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20120214_strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf.
[ii] “Brussels Summit Declaration”, NATO, accessed November 2, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156624.htm?selectedLocale=en.
[iii] “Press conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg ahead of the Leaders' Meeting in London on 3 and 4 December”, NATO, accessed November 2, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_171460.htm?selectedLocale=en.
[iv] Brooks Tigner, “Electronic jamming between Russia and NATO is par for the course in the future, but it has its risky limits”, Atlantic Council, accessed November 3, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/electronic-jamming-between-russia-and-nato-is-par-for-the-course-in-the-future-but-it-has-its-risky-limits/.
[v] “NATO’s overarching Space Policy”, NATO, accessed November 2, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_190862.htm
[vi] Ibid.
[vii] Ibid.
[viii] “Brussels Summit Communiqué Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels 14 June 2021”, NATO, accessed November 2, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm?selectedLocale=en.
[ix] “NATO 2022 Strategic Concept”, NATO, accessed October 27, 2022, https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/.
[x] Ibidem.
[xi] See: Monika Poprawa and Karolina Siekierka, “Francuski podbój kosmosu – trzeci największy gracz w the New Space Race”, Instytut Nowej Europy, accessed October 30, 2022, https://ine.org.pl/francuski-podboj-kosmosu-trzeci-najwiekszy-gracz-w-the-new-space-race/.
[xii] “On the path to 'strategic autonomy'. The EU in an evolving geopolitical environment”, European Parliament, accessed November 4, 2022, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/652096/EPRS_STU(2020)652096_EN.pdf.
[xiii] “EU cyber-defence capabilities”, European Parliament, accessed November 4, 2022, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2021/698032/EPRS_ATA(2021)698032_EN.pdf.
[xiv] Josep Borrell, “Space and defence: protecting Europe and strengthening our capacity to act”, European External Action Service, accessed November 6, 2022, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/space-and-defence-protecting-europe-and-strengthening-our-capacity-act_en.
[xv] See: “International Military Involvement of the French Republic”, Instytut Nowej Europy, accessed October 28, 2022, https://ine.org.pl/en/international-military-involvement-of-the-french-republic/.
[xvi] “EU Space Programme”, European Commission, accessed November 1, 2022, https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-space-policy/eu-space-programme_en.
[xvii] “The Strategy of the Swedish National Space Agency”, Swedish National Space Agency, accessed November 29, 2022, https://www.rymdstyrelsen.se/contentassets/3d8de30dbebb406c8f375c267ed04fe8/rymdstrategi-eng_web.pdf.
[xviii] “Ministry of Economic Affairs”, Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment of Finland, accessed November 29, 2022, https://tem.fi/en/space.
Image: https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2020/03/13/space-natos-latest-frontier/index.html
