Strategic Concept and Strategic Compass: A Hypothesis of the NATO-EU Division of Labour
By Shary Mitidieri
The Return of Great Power Politics
The return of war in Europe, on 24 February 2022, has shattered the illusion of perpetual peace on the continent and brought back on the agenda of state actors more traditional considerations on security and defence, aimed at protecting their independence and territorial integrity. Notwithstanding the Kremlin’s rhetoric on “denazification”, the invasion of Ukraine itself appears to answer to the geopolitical aspirations of the Russian Federation, which yearns for the reaffirmation of its status as a great power.
Yet, while states remain the fundamental players of international politics in an age of great power competition that seems to be paving the way for a multipolar system, international organisations and alliances certainly have a role to play to bolster the relative power of state actors through cooperation and shared initiatives. The attempt to coordinate the actions and postures of member states and allies was the underlying motive that prompted the European Union and NATO to approve two milestone documents in the early summer of 2022: the Strategic Compass and the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, respectively.
While the timing of their release suggests that they constitute a mere reaction to the ongoing war in Ukraine, at a closer look it appears clear that these documents take into account a broader set of (in)security trends to empower the EU and NATO to thrive in the changing international environment with targeted actions based on years of research and intelligence gathering. However, as the range of threats and opportunities presented by the international system widens, it is important that security organisations articulate their initiatives in such a way to prevent duplication and overlap.
Therefore, the aim of this article is to investigate, in light of the NATO Strategic Concept 2022 and the EU Strategic Compass, the areas and directions in which European defence could develop while acting in synergy with NATO to guarantee the security and prosperity of all allies and member states. The starting assumption is that such an opportunity is offered to the EU by the different focus of the two documents, the first global in scope and the second maintaining a regional outlook.
Methodologically, the article will start from a comparative review of the Strategic Concept and the Strategic Compass to highlight their differences in terms of priorities and structure. Based on this analysis, it will be possible to identify at least three areas in which the development of an EU security agenda would be not only feasible but also demanded by the international context: energy security understood as the protection of critical infrastructures, crisis management and the fostering of partnerships in the Enlarged Mediterranean, and the improvement of interoperability through joint investments among EU members.
While it is acknowledged that there are other agendas that call for close cooperation between the EU and NATO—from crisis management to disruptive technologies and climate change—these are arguably the main topics that have strategic importance for Europe but are only marginal for the United States and, consequently, for the Atlantic Alliance. For each of these thematic areas, a dedicated paragraph will identify the policies already in place as well as the initiatives that the European Union intends to implement to strengthen them. Finally, the conclusions will contain some considerations on the necessity to take advantage of the present window of opportunity to define a common European security identity, which is essential to maintain the relevance of the continent in the international arena in future.
A Comparative Review of the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept and the EU Strategic Compass
The Russian Federation’s “special military operation” has been a breaking point in the transition from a unipolar, post-Cold War system to a new and yet unspecified configuration of international politics. However, such changes rarely occur abruptly and without warning signs. In fact, both the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union had long acknowledged a transformation was taking place. As a result, a great deal of effort was put into making sense of the arising new world order and trying to shape it. In the past few years, NATO has looked for ways to reconfigure itself through the NATO 2030 process, while in European institutions the idea of a Common Defence and Security Policy has once again gained momentum.
At any rate, it was in fact the Russian-Ukrainian war that made it so urgent to re-examine NATO and EU strategic priorities. It is in this context that the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept and the EU Strategic Compass made their appearance, revealing the posture of the two staple political and security organisations of the Euro-Atlantic quadrant in the face of the conflict in Ukraine as well as the “more hostile security environment[i]” in general.
The two documents, while comparable in their intent to elaborate on the key points of the EU and NATO’s security strategy for the upcoming decade, are profoundly different in terms of identified priorities and proposed initiatives. The Strategic Concept, for its part, adopted a “more global approach to security—in line with the US position.”[ii] The vast majority of the text is dedicated to challenges coming from major world powers, making use of an unprecedentedly grave tone: for the first time, the Russian Federation is named the “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security,”[iii] while the People’s Republic of China is called out for its attempts to “subvert the rules-based international order.”[iv]
What is more, when it comes to NATO’s core tasks, collective defence takes up significantly more space and weight than crisis management and cooperative security, for which the initiatives proposed are limited to maintaining an Open Door policy and keeping up cooperation with partners to enable them to guarantee stability. This can be explained taking into account that, in the current security environment, “NATO core tasks are not only in competition with one another, but potentially even in contradiction.”[v] For example, while keeping a hard stance on sanctions against Russia fulfils NATO’s duty with regard to collective defence, the economic backlash might put under pressure fragile countries on the Alliance’s Eastern and Southern front, to the detriment of crisis prevention.
The primacy of the Alliance’s foundational mission has clearly been recognised by EU decision-makers, as the Strategic Compass states that “a stronger and more capable EU in security and defence will contribute positively to global and transatlantic security and is complementary to NATO, which remains the foundation of collective defence for its members.”[vi] Conversely, in a strategic document that is less ambitious in scope but much more varied in terms of detected threats and proposed solutions, the European Union has put forward no less than four core tasks: Act, Invest, Partner and Secure.
In the following paragraphs it will be discussed how many of the initiatives under these four keywords closely resemble NATO’s crisis management and cooperative security. For now, it is sufficient to emphasise how the Kremlin’s bet—counting on EU members’ lack of cohesion to embark on a full-scale war—has failed, and how the European Union might have found the resolve to become a “stronger and more capable security provider.”[vii] In the future, it will be of the utmost importance to maintain this determination, as the multiplication of security threats will most certainly imply that the priorities of European countries will not always coincide with the interests of the Alliance’s majority shareholder, the United States, engaged in an existential struggle to maintain its superiority on the global stage.
Energy Security and the Protection of Critical Infrastructure
The war in Ukraine began at an already very delicate moment for energy markets, after exporting countries had failed, during the post-pandemic economic recovery, to boost their production so as to contain prices.[viii] However, it was only with the beginning of the conflict and the imposition of several packages of economic sanctions from the EU on the Russian Federation that a difficult situation turned into a full-blown energy crisis. Electricity and gas prices skyrocketed in the first half of 2022,[ix] while member states—who previously purchased, on average, 60% of their oil from Russia—hurried to find new suppliers.
In these circumstances, energy procurement and the protection of energy infrastructure has become a security problem, not only an economic one. A case in point: after the decision by the German government to suspend the certification of Nord Stream 2 and shut down Nord Stream 1, on 26 September 2022 Danish and Swedish authorities reported significant leaks from both pipelines, presumably ascribable to sabotage.[x] This event has highlighted the vulnerability of the oil and gas infrastructures and, consequently, created a pressing need to better protect them from a vast range of threats, kinetic or otherwise.
In response to the suspected attack, EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell claimed that “any deliberate disruption of European energy infrastructure is utterly unacceptable and will be met with a robust and united response,”[xi] while Norway, now one of the most strategic suppliers of gas to the European Union, has deployed its own military to patrol oil and gas installations on its territory.[xii]
But what actions could the EU take to preserve energy infrastructure on the territory of its members? The question is both crucial and delicate, as oil and gas plants, regasifiers, nuclear power stations, and similar infrastructure are strategic assets, and therefore, it is only natural that every single member state would prefer to retain control of the physical infrastructure and provide security services using its own armed and police forces. However, the Strategic Compass contains a few suggestions that would help ensure the protection of critical infrastructures under the keyword “Secure”.
First of all, the EU intends to strengthen its role as a maritime security actor, so as to prevent the occurence of another incident like the one that affected Nord Stream. Secondly, recognising that threats to the EU’s energy supplies are not necessarily military in nature, the Strategic Compass has put forward the idea to develop a Hybrid Toolbox, a Cyber Diplomatic Toolbox, and EU Cyber Defence Policy to detect, identify, analyse, and respond to menaces to its economic and energy stability.[xiii] All these efforts must proceed in parallel with the transition towards climate neutrality, in so doing averting at least partially the risk that extreme climate events might compromise infrastructural security.
Apart from the immediate threat posed by Russia and the existential challenge of climate transition, it is important to remember that European maritime security is also increasingly challenged by the People’s Republic of China. In the past decade, Beijing’s national company COSCO has progressively acquired significant stakes in 13 European ports[xiv], while the so-called “17+1” cooperation framework between China and Central and Eastern European countries keeps raising suspicions among Brussels’ policy makers. The prevalent fear is that Beijing might use its financial clout to lure economically fragile countries, especially in the Western Balkans, to take out loans for infrastructural development that they won’t be able to repay, thus opening their political systems to Chinese influence and eventually acting as “Trojan horses” when they join the EU.[xv]
To be sure, the scenario at hand is difficult to navigate, but arguably, there is a lot to gain for member states who commit to the plan. First, the enhanced security of energy infrastructure would reduce the risk and impact of potential attacks by malign state and non-state actors. Secondly, it might foster cooperation in energy procurement as well, helping those member states that do not have a wide network of diplomatic and economic relations to rely on—such as Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic[xvi]—to finally phase out Russian oil. So far, in fact, the research on gas and oil suppliers has been conducted by individual states, with EU members having close-knit ties with producers gaining an advantage. Yet, if the European Union is to become a security provider, it also must develop a credible political and diplomatic strategy—and that means leaving no one behind. Third, while the Strategic Concept refers to China as a source of instability, it is predicted that the United States will confront potential threats in the Pacific and on a political level—leaving energy and infrastructure security in the Mediterranean to the EU.
Crisis Management and Partnerships in the Enlarged Mediterranean
As “NATO Allies in Europe are increasing their reliance on energy sources from Azerbaijan, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, and Gulf countries to reduce their dependency on Russian gas and oil”,[xvii] it appears clear that the topic of energy security is closely intertwined with stability in the Enlarged Mediterranean and, in particular, in the NATO Southern Flank. Yet, in the Strategic Concept the word ‘Mediterranean’ only appears once. This is hardly surprising considering that experts had long detected a “lack of resources and focus”[xviii] for the Mediterranean Dialogue, as well as the absence of a strategy for the area.[xix]
However, the EU’s Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity noted in 2020 that “zones of instability and conflict in different regions in a wide arch around the European Union and beyond will persist and may even grow in the coming decade,”[xx] making securitisation of the area a strategic priority for Brussels but only a secondary issue for the United States, which, as stated above, is fully invested in the ongoing great power confrontation.
Considering the state of affairs, the question is whether crisis management in the Enlarged Mediterranean could be at least partially handed over to the European Union, and whether Brussels would be up for the task. Revealing in this sense is the paragraph of the Strategic Compass dedicated to the core task “Act”, which envisages the establishment of a EU Rapid Deployment Capacity of up to 5,000 troops for different types of crises, the creation of a group of Common Security and Defence Policy mission experts, and an increased reliance on the European Peace Facility to support partners.[xxi]
Interestingly, in preparatory documents[xxii] the objective “Act” was named (more precisely) “crisis management”, implying that the EU would take over some of NATO’s duties in this sector at least in the Euro-Mediterranean area, where it already has a number of ongoing missions and operations[xxiii] and where most of its strategic interests are situated. The impression that the EU intends to enhance its political engagement with the area as well is further reinforced by the “Partner” goal, which expressed the aim to “develop tailored partnerships in the Western Balkans, our eastern and southern neighbourhood, Africa, Asia and Latin America,”[xxiv] something that closely mirrors the idea behind NATO's partnership programs.
The reference to the Western Balkans is of particular interest here because, while the scramble for energy is the leading motive behind EU members’ current attempt to tighten relations with partners on the southern coast of the Mediterranean, the region is still a potential cradle for crisis. A situation burdened with even more risks since the outbreak of conflict in Ukraine, as Belgrade is watched carefully as a potential harbinger of instability. The possibility that Russia might decide to stir the pot in the Balkans is the reason why “European leaders should keep up their pressure on local powerholders.”[xxv] The President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen has taken on the challenge with two different trips to the region: one in September, ahead of the EU-Western Balkans Summit,[xxvi] and one in October to reiterate EU support to the countries in the region facing the energy crisis,[xxvii] a particularly thorny issue given their dependency on Russian oil.[xxviii]
Furthermore, political heavyweight Germany has stepped in and hosted Balkan leaders on November 3 to sign a series of deals that will hopefully speed up their EU accession path.[xxix] The initiative is not particularly surprising per se, as Berlin has a history of taking the lead in the Western Balkans when unsatisfied with the hesitancy of its European partners. This particular event, however, could be informative of the shape that future European efforts in the field of security and defence might take: while it is true that they will pursue common objectives and advance common values, it is likely that the process will still be led by the member states holding the most political capital, economic strength, and vested interest in a certain region or agenda. A hypothesis that, as will be argued in the next paragraph, is further confirmed by the initiatives taken to reinforce interoperability.
Reinforcing Interoperability: A Variable Geometry Effort?
The issue of burden-sharing has been high on the United States’ agenda since the NATO 2016 Warsaw Summit, although US President Barack Obama took note of decreased defence spending among European allies already in 2014.[xxx] Therefore, it is not surprising that the new Strategic Concept would contain a reference to interoperability,[xxxi] which in turn, demands investments in capability so as to ensure the readiness, responsiveness, deployability, and integration of allied forces. It is the reception of this concept in the EU Strategic Compass, in relation to the core task “Invest”, that is particularly important, because “U.S. innovation moves fast while Europeans lag behind due to the fragmentation of efforts.”[xxxii]
The EU’s new strategic document puts forward the intention to “invest more and better”[xxxiii] in defence in order to achieve technological sovereignty in some critical technology areas while reducing dependencies and the vulnerability of value chains. These initiatives, particularly aimed at developing high-technology, next-generation capabilities, would allow EU defence to be a proficient security provider in all domains: land, sea, air, cyber, and space. Some first steps in this direction are identifiable in the decision of Germany[xxxiv] and other EU countries[xxxv] to boost their defence spending in 2022.
However, when thinking of the practical implementation of these principles, the question arises as to whether an equal commitment can be expected from all member states, when their financial conditions and the state of their military-industrial complexes differ greatly. More realistically, the development of such autonomous capabilities would be led by individual countries based on their already-existing capacities. Some EU members already have a history of taking the initiative in developing their own advanced military assets, such as France with the multirole fighter aircraft Dassault Rafale, a national alternative to the Eurofighter Typhoon. For its part, Italy could contribute in terms of maritime and hi-tech capabilities,[xxxvi] with Fincantieri and Leonardo being its flagships.
Nonetheless, it is certainly possible to envision closer cooperation at least among EU heavyweights. The Ukraine war has already had an effect in this sense, prompting close political contacts among French, Italian, and German leadership to support Ukraine, with the French-Italian consultations further underpinned by the 2021 Quirinal Treaty, which mandates “coordination of the two countries in matters of European and foreign policy, security and defence.”[xxxvii] The Strategic Compass further envisions several instruments to harmonise member states’ military-industrial initiatives, such as the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence, the European Defence Fund, or the Permanent Structured Cooperation.
In short, EU decision-makers seem well-aware that, while it would be difficult or even impossible for all members to provide the same contribution to European defence, in an international arena increasingly dominated by state actors with an enormous political, economic, and demographic weight, no European country can act alone and hope to be successful. Coherence between the EU’s defence-related initiatives, as well as transparency and collaboration, are essential to present a united front in the face of an increasingly competitive world order.
Conclusion: What Framework for a European Security?
The long-term tectonic shifts that have challenged the liberal international order—the rise of China and the return to great power politics, technological acceleration, climate change—have found their breaking point in the invasion of Ukraine, making it necessary for EU and NATO members to finally converge on a common position on European and Euro-Atlantic security. The result of this process has been the release of the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept and the EU Strategic Compass.
As suggested in this article, a close look at these documents permits us to advance some hypotheses on the structure of European security and its coaction with NATO. The EU—which has demonstrated unity of intent and capacity to act on the international stage in its efforts to punish Russia and support Ukraine—finds itself in an unprecedentedly favourable position to develop a common security identity, which has been brewing since the 1948 Treaty of Brussels but never came to light. The ongoing conflict has marked the sudden return to the forefront of collective security, a task that the Atlantic Alliance was built to fulfil and is now called to guarantee.
This commitment, however, would leave the flank open to less traditional threats, pertaining to the sphere of crisis management and cooperative security. It is exactly on these agendas that the European Union can and should focus its efforts to blend the efforts of member states into a coherent security strategy. Taking advantage of Washington's engagement with great power confrontation for global primacy, Brussels can find some space to define and pursue its own strategic priorities at the regional level while still remaining a pillar of Euro-Atlantic security.
Arguably, Brussels has much to gain from this newfound independence. In the short- and medium-term, it will empower the European Union to safeguard its own strategic interests at a time when the United States is relatively disinterested in the region. In the longer term, this endeavour will bestow Europe with the chance to stay relevant in a world that will likely be dominated by old and new great powers whose financial, military, and demographic weight cannot be contested by any individual EU countries.
To be sure, a Common Defence and Security Policy will come with its set of limits, from the dominance of the “old” European powers to the difficulties in coordinating the security perceptions of 27 members. However, even the most sceptical EU leaders should realise that, in a time of systemic change, it is no longer possible to rely exclusively on the United States to manage crises in Europe, as it has done since the end of World War II. The world is moving towards a different and yet undefined future, and it is time for Brussels to equip for whatever may come.
About the Author
Shary Mitidieri is a PhD candidate in International Studies at the University of Naples “L’Orientale”, as well as a Subject Expert in History of International Relations at the University of Naples Federico II. After her Master’s Degree in International Relations and Advanced Master in International Strategic-Military Studies, she has gained significant analytical experience working for various research groups and NGOs. Her areas of expertise include the historical, political, and institutional relations between NATO, the EU, and the Western Balkans, peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations, state-building in post-conflict scenarios, and identity and memorialization practices in ethnically diverse areas.
Notes
[i] Council of the European Union, “A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence - For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security”, 21 March 2022, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7371-2022-INIT/en/pdf
[ii] G. Pastori, “The EU, America and NATO’s New Strategic Concept: Not Just ‘Back to the Past’”, Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI), 28 June 2022, https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/eu-a
merica-and-natos-new-strategic-concept-not-just-back-past-35578
[iii] NATO, “NATO 2022 Strategic Concept”, 30 June 2022, par. 8
[iv] Ibid., par. 13
[v] A. Gilli et al., "Strategic Shifts and NATO’s new Strategic Concept", NATO Defense College, Research Paper, no. 24 , June 2022, https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1716#:~:text=At%20the%202
022%20Madrid%20Summit,a%20key%20document%20for%20NATO.
[vi] Council of the European Union, “A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence”. Italic added by the author.
[vii] Ibid.
[viii] L. Orlandi, “Petrolio: una crisi che precede la guerra”, Sicurezza energetica, n. 4, Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, Luglio 2022, pp. 4-14
[ix] Eurostat, “Electricity and gas prices in the first half of 2022”, 31 October 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/euro
[x] BBC News, “Nord Stream leaks: Sabotage to blame, says EU”, 30 September 2022, https://www.bbc.
com/news/world-europe-63057966
[xi] P. Carrell and S. Jacobsen, “EU vows to protect energy network after 'sabotage' of Russian gas pipeline”, Reuters, 29 September 2022, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/mystery-gas-leaks-hit-
major-russian-undersea-gas-pipelines-europe-2022-09-27/
[xii] N. Buli, “Norway to deploy military to protect its oil and gas installations”, Euronews, 29 September 2022, https://www.euronews.com/next/2022/09/29/ukraine-crisis-energy-norway
[xiii] Council of the European Union, “A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence”
[xiv] F. Bermingham, “Ports in a storm: Chinese investments in Europe spark fear of malign influence”, South China Morning Post, 30 October 2022, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3197723/
ports-storm-chinese-investments-europe-spark-fear-malign-influence
[xv] R. Heath and A. Gray, “Beware Chinese Trojan horses in the Balkans, EU warns”, Politico, 30 November 2022, https://www.politico.eu/article/johannes-hahn-beware-chinese-trojan-horses-in-the-
balkans-eu-warns-enlargement-politico-podcast/
[xvi] Euractiv, “Hungary celebrates EU Russia oil ban ‘victory’ – for now”, 1 June 2022, https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/hungary-celebrates-eu-russia-oil-ban-victory-for-now/
[xvii] T. Tardy, “War in Europe: preliminary lessons” NATO Defense College, Research Paper, no. 36, May 2022
[xviii] C. Brandsma, “NATO and the Mediterranean”, IEMed, Mediterranean Yearbook 2018, April 2019 https://www.iemed.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/NATO-and-the-Mediterranean.pdf
[xix] F.W. Luciolli, “Ma la NATO a Sud manca di strategia”, Airpress, n. 114, September 2020, http://www.comitatoatlantico.it/COMIT/2020/09/11/ma-la-nato-a-sud-manca-di-strategia/
[xx] EEAS, “Questions and answers: Threat Analysis – a background for the Strategic Compass”, 20 November 2020 , https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2020_11_20_memo_questions_and_
answers_-_threat_analsysis_-_copy.pdf
[xxi] Council of the European Union, “A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence”
[xxii] EEAS, “MEMO: Questions and answers: Threat Analysis”
[xxiii] EEAS, Missions and Operations: Working for a stable world and a safer Europe, last updated 6 August 2021, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/missions-and-operations_en#9620
[xxiv] Council of the European Union, “A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence”
[xxv] D. Bechev, “War Won't Be Coming Back to the Balkans”, War on the Rocks, 24 March 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/03/war-wont-be-coming-back-to-the-balkans/
[xxvi] European Commission, “President von der Leyen visits the Western Balkans”, News Article, 27 September 2022, https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/president-von-der-leyen-visits-
[xxvii] European Commission, President von der Leyen in the Western Balkans to discuss EU support to deal with the energy crisis, News Article, 26 October 2022, https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/
news/president-von-der-leyen-western-balkans-discuss-eu-support-deal-energy-crisis-2022-10-26_en
[xxviii] R. F. Jr. Ichord, “The war in Ukraine and gas in the Western Balkans”, Atlantic Council, 30 June 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/the-war-in-ukraine-and-gas-in-the-western-balkans/
[xxix] Daily Sabah, “Germany to host Balkan leaders with EU enlargement, energy on agenda”, 2 November 2022, https://www.dailysabah.com/world/europe/germany-to-host-balkan-leaders-with-eu-enlargement-
[xxx] A. Zannella, “An analysis of burden sharing in NATO and the problem of free riding”, Political Analysis, Vol. 21, 2020 https://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1058&context=pa
[xxxi] NATO, “NATO 2022 Strategic Concept”, par. 22
[xxxii] A. Marrone, "NATO’s New Strategic Concept: Novelties and Priorities", Istituto Affari Internazionali, IAI Commentaries, 22/30, 8 July 2022
[xxxiii] Council of the European Union, “A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence”
[xxxiv] M. Sheahan and S. Marsh, “Germany to increase defence spending in response to 'Putin's war' - Scholz”, Reuters, 27 February 2022, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/germany-hike
-defense-spending-scholz-says-further-policy-shift-2022-02-27/
[xxxv] M. Bernadò, “European States Boost Defence Spending”, Finabel, 6 October 2022, https://finabel.org/
european-states-boost-defence-spending/
[xxxvi] S.G. Jones, “The future of Italy’s armed forces”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 11 May 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/future-italys-armed-forces
[xxxvii] French Foreign Ministry, “Traité entre la République Française et la République Italienne pour une Coopération Bilatérale Reinforcée”, 26 November 2021, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/26_11_
2021_traite_bilateral_franco-italien_cle07961c.pdf
Image: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/defence-security/eu-nato-cooperation/
