The Euro-Atlantic and the Pacific: How NATO Can Play a Role in the Far East

By Aldo Carano

“What happens in the Indo-Pacific, matters for Europe, for NATO. And what happens in Europe, matters for the Indo-Pacific.”[i] 

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg

For the largest part of NATO’s history, the North Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific have been considered two different and separate security theatres. Moreover, considering US foreign policy, sometimes the two areas seemed to “compete” for the role of the top priority of Washington’s external action.[ii]  However, this strategic gap is beginning to close. The main reason lies in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and Moscow’s deepening alliance with China, notably defined by Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping as an “unlimited friendship”. Unlimited or not, the Moscow-Beijing convergence in the context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine has massively contributed to reshaping NATO’s approach to China.[iii]

The Sino-Russo partnership now also assumes another meaning: any support offered by China to the Kremlin may strengthen Russia’s position in Ukraine and, more broadly, compact a revisionist and anti-Western front led by Beijing and Moscow.

Though Russia’s expanding special relationship with China also constitutes a factor in NATO’s growing interest in the Indo-Pacific, it is not the only one. In December 2019, NATO mentioned China for the first time in an official communiqué, recognizing its growing influence and international policies as presenting both opportunities and challenges.[iv] This inclusion was principally motivated by the sharp US-China confrontation during the Trump Administration. Subsequently, NATO increased its references to China in a more assertive and precautionary tone, culminating in the 2021 NATO summit communiqué, which characterized China’s ambitions and assertive behaviour as presenting systemic challenges to the rules-based international order.[v]

In recent years, NATO has significantly expanded its engagement in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly its dialogue and coordination with key partners such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea (often referred to as the Asia-Pacific 4, or AP4). NATO’s growing involvement in the region is seen as a desirable development for countries like Japan, who are evaluating their ability to deter and defend against a rising China. However, it is important to note that there are no plans to integrate these partners into NATO’s military plans.

For the second consecutive year, NATO welcomed the AP4 leaders at its annual summit: NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg met Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio, New Zealand Prime Minister Chris Hipkins, and South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol in Vilnius on 11–12 July. While the 2023 NATO Summit focused on the accession of Sweden, Allied support to Ukraine, and the establishment of a path for Ukrainian membership, the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific was still a strong theme.[vi]

The summit emphasized the interconnectedness between the Indo-Pacific and Europe, with a recurring theme of “What happens in the Indo-Pacific, matters for Europe, for NATO. And what happens in Europe, matters for the Indo-Pacific”, to quote NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. This served to highlight the two primary concerns discussed during the summit: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China.

While the focus of the discussions naturally revolved around the conflict in Europe, the Vilnius Summit Communiqué significantly expanded its attention to China. This expansion is measurable both in terms of word choice (the word “China” was quoted only once in the 2022 Communiqué, but 16 times in 2023) and of the development of the theme.[vii] The Vilnius Communiqué highlighted that the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) ambitions and coercive policies pose a challenge to NATO’s interests, security, and values. It also emphasized NATO’s willingness to engage constructively with China to establish reciprocal transparency and safeguard the Alliance’s security interests.[viii]

Furthermore, NATO took a more assertive stance towards Beijing. Allies condemned China for its “malicious hybrid and cyber operations, confrontational rhetoric, and dissemination of disinformation”.[ix] NATO leaders accused Beijing of attempting “to undermine the rules-based international order, particularly in the domains of space, cyber, and maritime”.[x] The statement also expressed concerns about China’s strategic control over key technological and industrial sectors, critical infrastructure, strategic materials, and supply chains, as well as its efforts to create strategic dependencies. Generally, NATO recognizes that China is the only actor to possess both the ambition and the ability to change the international order.[xi]

The changing dynamics of NATO’s China policy have wider implications beyond the immediate concerns of the Russia-Ukraine war. The interdependence between Europe and the Indo-Pacific region is now greater than it was during the Cold War era. A challenge to the United States in the Indo-Pacific can have adverse effects on NATO and European security. Therefore, it is imperative for NATO allies to establish common priorities and strike a balance between the two theatres. Developing a robust and cohesive strategy towards China necessitates thorough assessments and proactive decision-making.

Enhancing NATO-Japan cooperation

In response to China and Russia’s declaration of a friendship with “no limits”, the security calculus in both NATO and Japan has moved from being regionally to globally focused: China now falls within NATO’s scope of concern in addition to the bloc’s primary focus on the European continent, and Russia within Japan’s, which has traditionally been fixated on threats emanating from Northeast Asia. For instance, Japanese Prime Minister Fumjo Kishida has pledged significant support to Ukraine, bilaterally and in multilateral contexts such as at the G7 summit in Hiroshima. Moreover, Japan has already committed US $7.1 billion in support in humanitarian, financial, and nonlethal defence equipment to Kyiv.[xii] In just a few years, Japan has abandoned its policy of preferential treatment toward Russia, even labelling it a serious violator of international law in its 2022 National Security Strategy. Thus, while Russia was long a factor complicating Japan’s engagement with NATO, it is now a factor promoting it.

This has incentivized defence cooperation, resulting in a genuine upgrading of political and military ties between Japan and countries within the NATO alliance.[xiii] As Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi recently put it when asked about the growing cooperation, “It is not possible to speak about the security of Europe and the Indo-Pacific region separately.” Washington has welcomed—indeed, pushed for and helped facilitate—the warming of relations between its principal multilateral and bilateral alliances as it continues its reorientation toward the Indo-Pacific. As part of this shift, the United States is now actively uniting its allies in Europe and Asia in order to take on China and Russia. This includes promoting dialogue to address common challenges, such as safeguarding the rules-based international order among NATO’s Indo-Pacific partners—Japan, South Korea, Australia, and India—who have not cooperated extensively in post–Cold War security affairs.[xiv]

The roots of the NATO–AP4 partnership can be traced back to the early 1990s, when Japan became the first Asian country to engage with NATO after the fall of the Soviet Union through an exchange of official visits.[xv] Bilaterally, the US government had already strengthened its ties with the Indo-Pacific in 1987 by designating Australia, Japan, and South Korea among the first Major Non-NATO Allies (MNNA).[xvi] Until recently, however, NATO’s focus on Asia primarily included Central Asia and its cooperative missions in Afghanistan. Last year’s NATO summit in Madrid expanded the Strategic Concept to include China as a “systemic challenge” and a “systemic competitor” to Euro-Atlantic security, thus widening NATO’s focus in Asia and putting increased focus on its Indo-Pacific partnerships.[xvii]

Among the AP4 countries, the NATO-Japan relationship is worthy of particular focus. Cooperation between Japan and NATO was spearheaded through high-level political exchanges and agreements, including the 2013 Joint Political Declaration and 2014 Individual Partnership and Cooperation Program, which put in writing the commitment to work together to enhance interoperability and build capabilities to address challenges to “shared strategic interests” inherent to the shifting security environments in both Europe and Asia. In their joint statement in early 2023, Stoltenberg and Kishida reinforced the importance of a “staunch” NATO-Japanese partnership that “will demonstrate its value under this severe and complex security environment.”  

In addition to the participation of Japan in the Madrid and Vilnius NATO Summits, Tokyo has been increasingly integrated into NATO’s institutions, and Japanese delegations have been invited to NATO Foreign Ministers’ Hiroshima meeting.[xviii] Such diplomatic ties were cemented in 2019, when Japan established its first formal mission to NATO within its embassy in Belgium. This mission was eventually upgraded in 2023 to a permanent mission to NATO headquarters, with its own ambassador appointed to the mission.

2023 is a crucial year for NATO-Japan relations for another reason: in May, NATO announced its intention to open a liaison office in Tokyo.[xix] A liaison office constitutes a qualitative leap for political and security dialogue: in the 1990s, NATO opened liaison offices in the post-communist countries in Eastern Europe, pursuing the path of liberal democracy and seeking security guarantees in the post-Cold War order. The liaison offices in Eastern Europe acted as a preliminary step for the full integration for those countries into the Alliance. Even though this is not the case of Japan, the creation of a NATO liaison office in Tokyo constitutes an unprecedented signal of NATO’s interest in Indo-Pacific security and an even closer cooperation between the Alliance and Japan in terms of interoperability, exchange of information, cyber and outer space, and political dialogue. Although the idea of a NATO liaison office in Japan has not received—at least for now—the support of France, the creation of an office is still a matter of discussion within the Alliance, as Secretary General Stoltenberg declared.

At the Vilnius summit in July, a further upgrade and even more ambitious partnership agreement was unveiled under the auspices of NATO’s new Individually Tailored Partnership Program (ITPP) with the understanding that cooperation on priority issues will be accelerated, streamlined, and expanded.[xx] NATO-Japan relations have gradually been institutionalized over the past decade, but the pace, level of integration, and planned commitment to the relationship over the past year alone are unprecedented. The ITPP, presented by the two parties on 12 July, is divided into three sections. The first one underlines the common values of NATO members and Japan, and their common challenges in a non-peaceful world: Russian aggression in Ukraine, China’s policy in the Pacific, and Moscow and Beijing’s challenge to the rules-based international order, Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, as well as emerging and disruptive technologies, cyberspace, outer space, and climate change. The second part sets three strategic objectives for the period 2023–2026:

1)    Japan and NATO strengthen dialogue and consultations.

2)    Japan and NATO promote practical cooperation and enhance interoperability.

3)    Japan and NATO enhance their individual resilience across the peace–crisis spectrum.

The third part describes four areas of cooperation: emerging security issues, longstanding security issues, expansion of cooperative activities, and promotion of fundamental values.

This cooperation seems to be very promising, since it incentives defence equipment cooperation. This means enhanced interoperability between NATO and Japan’s forces as well as standardization. This includes undertaking sizeable projects through the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), such as developing the “next generation fighter”, a joint project gathering Japan, Italy, Germany, and the UK.[xxi]

Another interesting development entails non-combatants evacuation operations (NEOs). However, the most challenging issue concerns the enhancement of the exchange of information.[xxii] As Professor Tsuruoka Michito, Visiting Fellow at the Australian National University Strategic & Defence Studies Centre (SDSC), declared during an interview with the International Institute for Strategic Studies, this is the most sensitive theme.[xxiii] Japan already has an agreement for the exchange of information with NATO. However, the document is just a framework, since it allows only the sharing of basic information. Through the ITPP, the NATO-Japan agreement on the sharing of security information may potentially evolve in the direction of a more “privileged” status, following the model of already existing agreements between the Alliance and countries like Ireland, Switzerland, Austria, Australia, and New Zealand.[xxiv]

Deterrence and Defence: What the Euro-Atlantic and Pacific democracies can do together

By capitalizing on the NATO–AP4 partnership, a strong deterrence message can be sent to authoritarian regimes possessing nuclear weapons, namely China, North Korea, and Russia. Furthermore, this partnership can contribute to a global security architecture that addresses shared challenges and promotes multilateral cooperation.[xxv] Amid greater difficulty in decision-making during crises and an increased likelihood of miscalculation, particularly in the context of multipolar nuclear competition, the concern over a potential Chinese invasion or blockade of Taiwan remains. Drawing on NATO’s relevant experiences, East Asian countries could strengthen US extended deterrence in Asia by adopting deterrence measures, practices, and consultative mechanisms. The Washington Declaration of 26 April 2023, agreed to after a summit between US President Joe Biden and South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, is one example of this.[xxvi] In order to counter North Korea’s nuclear threat (Pyongyang is developing tactical weapons that could target South Korean territory) and, at the same time, prevent the spread of nuclear weapons in the region, since Seoul could develop its own nuclear weapons to deter Pyongyang, Washington has agreed to periodically deploy US nuclear-armed submarines to South Korea and involve Seoul in its nuclear planning operations. In return, South Korea has agreed to not develop its own nuclear weapons.[xxvii]

Alongside hard security issues, like deterrence and defence, Euro-Atlantic countries and East Asian partners should collaborate on crisis response and management, expanding on existing political dialogues between the North Atlantic Council and NATO’s Allied Command Transformation. A coordinated response involving NATO, Allied Command Transformation, and the European Union, in alignment with the United States across multiple domains, is key in addressing threats from Beijing or potential Asian crises. The involvement of political, policy, and military officials is essential for formulating and implementing joint crisis response plans. Conducting exercises on scenarios like a crisis in Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, or the South China Sea resulting from deterrence failure is crucial in minimizing confusion during crises and preventing adversaries from dividing the allies. Having a basic plan also helps manage expectations, provide predictability, and allow NATO and EU member states to contribute effectively during crisis response scenarios. For instance, some NATO and EU member states have deployed naval and military assets to the Indo-Pacific to signal support for a rules-based international order. The US presence in the Indo-Pacific is certainly the most prominent among the Allies and is part of the US role as a global actor. The United States is the country with the largest presence in the Indo-Pacific region; as a fully-fledged Indo-Pacific nation, the US guarantees its presence from the West Coast across the Pacific Ocean, encompassing military bases on the island of Guam and troop barracks in the ROK and Japan, totalling over 80,000 troops in those two countries alone.[xxviii]

Additionally, the regular presence of the French Navy in the South China Sea can also be seen as a contribution to a broader allied effort to push back against Chinese unilateralism. In 2021, the deployment of the French SSN Émeraude and the amphibious exercises conducted with the United States, Japan, and Australia may be considered tangible efforts towards a more open Indo-Pacific[xxix]; although, at the same time, French President Emmanuel Macron is opposed to the idea of a “league” of NATO members against Beijing.[xxx] The United Kingdom, in addition to its traditional presence, cooperates proactively with the United States and its Pacific partners within many frameworks: e.g., NATO, AUKUS, and the Five Eyes for the exchange of information.[xxxi]

Pacific democracies’ support for NATO is essential, especially during a crisis scenario. While NATO as a whole would not militarily engage outside the Euro-Atlantic region, some individual members would, in particular the United States. Divisions among NATO members over a response to an armed attack in the Indo-Pacific should be avoided since they would grant adversaries an opportunity to exploit them. Therefore, like-minded allies and partners should discuss their supporting roles, considering the array of crisis possibilities. NATO could provide economic and political assistance or even military support similar to what some Allied Command Transformation countries have done for Ukraine to facilitate training, education, and communication through several projects, ranging from immediate training and education events to long-term support.[xxxii]

Allies and partners from the United States, Europe, and the Indo-Pacific could deepen joint military exercises in the Indo-Pacific region. These drills, either standalone or integrated with existing multinational exercises like Australia’s Talisman Sabre, can utilize hypothetical scenarios and targets to minimize misperceptions by Beijing, Pyongyang, and Moscow.[xxxiii] The skills developed in these exercises would be transferrable to real-life situations when required. Additionally, the United States could appoint an Indo-Pacific coordinator at NATO or a Pacific-Atlantic coordinator in Washington, someone with expertise in all three regions and deterrence. Coordinating NATO-Allied Command Transformation meetings with other multilateral groupings such as the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) security partnership and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue would prevent redundancy while working closely with Indo-Pacific experts in each capital. North American, European, and Indo-Pacific allies and partners must practice readiness collectively and foster habits of trilateral cooperation sooner rather than later. However, certain challenges must be addressed, such as the budget, resources, and consensus required for action plans and joint drills. Furthermore, the AP4 is not currently a formal independent grouping, and NATO only cooperates bilaterally with AP4 countries. These nations have yet to align on a common agenda as a group, and the Japan-South Korea relationship remains strained. Consequently, some NATO members may be hesitant about formalizing initiatives with the AP4. Nevertheless, practical initial steps must be taken, considering the high stakes involved, rather than waiting for a conflict or crisis to occur in the Indo-Pacific. An idea for a permanently established framework may come from initiatives such as the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation, both launched by the Alliance in order to cooperate with Middle East and North African countries.

The domestic domain

In addition to external threats, NATO allies and their partners must address vulnerabilities within their territories and reinforce internal resilience. Critical infrastructures, such as hospitals and banks, face increasing threats, while activities in space and at sea demand protection. The urgency to counter economic coercion, safeguard supply chains, and establish and enforce technological standards compatible with the international rules-based order is amplified under this scenario.[xxxiv]

The dissemination of state and non-state disinformation campaigns emerges as another significant concern when combatting threats from both Moscow and Beijing. Russia and China coordinate efforts to share false narratives about Ukraine and NATO, leveraging their media networks. As cooperation deepens between NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners, the manipulation of information by these actors is likely to intensify.[xxxv] To meet China, NATO members do not need to come to the Pacific: Beijing is pervasive in the cyber domain, in emerging and disruptive technologies, and it is increasing its role in outer space.[xxxvi]

Protecting societies in member states and partner countries alike necessitates confronting a wide range of potential threat actors. Cyber defence is a promising area for cooperation, given that all concerned nations face threats from state and non-state actors. Collaboration on improving cyber defences through NATO partnerships and engagement in exercises led by NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn presents valuable opportunities.[xxxvii]  Other Centres of Excellence may support the NATO-AP4 partnership. For instance, the Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence (CIMIC) and the recently developed “Resilience Through Civil Preparedness Course” from the Climate Change and Security Centre of Excellence in Canada could help to lay the basis for a joint Euro-Atlantic and Pacific response to climate change. Cooperation through such Centres of Excellence presents the advantage of sharing information and expertise with partners on global themes without necessarily involving classified material.

Furthermore, deeper cooperation in research, innovation, standard-setting, and interoperability for emerging and disruptive technologies holds great potential. Countering the spread of digital authoritarianism and maintaining a technological advantage on the battlefield rely on joint efforts in this regard. Collaboration on space-related issues, including satellite launches and reconnaissance, would also prove beneficial. However, cost limitations hinder other partners’ ambitions to develop greater space capabilities.

Enhancing ties between NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners would facilitate political dialogue and information sharing. The complexity and interconnectedness of global challenges highlight the short-sightedness of segregating or concentrating political discourse into a single theatre, as it restricts awareness and coordinated responses during crises. Establishing a NATO Centre of Excellence in the Indo-Pacific, potentially in Southeast Asia, with joint support from the alliance and host country, would promote exchange.[xxxviii] Simultaneously, Indo-Pacific partners should expand their participation in existing NATO Centres of Excellence, improving their knowledge on themes like emerging and disruptive technologies, and in fields such as artificial intelligence, hypersonic systems, quantum biotechnology, and human enhancement. Efforts to expand information exchange would also address vulnerabilities related to undersea pipelines and cables, a resource-intensive task. Additionally, NATO and an Indo-Pacific partner could together tackle the challenges posed by climate change, assisting Pacific Island states facing existential threats and promoting coordinated assistance.

Final recommendations

In conclusion, the Euro-Atlantic area and the Pacific democracies share more than the same values and economic interests. The global power competition—embodied in a tragic form by the ongoing Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and by China’s pressure on Taiwan and East Asia as well as its geo-economic global penetration—requires a joint NATO-Asia Pacific response. In order to launch and maintain a clear and effective partnership with its Indo-Pacific partners, NATO partners should bear in mind that concrete and efficient projects are preferable. NATO’s role should aim to achieve goals that without its action would be unfulfilled. Where cooperation seeks to develop something new, such as capabilities or standards, the approach must improve efficiency and security for all involved. More importantly, in times of severe economic vulnerability, the partnership must be financially efficient and sustainable. Unfortunately, this constraint could drastically limit the most ambitious projects, involving, for example, outer space, which requires massive investments. Openness to the public at large is needed to dispel any attempt to label cooperation as untransparent.

In order to effectively address economic coercion and other sub-threshold threats, it is important for cooperation to be comprehensive and encompass various areas that are often covered by other multilateral or bilateral formats. NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners should strive to complement and cooperate with other bodies, particularly the EU, and carefully select the most effective format for addressing specific concerns. Cooperation holds the potential to strengthen the rules-based order in the face of the growing threat of digital authoritarianism. This can be achieved by reinforcing the bedrock of common values, which should serve as the foundation for partnerships. Additionally, it is crucial to maintain openness in collaborating with like- and similar-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific region. To counter any attempts to label cooperation as untransparent, it is essential to adopt an attitude of openness towards the public. This level of transparency will help dispel any doubts or suspicions and demonstrate the genuine intent behind cooperative efforts.

About the Author

Aldo Carano holds a master’s degree in European and International Studies. Starting in September 2023, he will attend the Master’s in Diplomatic Studies organized by the United Nations Association of Italy (SIOI). He worked as an intern for the Italian Embassy to Ukraine in 2022. His main research interests are transatlantic relations and NATO, US–EU relations, and bilateral relations between the US and European partners. He is passionate about the history of international relations, diplomacy, and geopolitics. He is a Junior Fellow at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and a member of the European Association of International Studies (AESI), for which he organizes and participates in conferences on NATO, European security, and diplomacy.

Notes

[i] NATO, “Opening remarks by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Heads of State and Government, with Sweden, Indo-Pacific Partners, and the EU,” 12 July 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_217091.htm?selectedLocale=en

[ii] K. Berzina, “Next Steps for Closer Cooperation NATO and its Indo-Pacific Partners,” The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 26 June 2022, https://www.gmfus.org/news/nato-and-its-indo-pacific-partners

[iii] Ibid.

[iv] NATO, “London Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in London 3-4 December 2019,” 4 December 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_171584.htm

[v] NATO, “Brussels Summit Communiqué Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels,” 14 June 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm

[vi] S. Tiezzi, “NATO Summit Takes Aim at China,” The Diplomat, 12 July 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/07/nato-summit-takes-aim-at-china/

[vii] NATO, “Vilnius Summit Communiqué Issued by NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Vilnius 11 July 2023,” 11 July 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_217320.htm

[viii] Ibid.

[ix] Ibid.

[x] Ibid.

[xi] Berzina, “Next Steps for Closer Cooperation.”

[xii] M. Brummer and W. Lindgren, “Anarchy Is a Bridge: Russia and China are Pushing NATO and Japan Together,” War on the Rocks, 10 July 2023, https://warontherocks.com/2023/07/anarchy-is-a-bridge-russia-and-china-are-pushing-nato-and-japan-together/

[xiii] Ibid.

[xiv] Ibid.

[xv] NATO, “Relations with Japan,” last updated 28 July 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50336.htm

[xvi] “U.S. Is Granting Israel Non-NATO Ally Status: Move Should Bring Strategic and Economic Gains, Shamir Says; Egypt Gets Same Rating,” Los Angeles Times, 16 February 1987, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1987-02-16-mn-2391-story.html

[xvii] NATO, “NATO 2022 Strategic Concept.”

[xviii] Brummer and Lindrgen, “Anarchy is a Bridge.”

[xix] Ibid.

[xx] NATO, “Individually Tailored Partnership Programme between NATO and Japan for 2023 – 2026,” 12 July 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_217797.htm?selectedLocale=en

[xxi] “Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP),” Leonardo S.p.A., https://www.leonardo.com/it/business/gcap

[xxii] Y. Koshino, “Japan and NATO in 2023 with Ben Schreer and Tsuruoka Michito,” International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 1 August 2023, https://www.iiss.org/podcasts/japan-memo/2023/08/japan-and-nato-in-2023-with-ben-schreer-and-tsuruoka-michito/

[xxiii] Ibid.

[xxiv] Ibid.

[xxv] D. Kim, “NATO Can Help Create a Global Security Architecture,” Foreign Policy, 17 July 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/07/17/nato-asia-pacific-ap4-vilnius-summit-china-global-security/

[xxvi] The White House, “Washington Declaration,” 26 April 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/04/26/washington-declaration-2/

[xxvii] “Experts react: The US and South Korea strike a deal on nuclear weapons. What’s next for the alliance?” The Atlantic Council, 26 April 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react-the-us-and-south-korea-strike-a-deal-on-nuclear-weapons-whats-next-for-the-alliance/

[xxviii] Marcos Perestrello, NATO and the Indo-Pacific Region, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Political Committee, 20 November 2022, https://www.nato-pa.int/document/2022-nato-and-indo-pacific-region-report-krimi-021-pcnp

[xxix] Ibid.

[xxx] Ibid.

[xxxi] Kim, “NATO Can Help Create.”

[xxxii] Ibid.

[xxxiii] Ibid.

[xxxiv] Berzina, “Next Steps for Closer.”

[xxxv] Ibid.

[xxxvi] Koshino, “Japan and NATO in 2023.”

[xxxvii] NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, “Japan to Join the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn,” https://ccdcoe.org/news/2018/japan-to-join-the-nato-cooperative-cyber-defence-centre-of-excellence-in-tallinn/

[xxxviii] Kim, “NATO Can Help Create.”

Image: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/photos_211268.htm