Capitalizing on Atlantic & Pacific Synergies for Integrated Deterrence
By Katelyn Pisch
Despite thousands of miles separating the Atlantic and Pacific, the two regions are more intertwined than ever with the rise of revisionist powers seeking to undermine stability. Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and continued use of hybrid tactics has brought instability to the Euro-Atlantic. In the Pacific, Japan and South Korea face uncertainty in light of China’s aggression in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait in addition to North Korea’s continued nuclear posturing. Exacerbating these challenges, China and Russia have increased cooperation, with more frequent economic, diplomatic, and military interactions. These developments should prompt like-minded partners to increase their capacity for deterrence and defence. Examining the current strategic environment, it is clear that deepening cooperation between NATO and partners like Japan and South Korea can ensure stability in the Euro-Atlantic and Pacific.
Through closer cooperation, NATO and East Asian partners can benefit from the relative strengths of each to maximize efficiencies and enable integrated deterrence against aggressive neighbours like Russia and China. Capitalizing on the United States’ increased global engagement and revitalized transatlantic relationships, NATO can build its capacity and expand partnerships in East Asia. There are three key areas of opportunity to enhance cooperation between NATO, Japan, and South Korea: first, a formal intelligence alliance to support early indications and warning of aggression by Russia and China; second, further coordination of defence industrial capabilities to procure modernized and interoperable military systems to compete and win in joint, multi-domain operations; third, strengthening economic and technological resilience through shared standards for lowering supply chain risk and increased economic and scientific cooperation. By leveraging NATO’s experience with joint operations, the United States’ global economic and military reach, and South Korea and Japan’s advantages in economics and technology, further cooperation between NATO and East Asian partners can ensure strength, resiliency, and integrated deterrence.
Assessing the Security Environment
As noted in the U.S. Intelligence Community’s most recent Annual Threat Assessment, “strategic competition between the United States and its allies, China, and Russia over what kind of world will emerge makes the next few years critical to determining who and what will shape the narrative[...].”[i] Both Russia and China seek to undermine the rules-based order that the United States has fostered since the end of World War II. Exacerbating the challenge to U.S. allies in Europe and Asia is the increase in Sino-Russian cooperation since Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russia and China have continued joint military exercises, increased the frequency of diplomatic meetings, and bolstered trade relations.[ii] While Moscow and Beijing grow closer, there is an opportunity for the West to expand its partnerships in Asia to maintain the cohesion of the rules-based international order that Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping would like to undermine.
Russia and China’s desire to exert their influence in strategic regions is nothing new. Both powers have historically exerted influence over the Eurasian continent. Today, exploiting the globalized economy and advancements in technology, these revisionist powers are asserting themselves in strategically significant sectors and regions to restore their influence.
Xi Jinping has established China’s dominant military presence in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea to intimidate and coerce its neighbours. At home, the People’s Liberation Army is developing capabilities to confront the United States and its allies in large-scale combat operations.[iii] Beyond conventional capability advancements, China has begun growing and modernizing its nuclear arsenal to increase its ability to exploit conventional conflicts.[iv] Additionally, to undermine U.S. military strength in the Indo-Pacific, China has developed robust Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities that have rendered U.S. legacy platforms useless for operations in the INDOPACOM area of responsibility.[v] To compete with the United States on a global scale, China’s Belt and Road Initiative continues to expand, pushing the United States out of strategically significant regions, particularly in the Global South.[vi]
Meanwhile, Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine is just one element of Russia’s broader attempts to assert its influence in Eurasia and forge a multipolar international system where it can compete with the United States. The top U.S. General in Europe, Lieutenant General Tod Wolters, has emphasized Russia’s use of both conventional forces along NATO’s borders in combination with unconventional tactics like disinformation, malicious cyber activities, and manipulation of energy markets to destabilize Europe.[vii] In the Middle East and Africa, the Kremlin is utilizing the private paramilitary Wagner Group along with arms sales and resource extraction to garner soft power among client states.[viii] Additionally, Putin has expanded Russia’s military footprint in the High North, with advanced submarine, missile, and A2/AD capabilities.[ix] In light of Sweden’s and Finland’s upcoming ascension into NATO, a more prominent Russian presence in the Arctic, especially naval activity in the Barents Sea, presents a challenge for Arctic members of NATO.[x]
Malicious Chinese and Russian activity undoubtedly pose a challenge to the West and the rules-based international order. Countering this challenge requires integrated deterrence—deterrence that uses all levers of national power—to ensure peace and stability. Forging closer partnerships between NATO, Japan, and South Korea can ensure effective, integrated deterrence in the Atlantic and Pacific. This effort must capitalize on the United States’ current level of global engagement and the desire of NATO and East Asian partners to take greater responsibility for their own defence and security. An integrated deterrence approach for the Atlantic and Pacific does not require the extension of NATO’s Article V commitment to Japan and South Korea, but more formalized cooperation with NATO’s East Asian partners can benefit all parties by leveraging the unique advantages of each country.
Current Efforts to Deter Russia and China
Recognizing changes in the international security environment with the rise of China and Russia’s continued aggression, many NATO states, as well as Japan and South Korea, have taken steps to enhance their national capabilities and prepare for Great Power Competition.
The United States, as the most prominent member of NATO, is shifting focus away from counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) toward competition with China, managing the challenge of Russia, and preparing for a high-end fight. With this shift, the concept of Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) was born. JADC2 is informing massive modernization efforts across U.S. military services and intelligence community along with extensive efforts to train and exercise with allies and partners in Europe and the Indo-Pacific to master multi-domain operations. The doctrine emphasizes extending the range and endurance of military systems to operate in vast theatres, like the Pacific, even in denied, degraded, intermittent, or limited bandwidth (DDIL) environments. In addition to military advancements, the United States is working to enhance economic resilience and manage supply chain risk through policies like the CHIPS and Science Act to boost American semiconductor research, development, and production to alleviate dependency on China for this critical technology.[xi] Through such strategic planning, the United States has exhibited a clear strategic vision to manage China and Russia through crucial investments to strengthen defence, security, and the economy.
Turning to NATO at large, the recent Vilnius Summit produced important agreements to maintain NATO’s forward presence and deterrence against Russia. Notably, the NATO Defence Production Action Plan provides a new approach to aggregating demand across the alliance and sending longer-term demand signals to the Atlantic defence industry to sustain support for Ukraine while ensuring NATO’s stockpiles do not fall dangerously low.[xii] Additionally, NATO leaders invited Japan and South Korea’s heads of state to the summit in Lithuania this July to discuss continued partnership with the East Asian countries. This follows the NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme, launched in February of 2023, with Belgium, Australia, France, and Japan to facilitate dialogue between scientific experts from NATO and its partner nations to research issues of shared interest.[xiii] Additionally, NATO has also utilized joint military exercises to ensure interoperability and demonstrate unity across the Atlantic in response to Russia’s war in Ukraine. Most recently, NATO held its largest Air Force drills in history at the 2023 Air Defender exercise in Germany.[xiv] European members of NATO are accepting the risks of dependence on China for critical goods, and countries like Germany are adopting “de-risking” strategies to diversify supply chains and counter Chinese attempts to disrupt supply or utilize economic coercion.[xv] National strategies of this kind can increase the individual resiliency of NATO members, creating a stronger alliance overall. Paired with NATO’s efforts to enhance deterrence and defence, bolstering economic strength will contribute to integrated deterrence against Russian aggression and decrease vulnerabilities to potential Chinese antagonism.
In recognition of China’s power in East Asia, Japan is taking steps to increase its own military and economic strength. Prime Minister Fumio Kishida said Japan is at a “turning point in history.”[xvi] Kishida echoed rhetoric from German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, who introduced Germany’s Zeitenwende, a watershed moment, after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine that is prompting Berlin to invest in its military and take on a larger role in regional security. In 2022, the Japanese government announced a military build-up beginning with US $320 billion for the development of long-range missile capabilities. The country is also seeking to spend 2% of GDP on its military, breaking a historic 1% cap it adopted during the Cold War.[xvii] Amidst this strategic shift, Japan is emphasizing its desire for partnerships, including with the United States, whose defence manufacturers will play a key role in equipping Japanese forces.[xviii] Prior to these military investments, Japan took measures to ensure economic resilience and reduce supply chain risks through the adoption of the Economic Security Promotion Act, which evolved from earlier policies in reaction to China blocking exports of rare earth minerals in 2010.[xix] The Japanese government’s power to manoeuvre in the national economy and invest in critical industries has helped it build economic resilience to counter China’s attempted economic coercion. In conjunction with increased military investment, Japan is positioning itself for a larger role in East Asian security. Deeper political, economic, and military partnerships with South Korea and NATO can enhance these efforts and outcomes for integrated deterrence.
South Korea has been independently advancing its military capabilities for decades and exploits its edge in emerging technologies to maintain a high-tech military.[xx] In recent years, North Korea’s aggressive nuclear testing has prompted South Korea to invest in stronger air defence capabilities and submarine-launched ballistic missiles to protect against the North Korean nuclear threat.[xxi] Like Japan, South Korea maintains close relations with the United States and enjoys protection from the U.S. nuclear umbrella. South Korean forces regularly conduct exercises alongside U.S. troops, who maintain a significant presence on the peninsula. This year, marking the 70-year anniversary of the U.S.–South Korea military alliance, American and South Korean forces held the largest live-fire drills since the first round of drills in 1997.[xxii] In May 2023, South Korea and Japan agreed to tighten defence and trade ties with the United States, signifying the continued strength of U.S. alliances in East Asia despite the rising challenge of China.[xxiii] Upon examination of recent history and strategic shifts taking place within NATO, Japan, and South Korea, clear synergies emerge between the Atlantic and Pacific marking an opportunity for closer cooperation among allies and partners.
Opportunities for Further NATO-ROK-Japan Cooperation
To maximize the mutual benefits of closer cooperation between NATO, Japan, and South Korea, agreements should leverage the relative advantages of each through increased cooperation for integrated deterrence. With the United States as a leading, unifying force between NATO and East Asia, each country’s military, economic, technological, and political strengths can become a pillar of integrated deterrence against China and Russia.
To enhance cohesion necessary for a closer partnership, particularly in the military realm, NATO, Japan, and South Korea can formulate an intelligence and information-sharing alliance, following the Anglophone “Five Eyes” model. The “Five Eyes” system allows for signals intelligence sharing between the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand to monitor threats across the globe. Beyond integrating intelligence capabilities, this type of agreement between NATO, Japan, and South Korea could provide earlier indications and warnings of Chinese or Russian aggression to alert allies and partners of potential contingencies. In support of joint and combined military exercises and operations, intelligence sharing enhances situational understanding and situational awareness for all partner nations to minimize information asymmetries that adversaries can exploit. This alliance could leverage the United States’ extensive intelligence apparatus that is advancing its space-based assets, data transport capabilities, and automation technologies to deliver intelligence at the speed of mission relevance. Further advancements can make use of South Korea’s advantages in digital and emerging technologies providing innovative capabilities to the United States and key allies and partners in the Atlantic and Pacific.[xxiv]
A vital component of future combined and joint operations will be the interoperability and rapid adaptability of military systems. The United States is adopting a Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA) in the design of next-generation military capabilities with open standards so systems can be upgraded at the speed of innovation without replacing entire platforms.[xxv] NATO members along with Japan and South Korea can integrate MOSA into their defence modernization strategies to enhance cost-effectiveness and remain at the cutting-edge of military technology. As NATO is establishing long-term strategies to sustain its support to Ukraine, Japan and South Korea can benefit from the alliance’s Defence Production Action Plan. By aggregating demand and sending longer-term demand signals to regional defence manufacturers, this persistent effort seeks to strengthen Western defence industrial bases. East Asian partners can adopt a similar approach with a longer horizon for defence planning. In addition, Japan and South Korea can build off U.S. and NATO experience with military capability and gap analysis for joint and coalition forces. Combined approaches for strengthening defence industrial bases, identifying capability requirements, and open standards for development and procurement can ensure cohesion and interoperability between partners in NATO and the Pacific.
Finally, NATO, Japan, and South Korea can mutually benefit from strengthening existing economic relationships to enhance resiliency and address the threat of economic coercion from China and Russia. In addition to American and Japanese policies to reduce reliance on China for critical raw materials and semiconductors, European members of NATO have undergone significant efforts to reduce dependencies on Russia for energy resources. Capitalizing on the momentum behind these efforts, NATO members, Japan, and South Korea can commit to closer trade relations to benefit from the comparative economic advantages of each partner. Through agreed standards to reshore production of critical technologies and diversification imports of raw materials, rare earth minerals, and energy resources, these partners can reduce collective economic reliance on China and Russia, in turn limiting Beijing and Moscow’s abilities to manipulate markets and exercise economic coercion. Additional cooperation in scientific research and development can leverage the advanced economies of each partner nation and relative advantages in emerging and disruptive technologies to guarantee a technological edge over peer or near-peer adversaries like China and Russia. With advancements in digital technologies, NATO, Japan, and South Korea can counter Chinese and Russian authoritarianism and ensure freedom in cyberspace.
In tandem with advancements in military and intelligence capabilities among NATO and East Asian partner nations, building economic and technological strength can support freedom in the global commons: oceans, outer space, and cyberspace. While China and Russia seek to exert control over these domains and exploit them to undermine the rules-based international order, it is in the interests of NATO, Japan, and South Korea to enhance cooperation for integrated deterrence to maintain stability and security in all domains.
Conclusion
As demonstrated by Japanese and South Korean attendance to the July 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius and the subsequent August 2023 Trilateral Leaders’ Summit at Camp David, NATO members are focused on building lasting partnerships in the Pacific. NATO members should prioritize formal intelligence cooperation, common priorities for military capability development, and shared standards for economic and technological resilience to deepen existing partnerships with Japan and South Korea. To achieve this, NATO members must agree on the role of NATO as a strategic partner in the Pacific. Additionally, all parties will need to negotiate and formalize the priorities, standards, and benchmarks necessary to achieve the proposed partnership. By prioritizing intelligence sharing, capability development, and resilience, NATO members, Japan, and South Korea can all enhance their ability to compete, deter, and win in both the Euro-Atlantic and Pacific.
About the Author
Katelyn Pisch is a contractor for the U.S. Space Force Chief Strategy and Resource Office and a master’s student at the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs studying Security Policy Studies (SPS) and U.S. National Security. She also serves as an Executive Board Member on the SPS Student Board. In 2022, Katelyn graduated summa cum laude from the George Washington University with a Bachelor of Science in International Affairs and a minor in Economics. During her undergraduate studies, she interned at the Hudson Institute and worked as a Communications and Events Associate at the Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies (IERES).
(Disclaimer: Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Space Force.)
Notes
[i] Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, Washington, D.C.: February 6, 2023, 7, https://www.odni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2023-Unclassified-Report.pdf.
[ii]Alexander Gabuev, Li Mingjiang, and Hoang Thi Ha, “China-Russia Relations One Year into the Ukraine War,” interview by Paul Haenle, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 15, 2023, audio, 5:57, https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/15/china-russia-relations-one-year-into-ukraine-war-event-8029.
[iii] Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 7.
[iv] Ibid, 8.
[v] Ibid, 8.
[vi] James McBride, Noah Berman, and Andrew Chatzky, “China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative,” Council on Foreign Relations, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative#chapter-title-0-1.
[vii] United States Senate Armed Services Committee, “Statement of General Tod D. Wolters, United States Air Force Commander, United States European Command,” March 29, 2023, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SASC%2029%20MAR%202022%20EUCOM%20Statement%20(Gen%20Wolters).pdf.
[viii] Paul Stronski, “Late to the Party: Russia’s Return to Africa,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 16, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/16/late-to-party-russia-s-return-to-africa-pub-80056.
[ix] Sigbjorn Halsne, “Competitive Strategies in the European High North,” Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies, Volume 5 (1): 31-44, 2022, https://sjms.nu/articles/10.31374/sjms.93.
[x] “Arctic Military Activity Tracker,” Arctic, accessed July 2, 2023, Center for Strategic and International Studies, https://arcticmilitarytracker.csis.org/#45.
[xi] The White House, “Fact Sheet: CHIPS and Science Act Will Lower Costs, Create Jobs, Strengthen Supply Chains, and Counter China,” release, August 9, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/09/fact-sheet-chips-and-science-act-will-lower-costs-create-jobs-strengthen-supply-chains-and-counter-china/.
[xii]Sabine Siebold and Andrew Gray, “NATO calls for common standards in push to boost defence production,” Reuters, June 14, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/nato-calls-common-standards-push-boost-defence-production-2023-06-14/.
[xiii] “NATO launches new cooperation initiative with experts from partners in the Indo-Pacific region,” News, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, January 25, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_211244.htm.
[xiv] Alexandra Sharp, “NATO Begins Largest Air Force Drills in Its History,” Foreign Policy, June 12, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/06/12/nato-air-defender-military-exercise-russia-ukraine-counteroffensive/.
[xv] Editorial Board, “Germany’s strategy to ‘de-risk’ ties with China,” Financial Times, July 13, 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/9f543306-0adb-4cd7-ac7b-a8be72e494f4.
[xvi] Tim Kelly and Sakura Murakami, “Pacific Japan unveils biggest military build-up since World War Two,” Reuters, December 16, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pacifist-japan-unveils-unprecedented-320-bln-military-build-up-2022-12-16/.
[xvii] Ibid.
[xviii] Ibid.
[xix] Andrew Yeo and Kristin Vekasi, “Can the United States, South Korea, and Japan boost resilience to economic coercion?” Brookings, July 7, 2023, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/can-the-united-states-south-korea-and-japan-boost-resilience-to-economic-coercion/.
[xx] Sarah Jeong, “South Korea’s Defense Capabilities and Acquisition Programs,” Asia Dispatches, Wilson Center Asia Program, August 31, 2023, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/south-koreas-defense-capabilities-and-acquisition-programs.
[xxi] Ibid.
[xxii] Hyung-Jin Kim, “South Korea, US troops hold large live-fire drills near border with North Korea,” Associated Press, May 25, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/south-north-korea-us-firing-drills-9b0bb07c9392360412dba647c64a0009.
[xxiii] Steven Borowiec, “Japan, South Korea, U.S. to tighten trade and defense ties,” Nikkei Asia, May 19, 2023, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/G-7-in-Japan/Japan-South-Korea-U.S.-to-tighten-trade-and-defense-ties.
[xxiv] Taehun Lim, “NATO’s Opportunity in the Indo-Pacific,” Foreign and Security Policy, International Politics and Society, June 1, 2023, https://www.ips-journal.eu/topics/foreign-and-security-policy/natos-opportunity-in-the-indo-pacific-6422/.
[xxv] “Modular Open Systems Approach,” Chief Technology Office, Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, accessed July 1, 2023, https://ac.cto.mil/mosa/.
Image: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/photos_197227.htm
