The Importance of Energy Resilience in Multi-Domain Threats

By Fabrizio De Leonardis

Energy security has become increasingly relevant to national and global security in recent years. NATO and the Allies, in the Strengthened Resilience Commitment of 2021, committed to improving security measures and resilience in various areas, particularly in the context of energy security, protection of critical infrastructure (on land, at sea, in space, and cyberspace) and emerging technologies, natural hazards exacerbated by climate change, and military capabilities. The goal is to secure and diversify supply chains, protect key industries from harmful economic activities, protect next-generation communication systems, and safeguard technology and intellectual property. In addition, NATO will work on its internal resilience, ensuring the ability to consult, decide, and act together when necessary by demonstrating strength both individually and as a united Alliance to adapt its approach quickly and decisively to meet evolving challenges and ensure stability and security for Allies. (i)

In the last two years since the above commitment, NATO adopted a new Strategic Concept in Madrid that considers the issue of energy security as crucial, especially in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. The invasion produced multiple changes in the geopolitical arena and the need for the Alliance to strengthen energy security by investing in secure, stable, and reliable supplies and sources. In this light, at the 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius, the Allies agreed to develop NATO’s capacity to support national authorities in protecting critical energy infrastructure. In response to Russia’s internationally aggravated energy crisis, they reaffirmed their commitment to ensuring secure, resilient, and sustainable energy supplies. They also established the NATO Maritime Center (MARCOM) for the security of critical undersea infrastructure and initiated a network to improve information sharing and the exchange of best practices among NATO Allies, the private sector, and other relevant actors. These measures aim to protect critical infrastructure and ensure energy security in a complex strategic environment characterized by threats in cyberspace, manipulation of energy supplies, and economic coercion by authoritarian actors and strategic competitors. (ii)

Energy security and sustainability is a political, security, and economic priority. From these priorities comes the need to address the so-called “energy trilemma” of ensuring security, sustainability, and competitiveness. The energy trilemma is a key issue for the future of the European continent. In the short term, Europe must cope with the complex challenge of diversifying its energy supply; in the medium to long term, it must achieve its energy transition goals (-55% carbon dioxide emissions compared to 1990 levels) by 2030 and its goal of net-zero emissions by 2050. At the same time, it will be necessary to counter the growing food crisis as food prices have risen sharply over the last two years due to soaring energy prices and supply chain disruptions, putting millions of people at risk. The FAO’s Food Price Index, which measures the change in international prices of a basket of food products, recorded a 14.3% increase between 2021 and 2022. (iii) According to the World Food Program, the number of people facing acute food insecurity nearly quadrupled between 2017 and 2021 and could increase further by 17% to 323 million this year due to Russia’s war in Ukraine. (iv)

Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine has brought the issue of energy security back to center stage, between foreign dependence on hydrocarbon supplies and the push for energy transition related to renewable energy development. In this regard, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has forced a collective rethinking of energy supply choices and the revision of some international and European market mechanisms. In addition, Russia’s determination to use energy as a geopolitical weapon has dashed any hope of it being a reliable energy supplier. As a result, the European Union has pledged to eliminate all Russian imports of fossil fuels by 2027 (in addition to imposing numerous sanctions and embargoes), strengthening collaborations with traditional partners and promoting additional ones. Consider that Russia has shifted from supplying the 27 EU member states with about 40% of the gas they consumed (before the invasion) to a market share of about 14% as of June 2023. (v) In addition, the Atlantic Allies have reinforced and reconfirmed their climate ambitions by increasing decarbonization targets for environmental, economic, and strategic reasons.

Renewable energy sources not only represent an opportunity for the European energy system to meet the needs of the green transition but are also relevant to reducing foreign energy dependence by strengthening European energy security. In the past year, the United States and Europe have further accelerated energy security cooperation. In this regard, the increase in gas production in the United States and the start of U.S. LNG exports to the EU in 2016 have improved gas supply security in Europe and around the world. Europe currently imports about 90% of the gas it needs, and this share is expected to increase in the coming years. LNG is also a significant part of the EU’s diversification strategy, and as the world’s second-largest gas market after the United States, the EU is an attractive market for the United States. Natural gas plays a central role in the EU energy system by accounting for 23% of energy demand. (vi) In addition, LNG could accompany the move of the economic system toward a low-carbon economy to a clean energy transition, effectively representing the least polluting hydrocarbon with the most flexibility in storage. (vii)

In this scenario, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is expected to become an area of relevant interest for European energy policy both for oil and gas security and for the energy transition through sustainable energy trade. (viii) From 2015 to 2021, African and Middle Eastern countries, led by Saudi Arabia, were among the top 10 oil-supplying countries to NATO members. For example, in 2020, Nigeria was one of Africa’s largest oil producers, importing over 466,000 barrels of oil per day, followed by Morocco with 240,000 barrels per day. (ix) However, forging trade agreements with these countries is not enough: a vision towards Africa that is more strategic and long-term oriented is needed, because we cannot count on the security of our supplies from a region of the world that is increasingly unstable for both socio-economic and demographic reasons. Moreover, Africa is suffering more than any other region in the world from the consequences (food, energy, and geopolitical) of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

What are the main challenges to NATO’s energy resilience?

The principle of resilience, enshrined in Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, plays a key role in providing NATO with the means to fulfill its core tasks, particularly collective defense. Resilience is the ability of any NATO member state—thus of a society—to withstand and recover from a major shock (e.g., natural disaster, the failure of critical infrastructure, or a hybrid or armed attack). Resilience combines both military capability and civilian preparedness. The latter has three basic functions (continuity of government, continuity of essential services to the population, and support for operations) and constitutes a central pillar of the Alliance’s collective defense. Overall, NATO policy on resilience and civilian preparedness is guided by the Resilience Committee, which reports directly to the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s principal policy-making body. (x)

The Resilience Committee (RC), belonging to the Defense Policy and Planning Division, is responsible for strategic and policy direction, planning guidance, and overall coordination of NATO resilience activities. The RC is supported by six specialized planning groups composed of subject matter experts appointed by the allies, each responsible for providing advice in its area of expertise. Among the main planning groups is the Energy Planning Group (EPG), which is responsible for overseeing resilient energy supplies. Interestingly, the EPG has strengthened coordination with other international organizations, such as the International Energy Agency and the EU, as well as with the energy industry, including infrastructure operators. In addition, during NATO’s annual Energy Security Roundtable, energy infrastructure companies presented information regarding the security of undersea energy infrastructure and NATO’s adaptation to the energy transition. The latter will rely heavily on electricity infrastructure, offshore wind power generation, and the supply of critical minerals for renewable energy production, storage, and transportation. These initiatives reflect NATO’s continued commitment to ensuring the security and resilience of the energy sector. (xi) The other groups that are part of the RC are the Civil Communications Planning Group (CCPG), which focuses on building resilience in the communications sector; the Civil Protection Group (CPG), which focuses on ensuring continuity of government and effectively dealing with uncontrolled movements of people; the Food and Agriculture Planning Group (FAPG), which focuses on resilience in the food and water sectors as well as disruptive health crisis situations; and the Transport Group (TG), divided into inland surface, maritime, and air, supports resilient civil transportation systems. (xii) These efforts are crucial because, as highlighted by David Cattler, NATO’s Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence and Security, and David van Weel, NATO’s Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges, the Atlantic Alliance faces multi-spectrum and multi-domain threats that seek to attack its critical infrastructure, exploiting the openness, interdependence, and connectivity of societies and economies. (xiii)

First, according to Assistant Secretary General Cattler, there is a “persistent and significant risk” that Russia may target the critical energy and technical infrastructure of Allied countries with the goal of disrupting the lives of the West and gaining leverage against nations that are providing support to Ukraine. Effectively, since February 2022, i.e., the start of the Russian war against Ukraine, some cybercriminals have publicly stated that they support the Russian government and have threatened to conduct cyber operations to retaliate for material support for Ukraine and/or perceived attacks against Moscow. These cybercrime groups, likely aligned with Russia, threaten critical infrastructure organizations primarily through the distribution of ransomware, whereby cyber actors prevent victims from accessing data by demanding ransom to remove the restriction. This can cause significant disruption of operations or distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against websites, sending them into a tailspin. (xiv) In this respect, Assistant Secretary General van Weel stressed the need to recognize cyberspace as a “perpetually contested environment”. (xv) For instance, in May 2021, a hacker group launched a ransomware attack on the Colonial Pipeline, the largest pipeline system for refined petroleum products in the United States, forcing its closure.

Following the troubling 26 September 2022 attacks on the NordStream 1 and NordStream 2 pipelines carrying Russian gas to Germany, NATO established an office at its Brussels headquarters to protect the Alliance’s most important infrastructure and to assist the ongoing investigations by the three countries (Denmark, Germany, and Sweden) into the pipeline explosions. In this context, the North Atlantic Council stated that it stands ready to defend against the coercive use of energy and other hybrid tactics by state and non-state actors, stressing that any deliberate attack against Allied critical infrastructure will be met with a united and determined response. (xvi) What happened to the above-mentioned pipelines can be repeated anywhere else and may affect countries helping Ukraine defend itself against Russian invasion. It is possible, for instance, that the gas pipelines connecting Norway to the United Kingdom and the European mainland or the undersea data transfer cables crossing the Atlantic between Europe and the United States could be some of the hypothetical targets. (xvii) In addition, gas pipelines and data transfer cables are joined by hundreds of kilometres of power cables, and any disruption could affect some of Europe’s major ports, such as Hamburg, Rotterdam, Antwerp, and Zeebrugge.

Second, the rise of the People’s Republic of China has become one of the major drivers of change in geopolitical balances and is leading to a reconfiguration of economic, technological, political, and strategic balances both globally and in different regions of the world. NATO’s interest in China is an entirely natural concern, as Beijing is investing significant resources in new long-range weapons and missile systems that can reach all Allied countries. (xviii) Moreover, China is increasing its presence in the Arctic, Africa, the Balkans, cyberspace, and its investments in European infrastructure (xix) including the infrastructure of NATO Allied countries (e.g., the potential use of 5G technology in European countries in the wake of the Belt & Road Initiative, also known as the “New Silk Road”). (xx) As stated by David van Weel, NATO members, in addition to facing the threat of Russia’s military failures in Ukraine, should be aware of China’s attempts to create a new global approach to state behaviour in cyberspace “that favors restrictions over fundamental freedoms”. (xxi) In the same opinion David Cattler argues that China is another “significant actor on the seafloor” (in addition to Russia, NATO’s main threat in regard to undersea infrastructure) and is modernizing its armed forces and navy at an “alarming rate.” China is rapidly increasing its nuclear arsenal and developing increasingly sophisticated delivery systems without being more transparent and/or engaging in arms control or risk reduction. (xxii) NATO is also closely observing the growing strategic partnership (in diplomatic, defence, and trade spheres) between China and Russia, especially because of the impact this link can have on the stability of the international order. In this context, China’s coercive policies are seen as a challenge to the Atlantic Alliance’s interests, security, and values. (xxiii)

Third, since the attack on the twin towers on 11 September 2001, after two decades of fighting global terrorism, the threat of terrorist groups taking over the energy sector, including energy and LNG pipeline terminals or landing points, persists. During the past two decades, a substantial international effort has been made to combat terrorism, including the Global Coalition against ISIS, especially in Syria and Iraq. However, terrorist attacks and their geographical expansion have increased in recent years, with particular concern about the current presence of groups affiliated with Daesh and Al Qaeda in Africa. Terrorism, despite regional and international efforts to combat it, remains one of the major threats we face today. Terrorist groups, after being virtually defeated in Syria and Iraq, have spread to other regions such as the Sahel, Southeast Asia, and East Africa. (xxiv) According to some studies, terrorist attacks have increased in the energy sector around the world. In 2003, this type of attack accounted for 25% of terrorist attacks, rising to 35% in 2005. (xxv) In 2016, there was a 14% increase in terrorist attacks targeting the oil and gas industry, accounting for nearly 42% of all attacks. (xxvi) These types of physical attacks are not limited to power plants, refineries, and oil or gas pipelines, but also include other illegal activities, such as stealing oil or gas from pipelines, extortion, or selling raw materials to finance terrorist groups. (xxvii) In short, terrorism, cyber-attacks, infrastructure sabotage, attacks on oil tankers and pipeline installations, and attacks on energy companies represent a change in warfare.

NATO-EU Task Force

Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has produced new risks, including physical and cyber-attacks, often combined into a hybrid threat. Due to these reasons, on 16 March 2023, NATO and the European Union announced a Joint Task Force aimed at strengthening critical infrastructure protection in the face of Russia threats. The EU and NATO will share best practices, enhance situational awareness, and develop key principles for improving resilience, including mitigation measures and corrective actions. This initiative is aimed at improving preparedness and capacity for action in the event of disruptions to the organizations’ critical infrastructure. In the first phase, the NATO-EU Task Force will focus on four key sectors: energy, digital, transport, and space.

The above sectors are significantly interconnected (both physically and digitally) with each other, including other sectors that are outside the scope of this analysis (such as public health, water supply, or agriculture). Given the high level of interdependence between different types of infrastructure, the effects of any disruptions in one sector could spread to other countries, affecting critical infrastructure in other sectors as well. Furthermore, the rapid growth of digitization in these sectors makes them vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Thus, it is essential to better understand these interconnections to anticipate potential large-scale effects, identify measures to limit them, and facilitate an effective and complementary response through civilian and military means. (xxviii)

Conclusions

The evolving definition of security extends beyond deterrence and defence, encompassing cybersecurity, hybrid warfare, disinformation campaigns, space, supply chains, and food security. Therefore, energy resilience is a key strategic factor and a major and growing challenge for NATO to ensure comprehensive security. What we are witnessing after a year and a half of warfare is a massive cross-cutting war by Russia against Ukraine and against our friends in Kyiv.

Today a green revolution is taking place, and the world’s major economies are engaged in the effort to reduce polluting emissions. This revolution can be of great benefit to the armed forces of the Atlantic Alliance. Moreover, by upgrading our most efficient equipment and taking full advantage of new technologies, we can improve our armed forces and strengthen our security, as well as help address climate change. In this way, it will be possible to increase our resilience. (xxix)

Russia’s unwarranted war against Ukraine shows the danger of excessive dependence on an authoritarian regime for raw materials. Moscow’s use of energy as a weapon of coercion highlights the need to quickly break away from Russian oil and gas. At the same time, we must not trade one dependence for another. For example, many new green technologies require rare earth minerals which, for the most part, come from China. Therefore, it is important to diversify our energy sources and suppliers.

NATO and the EU share a common interest in preventing disruptions to critical infrastructure that provides essential services to citizens and sustains our economies. As part of the NATO-EU Task Force on Critical Infrastructure Resilience, NATO member states and Allies confirmed that they have a shared understanding of threats and potential risks. Both organizations will continue to cooperate in a complementary and synergistic way to strengthen resilience and prepare to handle any disruptions resulting from any event.

Finally, after a year of war, Ukraine has shown that it is a strong nation in battle, resilient and uncompromising about its freedom and sovereignty. This war has incredibly united the West politically to help Kyiv, as well as brought NATO and the EU closer together. In particular, the Allies are more united than in the past, and this is a very positive consequence. (xxx)

About the Author

Fabrizio De Leonardis is a recent graduate of the second-level Master’s in Parliament and Public Policy at Luiss Guido Carli and holds an MA in International and Diplomatic Sciences from the University of Bologna. He is currently attending the Master’s in Leadership for International Relations and Made in Italy programme offered by the Italy USA Foundation after receiving the America Youth Award for University Talent. He is currently a fellow for research activities in international economics at the Italian Trade Agency. Since May 2022, he has been a member of the Youth Council of the United States Embassy in Rome and attended the NATO Youth Summit as a US-Italy Young Ambassador.

Notes

(i)      NATO, “Strengthened Resilience Commitment,” 14 June 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_185340.htm#:~:text=Our%20commitment%20to%20strengthen%20our,individual%20and%20collective%20capacity%20to

(ii)     NATO, “Energy Security,” 24 July 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49208.htm

(iii)   FAO Food Price Index, 7 July 2023, https://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex/en/

(iv)    Peter Levi and Gergali Molnar, “How the energy crisis is exacerbating the food crisis,” IEA, 14 June 2022, https://www.iea.org/commentaries/how-the-energy-crisis-is-exacerbating-the-food-crisis

(v)     European Commission, “REPowerEU: A plan to rapidly reduce dependence on Russian fossil fuels and fast forward the green transition,” 18 May 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_22_3131

(vi)    European Commission, “EU-US LNG TRADE: US liquefied natural gas (LNG) has the potential to help match EU gas needs,” 2022, https://energy.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-02/EU-US_LNG_2022_2.pdf

(vii)  United States Energy Information Administration, “Natural gas explained. Natural gas and the environment,” last accessed 7 July 2023, https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/natural-gas/natural-gas-and-the-environment.php

(viii)  Manfred Hafner, “EU Energy Policy and MENA Region in the Wake of the Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine,” in Energy Politics in the MENA Region: From Hydrocarbons to Renewables?, edited by Valeria Talbot, 13–33, ISPI, 2022, https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/energy-politics-mena-region-hydrocarbons-renewables-36797

(ix)    Aleksander Olech, “Terrorist Threats to the Energy Sector in Africa and the Middle East,” in Countering Terrorism on Tomorrow's Battlefield: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resiliency NATO COE-DAT Handbook 2, edited by Sarah J. Lohmann, 161–186, Centre of Excellence Defense Against Terrorism, December 2022.

(x)     NATO, “NATO, Resilience, civil preparedness and Article 3,” last updated 2 August 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132722.htm

(xi)    The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2022, 59–60, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_212795.htm.

(xii)  NATO, “Resilience Committee,” 7 Oct. 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50093.htm

(xiii) Charlie Cooper, “NATO warns Russia could target undersea pipelines and cables,” Politico.Eu, 3 May 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-warns-russia-could-target-undersea-pipelines-and-cables/

(xiv) Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency, “Russian State-Sponsored and Criminal Cyber Threats to Critical Infrastructure,” 9 May 2022, https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa22-110a#:~:text=These Russian-aligned cybercrime groups likely pose a threat to,causing significant disruption to operations.

(xv)  See David van Weel: Keynote Speech at CyCon2023, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YgwiVP-277g.

(xvi) NATO, “Statement by the North Atlantic Council on the damage to gas pipelines,” 29 September 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_207733.htm

(xvii)       Cristina Gallardo, “UK and Norway team up to protect undersea cables, gas pipes in wake of Nord Stream attacks,” Politico.Eu, 18 May 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/uk-norway-team-up-protect-undersea-cables-gas-pipelines/

(xviii)      NATO, “Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg Following the Meetings of NATO Defence Ministers,” 16 June 2020, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_215694.htm.

(xix)  NATO, “Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg ahead of the Leaders’ Meeting in London on 3 and 4 December,” 29 November 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_171460.htm

(xx)  Fabrizio De Leonardis, “Le sfide geopolitiche del 5G: Cina, USA e NATO,” Geopolitica.info, 28 June 2022, https://www.geopolitica.info/sfide-geopolitiche-5g-cina-usa-nato/

(xxi)  See David van Weel: Keynote Speech at CyCon2023.

(xxii)       NATO, “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, 29 June 2022, par.18.

(xxiii)      Ibid., par.13.

(xxiv)      Pilar Rangel, “Guerra contra el terror después del 11S: análisis y prospectiva,” in Panorama estratégico, 249­–278 (Madrid: Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, 2022).

(xxv)        Jennifer Giroux, “Targeting Energy Infrastructure: Examining the Terrorist Threat in North Africa and its Broader Implications,” Elcano Royal Institute, Madrid, 13 February 2009, https://media.realinstitutoelcano.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/ari25-2009-giroux-energy-infraestructure-terrorist-threat-north-africa.pdf

(xxvi)      The One Brief, “Terrorist Attacks and Political Violence: How Oil Is Impacted,” last accessed on 6 June 2023, https://theonebrief.com/terrorism-political-violence-risk-impact-to-oil-energy-industry/

(xxvii)     Lukáš Tichý, “The Islamic State Oil and Gas Strategy in North Africa,” Energy Strategy Reviews no. 24 (2019): 254–260.

(xxviii)    “EU-NATO Task Force on the Resilience of Critical Infrastructure, Final Assessment Report,” June 2023, https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2023-06/EU-NATO_Final Assessment Report Digital.pdf

(xxix)      NATO, “Opening speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the High-Level Dialogue on Climate and Security,” NATO Public Forum, 28 June 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_197168.htm#:~:text=Climate change is not a,protect NATO's one billion citizens.

(xxx)        NATO, “Secretary General in Washington: NATO Allies are united like never before,” 8 February 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_211560.htm

Image: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49208.htm