NATO’s New Force Model: A Watershed Step for the Alliance’s Deterrence, Defence and Crisis Management Missions in a Complex Euro-Atlantic Security Landscape
By Jacopo Maria Bosica
Military mobility in the Euro-Atlantic area experienced a watershed moment at the 2022 NATO Summit in Madrid, as leaders agreed to establish a New Force Model to replace the existing Response Force. In addition to increasing their scale from 40,000 to over 300,000 units, such a shift will broaden troops’ operational domains and catalyse their deployment capabilities in Europe, ranging from 10 days to a maximum of six months. This year’s Vilnius Summit marked another milestone, as Allies adopted a new generation of regional defence plans that overcome a deterrence-by-punishment approach to embrace a deterrence-by-denial one. With the unpredictable evolution of the Russo-Ukrainian powder keg, the new defence plans and the operationalization of the New Force Model can fulfil Allies’ pledge to defend every inch of NATO territory from external attacks.
After a brief background on the context in which it was conceptualized, this paper illustrates the New Force Model’s features to identify changes, continuities, and improvements vis-à-vis the soon obsolete Response Force. It then reflects upon the added value it can bring to EU-NATO cooperation on military mobility and, within it, how coordination among the existing frameworks on funding, capability development, and procurement can be ensured without duplicating efforts. This will help to address the paper’s ultimate research question: the meaning of the New Force Model’s establishment for deterrence and defence in the Euro-Atlantic area. It will conclude that the New Force Model can bolster European Allies’ rapid deployment capabilities to defend themselves without necessarily waiting for the United States to take the lead.
Background: The return of conventional warfare to Europe on the road to Madrid and Vilnius
The last decade witnessed the return of conventional warfare close to the Euro-Atlantic area, starting with Russia’s annexation of Crimea and support for separatist movements in the Eastern Ukrainian oblasts of Donetsk and Luhansk; this encouraged a few NATO members to ready their armed forces for major land operations, albeit without giving rise to a decisive reversion of the demilitarisation process that followed the end of the Cold War.[i] The continental security landscape further deteriorated with Russia’s launch of a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, thus joining equally relevant and longer-standing threats such as terrorism, cyber and hybrid warfare, and China’s assertive and coercive foreign policy hindering NATO’s interests and values in the Indo-Pacific.[ii]
Taken together, these security challenges acted as a veritable wake-up call for European allies,[iii] who at the annual summit in Madrid on 29–30 June 2022 agreed on a new Strategic Concept.[iv] While identifying Russia as “the most significant and direct threat” to the Alliance’s security,[v] NATO heads of state and government decided on matters concerning the Alliance’s future.[vi] Among these, they decided to bolster NATO’s deterrence and defence posture by adjusting the balance between on-field forces and reinforcement while deploying additional robust and battalion-sized brigades on the Eastern Flank with an enhanced command-and-control structure benefiting from prepositioned equipment and reinforcements.[vii] In doing so, they laid the foundations for the establishment of the New Force Model (NFM), which would consist of over 300,000 high-readiness troops assigned to specific regional defence plans, throughout 2023.[viii] The NFM would replace the NATO Response Force (NRF), which was adopted 20 years before at the Prague Summit to establish interoperability among Allied forces with a common rotation plan.[ix] As put by Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg during the pre-Madrid conference, such a significant increase would mark “the biggest overhaul of NATO’s collective deterrence and defence posture since the Cold War.”[x]
The shift was formalised on 10–11 July 2023 at the Vilnius Summit, where NATO leaders approved a new generation of defence plans to enhance coherence between NATO’s collective defence planning and states’ posture, capabilities, and command and control.[xi] In parallel, they agreed to launch a new Allied Reaction Force, whose multinational and multi-domain ethos will guarantee a wider range of options for the Alliance to respond to threats from any direction, as well as to improve the preparedness and interoperability of the Integrated Air and Missile Defence through periodical training and rotational presence of modern systems and capabilities around NATO’s European territory.[xii] In spite of the scepticism about the time frame to reach this,[xiii] the ultimate objective is not only to guarantee that European forces possess the manpower for their own defence in case the United States diverts its focus towards China’s assertive actions in the Indo-Pacific,[xiv] but first and foremost to meet Allies’ requirement to build individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack (art. III Washington Treaty).
I. From a ‘tripwire’ to a ‘total defence’ approach: Comparing the NRF’s and the NFM’s features and rationale
The NATO Response Force functions according to a rotational system where Allied forces contribute land, air, maritime, and Special Operations Forces (SOF) for one year following a 15-day preparation (at the national level) and training period (alongside participants in the multinational force)[xv] in a wide range of activities, including peace-support operations, disaster relief, critical infrastructure protection, and territorial integrity preservation.[xvi] Troops’ rotation allows for the spread of standards and technologies across NATO territory, thus harmonising national forces’ defence practices[xvii] and showing Allies’ willingness to mobilise resources in the name of collective deterrence and defence.[xviii]
At the 2014 Wales Summit, Allies enhanced the NRF with the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), which is comprised of 20,000 troops (5,000 of which make up a multinational land brigade, as agreed by NATO Defence Ministers in February 2015)[xix] and complements the existing components: the Initial Follow-On Forces Group, a maritime component based on the Standing NATO Maritime (Countermeasures) Groups, a combat air and air-support component, SOFs and a Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence Task Force.[xx] This reform increased the number of troops in Eastern Europe from 13,000 to 40,000: these fall under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)’s command, although it is NATO’s Joint Force Commands in Brunssum (Netherlands) and Naples (Italy) that hold operational command on a rotational basis.[xxi]
The New Force Model envisages the opportunity to broaden the scale of intervention thanks to a larger pool of highly qualified land, sea, air, and cyber forces assigned to predetermined defence plans to respond to unexpected crises in a very short time frame. At the Vilnius Summit, NATO leaders reached consensus on allocating the model’s troops in three tiers depending on their readiness level: up to 10 days to mobilise over 100,000 troops, 10–30 days for an additional 200,000, and 30–180 days to reach 500,000.[xxii] Except for Iceland, which lacks armed forces, all NATO members are supposed to step up their contributions to the Alliance’s manpower and be ready to cover specific geographical areas.[xxiii]
Furthermore, the presence along the Eastern Flank was reinforced with more pre-positioned equipment and weapon stockpiles, more forward-deployed capabilities with integrated air and missile defence systems, stronger command and control, and updated regional defence plans.[xxiv] The reinforced presence in Eastern Europe does not, however, mark a point of discontinuity between the NFM and its predecessor, as local battalion-sized brigades will rotate for trainings and exercises across the region[xxv] to display NATO’s ability to scale up its current military presence comprising eight multinational battlegroups.[xxvi]
The new generation of regional defence plans mark the first complete revision of NATO’s doctrine in 30 years.[xxvii] They outline the details of the force elements, who will provide them, where and under what conditions, as well as how Allies should upgrade their defence capabilities and provide logistical support.[xxviii] For the first time in NATO’s history, the plans have objective and threat-based capability targets and replace large-scale interventions with geographically-specific brigades and experts operating across the so-called ‘strategic hat,’ which encapsulates the North-Atlantic, Central Europe, and the South (from Spain to Türkiye).[xxix]
From a teleological viewpoint, the NRF acts as a joint multinational force that is able to enact a rapid military response to compelling security challenges to the Alliance, both for collective defence and crisis management purposes.[xxx] The NFR can also be used to enhance education- and training-related cooperation through joint exercises and by promoting better use of the available technologies.[xxxi] The post-Wales Summit period witnessed the achievement of other milestones: the Graduated Response Plans on 24 June 2015, which aims at enabling the quick generation of operations plans; the strengthening of the Readiness Action Plan at the 2016 Warsaw Summit as the baseline of NATO’s deterrence and defence posture; and the launch of a Readiness Initiative at the 2018 Brussels Summit, in order to foster the Alliance’s rapid-response capability for high-intensity warfighting and rapid military crisis intervention through members’ contribution of 30 mechanised battalions, 30 air squadrons, and 30 battleships within up to 30 days.[xxxii]
All these initiatives added small tiles to the NFM’s mosaic, whose backbone takes inspiration from the high-readiness components of the NRF. The tripartition of available forces aims at giving the SACEUR a more comprehensive view of their composition and readiness level.[xxxiii] Besides boosting NATO’s manpower, the NFM wants to harness regional expertise and catalyse responsiveness through a renovated Allied Reaction Force, which maintains the current’s multi-domain approach[xxxiv] and falls within a comprehensive effort to restructure the Alliance’s ability to face a more complex and challenging worldwide security environment.[xxxv]
Most relevantly, the evolution towards the NFM is dictated by the need to address structural drawbacks of current European land forces, from limited training to ageing equipment, from operational overstretch to outdated procurement plans.[xxxvi] In this sense, the breakout of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine spurred NATO members to address such drawbacks and recalibrate their defence infrastructure towards heavy manoeuvre capabilities, deploy medium-weight formations for smoother strategic mobility, and invest on ground-based air defence (GBAD) based on interoperability and integration to cope with high-intensity combat scenarios.[xxxvii]
In a nutshell, the gradual takeover of the NRF by the NFM can be viewed as a point of no return in NATO’s collective defence and crisis management mission. With the abandonment of ‘tripwire’ multinational troops, such shift signals that any aggression would be met with a collective response to slow down enemy forces while waiting for reinforcements.[xxxviii] At the same time, it sends a strong message of cohesion vis-à-vis any attempts by Moscow to impair Eastern European countries’ territorial integrity.[xxxix]
II. An added value to EU-NATO cooperation and existing European military mobility frameworks
Throughout the NFM’s operationalisation process, NATO forces should learn from the failure of EU Battlegroups, whose temporary cycle (fixed deployment time frame, stand-by, eventual re-deployment and dissolution) prevents member states from building multilateral synergies to learn from each other’s experience.[xl] Conversely, permanent formations made up of heavy armoured units are required.[xli] These bring manifold advantages: Allied brigades’ gradual harmonisation, burden-sharing labour arrangements to ensure combat support’s full availability, and the creation of tailored force packages for rotational pre-deployments in coordination with non-European allies, in order to cover NATO territory’s hotspots with a large European formation (see tiers 1 and 2)[xlii] with no necessity to wait for transatlantic reinforcements.[xliii] The end result would allow NATO to touch bases with the EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation’s (PESCO) overarching objective of establishing a full-spectrum force package.[xliv]
This ‘European military pillar’ could act as a formidable platform for EU-NATO defence cooperation, since it would benefit from a meaningful EU contribution through the European Defence Fund to ensure that EU member states divert funds to fill in capability gaps for CSDP missions/operations.[xlv] Once entered into force, the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act (EDIRPA), which the Council of the EU, after reaching political agreement with the European Parliament last June,[xlvi] greenlit on 9 October[xlvii] can perpetuate EDF’s mission by encouraging member states to replenish their stocks and strengthen missile defence capabilities.[xlviii] Most importantly, these two instruments will, first, push for additional cost-effective defence expenditure and equipment harmonisation[xlix] and, secondly, ensure that projects will solidify the European technological and industrial base, something that NATO and its newly established Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) do not explicitly aim for.[l]
Once ready for enforcement, the NFM could also act as an additional platform for EU-NATO cooperation on military mobility, as it could deepen a wide array of existing frameworks that have rarely been used and turn them into permanent multi-domain formations assigned to a specific regional defence plan. These include the Eurocorps, the three groups led by Germany, Italy, and the UK within NATO’s Framework Nation Concept, and bilateral initiatives like the German-Netherlands Corps and the Franco-Belgian Motorised Capacity.[li]
A potential area of concern comes from the EU Strategic Compass, which announced the creation of a 5,000-troop, brigade-like Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) to intervene in expeditionary operations.[lii] Its interoperable and multi-domain nature might be viewed as a source of overlap with the soon-to-be-renewed Allied Reaction Force within tier 1 of NATO’s NFM: to avoid this, Biscop suggests merging them into a single European Reaction Force where both organisations would exercise command-and-control arrangements.[liii] At the same time, though, it remains to be seen whether EU member states will, first, take defence cooperation seriously as the Russo-Ukrainian war continues [liv] and, consequently, operationalise the RDC by 2025[lv] without repeating the battlegroups experience.[lvi]
III. Consolidating the shift from deterrence by punishment to deterrence by denial through a Europeanised approach: Benefits and caveats
The high-readiness and quick deployment of NFM forces is grounded in Article 21 of the new NATO Strategic Concept, which stipulates that the Alliance will be able to respond to threats in a very short time by fulfilling deterrence and defence in the five domains and with combat-ready units.[lvii] This condition can be satisfied only if all Allied powers allocate resources accordingly,[lviii] especially in a Euro-Atlantic security environment in constant evolution and deeply influenced by Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[lix] These events have also marked a point of no return in the Alliance’s approach to Moscow, which culminated in the adoption of the regional defence plans in Vilnius to replace the long-standing deterrence-by-punishment approach with a deterrence-by-denial one.[lx] In other words, NATO will turn a ‘symbolic’ presence trying to dissuade Moscow’s actions into a fully-fledged force capable of holding back Kremlin forces while waiting for reinforcements.[lxi] The latter aspect entails the defence of every inch of NATO territory[lxii] through a credible, coherent, and resilient posture remaining faithful to the fundamental principles of defence, proportionality, transparency, and compliance with international commitments.[lxiii]
As previously anticipated, the first line of NATO’s conventional deterrence and defence implied by the NFM will have a relevant European connotation: this reflects the developments of the global strategic environment, where the United States, in line with its grand strategy, would prioritise threats coming from the Asia-Pacific region due to China’s increasingly assertive geopolitical manoeuvre.[lxiv] Consequently, the NFM calls upon European armed forces to step up their on-field presence around the continent’s most sensitive areas, thus turning NATO into a ‘normal’ alliance where every member enhances its defence capabilities without waiting for the ally that is providing the lion’s share of NATO’s financial and military resources to step in.[lxv]
This dynamic becomes crucial vis-à-vis the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war of attrition, where the NFM’s high-readiness European brigades would be in the position to satisfy Kyiv’s military assistance requests, especially since the bulk of Washington’s presence in Europe since the invasion’s unfolding—however large it might be (100,000 troops)—counts more headquarters and depots than combat forces.[lxvi] Last June, to test their forces prior to the NFM’s full operationalisation, 10,000 NATO forces participated in the Air Defender Exercise across the North Sea, the Baltic Sea and Southern Germany to prevent aircraft, drones and missile attacks against cities and infrastructure,[lxvii] making it the largest deployment instance in the Alliance’s history.[lxviii]
Nevertheless, doubts arise about the feasibility of the manpower thresholds vis-à-vis the time frame envisaged for the three tiers, with some academics fearing that the reinforcement of the Eastern Flank with Finland’s accession could escalate tensions with Russia in the near future.[lxix] Equally unclear is whether all NATO members share a common perception of the Russian threat and, consequently, whether their political leaders are going to be willing to align their national policy and capability development plans with NATO ones, with repercussions on the actual increase in Allied manpower’s size and states’ ability to invest in other priority areas.[lxx] Additionally, recruitment and retention might be problematic if better offers are not made to personnel, conscription is not (re)introduced, or forces’ design is not revisited.[lxxi] All these factors potentially compromise states’ ability to achieve a financial trade-off between increased troops, weapons systems, stockpiles, and digitalisation, especially vis-à-vis ongoing conflicts like in Ukraine.[lxxii]
Crucially, without U.S. troops necessarily on the frontline, it will be up to European land forces to autonomously balance forces between manoeuvre formations, combat support, and combat service support: should the latter task remain within national remits, NATO members might struggle to deploy and sustain multinational forces,[lxxiii] thus running counter to the NFM’s high-readiness character.
Conclusion: Encouraging ambitious defence expenditures to bolster European states’ defence capabilities
In light of the foregoing analysis, NATO’s New Force Model has already marked, on paper, an indelible page in NATO’s military mobility legacy. Now words must be followed by concrete actions, although there is no clear indication as per the implementation timeframe and Allies’ ability to meet the established readiness and capability requirements. The classified nature of regional defence plans and the NFM’s very recent adoption prevent non-NATO insiders from a more accurate analysis, especially since we still cannot see any tangible implications of Allied leaders’ decisions at the Vilnius Summit in the contexts where NATO is operating. What remains sure is that states will have to continue substantiating their annual defence budgets:[lxxiv] the agreement to turn the 2% financial ceiling into a floor offers them the opportunity to remedy existing structural and operational drawbacks to contribute to NATO missions, operations, and exercises with the necessary troops, capabilities, and resources.[lxxv] Such level of ambition, however, will have to confront itself with domestic political and budgetary constraints, especially for states like France (1.89% as of 2022), Italy (1.51%), and Spain (1.09%),[lxxvi] which unlike their Eastern Flank counterparts might not take the need to invest so seriously.[lxxvii]
In conclusion, the NFM can bridge the comprehensive articulation of ‘war aims’ and the willingness to deploy defence capabilities amongst the transatlantic community vis-à-vis compelling conflict scenarios like in Ukraine by replacing the current blurred line of command (with decisions being taken by NATO, the EU, the United States, or individual states) with a clear decision-making locus.[lxxviii] Such ‘centralisation’ from a command-and-control viewpoint, together with delivering on the details of regional defence plans, can help NATO show resolve to keep Russia’s territorial ambitions in check[lxxix] and eventually bolster deterrence and defence by making European allies replace the battlegroups-like approach consisting of incomplete national forces with a ‘force package’ based on bilateral cooperation between NATO and the EU: while the former must realise that it takes EU instruments to benefit from European defence efforts, the latter must understand that its instruments cannot be effective without the North Atlantic Alliance.[lxxx]
About the Author
Jacopo Maria Bosica has recently graduated from the International Master in Security, Intelligence and Strategic Studies (IMSISS), a two-year Erasmus Mundus programme run by the University of Glasgow in cooperation with the Dublin City University, the University of Trento, and the Charles University of Prague. He previously studied at the Faculty of Law of the University of Trento between 2018 and 2021, where he graduated with honours in Comparative, European and International Legal Studies (CEILS).
In January 2022, Jacopo received the ‘Premio America Giovani’ from the Fondazione Italia USA, which every year rewards hundreds of creditable graduates from Italian universities. This award allowed him to attend a master executive in ‘Leadership for International Relations and “made in Italy”’, which he successfully completed in October 2022.
Mr. Bosica’s areas of interest are mis-/dis-/mal-information, foreign, security and defence policy in the Euro-Atlantic area and EU-NATO cooperation.
Notes
[i] Ben Barry and Henry Boyd, “The Future of NATO’s European Land Forces: Plans, challenges, Prospects,” International Institute of Strategic Studies, June 27, 2023, https://www.iiss.org/en/research-paper/2023/06/the-future-of-natos-european-land-forces/.
[ii] NATO, “Deterrence and defence,” July 19, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_133127.htm.
[iii] Barry and Boyd, “The Future of NATO’s European Land Forces.”
[iv] NATO, “NATO 2022 Strategic Concept,” June 29, 2022: 1–11, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf.
[v] Ibid., 4, §8.
[vi] Emekli Deniz Albay Ferhan Oral, “NATO’s New Force Model,” ANKASAM, March 17, 2023, https://www.ankasam.org/natos-new-force-model/?lang=en.
[vii] NATO, “Deterrence and defence.”
[viii] Sven Biscop, “The New Force Model: NATO’s European Army?” Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations, Policy Brief 285 (September 8, 2022): 1, https://www.egmontinstitute.be/app/uploads/2022/09/Sven-Biscop_PolicyBrief285_vFinal.pdf?type=pdf.
[ix] Oral, “NATO’s New Force Model,” 6.
[x] NATO, “Pre-Summit press conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg,” June 27, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_197080.htm.
[xi] NATO, “Deterrence and defence.”
[xii] Ibid.
[xiii] Barry and Boyd, “The Future of NATO’s European Land Forces.”
[xiv] Elise Vincent, “Despite the war in Ukraine, NATO is still searching for credible plans for Europe’s eastern flank,” Le Monde, July 10, 2023, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/07/10/despite-the-war-in-ukraine-nato-is-still-searching-for-credible-plans-for-europe-s-eastern-flank_6047577_4.html.
[xv] Oral, “NATO’s New Force Model.”
[xvi] NATO, “NATO Response Force,” July 27, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49755.htm#:~:text=The%20new%20NATO%20Force%20Model%20will%20provide%20a%20larger%20pool,for%20the%20defence%20of%20Allies.
[xvii] Ibid.
[xviii] Peter Remjug, “What is NATO’s Response Force, and why is it being activated?” Northeastern Global News, February 25, 2022, https://news.northeastern.edu/2022/02/25/nato-response-force/.
[xix] NATO, “Readiness Action Plan,” September 1, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_119353.htm.
[xx] NATO, “NATO Response Force.”
[xxi] NATO, “Readiness Action Plan.”
[xxii] NATO, “New NATO Force Model – Infographic,” June 29, 2022, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/220629-infographic-new-nato-force-model.pdf.
[xxiii] Deborah Haynes, “NATO set to agree biggest overhaul of defences since the Cold War – including expansion of 40,000-strong response force,” Sky News, June 23, 2022, https://news.sky.com/story/nato-set-to-agree-biggest-overhaul-of-defences-since-the-cold-war-including-expansion-of-40-000-strong-response-force-12638817.
[xxiv] NATO, “NATO’s military presence in the east of the Alliance,” July 28, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm.
[xxv] Lili Bayer, “NATO will increase high-readiness force to ‘well over’ 300,000 troops,” Politico, June 27, 2022, https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-increase-high-readiness-force-300000/.
[xxvi] NATO, “Vilnius Summit Communiqué,” July 11, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_217320.htm?selectedLocale=en.
[xxvii] María R. Sahuquillo, “NATO draws up biggest military reform since the cold War to meet Russian threat,” El País International, May 11, 2023, https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-05-11/nato-draws-up-biggest-military-reform-since-the-cold-war-to-meet-russian-threat.html.
[xxviii] William George, “Divisions remain, but NATO is expanding. This will not sit comfortably in Moscow,” Chatham House, July 13, 2023, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/07/divisions-remain-nato-expanding-will-not-sit-comfortably-moscow.
[xxix] Sahuquillo, “NATO draws up biggest military reform.”
[xxx] NATO, “NATO Response Force.”
[xxxi] Eurocorps, “NATO Response Force,” accessed September 1, 2023, https://www.eurocorps.org/readiness/nato-response-force/.
[xxxii] NATO, “Readiness Action Plan.”
[xxxiii] Biscop, “NATO’s European Army?” 1.
[xxxiv] NATO, “Vilnius Summit Communiqué.”
[xxxv] Jason C. Moyer and Henri Winberg, “NATO Vilnius Summit 2023: A Summit For Implementation,” Wilson Center, July 11, 2023, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/nato-vilnius-summit-2023-summit-implementation.
[xxxvi] Barry and Boyd, “The Future of NATO’s European Land Forces.”
[xxxvii] Ibid.
[xxxviii] Emily Rauhala and Ellen Nakashima, “Defend ‘every inch’ of NATO territory? New strategy is a work in progress,” The Washington Post, June 5, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/06/05/nato-eastern-flank-defense-russia/.
[xxxix] Ibid.
[xl] Biscop, “NATO’s European Army?” 2.
[xli] Sven Biscop, “European Defence: No Zeitenwende Yet,” Defence and Peace Economics (April 10, 2023): 4, https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2023.2201739.
[xlii] Biscop, “The New Force Model,” 2.
[xliii] Oral, “NATO’s New Force Model.”
[xliv] Biscop, “European Defence: No Zeitenwende Yet,” 4.
[xlv] Biscop, “NATO’s European Army?” 2.
[xlvi] Sebastian Clapp, “European defence industry reinforcement through common procurement act (EDIRPA),” European Parliamentary Research Service (July 11, 2023): 1, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2023/739294/EPRS_BRI(2023)739294_EN.pdf.
[xlvii] Council of the EU, “EDIRPA: Council greenlights the new rules to boost common procurement in the EU defence industry” (October 9, 2023), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/10/09/edirpa-council-greenlights-the-new-rules-to-boost-common-procurement-in-the-eu-defence-industry/.
[xlviii] Biscop, “The New Force Model,” 3.
[xlix] Biscop, “European Defence,” 4.
[l] Biscop, “The New Force Model,” 3.
[li] Biscop, “The New Force Model,” 2.
[lii] EEAS, “A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence” (March 21, 2023): 11, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/strategic_compass_en3_web.pdf.
[liii] Biscop, “The New Force Model,” 3–4.
[liv] Barry and Boyd, The Future of NATO’s European Land Forces,” 1.
[lv] Sebastian Clapp, “Establishing an EU rapid deployment capacity,” European Parliamentary Research Service, April 12, 2023, https://epthinktank.eu/2023/04/12/establishing-an-eu-rapid-deployment-capacity/#:~:text=This%20rapid%20deployment%20capacity%20(RDC,enablers%20need%20to%20be%20resolved.
[lvi] Biscop, “The New Force Model,” 3-4.
[lvii] NATO, “2022 NATO Strategic Concept,” 6.
[lviii] Mehmet Fatih Ceylan, NATO Geçmişi, Günceli, Geleceği (Ankara: Orion Kitabevi, 2022), 167, cited in Oral, “NATO’s New Force Model.”
[lix] NATO, “NATO’s military presence in the east of the Alliance.”
[lx] Atlantic Council experts. “Experts react: What NATO’s Vilnius summit means for Ukraine and the Alliance’s future,” Atlantic Council, July 11, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react/experts-react-nato-vilnius-summit-communique/?mkt_tok=NjU5LVdaWC0wNzUAAAGM5a0euAYt7jTZz_tBROYbohfYY-aupGpAg3upOGuYhpnvhQtreTV4aj82phnkRyqVPYwpwXRDEu3Aj5-umfMZlEQgDlXCvcAmAJwJlDd8OGMccw.
[lxi] Michael Birnbaum and Emily Rauhala, “Those 300,000 high-readiness NATO troops? ‘concept,’ not reality,” The Washington Post, June 29, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/06/29/those-300000-high-readiness-nato-troops-concept-not-reality/.
[lxii] NATO, “Madrid Summit Declaration,” June 29, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_196951.htm.
[lxiii] NATO, “NATO’s military presence in the east of the Alliance.”
[lxiv] Biscop, “The New Force Model,” 1.
[lxv] Ibid., 1–2.
[lxvi] Biscop, “European Defence,” 4.
[lxvii] NATO, “Germany hosts biggest ever air exercise of NATO forces,” June 12, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_215611.htm.
[lxviii] “NATO Summit: How the Alliance is strengthening its eastern flank,” France 24, July 11, 2023, https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20230711-nato-summit-how-the-alliance-is-strengthening-its-eastern-flank.
[lxix] Oral, “NATO’s New Force Model,” 6.
[lxx] Barry and Boyd, “The Future of NATO’s European Land Forces.”
[lxxi] Ibid.
[lxxii] Ibid.
[lxxiii] Ibid.
[lxxiv] Moyer and Winberg, “NATO Vilnius Summit 2023.”
[lxxv] NATO, “Deterrence and defence.”
[lxxvi] NATO, “Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014–2022)” (2023): 3, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2023/3/pdf/230321-def-exp-2022-en.pdf.
[lxxvii] George, “Divisions remain, but NATO is expanding.”
[lxxviii] Biscop, “The New Force Model,” 5.
[lxxix] John Weaver, “The 2023 NATO Summit in retrospect,” NATO Review, July 27, 2023, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2023/07/27/the-2023-nato-summit-in-retrospect/index.html.
[lxxx] Biscop, “The New Force Model,” 5.
Image: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49755.htm
