Partnership policy and the international community

Constructivism argues that identities are “collective meanings” that determine state interests and actions. This perspective holds the idea that “institutionalism is a cognitive process” of internalizing state identities and interests. As these identities and interests may trigger conflict in the international arena, shared values may, most likely, motivate states to act together. Within this context, the Partnership for Peace Program initiated in 1994 gave new impetus to NATO processes by providing a partnership scheme partly independent of the membership context. In this way, NATO has aimed to accelerate the international peacekeeping process without obliging or presenting membership as a precondition of the partnership.

The Partnership for Peace Program strives to fill the power vacuums formed after the collapse of the Soviet Union by assembling states around shared values such as freedom, justice, and peace through democracy. Based on this NATO may transform partner states’ identities and interests through socialization. According to this policy, which also overlaps with democratic peace theory, it is thought that sharing the same values will appease the mistrust between states that may arise from discrepancies. Accordingly, the Peace for Partnership Program is likely to prove that “democracies do not wage war against each other.”

Within this frame, NATO’s partnership policy will be analyzed as an essential motive of overcoming the bias that NATO is based on deterrence. Partnership is integrative and consolidative in form, away from exclusionist ontology.

 

By Buse Keskin

 

The constructivist turn in international relations ruled out one of realism’s central narratives: state interests are not determined by systemic interactions but formed by state identities.[i] If it is assumed that each state has a different identity and thus acts in line with its own interests, would the discrepancies stimulate conflict in the international system? If the answer to this question is yes, as structural realists would answer, all bilateral relationships between states would be dependent upon mutual vigilance.[ii] However, being alert all the time does not put forward a sustainable method for ensuring peace. At this point, the international community, i.e., international organizations, intercedes. Constructivism argues that the more complex the international system is, the more states will mutually fear and hold a grudge against each other and act toward their own interests. If states have different identities and thus different interests, conflicts are expected to escalate faster because they do not act in parallel. Yet, when states gather around shared values and collectively act against opposing parties, they form a sense of belonging to a group by feeling the sense of “we”.  Herein, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which built its identity amid the tension of the Cold War, undoubtedly ensures peace in the international system. Furthermore, bringing together states around democratic values through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, NATO has ensured peace between non-member states by eliminating the mistrust between states that may arise from different identities and interests.

 

On the other hand, solely embracing shared values or having the same political views does not guarantee that states will never be involved in conflict. Bruce Russet reveals this claim by citing the previous wars between the Soviet Union and its Eastern European neighbours.[iii] Therefore, sharing democratic norms between states is not enough to ensure peace, but states’ identity transformation would be determinative in the peacekeeping process. In the first years of its foundation, NATO performed various containment policies while acting with deterrence and defence against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. However, the existence of NATO, which was questioned at the end of the Cold War, has been a significant force since the collapse of the bipolar structure in terms of the universalization of democratic norms. Consequently, especially towards the end of Cold War, NATO took on the mission of ensuring international peace and promoting democratic norms rather than being in a war against Communism. It is because of the two great wars and the length of the Cold War period that old conventions of conflict in the international system came to be seen as redundant and costly.

 

In this regard, NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme initiated in 1994 and its systemic structure seem to prove this claim. PfP aims at bilateral cooperation between the Euro-Atlantic partners and NATO. In the program, each state can choose the level of involvement according to their aspirations on the state level or in the international community. Hereby, states voluntarily commit themselves to democratic values and principles. Within the scope of the programme, states are offered assistance in issues of defence, military training, education, science, and environmental issues. These points are customized according to the desired participation level of the partner states and offered accordingly. Assistance can be offered on the military level or could take the form of teaching English to targeted groups in the partner country.[iv] NATO’s partnership programs have evolved globally, and its boundaries have reached beyond the Atlantic with the subsequent Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative along with the Partners across the globe.

 

Apart from providing assistance, PfP strives to fill the power vacuums formed after the collapse of the Soviet Union by assembling states around shared values such as freedom, justice, and peace through democracy. Instead of dictating with austere language, NATO builds its identity upon advising and supporting states with this programme. The readiness of the post-Communist states to transform their identity in line with international norms, particularly that of NATO’s, and their yearning for stable institutions without outside interference have also accelerated the process of adaptation to NATO standards and allowed this program to succeed.[v]

 

Constructivism advocates that state identity is the introduction of the self to the outside world. Based on these embraced identities, states form “us versus them” rhetoric and communicate with other parties through these patterns. In that vein, NATO has the ability to transform partner states’ identities and interests through socialization, especially through the PfP programme in Central and Eastern Europe. Partner states that transform their identities in terms of a new understanding of “who we are” also generate a new relationship with the outside world.[vi] As an example of this, Romania and the Czech Republic, which became members after their involvement in the PfP programme, both performed a series of military reforms and legislative changes after the socialization process was conducted by pro-reform elites.[vii] These military reforms were directed to overcome these countries’ top-down structure, while legislative changes were in line with implementing democratic norms. Accordingly, state identity transformation in line with the Partnership for Peace programme has been evidence of the theory that “democracies do not wage war against each other”, i.e., democratic peace theory.

 

Democratic peace theory puts forward that liberal/democratic political systems are unlikely to wage war against each other. Accordingly, democratic countries are expected to use military force only as a last resort, while autocracies are inclined to use brutal force. It is thought that as autocracies cannot establish mutual trust between them, they are prone to swiftly take up arms. The formulation of the theory propounded by Bruce Russet in his work Grasping the Democratic Peace seems to prove the claims put forth in this article.[viii] According to the first step of Russet’s formulation, when alliances are developed through “common interests”, states are expected to approach each other in more peaceful ways. With these common interests, states stand together against a common party or ideology. The second step is that stable political structures generate peace. In this process, which goes hand in hand with economic stability, the state’s desire to resolve conflicts through brutal force erodes when the costs of war are considered. For this reason, democratic states are inclined to offer compromises when conflict arises.[ix] Of course, this modelling can be approached with suspicion in terms of its sustainability in non-developed or developing countries. At this point, PfP ensures the sustainability of democratic structures through its contribution to states’ political and economic modernization process.

 

The main point here is that partner countries within the PfP programme—whether they have membership aspirations or solely intend to be partners—gather around NATO’s “democratic principles” (e.g., liberty, equality, and justice) and transform their identities through socialization. In line with constructivist theory, states that share the same identities and hence the same interests can form mutual trust, and this will positively contribute to the international peacekeeping process.[x] One question is how socialization is functioning within this scope. The term socialization, which generally refers to bilateral relations between individuals, also embodies the same meaning when it is referred to two or more states’ norm transactions after an interaction.[xi] Especially for an international organization like NATO, which is moderate in rhetoric when it is compared to the United Nations, socialization is the most ideal form of soft power. The activities presented throughout the programme in terms of socialization can be specified as education and training aimed at domestic actors as well as civilians.

 

States wishing to take part in the Partnership for Peace program firstly sign a Framework Document before the partnership is formed. By signing this document, the partner state declares its adherence and commitment to democratic principles, human rights, and international law. In a way, this annunciation is the first step taken by the partner country to transform its identity in the area of democracy.[xii] Those with membership aspirations are obliged to act more democratically due to the clauses that take place within the Membership Action Plan (MAP): “(a) to settle their international disputes by peaceful means; [and] (b) to demonstrate the commitment to the rule of law and human rights.”[xiii] Therefore, the first phase of the partner’s identity transformation is achieved through the presented partnership framework.

 

Through committing to new principles, socialization starts. Especially in the case of Central and Eastern Europe, neighbouring countries can be models for each other in terms of accepting democratic norms and forming stable political institutions. Changing regional dynamics would motivate others to internalize a partner’s new identity. Particularly within the boundaries of the term socialization, NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme places great emphasis on NATO’s communication with the partner state. In that sense, this communication takes place on three different levels. The first level can be induced through the individual state with which NATO communicates and with different occupational groups through a number of workshops and seminars within the programme. Therefore, different occupational groups (police, judges, teachers, etc.) are likely to act in line with NATO’s values and to transmit them within the domestic atmosphere.[xiv] Thus, norms are internalized on the individual level. The second level can be referred to as political. On this level, domestic actors who have a say in the political arena are introduced to democratic norms based on international law and human rights. In this context, these actors, who spur political actions, are included in seminars, conferences, and workshops. Hereby, partner states’ political institutions can be transformed within the frame of democratic values. While aspiring member states sign individual MAPs, they are also asked to present an annual report on how they have adjusted these norms to fit their newly formed institutions and how well they have committed themselves to democratic principles. In this way, NATO also monitors the progress of socialization almost like the checks and balances system. This feedback can give insights on future actions that NATO and its partners should take. Thirdly, the last level of socialization can be categorized as the state level. On this level, the process is associated with the partner country’s ability to form politically stable democratic institutions and to stand on their feet without the expectation of third-party intervention. This also depends on the country’s willingness to embrace transformation through reforms and their material capability to implement NATO’s advice and support.

NATO provides the same amount of support for both partners and future members. All partners who are included within the scope of PfP are treated and welcomed equally as the program promotes integration and consolidation, away from exclusionist ontology. Only the degrees of communication may vary according to the framework with which each partner would like to proceed. This flexibility allows partners and NATO to build mutual trust as future membership is not leveraged with a membership plan. If states solely desire to become partners, there are no strict membership rules, unlike the European Union.

 

In light of the information presented throughout this article, it can be argued that PfP has made a substantial contribution to the international community through shared identities and socialization: the socialization dynamics on different levels have enabled this programme to be effective and to accelerate processes of state identity transformation. The outcome of the establishment of stable democratic institutions also proves the success of this program as these states are deemed as important actors in the international arena. PfP—based on socialization without coercion or force—has also been a process of adaptation for future members. Through socialization, democratic norms are diffused within the system. If there were no such international organizations as NATO and its Partnership for Peace programme, today we would not be able to talk about democracy and international peace in the same way.

 

About the Author

 

Buse Keskin is currently working as a translator. She received a bachelor’s degree in American Culture and Literature from Ege University and a master’s degree in International Relations from Kadir Has University in Istanbul. Her MA thesis traces patterns of American literature and art in American foreign policy. She studied Spanish in Instituto Cervantes with the aim of gaining first-hand understanding of Mexican-American identities. She has contributed two academic papers to undergraduate conferences at Pamukkale University and Ege University along with two Erasmus Plus projects in Denmark and Romania, the latter of which aim to explore European identity. She is mainly interested in identities, constructivism, and cultural patterns of societies.

 

 

Notes



[i] Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” The American Political Science Review 88, no. 2 (1994): 384–96, accessed 25 March 2020, doi:10.2307/2944711.

[ii] Bruce Russett, William Antholis, Carol R. Ember, Melvin Ember, and Zeev Maoz, “Why Democratic Peace?” in Grasping The Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World, edited by Bruce Russett, 24–42 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), EBook.

[iii] Ibid.

[iv] Lucarelli Sonia, “NATO and the European System of Liberal-Democratic Security Communities,” in Socializing Democratic Norms: the Role of International Organizations for the Construction of Europe, edited by Trine Flockhart, 85–106 (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), EBook.

[v] Andreas Hasenclever and Brigitte Weiffen, “International Institutions Are the Key: A New Perspective on the Democratic Peace,” Review of International Studies 32, no. 4 (2006): 563–85, accessed 20 June 2020, www.jstor.org/stable/40072171.

[vi] Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992): 391–425, accessed 25 March 2020, www.jstor.org/stable/2706858.

[vii] Alexandra Gheciu, “Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO and the 'New Europe,'” International Organization 59, no. 4 (2005): 973–1012, accessed 24 June 2020, www.jstor.org/stable/3877834.

[viii] Russett et al., “Why Democratic Peace?”

[ix] Azar Gat, “The Democratic Peace Theory Reframed: The Impact of Modernity,” World Politics 58, no. 1 (2005): 73–100, accessed 20 June 2020, www.jstor.org/stable/40060125.

[x] Martha Finnemore, “Defining State Interests,” in National Interests in International Society, edited by Peter J. Katzenstein, 1–34 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), EBook.

[xi] Kai Alderson, “Making Sense of State Socialization,” Review of International Studies 27, no. 3 (2001): 415–33, accessed 25 March 2020, www.jstor.org/stable/20097743.

[xii] Janne Haaland Matlary, “Partnerships to the East and South,” in NATO: the Power of Partnerships, edited by Hakan Edstrom, Janne Haaland Matlary, and Magnus Petersson, 60–83 (Basingsoke, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), EBook.

[xiii] NATO, “Membership Action Plan (MAP),” NATO, accessed 25 March 2020, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_27444.htm?

[xiv] G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, “Socialization and Hegemonic Power,” International Organization 44, no. 3 (1990): 283–315, accessed 25 March 2020, www.jstor.org/stable/2706778.

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