Doomed to cooperate: NATO, Russia and PfP

Since 1994, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme has allowed NATO to collaborate with states outside the Alliance. Russia was an active participant in this program until NATO suspended Russia’s participation after the Crimea crisis in 2014. Since then, this topic has not been subjected to any analytical analysis. The aim of this work is to assess Russia re-joining NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme. Although NATO and Russia still share a Founding Act and the NATO-Russia Council, both treaties regulate and limit relations to the formal diplomatic sphere. In the NATO-Russia Council, only high-level ministers really work on relations, and it is hard to include experts inside diplomatic procedures. Today, the formal diplomatic tracks are stuck, and there is no mechanism to jumpstart the normalization of NATO-Russia relations through a second track. Without the input of experts on both sides, diplomats are confined to narrow positions with no opportunities to move forward. Therefore, Russia’s re-admittance to the PfP is the best way forward. This paper assesses the reasons for the suspension of NATO cooperation with Russia through analyzing the positions of each of the parties. Game theory has been applied to characterize the current situation. A forecast for the future is also given. The results of the work demonstrate that the current situation between NATO and the Russian Federation and the suspension of the PfP is neither favourable and beneficial for both parties, nor impossible to solve. Thanks to a wide range of activities, tools, programmes, and previous experience on both sides, PfP is the best option to overcome today’s stalemate in relations.

By Igor Vokhmintsev

The history of relations between Russia and NATO is cyclical. Back in 1990, NATO signed the London Declaration, which laid the intentions for cooperation with all countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Moreover, between 1990 and 2003, Russia’s Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Belgium was also appointed as Russia’s Permanent Representative to NATO. In 1991, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was established as a forum for dialogue and cooperation with NATO’s former Warsaw Pact adversaries. In 1992, Operations Allied Goodwill I and II were real active demonstrations of winning hearts and minds. NATO assisted an international relief effort by flying teams of humanitarian assistance experts and medical advisors to Russia and other Commonwealth of Independent States nations using AWACS  trainer cargo aircraft. In 1994, Russia entered the newly created Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP). With the support of PfP, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) was created within the framework of the Founding Act on relations between Russia and NATO, which was signed in 1997.[i] In 1999, NATO started Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, which Russia negatively perceived due to its opposite position in the Kosovo conflict; following this, the partnership was briefly frozen. In 2001, the NATO Information Office in Russia was opened. And in 2002, the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) was created. Based on the above-mentioned agreements, Russia and NATO establised a concrete legal basis for further productive work. The first NATO-Russia Council Action Plan on terrorism was subsequently signed in 2004. The main reason for creating such a variety of organizations and international treaties is the commitment to the indivisibility of Euro-Atlantic security.

In 2008, an armed conflict occurred in South Ossetia. NATO viewed this as a Russian military operation against Georgia, while Russia says it acted to defend Russian citizens in South Ossetia and its own peacekeepers stationed there. Russia codenamed its military action “Operation to Force Georgia to Peace”. Despite this conflict flaming tensions between Russia and NATO, following this NATO decided not to suspend practical and political cooperation with Russia during the Strasbourg–Kiel summit in April 2009. Thanks to that decision, in 2009, the NATO-Russia Council launched a project for the Stand-Off Detection of Explosives (STANDEX) on suicide bombers in mass transport. This project, which was supported by the NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme, aimed to develop technology to detect explosives concealed on a person moving through a crowd, for example, in a metro station at rush hour. In 2011, the NRC Action Plan on Terrorism was re-established. In the period from 2008 to 2013, there were also numerous plans and common programs that included the civil track.

In 2014, another armed conflict occurred in Crimea. NATO viewed this as Russia’s illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea, while Russia viewed this as the legal and legitimate accession of Crimea. Practical civil and military cooperation between NATO and Russia was suspended after this. However, the Russia-NATO Council, as well as the high-level military meetings, were untouched. 

On 14 March 2018, the United Kingdom briefed Allies on the use of a nerve agent against a Russian dissident in Salisbury, UK, noting that it was highly likely that Russia was responsible. Russia denied all accusations. NATO imposed additional sanctions, and Russia recalled its Permanent Representative to NATO. 

As we see, relations between NATO and Russia have never been calm. Constant ups and downs haunt them. The first period from 1991 to 1999 is characterized by the desire for mutual cooperation and changing the Cold War perception of each other. During this period, Russia joined the PfP—the core programme for mutual cooperation. The second period from 1999 to 2000 was defined by the Kosovo crisis, which shows Russia’s counter position and therefore inability to be totally integrated into the Alliance. The third period from 2001 to 2008 was very important for cementing the legal basis of cooperation. In these years the NRC was created. The forth period from 2008 to 2011 was not fruitful due to the conflict in Georgia. Nevertheless, NATO and Russia remained partners. The fifth period from 2011 to 2014 can be defined as the “Golden Era” of NATO-Russia cooperation. Numerous programs in civil, security, and science spheres were developed, and common exercises and dialogue intensified. The sixth period from 2014 until today is the deepest crisis in relations since the Cold War. The Crimea case destroyed all partnerships with the exceptions of the NRC and military-military meetings in neutral places. While the current crisis does not bode well for the future of relations, this cyclical trend also suggests that the current crisis can be overcome, especially as the NRC as well as military meetings continue.  In this case, if PfP were to resume, what could PfP give both sides? And does it matter?

Rejoining the PfP

The Partnership for Peace programme was launched in 1994 to develop NATO’s political and military relations with countries outside the organization that are located in Europe and the former Soviet sphere. It developed from the already-mentioned NACC and led to the creation of the EAPC. Today, PfP unites all recognized countries of Europe and the post-Soviet space, except for Russia and Turkmenistan. At its core, PfP aims to create an indivisible Euro-Atlantic security zone. This could be provided in two ways: first, training and co-optation of new members to the Alliance; second, cooperation in the field of security. The second path is relevant for Russia. Joint exercises, expert discussions, joint missions, and scientific cooperation would form an indivisible security partnership, of which Russia and NATO are currently deprived.

In my opinion, it was a mistake to suspend Russia’s participation in PfP. The very name of the programme says what the partnership is for: peace. The return of Russia to the PfP, if NATO decides to do so, will be long, because some countries could create barriers against its re-entry. As the proverb goes, trust comes by foot and goes by horseback. The North Atlantic Council requires the unanimous agreement of all 30 members to admit new partners, despite some Allies’ grave and unchangeable positions. In this regard, Russia has major tensions with the Baltic States and vice versa. Remembering North Macedonia’s history of joining NATO, when Greece was firmly opposed to North Macedonia’s entrance to NATO due to the naming dispute, we can imagine the similarly firm opposition of the Baltic States on the question of renewing NATO-Russia relations. Moreover, within NATO there have already been disputes around the depth and breadth of the participation of countries outside the Alliance in the NACC.[ii] In turn, it was Russia’s mistake to recall its Permanent Representative to NATO, because this diplomat should have been engaged in partnership for the sake of peace. This post has been vacant since 2018.

PfP is an ideal platform for normalizing relations. First, the symbolism of the restoration of Russia in the PfP program will indicate a turn towards an indivisible security system. Second, PfP is a flexible tool, worked out over the years within the framework of which it is possible to build the configuration of cooperation necessary for each side. This mechanism would meet all the wishes and select only those areas of interaction that are worth it. Moreover, PfP is designed in such a way that if any of NATO’s member states do not want to cooperate with Russia, NATO cannot oblige them to do so. Third, this configuration can easily expand cooperation. Fourth, PfP is familiar to Russia: it was a participant for a long time and has practical experience in cooperating with NATO.

In what specific areas and projects could Russia and NATO work? The first is cooperation between Russia and NATO through the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC). Russia has a large fleet of air transport and fire-fighting aircraft and helicopters as well as other special equipment. And the parties have already worked in this format. Russia and NATO both have extensive experience in disaster management, and in such areas the exchange of experience is never superfluous. NATO and Russia could conduct exercises similar to, for instance, “Serbia 2018”. Moreover, the political advantages of such actions are obvious. Secondly, the NATO Science for Peace and Security programme was an excellent platform on which NATO and Russia could continue to work together to develop the technologies in transportation safety. Third, hundreds of small arms, submarines and land mines, and various ammunitions still remain in Europe and the coastal seas. This is due to both the illicit trafficking of weapons and the “echo of wars”. At the beginning of this year, NATO carried out work on the elimination of submarine mines.[iii] Why not combine efforts in the waters of the Baltic and Black Seas? A few years ago, we could see the joint work of Russia and NATO on the elimination of chemical weapons in Syria.[iv] This could become an important part of their shared work, conducting joint exercises to eliminate Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Threats. Biological threats have not gone anywhere, as we clearly understood. COVID-19 has shown that this is an important part of our common reality. Fourth, Russia and NATO could cooperate on counter-piracy operations. Russia and NATO have vast experience not only in joint exercises but also in real operations.[v] Fifth, the Woman Peace and Security (WPS) programme offers ample room for cooperation. This topic is very important for NATO. PfP Partners are invited to collaborate as observers to the annual Composition of the Committee on Women in NATO Forces (CWINF) Conference. The Russian army employs many women, and for several years, a number of higher military institutions have been focused on recruiting women.[vi] It is possible to hold special conferences on this issue and exchange experiences. Sixth is NATO Counter-terrorism Cooperation with partners. Today, it is difficult to talk about joint teams, but the provision of infrastructure, the so-called northern supply routes for the Afghanistan mission, could provide an area of cooperation.[vii] Russia and NATO are interested in a stable, terrorism-free Central Asia, especially as all countries of the region, except Turkmenistan, participate in PfP.

Escaping the Prisoner’s Dilemma: Toward Increased Cooperation

This paper has argued that NATO and Russia have ample room to increase cooperation. According to official proclamations, both sides are ready for fruitful work. NATO’s core idea for Russia is “deterrence and defence, while remaining open for dialogue”.[viii] Russia proclaims it “…is ready to develop relations with NATO on the basis of equality in order to strengthen common security in the Euro-Atlantic region”.[ix] However, both sides have many questions in their minds, and until deciding on these, they are not ready to begin action. NATO is waiting for Russia to end its illegitimate occupation of Crimea, and Russia is waiting for the “willingness of the Alliance to give due consideration to Russia’s legitimate interests”.

This situation looks like a classical example of the “prisoner’s dilemma” in game theory. Neither NATO nor Russia is willing to initiate cooperation, because it may lose its position if the other side uses this at its expense. One way or another, such logic takes place in diplomacy. As it is known from the dilemma, and it was also proven mathematically, the best tactic for both sides is to cooperate. But, as prisoners, NATO and Russia separately choose to maximize their own benefits at the expense of the other side, and this leads to losses for them. It is a trap, and as I demonstrate later in example of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the only way out is to trust your partner.

How can we avoid a stalemate and come to an agreement? On the way to cooperation, there are three areas in which the parties must prove themselves. The first area is diplomacy. Direct diplomatic negotiations and informal, off-the-record meetings could lead to meaningful results. Negotiations at the highest level with the support of non-public working discussions could move the situation off the ground. NATO and Russia have to diversify the contacts themselves and increase their regularity. Each side should try to understand the logic of the other side. I singled out diplomacy separately for an important and almost always overlooked reason—namely, the inertia of the diplomatic sphere. This is precisely where it will be necessary to overcome problems through direct public negotiations and non-public working discussions. Any bureaucratic system to which the diplomatic core also belongs, with all the people, formal and informal connections, laws, embassies, and services, is inert. People always work according to the everyday scenario. Therefore, even loud and regular meetings of the highest level will not be able to turn the tide if there is no progress on the grassroots level. This can be most clearly seen in the example of relations between the US and the USSR during the Cold War. The parties were so accustomed to confrontation and to the logic of perceiving the partner as an enemy that when Gorbachev announced his program of publicity, new thinking, and Perestroika, in the US, President Reagan perceived it as a USSR trap. A case in point is the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis. After long days of negotiations on the threshold of war, it was agreed that the USSR would withdraw its missiles from Cuba now and the United States would withdraw its missiles from Turkey after a certain time. The USSR took a risk, and the US kept its word.  It is important for Russia to take into account that NATO is an international organization, where participants resolve issues during long discussions. For international organizations, this is a normal and everyday practice.  NATO is made up of 30 Allies; it has complex procedures of discussion and most of all decisions need a complete consensus from member states to gain approval. However, NATO should not be delayed in giving answers, because there is a whole separate body of the NRC. NATO’s officials in the NRC have a mandate from all 30 Allies to openly discuss any issues, without needing the approval of each question from the NAC. In that case, the NRC is the most efficient platform for building cooperation. Another concrete step could be Russia’s appointment of a Permanent Representative to NATO as early as possible, without preconditions. This diplomat has to ensure partnership for the sake of peace. NATO should welcome such a move by Russia and begin to plan how to work together.

The principle of unified and indispensable safety was perfectly manifested under the conditions of the COVID-19 pandemic. This is a common challenge that every nation has struggled with. In this regard, Russia and NATO countries have shown that we can help each other. While cooperation took place through bilateral channels rather than through NATO-Russia relations, the United States provided critical ventilators to Russia, and Russia provided medical aid to Italy during the height of the crisis. This is a positive agenda. Here, it is also necessary to create cooperation through developing conflict-free spheres both for diplomats and experts. 

In the heat of solutions to today’s problems, one should not forget about the long-term strategic view. It is necessary to increase the pool of joint events, analyzes, reports, and studies on long-term problems and sensitive topics that the parties cannot discuss through diplomats. Also, it is necessary to be active in attracting young experts.

Strategically, paying attention to young experts will play an important role. They are not burdened with posts, epaulets, and official positions. Therefore, they are much better and faster in contacting each other. Young experts from Russia and NATO are almost unconnected. If NATO and Russia want to develop a strategic vision, it would be useful now for young experts to intersect and communicate so that in the future it would be easier and more experienced in communication. This is important for both parties. Atlantic Forum right now provides such a platform. The Atlantic Council is a bigger structure, but it is in the list of unwanted organizations in Russia, so it cannot play a bigger role.

Here, I would like to note that, of course, PfP is not a magic wand and with its help it will be possible to solve the whole complex of problems. But, I believe, and it has been convincingly shown, that PfP can play an important role in launching the dialogue that is now lacking.  

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize an important thing, which, in the heat of foreign policy discussions, is forgotten. NATO and Russia are geographical neighbours and share many of the same realities. It is customary to maintain good relations with neighbours, and there is often no choice but cooperation: in short, Russia and NATO are doomed to cooperate.

About the Author

Igor Vokhmintsev is an independent Russian expert on Euro-Atlantic Security. He received his bachelor’s in International Relations from Samara University. His research interests include NATO-Russia-EU relations, public diplomacy, and security. He was selected for the NATO HQ visitors program and participated in a conference co-organized by the NATO Information Office in Moscow. He also took part in numerous EU Delegation in Russia seminars and conferences related to EU-Russia links and the security system in Europe. He has own blog on the Russian International Affairs Council website.[x]

Notes

[i] Robert F. Simmons Jr, “Ten Years of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council: A Personal Reflection,” NATO Review, 1 April 1 2007, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2007/04/01/ten-years-of-the-eu....

[ii] Ibid.

[iii] NATO, “Allied Maritime Command - NATO Maps 38 Historical Ordnances in Oslofjord,” accessed June 2, 2020, https://mc.nato.int/media-centre/news/2020/nato-removes-38-historical-or....

[iv] Reuters, “Exclusive: Russia, NATO Plan Joint Operation on Syria’s Chemical Weapons,” 14 February 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-russia-nato/exclusive-ru....

[v] NATO, “NATO and Russian Federation in Counter Piracy Exercise At Sea,” accessed 4 June 2020, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_98853.htm#:~:text=NATO%20and%2....

[vi] Boris Egorov, “Russia’s Amazon Warriors: Why Are Women Joining the Country’s Military?” Russia Beyond The Headlines, 21 November 2017, https://www.rbth.com/lifestyle/326787-russias-amazon-warriors-why-are.

[vii] NATO, “Nato-Russia Council - 2012.10.16 TRIAL ISAF TRANSIT,” accessed 4 June 2020, https://www.nato.int/nrc-website/en/articles/20121016-trial-isaf-transit....

[viii] NATO, “Relations with Russia,” last updated 5 August 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50090.htm.

[ix] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Russia, NATO,” accessed June 2020, https://www.mid.ru/rossia-nato?p_p_id=56_INSTANCE_eVpNyrmEhNxQ&_56_INSTA....

[x] https://russiancouncil.ru/en/igor-vokhmincev/ (English); https://russiancouncil.ru/blogs/ivokhmincev/ (Russian).