NATO’s Continuing Support for Ukraine in an Increasingly Multipolar World

By Aybars Arda Kılıçer

The concerns over the future of the Atlantic Alliance’s continued assistance for Ukraine have escalated as the conflict in Ukraine has transformed into a war of attrition. Compared to the early months of the war, there are increasingly troubling discussions about how it might be better to attempt to bring an end to the conflict by initiating negotiations quickly. It should be realized that a feasible and practical solution that will provide perpetual peace in the region while ensuring the continuing sovereignty and independence of Ukraine can only be achieved by employing a new strategy, which focuses more on the political means. Considering this, this paper aims to evaluate the strategic significance of NATO’s ongoing commitment to Ukraine amid a new chapter of the modern world order marked by increasing multipolarity and shifting geopolitical dynamics.

NATO’s Eastward Expansion

It was clear that the European security architecture would undergo significant changes after the Berlin Wall came down and the Soviet Union dissolved. While there are still heated arguments about a supposed verbal promise made by Western leaders to the Soviet and later Russian leadership that NATO would not grow to the east,[i] there was never a legally binding agreement between the two sides. As a result, many countries that used to be part of the Warsaw Pact and were undergoing many changes applied to join the Alliance. Subsequently, the Alliance conducted and released the findings of a “Study on NATO Enlargement” in 1995. This critical report examined the benefits of expanding the Alliance and concluded that the Cold War’s end presented a once-in-a-generation chance to strengthen security across the whole Euro-Atlantic region, and that expanding NATO would help make that happen.[ii] It was at this moment that the idea of expanding NATO’s reach into the former Eastern Bloc began to take shape.

The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland were the first former Warsaw Pact states to join NATO on 12 March 1999, following the successful conclusion of prior accession talks held during the Alliance’s Madrid Summit two years earlier. During the 2002 Prague Summit, the Alliance invited Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia to start accession talks, marking the beginning of the second phase of its expansion. Their formal membership in the alliance began on 29 March 2004, leading to the biggest round of enlargement in NATO’s history. NATO establishing such a strong foothold in the region has brought several substantial geopolitical consequences that one should focus on to better understand why Ukraine has become such an important region in the contemporary power dynamics.

One of the immediate consequences of these two significant rounds of NATO expansion was the increased presence of the Atlantic Alliance near the Russian Federation. The admission of Bulgaria and Romania reinforced NATO’s position in the Black Sea, strengthening the organization’s already-established influence in the region through Turkey. Additionally, the membership of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland resulted in an ever-growing NATO presence in Central and Eastern Europe. But the most devastating blow to the Kremlin came from the accession of the three Baltic nations—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. After all, these three nations were the first to leave the Soviet Union and join the Atlantic Alliance. With their accession, the Western Alliance’s consolidated power projection in the Baltics was bolstered, and two of Russia’s most strategically significant regions—Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg—were now potentially vulnerable. From that point on, it was abundantly evident that Russia would fiercely oppose any further eastward NATO expansion as it began to solidify its strength in the wake of the chaotic 1990s. Yet, this reality would not be realized until 2008, a few years after NATO’s second wave of eastward expansion, when Russia attacked Georgia as a means of “punishing” the country for growing its ambitions to join the Atlantic alliance.

Unfortunately for Tbilisi, Russia would not budge from its stance of opposing future NATO expansion on its doorstep without a fight when Georgia sought to emulate the actions of the three Baltic states.[iii] One could argue that Moscow’s willingness to exploit the delicate power balance in Eurasia and punish any other former Soviet republic harbouring Western aspirations was first shown in its mistreatment of Georgia. At first, Moscow tried to put pressure on Tbilisi by declaring Georgia’s accession to NATO “would lead to another stage of confrontation.”[iv] When Tbilisi stood firm and did not give in to Russian demands and the conflict entered a new phase with waves of Russian troops and Russia-supported separatists violating its soil, Georgia had high hopes for their Western allies. Nevertheless, NATO could not provide any meaningful military aid and instead offered only words of encouragement. This was likely due to the Alliance’s reluctance to risk further escalating tensions with Moscow. Because of this lack of any meaningful answers to Russian aggression in Georgia, two breakaway regions of Georgia successfully declared their independence from Tbilisi, a move that further consolidated the Russian presence in the Caucasian region.

The war in Ukraine has now been widely and correctly acknowledged as NATO’s greatest challenge to date. Here, it is crucial to acknowledge that the origins of this conflict extend far beyond the commonly held belief that it commenced in 2022. The 2013 Euromaidan Protests served as a critical turning point for Ukraine, disrupting the previously existing balance of power between factions favouring either a pro-Western or pro-Russian orientation in Ukrainian politics. The ouster of President Viktor Yanukovych and the subsequent establishment of a pro-Western government in Kyiv significantly narrowed the prospects for pro-Russian groups to advance their objectives through political channels alone. This shift was particularly pronounced in the eastern regions, namely in the Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts, where there was a historical precedent for supporting pro-Russian political candidates. In these areas, a pronounced separatist movement, bolstered by Russia’s political and military support, highlighted the longstanding division within Kyiv. While Ukraine could maintain substantial territorial control in Donetsk and Luhansk, pro-Russian factions achieved greater success in seizing Crimea, leading to its defacto declaration of independence and subsequent annexation by Russia through referendums that were not internationally recognized. The substantial support from Russia for these separatist movements undoubtedly exacerbated the situation, leading to the onset of an eight-year armed conflict in these areas.      

Following the conflict’s entry into a new phrase in February 2022, the response of the international community was far from united. Although every NATO member condemned Moscow’s invasion, opinions on how to respond initially differed, with some calling for a more restrained response and others for a stronger one. However, the hawkish reaction and firm stance of former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg rallied the allies to pledge their unwavering support for Ukraine, arming Kyiv to repel Russia’s invasion and imposing sanctions on Russia. While the sanctions seem to fail to generate any significant political or social opposition against the Kremlin, the military support provided to Ukraine has shown to be highly effective. Amidst the growing discussions concerning whether NATO should shift its position in the conflict and reduce or end its support for Ukraine, it is now more crucial than ever to explain why the Alliance’s continuing support for Ukraine is critical to its survival in a multipolar world.

NATO’s Options

One may argue that the Atlantic Alliance currently has two options available concerning Ukraine. Among these choices is maintaining robust support for Kyiv in the hopes that the Ukrainian side will achieve a decisive triumph over Russia. However, it is extremely doubtful that this can be accomplished in an attrition-based fight with Russia. Moscow has successfully redirected Russia’s economy to one that can continue to wage war despite the many significant sanctions packages that have been applied to the country. That is why Moscow’s stance against Kyiv will only strengthen as the battle drags on without any swift victories for Ukraine. The alternative, on the other hand, is to abandon Ukraine’s fight against Russia and attempt to reach a relatively amicable peace agreement with the Kremlin for NATO. Nevertheless, this would further complicate the already precarious situation for Ukraine’s survival in this conflict. That is why coming up with both a probable and maintainable solution is still crucial. Nevertheless, let us assess each of these options before trying to develop an alternative that can serve both the interests of NATO and maintain the survival of Ukraine as a sovereign state.

For many compelling reasons, the first choice—which would include maintaining aid to Kyiv—seems to be the most reasonable at first glance. First of all, there are far-reaching implications for the future of NATO as a whole regarding its continued support for Ukraine. Not only does this present a chance to prevent Russia from re-establishing its strong position in the region, but it also sends a strong message to other non-NATO countries in the area, reassuring them that NATO can protect them from any aggression. Sweden and Finland, two of the most influential non-NATO nations in the area prior to the war, applied to become full members of NATO because of its credibility and assurances. Furthermore, by ensuring Kyiv’s resilience, NATO can avert the realization of potential designs for a triangular union state involving Moscow, Minsk, and Kyiv. Given these benefits, it seems like a good idea just to keep sending supplies and military help to Kyiv for their war efforts, doesn’t it? Unfortunately, given the current conditions in the field, this assertive and uncompromising approach is no longer practical or feasible in terms of providing a perpetual peace in Ukraine.

This strategy is currently looking less feasible due largely to the unsuccessful counter-offensive launched by the Ukrainian Armed Forces against Russian positions in the summer of 2023. Ukrainian and Western officers gained a false sense of self-confidence after their earlier victories against Russian occupation forces in Kupyansk and Kherson. They mistakenly believed that there was no reason to think the remaining Russian forces would be able to perform a successful defence against the Ukrainian army equipped with more superior Western arsenal. This was the same delusion of confidence that led Russian officers to believe, at the outset of their invasion, that they could capitulate Ukraine without facing significant opposition, just as they had successfully done in Crimea in 2014. However, Russians were able to learn from their mistakes and arguably established a formidable defence network around the eastern bank of the Dnieper, which proved itself highly effective in halting Ukrainian advances. Ukraine seems to have missed a great chance to overcome Russia’s fortifications, as their entrenchment has become even more solidified with continuing extension operations. Because of trenches and strong defensive positions, both sides are unable to make any significant progress in this struggle, which we can now characterize as a war of attrition, much like it was on the Western Front during World War I. Arguably, Russian positions on the eastern bank of the Dnieper River are just as strong as Ukrainian positions on the western side.

Kyiv’s failure to penetrate the Russian lines also brought several further complications concerning Western aid for Ukraine, as it gave the upper hand to the politicians and policy-makers in the Western world who have been relatively more reluctant to provide aid for the Ukrainian war effort. Here, it is possible to argue that such discussions have two dimensions. While the discussions within the European Union concerning continuing support for Ukraine have relatively deeper implications for the financial support for Kyiv, those within the United States have deeper implications for the material support for Ukraine as Washington’s aid is vital for reinforcement of Ukrainian forces as well as providing means to counter the industrial superiority of Russia over Ukraine. Considering this, it appears essential to briefly mention the implications of such discussions and the extent of how they have been influenced by Ukraine’s failure to drive out the Russian occupation forces.

It is argued that there have been notable shifts in the ways that several Eastern European nations within the EU have approached the conflict in Ukraine. It seems Slovakia has begun to adopt a more pro-Russian stance in the conflict, apparent with the remarks given by the recently elected Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, who even suggested that Ukraine “has to withdraw from several regions” to establish “peace” with Moscow.[v] Hungary, on the other hand, under Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s leadership, has always been a crucial partner sceptical of offering further support for Kyiv. However, a large financial aid package that is essential for Kyiv has finally passed after contentious debates within the European Union, which has gone so far as to threaten Hungary and any other EU member that if they veto, they might face serious consequences, suggesting that the European Union has so far been “successful” in keeping such different voices “under control”.

On the other hand, it is also worth mentioning the ongoing debates within American politics, with the Republican Party now more than ever under the influence of former President and apparent Republican Candidate for the 2024 Elections, Donald Trump, starting to increase their criticism against the Biden administration’s aid to Ukraine. Trump even went so far as to urge congressional Republicans to refrain from providing military assistance to Ukraine unless the Biden administration complies with their inquiries over the financial activities of the president and his son, Hunter Biden.[vi] Yet, adopting this stance would only exacerbate the situation for Kyiv. Ukraine is currently grappling with an ammunition shortfall, especially in terms of artillery shells. This deficiency is expected to intensify over the year, leading to increasingly perilous consequences.[vii] Considering these factors, it is likely that the Republicans may call for seeking an alternative solution for the war in Ukraine, implicitly suggesting that the United States and NATO should push Ukraine to make peace with Putin’s Russia as soon as possible. This comes despite the possibility that the terms of such a peace agreement could favour Moscow, potentially serving merely as a brief hiatus before the conflict could flare up again.

So, what should NATO do? Should it turn its back on Kyiv entirely and insist that it sign a peace accord with the Kremlin, thereby ceding a large portion of its territory and the strategically vital Black Sea coast that are essential to the future economic independence of Ukraine? Absolutely not. As much as it seems unfeasible for NATO to keep concentrating its strategy solely on military assistance, such a capitulation of Ukraine to Russian demands would be devastating to both NATO and Ukraine’s destiny. Not only would it seriously undermine NATO’s credibility and ability to withstand future acts of aggression, but it would also give the Kremlin more time to reorganize its forces and choose its next target for attack. An alternative, more feasible, and effective approach should be pursued through political channels. The situation in Ukraine has escalated beyond a simple confrontation of military arms and has instead become deeply politicized. Thus, in my opinion, the only way to untangle the Gordian knot is for NATO to offer a slightly alternative approach, one that includes focusing more on mobilizing substantial political mechanisms that would prove even more useful.

Multipolarity, A Third Option in Ukraine, and NATO

Despite widespread opinion to the contrary, NATO stands to gain more from the current shift in global power dynamics toward a more multipolar character. Multipolarity, according to experts like Deutsch and Singer,[viii] offers a more stable framework for the international order, and I agree with their assessment in this regard. Similar to how the bipolar order that defined the Cold War led to the start of more proxy wars, the unipolar order that followed the U.S.-led Western victory at the end of the Cold War essentially removed the sensitive balance of power dynamics and opened the door for Western wars of aggression, including the numerous conflicts in the Middle East. On the contrary, what is required is the establishment of a more rules-based international order, which will strengthen the mechanisms of checks and balances in the global arena. This will make it extremely unlikely for states to engage in aggressive wars with one another, as too many powerful groups of countries will compete for dominance. A more stable future for NATO is possible now that several alternative powerhouses have emerged, which can counteract each other’s political and military clout. This allows NATO to engage with other powers in a more constructive and dialogue-based manner. To that end, Ukraine may provide the ideal impetus for NATO to take that course of action.

We should agree on a fact that we have been trying to avoid for so long. Just as Russia should acknowledge the fact that Ukraine will never capitulate to their demands of practically becoming a puppet regime of Moscow, the West should also recognize the fact that Russia has repeatedly underlined that it will not hesitate to use its nuclear arsenal if it faces an existential threat,[ix] and it will not capitulate on leaving the whole territory it occupied. Nevertheless, that does not mean that the West should acknowledge Moscow’s aspirations and allow Russia to take what it occupies. Interestingly, a more reasonable and practical offer was made by famous businessperson Elon Musk, who offered to conduct referendums under United Nations supervision in the occupied regions of Ukraine on whether people living there would like to join Russia or Ukraine.[x] Nevertheless, unlike his proposal, Crimea should not be immediately recognized as a part of Russia as it shares the same unfortunate history with other regions of Ukraine that are recently occupied by Russia. Furthermore, the international community should make sure that the only people eligible to vote in the referendums are those who were residents of the five occupied Ukrainian regions—the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts—before the actual start of this bloody conflict in 2014. This should apply to both those who were forced to relocate to other parts of Russia or Ukraine or those who continued to live in these territories.

Here, NATO can and should act as a peacemaker by providing additional political incentives for both belligerents and underline the fact that in a peace agreement of any kind, Ukraine should be allowed to join NATO like any other sovereign state if that is the will of Kyiv. If Russia refuses to agree on such terms and wishes to wage a war it cannot win, as it would be very unlikely for them to pass the strong Ukrainian defences beyond the Dnieper, NATO should not hesitate to provide more weapons for Ukrainians to continue successfully defending themselves in future. This proactive approach will ensure both the survival of Ukraine as a sovereign and independent state while providing a means for the people who have been the subjects of this long conflict to show their political will in a credible manner. As both Russia and Ukraine are member states of the United Nations, they will have to accept the self-determination of people living within these territories through a carefully organized and safe referendum under the mandate of the United Nations.

Concluding Remarks

By establishing incentives and mechanisms to prevent future escalations of similar conflicts and the use of military force to undermine state sovereignty, a lasting peace in Ukraine has the potential to further stabilize the international order. To achieve a more stable and peaceful world, where conflicts are resolved through robust mechanisms instead of force, we must empower a new and functional balance of power mechanism through an increasingly multipolar world order while ensuring the well-functioning principle of self-determination regardless of its consequences. To ensure that Kyiv has the means to safeguard his sovereignty against Russian aggression, NATO’s continued assistance for Ukraine is important. However, NATO should also seek an effective and perpetual political resolution by bolstering international institutions that both sides of the conflict are a part of to end the ongoing conflict and to prevent any possible repeat of it in the future. Hopefully, this will ensure Ukraine’s independence and sovereignty going forward and provide a voice to those affected by the non-stop violence since 2014. To further strengthen its capabilities in a world that is becoming more and more multipolar, NATO should adapt to new challenges by evolving from a primarily militarily defensive alliance to one that pursues a more flexible and constructive political agenda.

About the Author

Aybars Arda Kılıçer is a PhD Candidate in Political Science and International Relations at Koç University, Istanbul. He holds a BA in Political Science and International Relations from Boğaziçi University and an MA in International Relations from Koç University. He wrote his master’s thesis on “Assessing Regime Survivability During Civil Wars: A Comparative Analysis of the Russian (1917-22) and the Spanish (1936-39) Civil Wars”. He specializes in comparative politics, specifically interested in Balkan Studies, Caucasian Studies, Studies of Post-Soviet Sphere, and Security Studies. Since August 2022, he is the Editor-in-Chief of Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (former Turkish Policy Quarterly). Apart from being a native Turkish speaker, he is fluent in English and knows Russian at a pre-intermediate level.

Notes

[i] See Patrick Wintour, “Russia’s Belief in NATO ‘Betrayal’ and Why It Matters Today?” The Guardian, 12 January 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jan/12/russias-belief-in-nato-betrayal-and-why-it-matters-today

[ii] “NATO’s Member Countries,” NATO, last updated on 8 January 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52044.htm#coldwar

[iii] Oleg Shchedrov, “Russia Warns Georgia Against Joining NATO,” Reuters, 21 February 2008, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL2134591/

[iv] Sophia Kishkovsky, “Georgia is Warned by Russia Against Plans to Join NATO,” The New York Times, 7 June 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/07/world/europe/07russia.html

[v] Mathieu Pollet, “Slovak PM: Ukraine must give up territory to end Russian invasion,” POLITICO, 21 January 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/slovakia-prime-minister-robert-fico-ukraine-cede-territory-russia-moscow-invasion-nato-entry/

[vi] Isaac Arnsdorf, “Trump calls for conditioning Ukraine aid on congressional Biden probes,” The Washington Post, 29 July 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/07/29/trump-ukraine-congress-hunter-biden/

[vii] Gideon Rachman, “Trump’s Betrayal of Ukraine,” Financial Times, 5 February 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/18c5296a-f0d5-47d5-aacd-af5210d638fc

[viii] Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, “Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability,” World Politics 16, no. 3 (April 1964): 390–416.

[ix] “Russia Would Only Use Nuclear Weapons Faced With ‘Existential Threat’: Kremlin,” France24, 22 March 2022. https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220322-russia-would-only-use-nuclear-weapons-faced-with-existential-threat-kremlin; “Russia Seeks to Balance US, meet ‘Existential Threats’ in New Foreign Policy Doctrine,” Reuters, 31 March 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-seeks-balance-us-meet-existential-threats-new-foreign-policy-doctrine-2023-03-31/

[x] Elon Musk, Official Twitter “X” Account, 3 October 2022, https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1576969255031296000