An Innovative Institutional Platform for Cooperation between Allied Powers and Kyiv: Exploring the NATO-Ukraine Council and Its Hidden Diplomatic and Crisis Management Potential
By Mejreme Asllani
In a complex Euro-Atlantic geopolitical environment, which witnessed the return of conventional warfare following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, enhancing political dialogue and crisis management have turned into NATO’s operational flagships. Since its establishment at the Vilnius Summit on the ashes of the NATO-Ukraine Commission, the NATO-Ukraine Council has become the relevant forum for Allies and Ukraine to hold joint consultations, devise courses of action to cope with the war of attrition against Russia, and foster Kyiv’s NATO membership aspirations. As bilateral relations with Moscow grinded to a halt, this new body also aims to tarnish the legacy of the now defunct NATO-Russia Council. Ukraine’s equal stance vis-à-vis the 31 NATO members is indicative of its future position in the Alliance; however, before formally inviting Kyiv to join it, significant ground remains to be covered under the fast-track accession procedure agreed in Vilnius. In this respect, the Council can act as a formidable platform for Allies to build consensus at the heads of state, government, ministerial, ambassadorial, and military level.
After briefly introducing the context in which it came to life, the paper illustrates the NATO-Ukraine Council’s multi-layered structure, ambitious mission, and working dynamics as seen in the sessions held so far (section I). This provides a useful baseline to highlight elements of change and continuity between the body and the now defunct NATO-Ukraine Commission (section II). The paper will then discuss strengths and weaknesses that have emerged in the Council’s modus operandi since its inception in Vilnius and, on such a basis, envisage opportunities to fulfil its diplomatic and crisis management potential (section III). On this note, the paper concludes that the Council can act as the institutional springboard to boost Ukraine’s progress towards NATO membership.
Background: Coming to Life in a Turbulent Euro-Atlantic Security Framework
The NATO-Ukraine Council took shape within an evolving Euro-Atlantic security landscape seeing, on the one hand, the Russo-Ukrainian war of attrition showing no sign of appeasement and, on the other, the Alliance making progress in its enlargement policy with Finland, which became a member on April 4, 2023. Meanwhile, negotiations have been slowly advancing for Sweden’s membership bid despite Hungary and Türkiye initially delaying the accession process. In such a context, Kyiv has consolidated its status as NATO’s main partner in Eastern Europe and, thanks to the financial and military support received from Allies, has succeeded in building remarkable military power and expertise contributing to protecting the Eastern Flank.[i]
As they approached its annual summit in Vilnius, NATO members disclosed their intention to establish a politically more advanced platform to cope with the manifold areas of cooperation between NATO and Ukraine.[ii] At the defence ministers meeting in Brussels on June 15–16, 2023, NATO agreed to offer Kyiv equal standing during meetings dealing with security issues of mutual concern, as well as equal possibilities to consult vis-à-vis the 31 Allies.[iii] As explained by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg in the post-defmin briefing, this decision would not only establish a body for joint decision-making beyond mere consultation but also bring Ukraine politically closer to the Alliance.[iv]
On July 11–12, 2023, NATO leaders convened in Vilnius where, whilst not giving clear indications about the timeline for Kyiv’s accession process, adopted a three-part support package comprising a multi-year assistance programme to attain Allied and Ukrainian forces’ full interoperability, the reiteration of Ukraine’s membership when Allies reach consensus and conditions are met, and the establishment of the NATO-Ukraine Council.[v] The latter follows the structure of the now defunct NATO-Russia Council: as the latter’s works have suffered from the suspension of bilateral engagement since February 2022, this decision marks a turning point in NATO-Ukraine-Russia relations, with the centre of gravity shifting towards Kyiv.[vi]
I. The Council at a Glance: A Multi-Layered Structure to Live up to an Ambitious Mission
Paragraph 12 of the Vilnius Summit final communiqué defines the newly established NATO-Ukraine Council as a joint body where Allies and Ukraine sit as equal members to enhance political dialogue, engagement, cooperation, and Kyiv’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for NATO membership. Additionally, the Council will facilitate joint consultations, decision-making and activities, as well as act as a crisis consultation mechanism between the Alliance and Kyiv,[vii] with the latter entitled to convene meetings on its own volition.[viii] The way it can convene reflects a multi-layered structure distinguishing between five main levels: heads of state and government, foreign ministers, defence ministers, ambassadors, and top military officials (including chiefs of defence).[ix]
While leaving out of the communiqué any hint at the steps and the conditions to be satisfied before extending the invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance,[x] first, NATO leaders gave the NATO-Ukraine Council an innovative format in which to negotiate: besides its decision-making modus operandi, the fact that the 31 Allies and Kyiv sit as equal participants distinguishes the body from a regular meeting between NATO states and a partner.[xi] Secondly, NATO members entrusted the Council with the fundamental mission to bring forward a thick bilateral consultation and decision-making agenda, ranging from crisis management and political, military, and defence cooperation to recently emerging coordination in scientific and environmental domains.[xii] As Secretary General Stoltenberg put it on the margins of its inaugural session, these features contribute to make the new body “a much stronger, much more important political entity” than the previously existing NATO-Ukraine Commission.[xiii] Such comparison will be scrutinised in the following section.
Two weeks after its inaugural meeting on July 12, 2023 within the context of the Vilnius Summit at the level of Heads of State and Government,[xiv] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy made a crisis consultation request to convene the NATO-Ukraine Council in order to discuss the escalating security situation in the Black Sea region upon Russia’s unilateral termination of the Black Sea Grain Initiative. Besides condemning Moscow’s deliberate attempts to stop Kyiv’s agricultural exports, its recent missile attacks on Odessa, Mykolaiv, and its drone attack on the Ukrainian grain storage facility in the Danube port city of Reni, the 31 Allies plus Ukraine pointed out the new risks for miscalculation and escalation, as well as serious impediments to freedom of navigation posed by Russia’s new warning area within Bulgaria’s exclusive economic zone.[xv]
The timeline of the following meetings has witnessed an alternation between recapitulatory sessions and crisis management consultations. As for the former, Allies and Ukraine met on October 4, 2023 to reaffirm NATO’s long-term support to Ukraine through the Comprehensive Assistance package and implement the decisions from the Vilnius Summit to, inter alia, fulfil Ukrainian forces’ interoperability with NATO.[xvi] On similar terms, the meeting on November 29 at the foreign ministers level saw, on the one hand, Ukraine restating its pledge to drive forward its democratic and security sector reforms and, on the other, Allies making recommendations to Kyiv on which reforms to prioritise and their support to enforce them.[xvii]
Moving on to the emergency meetings within the context of the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war, NATO and Ukraine leaders gathered on November 8, 2023 to tackle energy security. After recalling Russia’s attempts to weaponize winter against Ukraine through drone, missile, and cyber-attacks, NATO Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoană praised Kyiv for swiftly restoring its power grid and Allied support by means of air defence systems, emergency exports of electricity, and spare parts and autotransformers to mitigate the strikes’ effects.[xviii] Eight days later, the NATO Military Committee convened the NATO-Ukraine Council through its Military Representatives format for the first time. Committee Chair Lieutenant-Admiral Rob Bauer emphasised the need for invigorated support in response to Ukrainian Military Representative Major General Serhii Salkutsan’s updates on the ongoing military activities to push back the Russian forces, the current capability requirements to continue the fight, and the lessons learned by the Ukrainian Armed Forces from the war.[xix] The Council’s crisis consultation mechanism was triggered again in early January 2024 when Ukraine’s request to address the swarm of Russian aerial attacks across the country[xx] led the body’s ambassadorial layer to reiterate NATO’s commitment to bolster Kyiv’s defences with, above all, 1,000 Patriot air defence missiles, whilst remaining steadfast in delivering major military, economic, and humanitarian assistance.[xxi], [xxii]
To date, however, the Council’s most emblematic meeting arguably occurred on November 29, 2023 at the level of foreign ministers. To begin with, delegates formally endorsed the body’s substructure and ambitious agenda for 2024, which encapsulates areas such as interoperability, energy security, innovation, cyber defence, and resilience.[xxiii] Furthermore, ministers took stock of the progress on the roadmap about interoperability between NATO and Kyiv, which, coupled with new projects on humanitarian demining, medical rehabilitation for wounded Ukrainian soldiers, and Ukraine’s defence industrial capacity, fall within the wider shift from the Comprehensive Assistance Package into a multi-year programme to contribute to Kyiv’s security and defence sector’s restructuring and long-term deterrence and defence. Lastly, Allied ministers welcomed Ukraine’s Annual National Programme for 2024, with Kyiv renewing its commitment to democratic and security sector reforms.[xxiv]
II. Taking over the NATO-Ukraine Commission’s Legacy: Similarities, Differences, Change and Continuity
This section aims at comparing the newly established Council with its institutional predecessor, i.e., the NATO-Ukraine Commission. The latter became the decision-making body to lay the foundations of the NATO-Ukraine relationship and direct cooperative activities within it at the Madrid Summit on July 8–9, 1997, when Ukrainian and Allied Heads of State and Government signed the NATO-Ukraine Charter on Distinctive Partnership.[xxv] This document laid out mutual commitments at the highest level to develop a special and effective partnership enabling greater stability and shared democratic values in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), as well as becoming the legal basis for bilateral consultations in the Euro-Atlantic continuum of security conflict, crisis management, peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations.[xxvi] For the successful development of relations between Ukraine and the Alliance and the resolution of the Charter’s objectives, the NATO-Ukraine Commission Forum was set up, within which the Joint Working Groups (JWGs) on military reform, arms, economic security, emergency planning, science, and environmental protection, as well as other ways to improve cooperation, were established.[xxvii]
The Commission’s task was to ensure proper implementation of the Charter’s provisions, assess the development of the NATO-Ukraine relationship, survey planning for future activities, and suggest ways to further develop cooperation.[xxviii] In the latter regard, Allies and Kyiv decided to reinforce ties across political, military, civil emergency, scientific, and environmental activities.[xxix] With the passing of time, Kyiv has been significantly contributing to areas such as defence cooperation through the Joint Working Group on Defense Reform and the Partnership for Peace (PfP), while its troops are deployed alongside NATO’s in Bosnia and Herzegovina and have participated in several NATO-partner training exercises.[xxx] From a political and democratic reform viewpoint, in December 2008, NATO Foreign Ministers decided to further enhance work under the Commission through the development of an Annual National Programme (ANP) to help guide Ukraine’s reform efforts.[xxxi]
Despite being established through a different legal instrument (a summit communiqué rather than a separate charter), the NATO-Ukraine Council has preserved the multi-faceted nature of bilateral cooperation, albeit with some innovative items: suffice it to refer to the Annual Agenda for 2024 agreed on November 29, 2023, which goes beyond the classic military, political, scientific, and environmental cooperation areas to encapsulate armed forces’ interoperability, energy security, innovation, cyber defence, and resilience.[xxxii] At the same time, the Council has retained its supportive ethos towards Kyiv’s domestic reform process, which, since Vilnius, has evolved into a Comprehensive Assistance Package and a fast-track accession procedure for Ukraine to become a NATO member at a later stage.
There seems to be continuity between the Commission’s and the Council’s structure. Throughout its 26-year history, the former convened at levels of heads of state and government, defence ministers, foreign ministers, deputy permanent representatives, ambassadors, and chiefs of staff.[xxxiii] At the committee level, Allies plus Kyiv gathered in the political and partnerships committee and in the partnerships and cooperative security committee, the latter being the forum that was convened the most.[xxxiv] Additionally, the 1997 Charter set up joint working groups operating in specific areas, namely defence and security sector reform, armaments, economic security, and scientific and environmental cooperation. These working groups, together with NATO committees in Commission format, used to prepare the Commission’s senior-level meetings.[xxxv]
Considering its relatively recent establishment, it is still inappropriate to put the NATO-Ukraine Council on the same level as its predecessor; to date, however, based on the findings in the previous section, we know that the Council has replicated (and already convened at) the heads of state/government, defence and foreign ministerial, ambassadorial, and military layers. Furthermore, given the need to follow up on the cooperation policies initiated under the Commission’s auspices (e.g. Kyiv’s participation in the PfP Programme, cooperation with the NATO Military Committee, and the fulfilment of the Ukraine Annual Work Plan), as well as to signal the consolidation of NATO-Ukraine ties, the Council is very likely to preserve the existing committee/working group layout.[xxxvi]
Perhaps the biggest area of discontinuity between the two bodies concerns the way and frequency meetings are called and held, and Ukraine’s role therein. As previously mentioned, the new configuration sees Ukraine sitting as an equal vis-à-vis the 31 Allies and, for crisis consultations, capable of convening them proprio motu, as demonstrated by the Council’s latest meeting on January 10, 2024. Under the now defunct Commission format, Ukraine was merely invited to participate in meetings by NATO,[xxxvii] where it would discuss proposals prepared by Allies beforehand.[xxxviii] Interestingly, though, despite not being equal to NATO members, Kyiv was able to request emergency meetings following military escalation on the battlefield, as it was the case on August 29, 2014 and January 26, 2015.[xxxix]
Additionally, the 1997 Charter foresaw a minimum of two meetings per year to broadly assess the implementation of the relationship and suggest ways to improve/develop cooperation between NATO and Ukraine.[xl] The Vilnius Summit final communiqué did not impose any timeline for meetings,[xli] in order to overcome such a ‘bare minimum’ approach and convey the idea of a forum whose members should be ready to meet at any time. In line with this mentality, the Council has already convened seven times since its launch on July 12, 2023.
In a nutshell, the upgrades from one body to the other highlighted in this section indicate a remarkable strengthening of NATO-Ukraine political and military integration.[xlii] Likewise, the shift from Commission to Council is a litmus test for the geopolitical changes along NATO’s Eastern Flank over the last 25 years and of the Alliance’s position vis-à-vis Russia. At the 1997 Madrid Summit, following the creation of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council with the signature of the NATO-Russia Founding Act on May 27, the Alliance opted for a more prudent line by adopting a ‘Charter’ to establish a ‘Commission,’ which would deal with NATO-Ukraine relations through an ‘Allies + 1’ consultation format without leading to binding decisions.[xliii] Needless to say, the unfolding of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 marked the point of no return, with NATO suspending any form of consultation with Moscow and stepping up its efforts to bring Kyiv closer to the Euro-Atlantic family.
III. Strengths and Weaknesses in the Body’s Modus Operandi and Opportunities to Fulfil its Diplomatic and Crisis Management Potential
The establishment of the NATO-Ukraine Council marks a significant development and provides the opportunity for permanent and regular consultations in which Ukraine participates alongside the members of the Alliance. The fact that a Council meeting may be convened by NATO’s Secretary General, Deputy Secretary General, or any member state will make it more difficult for Hungary to block Kyiv’s political and practical cooperation with NATO. Convening the Council in the event of Russia’s unprecedented war of aggression will help Ukraine to facilitate a faster, coordinated, and more decisive reaction by NATO member states and partners on mitigating security risks faced in the future. Additionally, the body will provide Ukraine with greater opportunities to exert political influence on new forms of cooperation with the Alliance as well as pressure on its admission to NATO.[xliv]
The Council’s strength lies in an enhanced partnership model, granting Ukraine a stronger voice and leaving room for deeper cooperation on critical security issues, including interoperability, cyber defence, innovation, energy security and resilience. The commitment to long-term support, including a multi-year assistance program and a roadmap for Ukraine’s accession, further bolsters Kyiv’s path toward full NATO membership.[xlv] Participating as an equal to NATO Allies also provides Ukraine with the opportunity to have a say in international security developments and act as a global security factor.[xlvi] Even before the Russo-Ukrainian war of attrition, Kyiv has participated in international peacekeeping missions under the umbrella of NATO, the EU, and the UN.
As emphasised by Ukrainian officials, despite the challenges of the Vilnius Summit, the NATO-Ukraine Council marks a significant shift towards a more inclusive decision-making process in line with the principles of “nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine.” Head of the Ukrainian Delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Yehor Cherniev, says that they expect to “receive more specific recommendations on defense and security sector reform, as well as the necessary practical assistance and advice for our future membership” from the Council.[xlvii] Still, concerns persist regarding potential political blockages from member states, even though Secretary General Stoltenberg reassured that this type of format would be more resilient against such hindrances.[xlviii]
While the urgent question of decisions within its competences remains, the Council’s elevated political meaning suggests a streamlined integration process for Ukraine, including reform assessments and interoperability with NATO standards. Additionally, for the body to be different from and more concrete than the former NATO-Ukraine Commission, decisions have to be mutually binding and enshrine a sense of responsibility for all NATO members to implement them.[xlix] Along these lines, in June 2023, Secretary General Stoltenberg had pointed out the fundamental difference between the Commission and the Council formats: while the former served as a mere consultation platform between Allies and the partner country, the latter would significantly strengthen the partnership between NATO and Ukraine as a joint decision-making body.[l]
According to some expert concerns, as long as Ukraine does not join the Alliance, the Council would remain a non-binding actor with the possibility to be cancelled at any time: consequently, it would not have the desired effect of stopping the ongoing war of attrition against Russia.[li] On the same wavelength, one of the former U.S. Army commanding generals in Europe, Ben Hodges, while acknowledging the Council’s importance, argued that NATO membership remains the ultimate goal for Ukraine’s and Europe’s long-term security.[lii]
The NATO-Ukraine Council holds significant opportunities to fulfil its diplomatic and crisis management potential by strategically addressing key areas crucial for Kyiv’s defence and resilience against Moscow’s war of aggression. The Council can play a pivotal role in ensuring Ukrainian forces are capable of deterring future threats through continued assistance from NATO members and partners to, inter alia, modernise military equipment across different domains, strengthen capabilities in air defence, and deliver additional ammunition.[liii] In addition, the Council should serve as a body for closer cooperation, intelligence sharing, and comprehensive training exercises for the Ukrainian armed forces to enhance their military capabilities.[liv]
Beyond military aspects, the Council presents an opportunity to strengthen Ukraine’s political and diplomatic ties with NATO Allies and partners to address immediate needs arising from the ongoing conflict against Russia whilst continuing to implement vital reforms for its aspirations towards NATO membership and post-war reconstruction. By strategically focusing on these areas, the NATO-Ukraine Council can bolster Kyiv’s defence and crisis management capabilities, with positive repercussions on Euro-Atlantic security and resilience.
Concluding Remarks
The foregoing analysis has tried to depict the NATO-Ukraine Council as an institutional platform with both an innovative format and a multi-dimensional focus. The upgrade of Ukraine’s status compared to the NATO-Ukraine Commission framework should not only be read as a significant milestone to consolidate the bilateral ties between Kyiv and the Alliance, but first and foremost as a point of no return in NATO’s defence posture in the Eastern European security panorama, with a shift from mere deterrence to increased assertiveness.
As the Council is less than one year old, any considerations about the Council’s decision-making dynamics and the implementation of the courses of action agreed would still be premature: only time, the military developments on the Russo-Ukrainian battlefield, and Kyiv’s domestic reform progress will allow for more reasoned assessments. Nevertheless, the fact that it has been convened seven times at different levels during its first six months is indicative of the relevance the body has quickly gained as a multilateral forum to both coordinate crisis management efforts and restate diplomatic, military, and financial support to Ukraine whilst closely monitoring the implementation of NATO’s Comprehensive Assistance Package. As long as the two sides continue to cultivate this synergy, they will be able to unpack the Council’s hidden potential, i.e., to smoothen Kyiv’s road towards NATO membership.
About the Author
Mejreme Asllani graduated with a Master’s in International Security, Intelligence, and Strategic Studies at the University of Glasgow (Scotland), the Dublin City University (DCU) (Ireland), and the Charles University of Prague. She has a comprehensive background in political science, followed by postgraduate studies in management and security. Mejreme has broad experience in the civil society and international organizations sectors. She conducted a seven-month internship at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies and has been engaged with the Institute for Peace and Economics in Brussels. Prior to this, she held the position of Programme Coordinator at the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) office in Pristina, Kosovo, focusing on areas such as good governance, regional security, and youth empowerment. Her professional focus includes the Western Balkans, transatlantic relations, European security, and geopolitics.
Notes
[i] Vitaliy Syzov, “Ukraine Takes Its Place in the European Security System while Russia Fades,” Kennan Institute, July 7, 2023, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/ukraine-takes-its-place-european-security-system-while-russia-fades.
[ii] Hennadiy Maksak, “NATO-Ukraine Council Must Turn Into Stepping Stone to Membership,” Visegrad Insight, September 13, 2023, https://visegradinsight.eu/nato-ukraine-council-must-turn-into-stepping-stone-to-membership/.
[iii] Tim Martin, “NATO finalizing new Ukraine Council to draw Kyiv ‘politically closer’ to alliance,” Breaking Defense, June 16, 2023, https://breakingdefense.com/2023/06/nato-finalizing-new-ukraine-council-to-draw-kyiv-politically-closer-to-alliance/.
[iv] “NATO Secretary General Explains Impact of Potential Ukraine-NATO Council,” European Pravda, June 14, 2023, https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/news/2023/06/14/7163664/.
[v] “NATO-Ukraine Council,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, July 13, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_217652.htm.
[vi] Syzov, “Ukraine Takes Its Place in the European Security System.”
[vii] “Vilnius Summit Communiqué Issued by NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Vilnius 11 July 2023,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Press Release (2023) 001, July 11, 2023, last updated on July 19, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_217320.htm.
[viii] Claire Mills, “Security guarantees to Ukraine,” House of Commons Library, Research Briefing No. 9837, January 17, 2024, https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-9837/CBP-9837.pdf, 3.
[ix] NATO, “NATO-Ukraine Council.”
[x] Steven Pifer, “For a secure and stable Europe, put Ukraine on a definitive path to NATO,” Brookings Institute, December 13, 2023, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/FP-20231213-ukraine-nato-pifer.pdf, 8.
[xi] Mills, “Security guarantees to Ukraine,” 3.
[xii] Maksak, “NATO-Ukraine Council Must Turn Into Stepping Stone to Membership.”
[xiii] “Joint press conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, July 12, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_217093.htm.
[xiv] “NATO leaders, President Zelensky meet for first NATO-Ukraine Council,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, July 12, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_217565.htm?selectedLocale=en.
[xv] “NATO-Ukraine Council addresses serious security situation in the Black Sea,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, July 26, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_217835.htm?selectedLocale=en.
[xvi] “NATO-Ukraine Council meets to take forward Vilnius Summit decisions,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, October 4, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_218952.htm?selectedLocale=en.
[xvii] “Statement by the NATO-Ukraine Council at the level of Foreign Ministers, issued following its meeting held in Brussels on 29th November 2023,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, November 29, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_220818.htm; in Pifer (2023): 9.
[xviii] “Energy security at forefront of NATO-Ukraine Council meeting,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, November 8, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_219874.htm?selectedLocale=en.
[xix] “NATO Military Committee holds first meeting in new NATO-Ukraine format,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, November 16, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_220082.htm?selectedLocale=en.
[xx] “NATO Calls Meeting Of New Ukraine Council Amid Massive Russian Attacks,” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, January 4, 2024, https://www.rferl.org/a/nato-ukraine-council-meeting-russian-attacks-january-10/32759833.html.
[xxi] “NATO-Ukraine Council meets, Allies pledge further air defences,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, January 10, 2024, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_221643.htm.
[xxii] NATO News, “NATO-Ukraine Council Jan. 10th: Allies pledge further air defences,” EU Today, January 11, 2024, https://eutoday.net/nato-ukraine-council-patriot/.
[xxiii] “Ukraine-NATO Council approves annual programme for Ukraine,” Ukrinform, November 29, 2023, https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-polytics/3793508-ukrainenato-council-approves-annual-programme-for-ukraine.html.
[xxiv] NATO, “Statement by the NATO-Ukraine Council.”
[xxv] NATO, “NATO-Ukraine Council.”
[xxvi] “Charter on a distinctive partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, July 9, 1997, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25457.htm.
[xxvii] Lesya and Mykola Alexiyevets, “Ukraine - the NATO: mutual relations and partnerships main stages,” Skhidnoievropeiskyi Istorychnyi Visnyk, issue 14 (2020): 181, http://eehb.dspu.edu.ua/article/view/197189/198754.
[xxviii] NATO, “NATO-Ukraine Council.”
[xxix] “NATO Summit: NATO-Ukraine Commission - Fact Sheet,” Clinton White House Archives, 1997, https://clintonwhitehouse5.archives.gov/WH/new/NATO/fact6.html.
[xxx] Ibid.
[xxxi] NATO, “NATO-Ukraine Council.”
[xxxii] “Ukraine-NATO Council approves annual programme for Ukraine,” Ukrinform.
[xxxiii] “NATO-Ukraine Commission,” Mission of Ukraine to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, December 16, 2019, https://nato.mfa.gov.ua/en/ukraine-and-nato/nato-ukraine-commission.
[xxxiv] NATO, “NATO-Ukraine Commission.”
[xxxv] “NATO-Ukraine Commission (1997-2023),” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, last updated on July 13, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50319.htm.
[xxxvi] Maksak, “Stepping Stone to Membership.”
[xxxvii] NATO, “NATO-Ukraine Council.”
[xxxviii] Maksak, “Stepping Stone to Membership.”
[xxxix] NATO, “NATO-Ukraine Commission.”
[xl] NATO, “Charter on a distinctive partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine.”
[xli] NATO, “Vilnius Summit Communiqué.”
[xlii] “Relations with Ukraine,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, last updated on July 28, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_37750.htm.
[xliii] John Borawski, “NATO’s other special relationship,” in Borawski et al., “NATO-Ukraine Charter: First Act or Curtain Call?” Berlin Information Center for Transatlantic Security, Briefing Note 97.1 (July 1997), https://www.bits.de/public/briefingnote/bn97-1.htm.
[xliv] Wojciech Lorenz, “NATO Vilnius Summit Focused on Ukraine, but Still No Invitation,” Polish Institute of International Affairs, Bulletin No. 95 (2214), July 14, 2023, https://pism.pl/webroot/upload/files/Biuletyn/PISM%20Bulletin%20no%2095%20(2214)%2014%20July%20%202023.pdf.
[xlv] NATO, “Statement by the NATO-Ukraine Council at the level of Foreign Ministers.”
[xlvi] Maksak, “Stepping Stone to Membership.”
[xlvii] Yasmeen Serhan, “Why the New NATO-Ukraine Defense Council Falls Short,” Time, July 11, 2023, https://time.com/6293378/nato-ukraine-council/.
[xlviii] Maksak, “Stepping Stone to Membership.”
[xlix] Ibid.
[l] “Ukraine-NATO Council approves annual programme.”
[li] “Establishment of NATO-Ukraine council will have limited importance: experts,” Global Times, July 6, 2023, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202307/1293900.shtml.
[lii] Serhan, “Why the New NATO-Ukraine Defense Council Falls Short.”
[liii] “Secretary General to Ukraine Defense Contact Group: support for Ukraine matters for Ukraine’s security and for NATO,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, January 23, 2024, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_221998.htm.
[liv] Mills, “Security guarantees to Ukraine.”
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