Advanced Assistance: How NATO's Technological Innovation Fortifies Ukrainian Sovereignty
By Thomas Brandes
“The courage of Ukrainians + technology = the key to Ukraine’s future victory.”
- Mykhailo Fedorov
Deputy Prime Minister for Innovation, Education, Science and Technology Development
Technology has always been pivotal in the outcome of conflicts, whether managing logistics, communication, or direct engagement of adversary forces. Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) from NATO member states have played contributive roles in enhancing Ukrainian defence capabilities. As outlined by the Alliance’s Science and Technology Organisation, “emerging” refers to technologies expected to mature between 2020 and 2040 and whose effects are not expected to affect NATO’s defence, security, and enterprise functions, while “disruptive” refers to technologies that are expected to show a revolutionary impact.[i] Certain solutions that have been notably sought after in Ukraine have been operational internet connectivity, the new rise of “affordable mass” weapons systems, and the ability to computerise command and execution of combat exercises.[ii]
Accordingly, NATO has committed to fostering advanced technologies in reference to its EDT strategy, through the NATO Innovation Fund (NIF) and DIANA accelerator programmes, in both Europe and the United States. Many of these technologies will be geared towards providing pragmatic ground-based solutions to protecting Ukrainian sovereignty, with many offering dual uses to civilian and environmental contexts.[iii] In order to properly evaluate the usefulness of NATO assistance to Ukrainian self-defence, we must be aware of future problems before they are allowed to proliferate. From there, we may rest assured in our capacity to guarantee security to ourselves and our allies.
First, this article underlines the role that is played by the US and European private sectors in developing and producing pivotal EDTs. We can observe concentrated points of development amongst the transatlantic alliance as to which members are providing more than their fair share of cutting-edge technology. We note how the medium-term efficacy of the NIF compares to other EDT initiatives. This report also reflects upon ambiguous legislation that struggles to reconcile new systems, providing potential opportunities for exploitation by adversaries. Finally, we underline the risk that Ukraine’s strong domestic technology sector may be overlooked by NATO and joint NATO-EU initiatives in developing new solutions.
Current Strategic Technological Advances in Ukrainian Defence
I. Drone Systems & Counter Drone Systems
Russia’s war in Ukraine can be distinguished by its heavy, if not exhaustive usage of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to the extent it has been dubbed a ‘drone war’.[iv] The tasks that drones complete vary from reconnaissance, intelligence collection, and propaganda to strike coordination and munition drops.[v] However, these drones are no longer limited to the cumbersome plane-sized MQ-9 that were operated throughout Iraq and Afghanistan as military drones have been forced to share the skies with commercial and significantly smaller quadcopters. The two types of significant drone assistance that Ukraine has used in its self-defence can be assigned into NATO drone classifications I (> 150 Kilograms) and III (<600 Kilograms).[vi]
The former classification comprises small and micro drones, such as commercial quadcopters and certain military variants. These have been utilised for precision coordinating, significantly reducing instances of ‘blind shelling’,[vii] and shortening the time necessary to locate artillery targets and engage from 30 minutes to a mere three to five minutes.[viii] This is a vital development that minimises potentially wasted time spent circling while carrying out the second role of drones: loitering munitions.[ix] Loitering munitions, also known as ‘kamikaze drones’, exist as a fusion between drones and missiles. They have proved both invaluable against Russian armour and trench positions and frustrating when dealing with Russia’s counterpart, the Iranian-made Shahed-136. NATO members have provided specialised aerial systems such as the US-produced Switchblade 600 and its smaller 300 variant, which have relative ranges of 25 miles (40 km) and 6 miles (9.6 km).[x] Other NATO forms of loitering munitions used by the Ukrainian Armed Forces since 2022 include the Polish Warmate and American Phoenix Ghost systems. The latter classification of larger drones includes the notorious Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drone, which has become a flying symbol of Ukrainian determination and resistance. The TB2 has an effective range to carry firepower 300 kilometres and has been used to lure Russian fighter jets into the weapon-engagement zone of ground-based missiles to be dispatched.[xi] On 27 October 2022, Ukraine’s attack on Sevastopol Naval Base illustrated that even the Russian Black Sea Fleet was not safe from the technological prowess of coordinated remote munition attacks, rendering their flagship vessel damaged, if not disabled.[xii]
As previously underlined, Russia has also been utilising UAV technology to attack Ukrainian military and oftentimes civilian infrastructure. The challenge for Ukrainian forces often lies in having to expend expensive and finite anti-air defences on these cheap and mass-produced aerial threats. While the Shahed-136’s civilian GPS navigation mechanisms can be disabled with jammers, not all Russian drones are as easy to hinder. NATO member nations have agreed to provide hundreds of drone jammers to minimise damage from intensified drone attacks, as well as offering German IRIS-T SLM and American NASAMS and VAMPIRE anti-air, which could be used against loitering munitions.[xiii] We have seen that NATO has been providing both offensive and defensive drone technologies, but it is imperative to accelerate counter-UAV innovation to efficiently counter UAV proliferation. NATO’s dedicated military UAV systems also provide an alternative to commercial drones, whose makers have been attempting recently to clamp down on unauthorised combat with their products.[xiv]
II. Space Systems
The war in Ukraine is a “watershed moment” for utilising space capabilities in military operations.[xv] Satellite systems have been instrumental in communication and intelligence capacities, access to which has been predominantly provided by private companies in NATO states. The usage of these systems has been to Ukraine’s advantage in defending its territory; however, this has also raised questions for the future.
Fig 1. ICEYE SAR imagery highlights ground changes in demonstration.
Credit: ICEYE, Breaking Defence.[xvi]
One example of satellite intelligence instrumentalized by the Ukrainian Armed Forces is Finland’s ICEYE Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) Network, which is the largest commercial constellation of SAR satellites. This form of satellite allows high-resolution satellite imagery both during day and night time, regardless of cloud coverage.[xvii] The Lieber Institute at West Point has praised the ICEYE Satellite as providing “necessary and reliable data for military decision-making”.[xviii] The Ukrainian military also noted that the system was cost effective, due to its price being offset by the damage that was caused to Russian forces within the first days of its use.[xix] However, the use of the system has raised concerns over whether this qualifies Finnish-registered satellites as legal targets for Russian anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. To make matters more convoluted, this problem is far from theoretical as Russian ASATs have been successfully tested, leading to the destruction of Kosmos 1408, creating disruption among the international community and endangering their own astronauts aboard the International Space Station (ISS).[xx] In light of this possibility, it is important to note the dubious legality of such actions. Hitoshi Nasu, Professor of Law at the US Military Academy at West Point, argues that “ICEYE’s decision to grant Ukrainian forces access to its satellite imagery services means that these satellites will qualify as legitimate military targets under the law of armed conflict as it applies to the Russia-Ukraine war.”[xxi] Although Russia is likely to take into account what repercussions this may cause, reducing physical strike potential, any legal ambiguities may need to be addressed in preparation for increasing use of cyber and hybrid threats.
The other role that commercial satellites have filled is providing communication and command support. SpaceX’s Starlink network was employed following the request of Deputy Prime Minister Mykhailo Fedorov following extensive Russian cyberattacks on Ukrainian communication infrastructure, which included targeting the US commercial satellite ViaSat.[xxii] The requirement for a resilient, low-latency (high-speed) internet connection was fulfilled by Starlink’s agile operability and proliferated architecture—strength in numbers and technical manoeuvrability.[xxiii] This has allowed it to counter attempts at cyber-attacks and jamming. Federov has announced that Starlink has since become “the blood of our entire communication infrastructure now,” and has been acknowledged by former head of the State Service of Special Communications Yurii Shchyhol as the most useful digital assistance Ukraine had yet received.[xxiv] This reliance can shift from a strength to a weakness when aware of the private influence the network can be susceptible to. According to an account from owner Elon Musk’s biography, he had ordered his engineers to disable Starlink near the Crimean coast last year to disrupt a Ukrainian strike on Sevastopol.[xxv] This led to a confrontation not only between Ukrainian officials and Musk but also to a dispute over the US $145-million bill between SpaceX and the Pentagon, fracturing the United States’ unified image of commitment to Ukraine’s security. This has led to recommendations that the United States, and by extension NATO states, must be aware of private sector interests and that certain actors may expect to be treated as allies rather than contractors.[xxvi] Alternatively, “voluntary pre-negotiated contractual arrangements” between private actors and member states over technological assets must serve to mitigate conflicts of interest at pivotal times.[xxvii]
III. Artificial Intelligence & Data Systems
Not all of the technical assistance used by Ukraine has been physical. This section aims to underline the importance and limitations of advanced software and computer systems in facilitating the reclamation of Ukrainian territory. Its ability to do so hinges on its role in information warfare, aiding allied military decision-making through advanced analysis of geospatial and digital information, while disseminating false and misleading material among adversaries.[xxviii] It is thanks to these forms of software that troop positions and movements can be predicted days in advance.[xxix] These data-processing mechanisms work hand in hand with the data collection capacities demonstrated with the provided aerial and astro-imaging technology.
It was reported that professionals from Anduril, an American defence company, landed in Ukraine within two weeks of the full-scale invasion to assist with drone deployment.[xxx] The company, founded in 2017, prides itself on its ‘Lattice’ data processing system, which can simplify the management of hundreds of UAVs at a time, allowing military labour resources to be concentrated elsewhere.[xxxi] The Lattice network, derived from the US Space Surveillance Network has also been awarded a US $1 billion contract by the US Special Forces Command, for developing a “resilient, high speed and integrated operational mesh network” that will be able to identify and geolocate drone threats.[xxxii] Although it has not been officially confirmed that these systems are operational in Ukraine to their full extent, there is a likelihood that these systems will be employed as solutions to the specific operational challenges encountered by the armed forces.
Another new-generation defence contractor, Palantir, provides automated assistance with AI-integrated UAV-to-artillery target acquisition, allowing it to boast a “sensor to shooter” time of a mere 30 seconds. The firm also allows improved targeting for armoured mobile systems such as tanks. CEO of Palantir, Alex Karp, has professed that the software is “responsible for most of the targeting in Ukraine”.[xxxiii] We have seen that these systems are deeply valuable, although the majority of these systems originate from the United States, with noticeably less input coming from NATO’s European members.
Strategic Imperative: Prioritising Future EDT Development
I. Advanced Technology Initiatives
With technology filling a major role in Ukrainian defence, it is important to understand how and why the NATO alliance intends to keep prioritising EDT development. The priority sectors specifically noted in this drive are as follows:[xxxiv]
● Artificial Intelligence (AI)
● Autonomy
● Quantum
● Biotechnologies and Human Enhancement
● Next-Generation Communications Networks
● Hypersonic Systems
● Space
● Novel Materials and Manufacturing
● Energy and Propulsion
The following reasons have been laid out as to why EDT development is not to be ignored in light of other issues:
Harnessing emerging technology is imperative to maintain a technological edge against adversarial counterparts. The aim is to “mitigate adverse conditions where rivals temporarily achieve technological parity, or even supremacy”.[xxxv] This point is compounded as hybrid and cyber threats are likely to increase in quantity due to an absence of clearly defined rules, rendering responses challenging.[xxxvi]
The onset of new technologies opens the window for interoperability standardisation. The difficulty of introducing a standard framework grows the longer technologies exist. It is currently necessary to cultivate transatlantic cooperation for requirements on a plethora of EDT systems. It also reserves the possibility for standards to be promoted beyond NATO, for future cooperation with other allied states.
EDT Provision is often dual use, providing a plethora of new solutions to civilian issues, including environmental and medical.
With these motivations, we can contextualise NATO’s approach to fostering new technology. Guided by the NATO Innovation Board, a specialised array of military and civilian personnel, the transatlantic alliance has formed two primary bodies to fund the next cutting-edge solutions: DIANA, the Defence Innovation Accelerator, was established as part of the 2022 Madrid Summit as an initiative to combine the capacities of academia, the private sector, and governments.[xxxvii] This initiative provides access to grants, as well ninety-one deep-tech test centres where start-ups are offered the opportunity to de-risk, demonstrate, and validate their proposed dual-use technologies. This was followed in June 2023 by the establishment of the NATO Innovation Fund (NIF), the world’s first multi-sovereign fund, where €1 billion have been set aside to support investment in policy areas suffering from prolonged time-to-market timelines and elevated capital risks, such as EDTs.[xxxviii] This funding prioritises investments in DIANA’s accelerated projects that have successfully passed the necessary programmes. Canada, France, and the United States have similar programmes, though they are not party to the NIF.
Fig 2. DIANA’s Footprint.
Credit: NATO DIANA [xxxix]
These programmes have been successful in finding and fostering promising solutions so far. For example, DIANA has funded Kitepower, a generator that “delivers portable wind energy that can be effortlessly transported and installed whilst demanding minimal ground space”. This provides an environmental upgrade to off-grid electrical provision.[xl] This could be employed for both troops and civil communities alike in demanding remote environments.
II. Limitations
However, as with all initiatives, certain concerns have been raised. For instance, despite the unprecedented nature of the NIF’s funding structure, the relative ambition of the project has come under scrutiny. Raquel Ricart, a researcher and policy advisor from Carnegie Europe, has underlined that the EU’s Defence Innovation Scheme budgets €2 billion for the 2021–2027 period. This is “double the budget for two-fifths of the period” in comparison to NATO’s 15-year initiative.[xli] She notes that this may generate issues over the medium term. Additionally, a lack of coherence was noted between private technology markets and NATO. Europe and North America’s deep-tech ecosystems have been developed independently, with less cooperation than ideally desirable. Increased cooperation and overlap between systems would benefit complementarity when such technology would be collectively employed.
Additionally, there is an asymmetry noted between the quantity of accelerators and test centres as part of the DIANA network, visible in Figure 2. Although test centres allow access to test develop products and measure market preparedness, accelerators are necessary to demonstrate proof-of-concept. While both are imperative to developing new technology, the mismatch between them may hinder access to research and development of new solutions. Addressing this issue may aid in reducing Europe and Canada’s research gap.
The significant gap between the United States and the rest of its democratic allies, both in NATO and non-NATO member states, signals that there is plenty of room for the Alliance to contribute to technological innovation. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute draws attention to the gap in high-impact research papers: “Our dataset reveals that there’s a large gap between China and the US, as the leading two countries, and everyone else. The data then indicates a small, second-tier group of countries led by India and the UK.”[xlii] The asymmetry between these two zones of the Alliance places a resolvable burden upon certain actors in NATO, specifically the United States and UK.
Finally, one limitation specific to the development of dynamic solutions to reinforce Ukraine’s territorial integrity has been the insufficient incorporation of the country’s own technological expertise. The Ukrainian Prism Foreign Policy Council specifies that the Alliance could take more steps to harness the nation’s dynamic venture capital investment ecosystem and Brave-1 tech cluster, which featured 200 projects undergoing military testing.[xliii] It remains the case that Ukraine itself offers promising, home-grown solutions that can be combined for both its own defence and that of NATO.
Conclusion and Recommendations
In summary, we have seen a plethora of NATO-origin EDTs being employed by Ukrainian forces for self-defence. These have been a mixture of kinetic and informational, aiding lethality and efficiency. Our rivals have also challenged NATO’s dominance, rendering the situation highly competitive. The utilisation of these technologies has revealed several aspects of concern, which we must address collectively. Efforts to maintain thorough and inclusive defence planning should not put the values and strength of the Alliance at risk. The following recommendations may be considered by governments and private actors:
1. Private Sector Oversight:
Vigilantly monitor private sector influence, recognizing that legal frameworks should constrain individual actions at pivotal moments. Potential choke points of governmental over-reliance should be predicted, and voluntary contacts should be drafted to ensure legal accountability for companies to prevent divergence of command during conflicts.
2. Addressing Research Gaps:
Recognize and address research gaps, particularly between the United States and other member nations, to avoid vulnerabilities. Increasing the quantity of DIANA accelerators may allow more countries to address the asymmetry of research output.
3. Competitive Funding and Ambition:
Showcase competitive funding and ambition to stay on par with other defence initiatives. Maintaining a strong NIF medium-term strategy will be vital in the landscape of defence technologies.
4. Involvement of Ukrainian Technology Sector:
Actively leverage Ukraine’s wealth of defence technology innovation capacity to benefit not only their situation but also contribute to broader defence strategies. Invitations to EU-NATO cyber exercises and hybrid warfare initiatives would allow the country to cooperate without inherently compromising classified information or technology.
5. Minimising Space Engagement Risks:
Assess the risks associated with space engagement, especially the legality of satellite destruction. Given its legality, countries and commercial space groups should eliminate any ambiguity in neutrality to avoid confusion during conflicts.
About the Author
Thomas Brandes is in his final year as a bachelor’s student in International Studies at Leiden University. He is an Alumnus of Global Human Rights Defence’s (GHRD) Pakistan Division, specialising on security policy. He has worked with The Partisan Report to cover security developments in Africa and Pakistan and has consulted security policy matters with the British Commonwealth Director of Defence as well as the Ambassadors of Georgia and Yemen.
Notes
[i] D.F. Reding, and J. Eaton, Science & Technology Trends 2020-2040 (Brussels: NATO Science & Technology Organization, 2020), https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/4/pdf/190422-ST_Tech_Trends_Report_2020-2040.pdf.
[ii] Michael Marrow, “Shield AI Sees DoD Opening for ‘Intelligent, Affordable Mass’ of Drones,” Breaking Defense, October 13, 2023, https://breakingdefense.com/2023/10/shield-ai-sees-dod-opening-for-intelligent-affordable-mass-of-drones/.
[iii] “Emerging and Disruptive Technologies,” NATO, last updated June 23, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_184303.htm.
[iv] David Axe, “‘Now It’s a Drone War.’ A Russian Drone Strikes This Ukrainian Infantry Company Every 82 Minutes.,” Forbes, December 14, 2023, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2023/12/14/now-its-a-drone-war-a-russian-drone-strikes-this-ukrainian-infantry-company-every-82-minutes/?sh=75c600ff1443.
[v] Ulrike Franke and Jenny Söderström, “Star Tech Enterprise: Emerging Technologies in Russia’s War on Ukraine,” ECFR, September 5, 2023, https://ecfr.eu/publication/star-tech-enterprise-emerging-technologies-in-russias-war-on-ukraine/.
[vi] NATO, “STANAG 4671 – Unmanned Aircraft Systems Airworthiness Requirements, Annex A,” February 2017.
[vii] Dominika Kunertova, “The War in Ukraine Shows the Game-Changing Effect of Drones Depends on the Game,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 79, no. 2 (March 4, 2023): 96, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2023.2178180.
[viii] Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, Ukraine at War Paving the Road from Survival to Victory Special Report (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2022), https://static.rusi.org/special-report-202207-ukraine-final-web_0.pdf.
[ix] Kunertova, “The War in Ukraine,” 96.
[x] Kelsey D. Atherton, “Everything to Know about Switchblades, the Attack Drones the US Is Giving Ukraine,” Popular Science, March 22, 2022, https://www.popsci.com/technology/switchblade-drones-explained/.
[xi] Franke and Söderström, “Star Tech Enterprise,” 2023.
[xii] John C. K. Daly, “Ukraine Launches Unprecedented Drone Attack on Russian Black Sea Fleet’s Sevastopol Headquarters,” The Jamestown Foundation, November 8, 2022, https://jamestown.org/program/ukraine-launches-unprecedented-drone-attack-on-russian-black-sea-fleets-sevastopol-headquarters/.
[xiii] Kunertova, “The War in Ukraine,” 99.
[xiv] Seth Jones, Riley Mccabe, and Alexander Palmer, Ukrainian Innovation in a War of Attrition (Washington D.C.: CSIS, February 2023), https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep47447.pdf.
[xv] Valentina Chabert, “The Outer-Space Dimension of the Ukraine Conflict: Toward a New Paradigm for Orbits as a War Domain?” Journal of International Affairs 75, no. 2 (2023): 146, https://www.jstor.org/stable/27231743.
[xvi] Theresa Hitchens, “ICEYE to Supply Ukraine with SAR Satellite Imagery via Ukrainian Foundation,” Breaking Defense, August 18, 2022, https://breakingdefense.com/2022/08/iceye-to-supply-ukraine-with-sar-satellite-imagery-via-ukrainian-foundation/.
[xvii] Hitoshi Nasu, “‘The Eye in Space’: ICEYE’s SAR Satellites and the Law of War - Lieber Institute West Point,” Lieber Institute West Point, September 6, 2022, https://lieber.westpoint.edu/eye-space-iceyes-sar-satellites-law-of-war/.
[xviii] Nasu, “‘The Eye in Space’,” 2022.
[xix] Franke and Söderström, “Star Tech Enterprise,” 2023.
[xx] Chabert, “The Outer-Space Dimension,” 148.
[xxi] Nasu, “‘The Eye in Space’,” 2022.
[xxii] Chabert, “The Outer-Space Dimension,” 148.
[xxiii] Kari A. Bingen, Kaitlyn Johnson, and Zhanna Malekos Smith, “Russia Threatens to Target Commercial Satellites,” CSIS, November 10, 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-12-14/palantir-anduril-and-us-defense-tech-companies-struggle-in-europe.
[xxiv] Franke and Söderström, “Star Tech Enterprise,” 2023.
[xxv] Sean Lyngaas, “‘How Am I in This War?’: New Musk Biography Offers Fresh Details about the Billionaire’s Ukraine Dilemma,” CNN, September 7, 2023, https://edition.cnn.com/2023/09/07/politics/elon-musk-biography-walter-isaacson-ukraine-starlink/index.html.
[xxvi]Audrey Kurth Cronin, “How Private Tech Companies Are Reshaping Great Power Competition,” Johns Hopkins SAIS, August 21, 2023, https://sais.jhu.edu/kissinger/programs-and-projects/kissinger-center-papers/how-private-tech-companies-are-reshaping-great-power-competition.
[xxvii] Franklin Kramer, THE SIXTH DOMAIN: The Role of the Private Sector in Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Atlantic Council, 2023), 16, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/The-sixth-domain-The-role-of-the-private-sector-in-warfare-Oct16.pdf.
[xxviii] Roy Lindelauf, Herwin Meerveld, and Marie Postma, “Leveraging Decision Support in the Russo-Ukrainian War: The Role of Artificial Intelligence,” Atlantisch Perspectief 47, no. 1 (2023): 38.
[xxix] Ibid., 38.
[xxx] Mark Bergen et al., “Peter Thiel’s Palantir, Anduril Struggle to Break into European Defense Market,” Bloomberg, reposted on Yahoo Finance, December 14, 2023, https://finance.yahoo.com/news/us-defense-tech-start-ups-083656109.html.
[xxxi] Colin Demarest, “Anduril Unveils Software to Manage Hordes of Drones,” C4ISRNet, reposted on Yahoo News, May 3, 2023, https://news.yahoo.com/anduril-unveils-software-manage-hordes-040100367.html.
[xxxii] Sandra Erwin, “Space Force Using Anduril Software to Integrate U.S. Space Surveillance Sensors,” SpaceNews, July 20, 2023, https://spacenews.com/space-force-using-anduril-software-to-integrate-u-s-space-surveillance-sensors/.
[xxxiii] Jeffrey Dastin, “Ukraine Is Using Palantir’s Software for ‘Targeting,’ CEO Says,” Reuters, February 2, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/technology/ukraine-is-using-palantirs-software-targeting-ceo-says-2023-02-02/.
[xxxiv] “Emerging and Disruptive Technologies,” NATO.
[xxxv] Simona R. Soare, “Innovation as Adaptation: NATO and Emerging Technologies,” German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2021, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep33488.pdf.
[xxxvi] Daniel Doicariu, “Emerging and Disruptive Technology Trends in Defense and Security,” Journal of Defense Resources Management 14, no. 2 (October 2023): 36, http://www.jodrm.eu/issues/Volume14_issue2/3_Doicariu.pdf.
[xxxvii] Hanna Shelest and Viktoria Omelianenko, “EU, NATO and Ukraine: Dream Team or a Triangle?” Ukrainian Prism Foreign Policy Council, October 23, 2023, https://prismua.org/en/english-eu-nato-and-ukraine-dream-team-or-a-triangle/, 8.
[xxxviii] Raquel George Ricart, “NATO Defense Innovation and Deep Tech: Measuring Willingness and Effectiveness,” Carnegie Europe, August 29, 2023, https://carnegieeurope.eu/2023/08/29/nato-defense-innovation-and-deep-tech-measuring-willingness-and-effectiveness-pub-90314.
[xxxix] “NATO’s DIANA Expands Transatlantic Footprint, Gears up for First Challenges,” NATO, March 22, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_213074.htm.
[xl] “NATO DIANA Accelerates Kitepower’s Renewable Energy Revolution,” Kitepower, November 30, 2023, https://thekitepower.com/nato-diana-accelerates-kitepowers-renewable-energy-revolution/.
[xli] Ricart, “NATO Defense Innovation.”
[xlii] Dr Jamie Gaida et al., “ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker,” ASPI (Australian Strategic Policy Institute), September 23, 2023, https://www.aspi.org.au/report/critical-technology-tracker.
[xliii] Shelest and Omelianenko, “EU, NATO and Ukraine,” 12.
Image credit: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/tech-innovation-helps-ukraine-even-the-odds-against-russias-military-might/
