Forced Polarization: Disinformation on EU and NATO security assistance to Moldova
By Luigi Nicolò Segarizzi
Geopolitical rivalry is visibly back at the heart of Europe. In the last decade, the Eastern part of the continent has rapidly shifted from a ‘common’ to a ‘contested’ neighbourhood between Moscow and Brussels.[i] The ongoing Russian large-scale invasion of Ukraine has further deteriorated regional instability. Moldova has been particularly affected by the ongoing war, lending to the outbreak of massive anti-government protests earlier this year. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union, via the Common Security and Defence Policy, have thus openly committed to synergetic actions for shoring up the defence of the country against mounting hybrid warfare. Foreign Information Manipulations and Interferences (FIMIs) are now targeting external security assistance with the goal to exacerbate tensions in the already polarised Moldovan society. NATO and the EU must now face a pressing paradox, as further accommodating the needs of Chisinau in the defence domain risks unleashing a new wave of disinformation-driven dissensus.
1. Information warfare, evidence from Crimea to Moldova
“An explosion in security threats”. This is, in the words of Moldovan Interior Ministrer Ana Revenco, the situation afflicting the country since the beginning of the Russian offensive in Ukraine in February 2022.[ii] President Maia Sandu has repeatedly stressed how her administration has been fighting a hybrid war unleashed by Kremlin interferences.[iii] Russia has, indeed, demonstrated an effective capacity to leverage contingent circumstances to exacerbate rooted structural problems in Moldova. The deteriorated regional stability has just added more gunpowder to a prolonged unstable political situation. Despite its pivotal geopolitical position, this small country has been exposed to low living standards, high emigration levels, widespread corruption, and chronic economic stagnation. Moreover, Moldovan society is ethically and linguistically heterogeneous with Russian (13%), Ukrainian (4%), and Gagauzian (3%) minorities living alongside the Romanian-speaking population.[iv] The political landscape is even more divided by those backing integration with the European Union and those in favour of reinforcing ties with Moscow, such as former president Igor Dodon, the Socialist-Communist bloc, and the pro-Russian Shor Party funded by the exiled oligarch Ilan Shor. This political divergence leads to frequent protests against central authorities, which are now growing in scale and intensity. Secessionist tendencies are also a persistent challenge, with the Transnistrian region governed since 1992 by the self-proclaimed Pridnestrovian Republic shored up by a contingent of 1,500 Russian ‘peacekeepers’ from the Forces Operational Group, while the Gagauzian district is claiming increasing autonomy. In this troubled context, the consequences of the war in Ukraine have been severe: skyrocketing inflation, a rise in gas prices by Russia, and a massive influx of 100,000 refugees. To cope with the mounting pressure, authorities in Chisinau and Kyiv activated the EU accession procedure, which was perceived by Moscow as a further erosion of its influence in the area.[v]
Since the ‘Kozyrev doctrine’ in 1994, the Russian establishment has conceived countries once part of the Soviet Union as a ‘zone of privileged interest’, a ‘Russian World’ (Rusky mir) to be kept anchored to Moscow.[vi] Determined to preserve a leading role in the post-Soviet space, the Putin presidency reintroduced KBG-time ‘active measures’ (‘activnie meropryatia’), meaning “overt and covert techniques for influencing events and behavior in, and the actions of, foreign societies”.[vii] The well-noted concept of ‘hybrid warfare’ (‘gibridnaya voyna’) was later coined by General Gerasimov to describe the synergistic use of military and non-military actions to achieve effects both in the physical and psychological dimension of conflict.[viii] Hoffman and Larson emphasize the critical role of information warfare based on the manipulation of cognitive perceptions by altering the surrounding informational environment.[ix] Shaded by a vail of deception (‘maskirovka’), multiple instruments of persuasion or manipulation are tailored to the specific vulnerabilities of the local socio-political context to deeply penetrate into civil societies.[x] The final goal of this ‘battle of perceptions’ is to frustrate and confuse the public opinion, opening an enduring internal front to destabilize the targeted state.[xi] As stressed by Linebarger, to be fully effective these measures should be “combined with a precise message or narrative”.[xii] Disinformation (dezinformatsiya) is a pivotal element of this hybrid warfare. In fact, manipulated information re-constructing existing narratives is disseminated via various channels to mislead public opinion.[xiii] Externally forged narratives can be injected into the public debate using state-controlled media such as Sputnik and Russia Today or even local tabloids, then amplified in social network platforms like Facebook or Telegram. Usually, the circulation of a narrative in social media is facilitated by fake profiles created in ‘bot factories’ such as the St Petersburg Internet Research Agency, assisted by intelligence units like the 642nd Informational-Psychological Warfare Group of the GRU.[xiv] Additionally, the conveyed message is reinforced and legitimized through speeches of local political proxies and official communications from Russian diplomatic missions. The variety of channels allows Russian propaganda not only to reach a large audience but even to make more persuasive a fabricated narrative via rapid, continuous, and repetitive flows of manipulated information.[xv]
The described modus operandi was widely applied in Crimea and in the Donbas in 2014. Civil unrest against central authorities was encouraged by forged reports in social media describing attacks on the Russian-speaking population by neofascist bands ready to unleash an “ethical genocide”.[xvi] Once anxiety in public opinion was exacerbated, contacts with local personalities and disinformation about a “legal responsibility to protect” Russian minorities abroad triggered the formation of local self-defence militia and staged the ground to cover military interventions, such as the taking of Simferopol by “little green men” (later confirmed to be troops without insignia of the 45th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade). As eloquently described by Snyder, the secession of Crimea is “not a reaction to actual threats but rather an [external] attempt to activate a threat, so that violence would change the world”.[xvii] In this regard, well-staged disinformation campaigns maximise confusion and uncertainty in the population, undermining confidence in institutions, delegitimising political decisions and leading to a situation of chaos. This pattern is clear in Moldova, where “Russia is using hybrid warfare in a way that is tailored to the idiosyncrasies of local context”.[xviii] Here, Moscow encouraged a ‘controlled chaos’ characterised by mounting societal polarization and anti-government mobilization.[xix] As tensions and paranoia grow high in the country, US President Security Advisor Kirby mentioned the risk of ‘manufactured insurrection’.[xx] Even Maia Sandu, at the Davos Summit, highlighted the precautious situation in Moldova, encouraging her compatriots to engage in a “serious debate about the capacity to defend ourselves”.[xxi]
2. EU, NATO and the “assistance paradox”
In 2022, with threats to stability of Moldova reaching an unprecedented peak, Chisinau decided to strengthen security ties with NATO and the European Union. Both organisations pledged to support the Sandu government via packages of tailored measures able to enhance the resilience of the country while preserving its ‘constitutional neutrality’.
On one side, the European External Action Service (EEAS), the diplomatic branch of the European Union, has constantly increased the level of financial assistance through the European Peace Facility (EPF). This off-EU budget mechanism linked to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) avoids tedious unanimity votes in the Council in order to allocate significant defence investments to partner countries in need. For Moldova, the support package totals 47 million euros, which represents a crucial amount considering that the total defence budget of the country reaches just 85 million euros. Concretely, the resources are meant to provide non-lethal equipment to enhance operational effectiveness, interoperability, and crisis-management capabilities. This includes cutting-edge communication technologies, logistic materials, transport trucks, reconnaissance UAVs as well as training for cyber-defence, medical, and engineering units. Among the different forms of aid activated with the EPF, the most important is the procurement of Estonian long-range surveillance radars to counter the recent increase of Russian missiles crossing Moldovan airspace.[xxii] Parallelly, the FRONTEX agency deployed a Task Force of border guards to support the long-standing European Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) between Moldova and the Odesa oblast of Ukraine, which was followed by the announcement of a CSDP mission to set off early-warning systems against hybrid threats.[xxiii]
On the other side, recent assistance from NATO has been focused on training to reform and modernize the Moldovan Army. Particularly, the NATO Liaison Office in Chisinau agreed with local authorities on a Professional Development Programme to increase the responsiveness of their units. Given its neutral status, interactions of Moldova with NATO under the Euro-Atlantic Partnership for Peace (PfP) framework has always been limited to a few specific initiatives like a cyber defence laboratory, programmes to enhance education in military academies, participation in the Disaster Response Coordination centre, and involvement in PfP exercises for peacekeeping standards.[xxiv] However, the current government has also taken steps to increase bilateral defence ties with individual NATO member states including Germany, Romania, and the United Kingdom, as well as demonstrated interest in upgrading its political relations with the Atlantic alliance.[xxv] After the NATO Madrid Summit in 2022 addressed issues of logistic capacity in Moldova, its Ministry of Foreign Affairs was invited for the first time to a ministerial meeting of the Alliance, organized in Bucharest at the end of the year.[xxvi] Secretary General Stoltenberg even declared that NATO is “evaluating ways to protect non-member countries such as Moldova”, while Sandu did not excluded the possibility in the future to join “a larger alliance”.[xxvii]
The difficult conditions of the Moldovan Armed Forces remains the most pressing issue. They are constituted of just 6,000 units, mainly border guards and Carabinieiri gendarmes, with Soviet-era equipment and basic combat training. The latest analyses estimate that 250 million euros is needed to renovate the country’s armed forces. In 2020, Moldovan Military Capabilities published a plan to enhance troops’ mobility and deployment with modern vehicles like IVECO tactical trucks, JLTV Humvee, and Piranha-3H armoured personnel carriers.[xxviii] Despite the fact that the creation of a flexible force figures as a priority to defend against possible adversaries, covert operations, or limited interventions, its establishment is still in an embryonic phase, with the first batch of the 19 Piranha APC package delivered by Germany just in January 2023.[xxix] Another key priority is the air defence system, which has just a few radar technologies and still relies on forty-year-old S-125 anti-aircraft missiles or even older 57mm anti-aircraft guns (S-60). Targeted investments from the EU and NATO in the procurement of modern transport vehicles and radar, training practices, and systems to repel cyberattacks indubitably mitigate different mentioned deficiencies. However, the Moldovan army urgently requires considerable military supplies to increase their combat effectiveness. But this support comes with a hidden ‘paradox’.
In a contest of growing societal polarization, public opinion has become extremely sensitive to political discourses on defence relations with external actors given the ‘neutral status’ enshrined in the Moldovan Constitution. Russia weaponized such debates by manipulating information on Western military assistance to fuel the fire of instability. Now, the dilemma of “cooperating with NATO versus neutrality” is a key narrative.[xxx] Already in 2016, an anti-NATO rally fomented by manipulated information was able to hamper the circulation of some US vehicles taking part in the “Dragon Pioneer” joint exercises in the northern city of Negresti. After all, as stated by former KGB General Kalugin, during the Cold War disinformation activities used “to drive wedges in the Western community alliances of all sorts, particularly NATO” by “weakening its image in the eyes of the people”.[xxxi] Moscow was also able to ‘ethicize the debate’ concerning Chisinau’s rapprochement with the EU, creating deep divides between the various ethno-linguist groups.[xxxii] Now, disinformation on evolving security relations with the Atlantic alliance and the EU are re-framed to cultivate narratives that exacerbate fear in people about the danger of triggering Russian retaliation and getting drawn into a large-scale conflict. Such a criticality was repeatedly stressed by President Sandu, who remarked how “all the rhetoric of the opposition is false because the EU provides us with non-lethal equipment even though we need ammunition. […] What will we do if Russia attacks us? will we send army to defend us with a hoe? We don't want anyone to drag us into a war, but this is a reality we must be prepared for”. [xxxiii]
3. Disinformation-driven polarisation in Moldova
The disinformation campaign launched between February and August 2022, at the same time as the Russian offensive in southern Ukraine, is a clear example of information warfare. According to the Russian Central Military District command, a military manoeuvre aimed at reaching the city of Odesa to “open a route to Moldova's Trans-Dniester region”.[xxxiv] The strategy of employing a wide array of Foreign Information Manipulations and Interferences (FIMIs) to destabilize the internal situation and instil a logic of the ‘enemy at the gate’ in self-governed Transnistria appears functional to military operations in Ukraine. At the end of February, assertive propaganda offensives, including disinformation on NATO and the EU CSDP, started in Moldova. The narrative that NATO was providing weapons to Ukraine through the Republic of Moldova in violation of its neutrality was reported in local tabloid Politnavigator.net, then diffused in Telegram chats.[xxxv] In spring, this initial narrative was reinforced with allegations that Moldova had abandoned its neutrality in favour of NATO, which represented a “threat to the country’s very existence”.[xxxvi] Simultaneously, a series of bomb attacks on military buildings in Transnistria was accompanied by accusations that these were false-flag interventions by the Ukrainian army coordinated by NATO to push Chisinau into the Alliance and accept the deployment of NATO forces on its territory.[xxxvii] Finally, in mid-summer disinformation on NATO-backed provocations in Moldova to open a second front in the war in Ukraine was accentuated, together with allegations that the EU was planning to send heavy weaponry to the country.[xxxviii] Local politicians, including former president Dodon, claimed that NATO was setting up logistical platforms near Chisinau to deliver military aid to Ukrainian forces in the Odesa oblast.[xxxix]
Such flows of manipulated information heavily destabilized Moldova’s political environment. Some analysts like Minzarari stressed the “population-centric” nature of this model of hybrid warfare, not excluding a scenario where a wave of disinformation could have pushed confused mobs to “ask for protection against NATO” interference.[xl] The concrete risk was Moscow provoking ‘manufactured insurgencies’ and covered interventions following the 2014 Donbas template. Limited Russian military actions against Moldova were at the time plausible considering the opportunity to open a new front in Ukraine, with the goal of supporting the Kherson-Mykolaiv offensive or even to seize key logistical hubs such as airports and roads to pressure Odesa, already under maritime blockade and threatened by amphibious landings.[xli]
A second extensive psychological operation in Moldova, which involved discrediting NATO and EU defence assistance, occurred between December 2022 and March 2023. As gas prices in the country peaked, new disinformation campaigns began to hammer Moldovan society as much as Russian missile strikes hammered border areas in Ukraine. The EEAS East StratCom Task Force assessed that the new wave of FIMIs had a decisive impact in reinforcing previous metanarratives, exacerbating tensions, widening polarization, and bringing thousands of people to the streets.[xlii] Already in late 2022, posts on Facebook and TikTok cited videos of a British military instructor in the local academy as proof that NATO troops have illegally penetrated the country, calling citizens to “urgently unite against this threat”.[xliii] A huge number of posts shared in Facebook groups and Telegram chats mentioned that the government and Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) led by Sandu were actively negotiating NATO support to develop Moldova’s military strategy, exactly when the country was facing severe economic downturn, and while in Paris mass mobs were demanding for “France’s withdrawal from the Alliance”.[xliv] Parallelly, Russian media and diplomatic representatives in Moldova started to portray NATO as fully involved in the Ukrainian war, supported by EU satellite intelligence systems.[xlv] However, it was at the beginning of the new year that this manipulated information served the most precise and harmful meta-narrative: NATO structures were helping Romania to amass a fully-equipped army at the border to invade and annex Moldova.[xlvi] This main narrative was backed by other (often incompatible) discourses claiming that both Ukraine and Moldova were staging provocations to attack Transnistria.[xlvii] Such assertions, widely disseminated through various web pages and then amplified by massive re-posting in social networks, provided ‘proof’ of an imminent attack, citing the duplication of the Moldovan defence budget thanks to the European Peace Facility, the supply of armed vehicles via NATO platforms, and waves of Ukrainian missiles violating Moldovan airspace identified by new EU radar.[xlviii] A manipulated video claiming that Romania was massing military equipment on the Moldovan border was again extensively diffused, reaching more than 300,000 views on Telegram, while another post containing alleged images of hundreds of Ukrainian saboteurs penetrating Transnistria with NATO logistical support had 140,000 views.[xlix] According to different online sources, once a military operation in Transnistria started, Ukraine was also “ready to ask for NATO intervention”, as the organization was already preparing the territory of Moldova for the future theatre of war.[l] Parallel to the disinformation campaign launched in traditional and social media, the forged narrative about NATO-supported invasions was amplified by speeches of local figures like Dodon and Transnistrian de-facto Foreign Minister Ignatiev.[li] Meanwhile, several high-ranking Russian officials such as Deputy Foreign Minister Galuzin and Kremlin Press Secretary Peskov confirmed that a NATO-approved invasion was imminent and reiterated that there would be severe repercussions on Moldovan security in case of a boost in the cooperation between Chisinau and NATO.[lii]
The described disinformation activities targeting EU and NATO support to Moldova reinforced Russian large-scale psychological operations meant to exasperate tensions within society. The deteriorating security environment and the economic downfall aggravated fears in the population and fomented opposition to the incumbent government. Between late February and mid-March 2023, mass protests backed by the “Shor Party” flooded the streets in Chisinau against the low living standards and the push toward the West promoted by Sandu. Moldovan authorities reported that the protests were part of a broader Russian-staged attempt to overthrow the government via violent uprisings.[liii] Manipulated information flows have been complemented by almost a hundred false bomb alerts all over the country and infiltration in the crowd of military-trained foreigners, including members of the Wagner Group. Mizarari and Parmentier suggest that Moscow’s final aim is to foment protracted institutional paralysis or an elite-driven coup in the capital.[liv] Although a fully-fledged offensive like the one planned a year before was not plausible, the intelligence sources reported a possible eruption of violence. [lv] A situation of widespread chaos and attempted coup would have also facilitated circumscribed military operations from Transnistria to take control of the Chisinau airport and then transport troops to open a new front in the Ukrainian southern flank, adding pressure to Odesa and dragging fresh forces in Kyiv away from the battle of Bakhmut.[lvi]
Conclusions: The “devil in the details”
Over the past year Moldova has been flooded with Russian propaganda.[lvii] Such a wave of FIMIs has contributed to inflaming the frustration of citizens and provoking widespread protests. Given the increasingly unstable situation, the Sandu government boosted cooperation in the defence sector with the EU and NATO. Although these relations are restricted to political commitments and support in specific technical areas not related to lethal equipment, they have been heavily targeted by Russian disinformation reinforcing large-scale psychological operations. The information warfare particularly leveraged Moldova’s ‘constitutional neutrality’ and fears of the country being suddenly dragged into the Ukrainian conflict because of European or NATO interferences. This logic has contributed to instil a pervasive sense of uncertainty in Moldovan society, now more polarized than ever. As stressed by President Sandu, “Russian propaganda managed to convince part of the population that neutrality means you don’t have to invest in your defence.”[lviii] Consequently, NATO and the EU now are facing a serious ‘assistance paradox’: On the one hand, their support is much needed to shore up Moldova’s limited defence capabilities. On the other hand, information about enhanced military support could be easily manipulated to exacerbate tensions and plunge the country into “Kremlin-controlled chaos”.[lix] Measures like the EU-financed long-range radars or the NATO Professional Development Programme can improve the resilience of Chisinau, but the Ukrainian case demonstrates how efficient armed forces, well-equipped and trained according to modern standards, are essential to mitigate possible military interventions. Empirical findings also show that Russian disinformation seems able to weaponize the debate on EU assistance in the security domain only to a limited extent, while relations with NATO are perceived by the population as more controversial. Finally, the incoming CSDP mission establishing early-warning mechanisms and the NATO cyber threat laboratory, in combination with national bans on pro-Russian broadcastings (e.g., RT, Sputnik), are important measures in the fight against externally forged narratives. Nevertheless, the dissemination of fake news on Facebook and Telegram groups has proved difficult to control. Containing the online diffusion of manipulated information about NATO and EU security assistance thus requires a solid population-centric strategic communication to engage diffusely and directly with those communities most exposed to disinformation. As the electoral campaign for the 2024 Moldovan presidential vote gets closer, we should not forget that “strategic uses of social networks may have a redistributive effect on international power relations”.[lx] Surely, Russia will remember it.
About the Author
Luigi Nicolò Segarizzi is a doctoral researcher in international relations and area studies (Russia/Europe) at ULB in Brussels and at the UBB in Romania under the EU-funded Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions Fellowship, GEM-DIAMOND Programme.
Notes
[i] Romanova Tatiana and Maxine David, “From a ‘Common’ to a ‘Contested’ Neighbourhood: Connecting Levels of Analysis in EU–Russia Interaction,” in The Routledge Handbook of EU-Russia Relations, edited by Romanova Tatiana and Maxine David (London: Routledge, 2021).
[ii] Thomas Escritt, “Fake bombs and failed coup: Moldova smolders on border of Russia’s war,” Reuters, 10 March 2023,
[iii] Euronews, “Moldova threatened by 'hybrid warfare generated by Russia' to destabilise government,” 15 March 2023,
[iv] OSCE, “HCNM Ethnobarometer Moldova – 2020,” Centre for Sociological, Politological and Psychological Analysis and Investigations CIVIS (CIVIS Centre), 2021,
https://www.osce.org/hcnm/505306
[v] Bob Deen and Wouter Zweers, “MOLDOVA’S VULNERABILITIES AMID WAR IN UKRAINE," clingendael, 30 September 2022,
https://www.clingendael.org/publication/moldovas-vulnerabilities-amid-war-ukraine.
[vi] Litera Bohuslav, “The Kozyrev Doctrine - a Russian Variation on the Monroe Doctrine,” Perspectives 4 (1994): 45–52.
[vii] R. Godson and R. Shultz, “Soviet active measures: Distinctions and definitions,” Defense Analysis, 1985, 101–110.
[viii] F. Hoffman, “On Not-So-New Warfare: Political Warfare vs. Hybrid Theats,” War on the Rocks, 28 July 2014, https://warontherocks.com/2014/07/on-not-so-new-warfare-political-warfare-vs-hybrid-threats/.
[ix] E.Larson et al., “Foundations of Effective Influence Operations: A Framework for Enhancing Army Capabilities,” RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2009, https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG654.html.
[x] J. Valenta and L. Valenta, “Why Putin Wants Syria,” Middle East Quaterly 23, no. 2 (2016): 1-17.
[xi] L. Robinson et al., “Modern Political Warfare: Current Practices and Possible Responses,” RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2018. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1772.html.
[xii] Paul Linebarger, M.A., Psychological Warfare, Gateways Books & Tapes, October 15, 2010.
[xiii] D. Jackson, International Forum for Democratic Studies, “Issue Brief: Distinguishing Disinformation From Propaganda, Misinformation and ‘Fake News’”, NED, The National Endowment For Democracy, October 17, 2017, https://www.ned.org/issue-brief-distinguishing-disinformation-from-propaganda-misinformationand -fake-news/.
[xiv] The Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (Glavnoje Upravlenije General'nogo shtaba Vooruzhonnykh), also known as GRU, is a foreign military intelligence agency of the Russian Ministry of Defence responsible for military operations. It is part of the network of intelligence agencies and units of the Russian Federation together with the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), the Federal Security Service (FSB), and the Federal Protective Service (FSO).
[xv] Christopher Paul and Miriam Matthews, “The Russian "Firehose of Falsehood" Propaganda Model: Why It Might Work and Options to Counter It,” Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016,
https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE198.html
[xvi] J. Pupcenoks and E. Seltzer, “Russian Strategic Narratives on R2P in the ‘Near Abroad’”, Nationalities Papers 49, no. 4 (2021): 757–775.
[xvii] Timothy Snyder, “Crimea: Putin vs. Reality”, The New York Review of Books, March 7, 2014,
https://www.nybooks.com/online/2014/03/07/crimea-putin-vs-reality/.
[xviii] Denis Cenuşa, “Twitter Facebook Send this page to a friend Moldova’s neutrality dilemma,” International Politics and Society, 31 May 2022.
[xix] Mark Galeotti, “Controlling Chaos: How Russia manages its political war in Europe,” The European Council on Foreign Relations, September 1, 2017,
https://ecfr.eu/publication/controlling_chaos_how_russia_manages_its_political_war_in_europe/.
[xx] US President Security Advisor John Kirby, quoted in “White House Says Russia Preparing To Annex More Ukrainian Territory,” RFE/RL, July 19, 2022,
https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-russia-us-kirby-annex-donbas/31950917.html.
[xxi] Suzanne Lynch, “Time to join NATO? Moldova eyes joining ‘a larger alliance,’” Politico, January 20, 2023,
[xxii] Andrew Rettman, “EU buying radar for Moldova, as Russian missiles fly overhead,” euobserver.com, March 14, 2023, https://euobserver.com/world/156824.
[xxiii] Străjescu Carolina, “European Union mission to Moldova for security consultations in early summer,” radiomoldova.md, March 3, 2023, https://radiomoldova.md/p/7501/european-union-mission-to-moldova-for-security-consultations-in-early-summer.
[xxiv] Since 2014, Moldova has deployed roughly 40 troops in support of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR).
[xxv] For instance, Berlin started the delivery to Moldova of 19 Piranha-3H armoured personnel carriers (APCs).
[xxvi] Iulian Ernst, “Moldova attends first Nato summit but says membership is not an option
in Bucharest,” intellinews.com, December 1, 2022,
[xxvii] Chirileasa Andrei, “NATO evaluates ways to protect non-member countries such as Moldova,” February 14, 2023, https://www.romania-insider.com/nato-ways-protect-non-member-countries-moldova; Lynch, “Time to join NATO?”
[xxviii] Necsutu Madalin, “Moldova Weighs Mobility And Firepower In Military Overhaul,” Balkaninsight, July 13, 2022, https://Balkaninsight.Com/2022/07/13/Moldova-Weighs-Mobility-And-Firepower-In-Military-Overhaul/.
[xxix] Tanas Alexander, “Moldova needs $275 million to modernise armed forces,” Reuters, April 13, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/moldova-needs-275-mln-modernise-armed-forces-defence-official-2023-04-13/.
[xxx] Denis Cenuşa, “Moldova’s Neutrality Dilemma,” International Politics and Society, May 31, 2022, https://www.ips-journal.eu/topics/foreign-and-security-policy/moldovas-neutrality-dilemma-5967/
[xxxi] R.S. Cohen and L. Robinson, “Political Warfare Is Back With A Vengeance,” Rand Corp., Center For The National Interest, April 12, 2018, https://Www.Rand.Org/Pubs/Research_Reports/Rr1772.Html.
[xxxii] Vladimir Socor, “Ethnic Factors Affecting Moldova’s Debate on Association With the European Union,” Jamestown Foundation, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 11, Issue 33, February 20, 2014,
https://jamestown.org/program/ethnic-factors-affecting-moldovas-debate-on-association-with-the-european-union/.
[xxxiii] “Maia Sandu: If Russia attacks us, we send army to defend us with a hoe?” IPN, July 7, 2022, https://www.ipn.md/en/maia-sandu-if-russia-attacks-us-will-we-send-army-7965_1091048.html#ixzz7Z0IpROlD.
[xxxiv] Dmytro Hubenko, “Russia eyes route to Trans-Dniester: What do we know?”, Deutsche Welle, April 22, 2022,
https://www.dw.com/en/russia-eyes-route-to-trans-dniester-what-do-we-know/a-61559127.
[xxxv] Cornel Ciobanu, “FAKE NEWS: NATO is providing weapons to Ukraine via the Republic of Moldova, which represents a breach of the country’s neutrality status,” February 28, 2022,
[xxxvi] Независимая газета, “Молдавия отказалась от постоянного нейтралитета в пользу НАТО”, May 19 2022, https://www.ng.ru/cis/2022-05-19/5_8440_moldova.html; “Disinfo: NATO will not defend its members in the event of a conflict with Russia,” Veridica, April 11, 2022, https://www.veridica.ro/en/disinformation/disinformation-nato-will-not-defend-its-members-in-the-event-of-a-conflict-with-russia.
[xxxvii] Sputnik in “Disinfo: The West Is Destabilising Moldova To Justify Military And Political Annexation By Romania,” euvsdisinfo.eu, June 6, 2022,
[xxxviii] “«НАТО провоцирует горячие головы» Молдавия готовится к новой войне за Приднестровье. Кому нужен второй фронт в Европе?”, lenta.ru, August 28, 2022, https://lenta.ru/articles/2022/08/28/pridnestrovie/; “Молдавия обсуждает со странами ЕС возможные поставки летального оружия,” tass.ru, June 22, 2022, https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/14807569.
[xxxix] “Додон: Молдова активно закупает у НАТО оружие, чтобы начать стрелять по России,” «Россия-24», July 18, 2022, https://smotrim.ru/video/2444636.
[xl] Dumitru Minzarari, “The next war: How Russian hybrid aggression could threaten Moldova,” The European Council on Foreign Relations, Policy Brief July 29, 2022, https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-next-war-how-russian-hybrid-aggression-could-threaten-moldova/.
[xli] Grzegorz Kuczyński, “Russian Invasion Of Ukraine: Fears Of Attack On Odessa,” Warsaw Institute Foundation, April 27, 2022, https://warsawinstitute.org/russian-invasion-ukraine-fears-attack-odessa/;
Frederick W. Kagan, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Karolina Hird, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment,” ISW, April 26, 2022, https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-26.
[xlii] “A Russian Psychological Operation Pressures Moldova,” EUvsDisinfo, March 3, 2023,
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/a-russian-psychological-operation-pressures-moldova/.
[xliii] “ЧТО ДЕЛАЮТ СОЛДАТЫ НАТО В МОЛДОВЕ,” Газета, “СП” November 28, 2022,
https://esp.md/ru/kaleydoskop/2022/11/28/chto-delayut-soldaty-nato-v-moldove-video.
[xliv] Post on Facebook: “19 депутатов PAS полетели в воскресенье в Брюссель в штаб-квартиру НАТО”, February 21, 2023; “В Париже прошли протесты” February 27, 2023;
“Румынский сенатор Диана Шошоакэ: Санду втягивает Молдову в войну!”, February 21, 2023;
“НАТО и правительство Великобритании займутся разработкой национальных стратегий безопасности и обороны в Молдове,” March 23, 2023. See, https://www.facebook.com/groups/1464141143898025/search/?q=%D0%9D%D0%90%D0%A2%D0%9E
[xlv] Telegram page of the Russian Embassy in Moldova, “«Коллективный Запад» Использует Гражданские Космические Спутники В Военных Целях,” November 11, 2022,
[xlvi] “Romania is concentrating air defense systems to Moldova’s border,” Pravda.ru, February 27, 2023,
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/romania-is-concentrating-air-defense-systems-to-moldovas-border;
“ФЕЙК НОВОСТЬ: Украина готовится к нападению на Приднестровье, а армада танков НАТО с территории Румынии прибудет в Крым,” POLITNAVIGATOR.NET, February 20, 2023,
[xlvii] Post on Facebbok: “Moldova will be able to identify Ukrainian missiles,” March 3, 2023,
https://www.facebook.com/groups/1464141143898025/permalink/3305540793091375/;
“FAKE NEWS: NATO prepares the territory of the Republic of Moldova to become a future heatre of war,” RUBALTIC.RU, January 26, 2023,
https://www.veridica.ro/en/fake-news/fake-news-nato-pregateste-teritoriul-republicii-moldova-ca-viitor-teatru-de-razboi; Sputnik, quoted in “Disinfo: The West And Kyiv May Start Provocations Against Transnistria,” euvsdisinfo.eu, February 27, 2023, https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-west-and-kyiv-may-start-provocations-against-transnistria;
POLITNAVIGATOR.NET, quoted in “ФЕЙК НОВОСТЬ: Украина готовится к нападению на Приднестровье, а армада танков НАТО с территории Румынии прибудет в Крым,” February 2, 2023, https://www.veridica.ro/ru/feiki/feik-novost-ukraina-gotovitsya-k-napadeniyu-na-pridnestrove-a-armada-tankov-nato-s-territorii-rumynii-pribudet-v-krym; Tass.com, quoted in, “Ukrainian nationalists are planning a false-flag operation in Transnistria, Moldova,” EUvsDisinfo, February 2, 2023, https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/romania-is-concentrating-air-defense-systems-to-moldovas-border;
Pravda.ru, quoted in “Romania is concentrating air defense systems to Moldova’s border,” EUvDisinfo, February 27, 2023,
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/romania-is-concentrating-air-defense-systems-to-moldovas-border;
Rubaltic.Ru, quoted in, “ФЕЙК НОВОСТЬ: Брюссель дал согласие за аннексию Республики Молдова Румынией,” verdica, January 29, 2023, https://www.veridica.ro/ru/feiki/feik-novost-bryussel-dal-soglasie-za-anneksiyu-respubliki-moldova-rumyniei.
[xlviii] Moldavskie Vedomosti, quoted in, “Disinfo: Moldova is preparing for war,” EuvDisinfo.eu, December 12, 2022, https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/moldova-is-preparing-for-war.
[xlix] Shannon Bond, “From TV to Telegram to TikTok, Moldova is being flooded with Russian propaganda,” NPR, March 9, 2023,
https://www.npr.org/2023/03/09/1162045645/from-tv-to-telegram-to-tiktok-moldova-is-being-flooded-with-russian-propaganda.
[l] RUBALTIC.RU, quoted in, “FAKE NEWS: NATO prepares the territory of the Republic of Moldova to become a future theatre of war,” January 26, 2023,
https://www.veridica.ro/en/fake-news/fake-news-nato-pregateste-teritoriul-republicii-moldova-ca-viitor-teatru-de-razboi; md.tsargrad.tv, quoted in “Ukraine wanted to use a missile attack to escalate and involve NATO in the conflict,” EUvsDisinfo.eu, February 2, 2023, https://euvsdisinfo.eu/disinformation-results/?text=Moldova+NATO.
[li] “(ВИДЕО) ДОДОН СЧИТАЕТ ЧТО ГРАЖДАНЕ МОЛДОВЫ ПРОТИВ ИНТЕГРАЦИИ В НАТО,” Presa Liberă, February 20, 2023, https://www.facebook.com/groups/1599133697033735/permalink/3433629680250785/; “Молдова де-факто переформатирована под стандарт НАТО: там работает миссия Frontex, в министерстве обороны сидят советники США и стран НАТО, подготовка офицеров ведется на натовский базах.— заявил в интервью,” SputnikLive, February 20, 2023, https://vk.com/video-211144754_456241628.
[lii] “Providing Moldova with NATO arms could turn out 'disastrous': Russia,” Al Mayadeen, December 24, 2022, https://english.almayadeen.net/news/politics/providing-moldova-with-nato-arms-could-turn-out-disastrous; “Kremlin: Russia’s relations with Moldova are very tense,” EURACTIV.com, February 2023, https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/kremlin-russias-relations-with-moldova-are-very-tense/.
[liii] Wilhelmine Preussen, “Russia is planning coup in Moldova, says President Maia Sandu,” Politico, February 13, 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/moldova-president-maia-sandu-russia-attack/.
[liv] Mizarari and Parmentier Florent, “I tre scenari di un colpo di Stato pro russo in Moldavia,” Le Grand Continent, February 13, 2023, https://legrandcontinent.eu/it/2023/02/16/i-tre-scenari-di-un-colpo-di-stato-pro-russo-in-moldavia/.
[lv] Radu Eremia, “Recean, reacție privind intenția rușilor de a prelua controlul Aeroportului Chișinău: Instituțiile noastre sunt pregătite,” Februaruy 22, 2023.
[lvi] Ibid.
[lvii] Shannon Bond, “From TV to Telegram to TikTok, Moldova is being flooded with Russian propaganda”, Houston Public Media Foundation, University of Houston, March 9, 3023,
https://www.houstonpublicmedia.org/npr/2023/03/09/1162045645/from-tv-to-telegram-to-tiktok-moldova-is-being-flooded-with-russian-propaganda/
[lviii] Preussen, “Russia is planning coup in Moldova.”
[lix] Galeotti, “Controlling Chaos: How Russia manages.”
[lx] T. Nissen, “The Weaponization Of Social Media,” Characteristics of Contemporary Conflicts, Royal Danish Defence College, 2015.
