Supporting NATO Partners at Risk: Moldova
By Željko Marjanović
Certain post-Soviet countries have been under increased threat of a possible Russian invasion following the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has shown its capability of tearing countries apart in order to prevent them from starting a process of transatlantic integration. Moldova is particularly at risk as it is under the threat of armed conflict in Transnistria—the Russian-occupied Moldovan breakaway region. To make Moldova a safer and more prosperous country, both the European Union and NATO have a crucial role in supporting their post-Soviet partner at risk.
Old and new security challenges
European security has been constantly challenged over the last few decades. While the end of the Cold War incentivised the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the United States’ unipolar hegemony did not last long in this region. Liberal values and democracy did not put an end to human history, as predicted by political scientist Francis Fukuyama, and new threats have emerged. During the 1990s, the Russian Federation suffered through crises but eventually rose as a potential superpower, challenging the transatlantic community both geopolitically and ideologically. Today, we see that “Russia is driven by the idea of eliminating its rivals, turning conflicting ideas within a country into a battlefield of ideological resistance with the West.”[i] Post-Soviet countries like Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine have already paid the bloody price for showing any signs of affiliation with the European Union or NATO. Now, Cold War geopolitics are re-emerging, and both the European Union and NATO must face it.
Russia has put almost everything at stake for the cause of protecting its so-called ‘historical territories’ and trying to re-establish the new Soviet Union. According to scholars, “Putin and his regime’s ideology are remarkably Soviet, promoting a collective identity founded on shared ideals, shared history, and collective resistance to outside enemies, particularly the West.”[ii] Russia’s historical territories include post-Soviet countries, such as Georgia and Ukraine as well as the Baltic states. Georgia has already suffered Russian aggression after Moscow invaded Georgian territory in 2008, and two self-proclaimed pro-Russian states, hence breakaway regions—Abkhazia and South Ossetia—have since posed a problem to its sovereignty. Additionally, Ukraine suffered under Russian-backed aggression in 2014, and it is still suffering in 2023. The regions of Donetsk and Luhansk along with the Crimean Peninsula, invaded by Russian troops in 2014, have since been considered Russian territories by Vladimir Putin. The Baltic states are also under threat from Russia. In 2007, Estonian banks and institutions suffered from a Russian cyber-attack after a debate arising from the relocation of the Bronze Soldier of Tallinn, a Soviet-era war memorial. A similar cyber-attack occurred seven years later in Latvia when Russian hackers attacked Latvia’s Ministry of Defence.
At the end of the Cold War, the Moldovan government declared independence, although part of its ethnic Russian population did not accept it. Shortly thereafter, an armed conflict began between these ethnic Russians and the Moldovan armed forces, which resulted in the Russian occupation of Transnistria due to the Moldovan government’s inability to regain control over the territory. Today, Russian armed forces are still stationed in Transnistria and are considered ‘peacekeepers’ by the Kremlin.[iii] Despite this, Moldova has established a firm partnership with NATO as well as the European Union. Moldova joined the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1992 and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme in 1994. Furthermore, Moldova has even expressed its willingness to unify with Romania in order to enter the European Union and NATO: in a 2021 poll, around 44% of Moldovans said that they support unification.[iv] However, as this means that a majority of Moldovans oppose such an idea, it is unclear whether unification is even possible.
There is a strong possibility that the Transnistrian conflict could escalate. Russian armed forces have been present in the region of Transnistria to maintain peace among citizens and to discourage Moldova from continuing the armed fight for its territory, threatening Moldova’s sovereignty. If Russia proclaims victory in neighbouring Ukraine, it is possible that Russia could start a new war on European soil. If Moldova does not continue to strengthen its partnership with the West or eventually does not become a member of the European Union or NATO, Russia is likely to attack Moldova.
What do Russian aggression and these pro-Russian, self-proclaimed states mean to the security of the European Union and hence NATO member states? First of all, it means that the threat from the East, i.e., the Russian threat, is still largely present. Russia considers itself a state with the right to attack any post-Soviet state that shows a sign of affiliation with the European Union or NATO. Russia does this to protect its so-called historical territories and re-establish control over the Soviet Union. The idea of protecting its historical territories was inspired by the ideology of Eurasianism, championed by Russian philosopher Alexander Dugin. According to Dugin’s form of Eurasianism, Russia is a protective power that “must reclaim its Great Space in order to safeguard all of the peoples who live there, based on a special concept of Russian nationalism in which Russians must first acknowledge themselves as Orthodox, then as Russians, and finally as individuals.”[v] Second, Russia claims that the Western political concepts of liberalism and liberal democracy are utterly regressive and prone to moral decline. Russia is very eager to challenge Western democracies, and it is ready to tear certain (European) countries apart—especially post-Soviet ones—in order to show, promote, and most importantly, preserve the significance of its authoritarian values. In doing this, “Russia challenges international law, alters traditional (liberal) approaches to peacekeeping, and misapplies the principle of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), [and] it also uses ethnic discrimination against Russian-speaking populations abroad as a pretext to intervene.”[vi]
Looking at Russia’s ideology and acts of aggression, Russia must be considered a significant actor in European and post-Soviet geopolitics. In response, both NATO and the European Union must strengthen their partnerships with countries that show transatlantic aspirations such as Moldova to protect these states from Russian aggression. Likewise, Moldova, as a nation both under Russian occupation and with transatlantic aspirations, is particularly vulnerable and therefore must strengthen its partnership with NATO and the EU in several areas of cooperation, which will be discussed below.
Strengthening the Partnership with Moldova
Security and military
As previously mentioned, Moldova has already made certain efforts to cooperate with NATO. While Moldova is constitutionally neutral, NATO fully respects Moldova’s constitutional neutrality even as it seeks to draw closer to Euro-Atlantic standards and institutions.[vii] Here are some suggestions for how to make this partnership even stronger.
As mentioned above, Moldova is a member of NATO’s PfP programme, which is designed to maintain solid cooperation between NATO and its partners in the Euro-Atlantic. Additionally, NATO and Moldova have launched a Professional Development Programme for civil servants. According to NATO’s website, “The objective of the NATO-Republic of Moldova Professional Development Programme is to enhance professional development of civilian personnel and civil service capacities in the defence and security sector.”[viii] In the current era of armed threats against the post-Soviet space, the programme should include specific goals, and it should create deeper connections between civil servants and military staff. Furthermore, policy planners from both Moldova and NATO should address current security threats, such as the Russian military presence in Transnistria and recent Russian threats concerning the possible invasion of Moldova. Moldova should seek additional help from NATO’s security policy makers to be more ready for any possible armed conflict.
Increased cooperation should also translate to a high(er) level of interoperability between member states’ armies and the Moldovan military as well as certain reforms in the military. In order to reach a higher level of interoperability and having more skilled military staff, NATO should engage in constant cooperation on the education of Moldovan military personnel.
Moldova also should increase its military budget. As highlighted by Balkan Insight, “While Moldova’s defence budget for 2023 increased 70 percent from 2022, amounting to almost 85 million euros; at just 0.55 percent of its gross domestic product, this is still relatively small compared to the 2 percent minimum that NATO requires of its member states.”[ix] In order to have a stronger military and armed response, both Moldovan and NATO security and defence policy makers should calculate and propose a bigger, but also achievable, Moldovan defence budget. Furthermore, if possible, NATO and Moldova should aim at creating an ad hoc body to coordinate such efforts and increase the expenditure of the PfP.
Cooperation with the West should not only be based on strengthening ties between the Moldovan and NATO member militaries but also strengthening economic cooperation between members and partners, such as increasing investments in partner countries.
Investments
Since the end of the Cold War, “As a result of Russian-imposed import restrictions on Moldovan goods, exports [of Moldovan goods] have shifted away from markets in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in favour of European markets.”[x] In order to expand the Moldovan partnership with the West, the European Union should capitalize on this advantage and support Moldova financially. Likewise, Moldova should strive to attract more (European) investments.
Large European investments would prove that the European Union is a more reliable partner to Moldova than Russia. According to the National Strategy for Investment Attraction and Export Promotion, there are “seven [identifiable] priority sectors for investment and export promotion: agriculture and food, automotive, business services such as business process outsourcing (BPO), clothing and footwear, electronics, information and communication technologies (ICT), and machinery.”[xi] In 2022, Russia imposed sanctions on Moldovan fruits. While Russia claimed that this was due to the fruits’ poor quality, Moldova claims that it was sanctioned because of Moldova’s shift to the West. In such cases of economic coercion, improved economic ties between the West and Moldova would help to mitigate the economic effects of such a situation.
Additionally, the European Union should strive to invest in modernizing Moldovan infrastructure to improve the mobility of Moldovan military logistics in case of a full-scale war. This would align with NATO’s ideas on civil preparedness, as NATO views that “Military forces, especially those deployed during crises and conflict, heavily depend on the civilian and commercial sectors for transport, communications, energy, and even basic supplies such as food and water, to fulfil their missions.”[xii]
First, however, in order to attract European investments, Moldova should tackle corruption and also strengthen the rule of law. In addition to the financial character of European investments in Moldova, Moldova should adopt a certain geopolitical character to facilitate cooperation with its partner.
The rule of law
The stronger the rule of law is, the more investments in Moldova will take place. Foreign direct investment in Moldova remains low as “the economic and political environment is not particularly attractive to investors.”[xiii] On one side, certain security threats disable further, and hence bigger, investments; on the other side, there is a huge amount of corruption in Moldova. In response to these challenges, Moldova must continue “to fight corruption, improve the investment climate, remove obstacles for exporters, convert remittances into productive investments, and develop a reliable financial sector.”[xiv] Fighting against corruption and strengthening the rule of law requires both Moldovan and European efforts.
The Moldovan government should aim at creating a culture that promotes the rule of law and transatlantic values. That means Moldova should educate both children and public officials on its significance. Putting it simply, it should mimic the rule of law culture in the European Union. The rule of law, alongside other EU values, can only exist through a strong, supportive culture.[xv] The European Union should insist on monitoring the Moldovan implementation of the rule of law and condition future investments based on the level of its implementation. The implementation of the rule of law is likely to attract further financial investments and create a safer business climate for investors.
Political and economic integration through membership
If Moldova ever becomes a member of both NATO and the European Union, transatlantic values will spread further into the post-Soviet space. Alongside the European Union’s promotion and monitoring of the implementation of the rule of law, being a member of the European Union and NATO will fully enrich Moldovan society with transatlantic values. Values such as individual liberties, democracy, the free market, and, of course, the rule of law would be rooted in Moldovan schools, faculties, political institutions, etc. Eventually, Moldova would become a less corrupt and more reliable country.
Moldova would also have greater access to European goods and services through integration into the European single market.[xvi] Moldova would also attract more FDI in order to boost its economy, not only through being a member of both the European Union but also through having access to more resources to help tackle corruption more efficiently. Among the benefits that come with being integrated into the EU’s single market, Moldovan consumers will be protected from any unfair treatment. Furthermore, the European single market strongly demands high-quality standards in terms of food, improving the health of its citizens. Trading on the European single market will surely boost the growth and development of the Moldovan economy and society, making it more open and safer for business owners, investors, and consumers.
Conclusion
In the era of armed threats to the post-Soviet space, both NATO and the European Union face certain risks. First, Russia is determined to challenge transatlantic values such as individual liberties, democracy, the free market, and the rule of law. Second, Russia is willing to attack post-Soviet countries that are somehow affiliated with NATO and the European Union. In order to prevent future Russian attacks and to defend transatlantic values, NATO and the European Union have to make their partnerships even stronger.
In the case of Moldova, Transnistria has faced a decades-long Russian military presence. Russia has also shown its willingness to attack Moldova in case Moldova becomes a member of both NATO and the European Union, either through its own volition or by uniting with Romania. NATO and the European Union should strengthen their partnership with Moldova through broadening their cooperation in the fields of civil servant education, policy making, military education, among others. Furthermore, Moldova should tackle corruption through strengthening the rule of law and through increasing its defence budget.
If Moldova ever becomes both a member of the European Union and NATO, it will surely see certain political, economic, and military benefits. More specifically, Moldova will have stronger transatlantic values, Moldovan economic growth and development will be boosted, and higher military interoperability between NATO members will be achieved.
No matter the Russian efforts to destabilize NATO and the European Union, a new crisis always manages to strengthen and enlarge them. Crises are always challenging—they test public officials’ problem-solving and policy-making capacities. In this case, an EU-NATO-Moldovan partnership in security policy making is crucial in order to maintain stability and peace in Europe. It is high time to strengthen the partnership with Moldova and show NATO’s willingness to support partners at risk.
About the Author
Željko Marjanović is a political scientist and a member of YATA Croatia. He graduated from the Faculty of Political Science of Zagreb University, focusing on international relations.
Notes
[i] Daria Blinova, “Russia’s Challenge to Liberal Peacekeeping,” E-Inernational Relations, January 23, 2023, https://www.e-ir.info/2023/01/23/russias-challenge-to-liberal-peacekeeping/.
[ii] Tsira Shvangiradze, “Vladimir Putin’s Russia: Trying to Rebuild the Soviet Era?” The Collector, April 28, 2022, https://www.thecollector.com/vladimir-putin-russia-rebuilding-the-soviet-era/.
[iii] Matthew Crandall, “Hierarchy in Moldova-Russia Relations: the Transnistrian Effect,” Studies of Transition States and Societies 4, no. 1 (2012), 3–15, https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-363773.
[iv] Wilder Alejandro Sanchez, “Opinion - Moldova and Romania’s Unification is Not on the Horizon,” E-International Relations, February 12, 2023, https://www.e-ir.info/2023/02/12/opinion-moldova-and-romanias-unification-is-not-on-the-horizon/.
[v] Laura Pennisi, “How Eurasianism is Manipulated to Justify the War in Ukraine,” Quo Vademus, June 17, 2022, https://quo-vademus.org/how-eurasianism-is-manipulated-to-justify-the-war-in-ukraine/.
[vi] Daria Blinova, “Russia’s Challenge to Liberal Peacekeeping,“ E-Inernational Relations, January 23, 2023, https://www.e-ir.info/2023/01/23/russias-challenge-to-liberal-peacekeeping/.
[vii] “Relations with the Republic of Moldova,” NATO-Topic: Relations with the Republic of Moldova, accessed April 4, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49727.htm.
[viii] “NATO and the Republic of Moldova launch Professional Development Programme for civil servants,” NATO, accessed April 5, 2023, nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_212470.htm.
[ix] Madalin Necsutu, “As Moldova Hikes Defence Spending, Rebel Region Follows Suit,” Balkan Insight, February 13, 2023, https://balkaninsight.com/2023/02/13/as-moldova-hikes-defence-spending-rebel-region-follows-suit/.
[x] “Moldova - Country Commercial Guide,” International Trade Administration, accessed April 4, 2023, https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/moldova-market-overview.
[xi] “Foreign direct investment (FDI) in Moldova,” Foreign direct investment (FDI) in Moldova - International Trade Portal, accessed April 4, 2023, https://www.lloydsbanktrade.com/en/market-potential/moldova/investment.
[xii] “Resilience, civil preparedness and Article 3,” NATO, accessed May 26, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132722.htm.
[xiii] “Foreign direct investment (FDI) in Moldova.”
[xiv] Ibid.
[xv] “COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Strengthening the rule of law within the Union A blueprint for action,” EUR-Lex, accessed, April 4, 2023, eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52019DC0343&from=EN.
[xvi] Key European Union achievements and tangible benefits,” European Union, accessed April 5, 2023, https://european-union.europa.eu/priorities-and-actions/achievements_en.
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