Finland and Sweden in NATO: Turning point or historical routine?

By Igor Vokhmintsev

Sweden and Finland: 1809–1944

The Russo-Swedish War of 1808–1809 was the last war between Russia and Sweden. The beginning of the war was difficult for Russia as Finnish peasants organised a militia and took up arms against Russia. At the end of the war, Finland became part of the Russian Empire as a separate principality, preserving its local self-government, constitution, and laws. After the war the empire’s capital, Saint Petersburg, was far from any rival state and close to the Finnish people, who had developed an independent character. Russia tried to make them happy to keep the capital safe, which calmed tensions between Finland and Russia. The principality took a privileged position among the rest of the regions of the empire.[i] That’s why Lenin, who wanted to make a revolution and topple the tsar, hid from law enforcement in Finland: de facto remaining in the empire, and therefore remaining close to political life, de jure a person was outside of the jurisdiction of Russian law enforcement. However, while Finland was a duchy of Russia, the period from 1898 to 1904 is called the “years of oppression” because of the harsh politics of Nikolay Bobrikov, who Tsar Nicolas II appointed as Governor-General of Finland.

In 1917, under the Russian Provisional Government following the tsar’s abdication, Finland’s privileges were restored almost completely. Only the Russian Empire did not have much time left to exist. On December 28, 1917, Finland became independent. In 1918, the Finnish pro-imperial elite triumphed over the Finnish pro-revolutionary elite, exactly the opposite of what was happening in the rest of Russia. Finland did not become part of the USSR, and in 1920, the Treaty of Tartu was signed, which formally made Finland an independent state.[ii] In 1932, the USSR and Finland signed a non-aggression pact.[iii] The USSR signed similar agreements with border countries, trying to protect itself and push possible fronts as far as possible. With the start of World War II, the USSR attempted to persuade Finland to exchange one territory for another. Finland refused, and the Soviet-Finnish war, or the Winter War, of 1939–1940 began. The USSR won the war only after enduring great difficulties, as in 1809. In 1940, the Moscow Treaty was concluded, according to which part of the country’s territory went to the USSR.[iv] While Great Britain and France helped Finland in the Winter War by providing them weapons as well as protesting the invasion in the League of Nations, they could neither stop the aggression nor help return the territory to the country. Though Nazi Germany was bound by a non-aggression treaty with the USSR, it tested the waters and helped Finland. The Finnish representative was told in advance that Germany would attack the USSR. And so it happened, but before Finland was under Nazi occupation; Germany attacked the USSR in 1941. Following this, Finland tried to win back its land from the USSR and radically expand its territory with the help of Germany but was defeated along with Berlin. It paid all reparations and accepted all Soviet conditions that were agreed with Great Britain and the United States. The USSR preserved the independence of the country.

After the Russo-Swedish War, Sweden and Russia were not at enmity. Sweden has adopted a policy of neutrality since the end of the Napoleonic Wars. During World War I, Sweden pursued a policy of military neutrality, rather choosing to defend its trade interests instead. It traded with both the Entente and the Triple Alliance.[v] In 1924, Sweden recognised the USSR and concluded a trade treaty. During the Second World War, Sweden behaved in the same way as during the First World War. It allowed the Wehrmacht to transport weapons and soldiers across its territory. In 1944, Sweden exported iron ore to Germany, which was manufactured into Nazi weapons. Less well-known, but no less important, Sweden developed trade relations with the USSR. Being a neutral country, in 1942, it entered into a barter agreement with the USSR and exchanged steel for Soviet platinum.[vi]

To sum up, it is important to emphasise that the countries of Europe did not recognise Finland’s independence until Finland received this right from Soviet Russia. First, Finland, being part of Sweden, became a bargaining ground for the great powers during the Napoleonic Wars. Later, in the lead-up to World War II, the USSR bit off part of the country’s territory. In alliance with Germany, Finland attempted revenge, then lost, and the United States and Great Britain unconditionally supported the USSR. Following the war, the United States conducted a study whereby they openly substantiated the idea that if the USSR wanted to, then there would be no trace of Finnish independence.[vii] Finland came out of the war with an understanding of this and with the determination to build constructive relations with the USSR. By 1949, Finland had realised how many times it had been a bargaining chip in the games of the big countries.

Sweden approached 1949 with a different experience. Firstly, the country had been neutral since the beginning of the 19th century. This policy helped it survive the First World War and even helped Sweden to profit in the Second World War. The territorial integrity of Sweden was not affected. The USSR, Great Britain, and France wanted it as a financial partner. Secondly, Sweden did not border on the USSR as Norway and Finland did and therefore did not pose as a threat. Based on these factors, we can see the different strategic positions of the two countries, which persist to this day.

Sweden and Finland: 1945–1949

In February 1947, as part of the Paris Peace Conference, Finland signed a series of peace treaties. In March 1947, France and Great Britain signed the Treaty of Dunkirk. The UK, in an effort to expand the treaty, then began a grandiose discussion between the Benelux countries, France, the UK, and the United States on how this treaty could be implemented more profoundly. The UK from the beginning wanted to tie the United States to Europe security. Washington agreed but needed a guarantee about the ability of Europe for self-help. The UK, France, and the Benelux countries signed the Brussels Treaty, which paved the road towards the Washington Treaty[viii] In January 1948, the first Berlin Crisis occurred. In February 1948, a pro-communist coup took place in Czechoslovakia. In Italy, the communists were gaining strength and were preparing to take power after the April elections. Hungary and Romania signed treaties of friendship and mutual assistance with the USSR. Finland saw that Western countries could not agree among themselves and could not to take a risk. Sweden chose neutrality; Norway was weaker than Finland. Thus, Finland made the only right decision and agreed to sign a treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance with the USSR in 1948.[ix] Formally, the treaty was directed against Germany or any other state allied with it. This means that since 1955, NATO has been included in the treaty area. The USSR pushed NATO away from the Finnish-Soviet border.

Remembering its World War II experience, Sweden wanted to remain neutral. Sweden went even further and proposed the idea of a third, neutral bloc of Scandinavian countries between West and East. In 1948, there were still discussions about the participation and form of such participation for Norway and Denmark in NATO.[x] Sweden pursued the third bloc model. In the fall of 1948, the Scandinavian countries discussed their own security system, including assistance from the United States though not connected with the countries of the Brussels Pact. Sweden would receive all assistance from the United States as part of the collective security system but would not owe anything to the United States and maintain its neutrality.[xi] Ironically, this form was somewhat reminiscent of the form of the entry of the Principality of Finland into the Russian Empire. Sweden actively defended its position only because Norway and Denmark initially shared its vision. Norway, which bordered the USSR, was afraid it would become its first victim, and therefore, it liked the Swedish project as it removed all Soviet suspicions. Moreover, Norway had a sad experience during the Second World War as a country under Nazi occupation. It envied Sweden’s neutrality, and initially, the idea of a neutral regional bloc was warmly welcomed in Norway.

Finally, the region became divided. Finland sided with the USSR, Sweden was neutral, and Norway and Denmark became founding members of NATO. The latter understood that despite regional unification, without the United States, they could not defend themselves. When the United States firmly rejected Scandinavian neutrality in January 1949, Norway and Denmark abandoned the idea of ​​a regional security system. The United States did not see any advantages from this system, because Sweden wanted security but would not give anything in exchange due to its position of neutrality. Sweden’s path was pursued independently and supported by its past experiences, as well as its finances. Sweden itself also abandoned its regional plans. Sweden had already entered into a loan agreement with the USSR at that time, which will be discussed below.

In 1948–1949, Finland did not have the slightest chance of entering the Brussels Pact or NATO for several reasons. Geographically, Finland was separated from the countries of the Brussels Pact. Politically, Western approaches to collective security at the time of Stalin’s offer, which Helsinki could not refuse, were loose at best. While they were far away, the USSR was close. After the signing of the treaty with the USSR, there was no question of any participation in NATO for Finland. But even so, history has shown Finland made the right choice. The entry of Norway into NATO was not clear even in January 1949. Finland could not wait so long and expose itself to the danger of arousing the suspicions of the USSR. 

On the contrary, as always in history, Sweden played its own game. It did not border the USSR, but it could hardly be sure that the territory of Finland was a reliable defence against the Red Army. It relied on neutrality and the USSR’s desire to trade. But even so, it did not miss the opportunity to try to get help from the United States. Again, we see different approaches and outcomes in Finland and Sweden to resolve security issues.

Sweden and Finland: 1949–1991

With the signing of the treaty with Moscow, the process of “Finlandization” began. It is important to note that the special position of Finland concerned not only security but also the economy. Western countries created the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) to control exports to the USSR. Though Finland had links with this organisation, it was not a member. Thus, Finland became the showcase of the USSR in the West. Relations were so close that in 1960 the USSR proposed a bilateral free trade union with Finland following the example of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) or the European Economic Community (EEC), but the idea did not go beyond these plans.[xii] If such a plan had passed, then Finland would become a transit zone between the EFTA and the EEC, on the one hand, and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), on the other. In this way, Finland adopted a middle path as earlier proposed by Sweden. But even without this, “Finlandization” was successful by several measures. In the West, this term has a negative connotation because it supposedly means the subordination of Finland to the USSR with nominal independence. Firstly, it is important to ask what choice Finland had in 1948. Secondly, despite this process, Finland has defended its independence until today. Thirdly, such a situation allowed Finland to benefit from trade with the USSR and more staunchly defend its positions in negotiations with the Western bloc. It is easy for notional Belgium to speak disparagingly of “Finlandization”, but how would Brussels act if it was in the same geographical and political circumstances? In international politics, decisions are made not based on desires but opportunities.

Similarly, Sweden’s neutrality before and during the Cold War helped to save not only its territorial integrity but also its financial position. Sweden was an industrialised country that needed to export goods and import raw materials. Ideally, it needed access to large markets with capacious economies. The United States was a manufacturer, the Western European market was small, and therefore, Washington was a competitor. There was no hope for the former partner, Germany, in view of the limitations of the Allies. Germany was under the control of its treaty with the USSR, United States, UK, and France, without the ability to produce weapons or industrial mechanisms, and was paying reparations. The choice fell on the USSR, which after the war would have to restore vast territories. Moreover, access to Moscow gave access to Eastern Europe. Back in the spring of 1944, Sweden offered the USSR a loan, but at that time, the USSR refused as Moscow considered it unprofitable.[xiii] In 1946, Sweden proposed a loan again. Sweden proposed a tied loan for the purchase of goods by the USSR in Sweden with an interest rate of 2.3% per annum. The USSR finished paying interest and started paying off the debt itself only in 1960.[xiv] It was also important that the USSR hoped to prevent Scandinavia from being drawn into the Anglo-American bloc. In 1949, Sweden joined the Council of Europe but did not join the Western security bloc. Similarly, the 1948 treaty with USSR did not allow Finland to join WEU because of the military-security basis of the WEU.  Until the end of the Cold War, Sweden continued to actively do what it always does: be neutral and prioritise its interests.

In 1975, both states joined the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). In 1991, Sweden recognised the Russian Federation as an independent state. In 1992, the 1948 treaty between the USSR and Finland was replaced by a treaty between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Finland on the fundamentals of relations.[xv] In 1994, Sweden, Finland, and Russia joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP). In the years following, Sweden and Finland contributed to NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) and its later missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. In 2009, the five Scandinavian countries (Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Sweden, and Finland) formed the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFKO). While NORDEFKO is not a collective security organisation, it is a forum for enhanced security cooperation between countries. Thus, Sweden’s idea for regional cooperation in 1948 partially materialised. In 2014, NATO launched the Partnership Interoperability Initiative (PII) and the Enhanced Opportunities Partners (EOP) program, including Sweden and Finland—the latter being the densest, most privileged partnership with NATO.

Sweden, Finland and NATO in 2023

Sweden and Finland are NATO’s closest partners. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the partners decided to join the Alliance in order to protect themselves from an attack from Russia. While at the time of writing Turkey and Hungary continue to hold up Sweden’s entry, Ankara and Budapest have ratified the entry of Finland exclusively, and Finland is set to join the alliance on 4 April. Sweden and Finland are considered as a one entity within NATO by many experts in foreign relations. Both states have deep coordinating mechanisms (NORDEFCO). But, history always has own plans.

Many experts argue that because these countries applied together and are interdependent on each other in matters of defence, they should become members simultaneously. Finland is allegedly a shield for Sweden from Russia. But, as our previous analysis shows, there is no real military-political connection between these countries and never was aside from shared cultural norms and neighbourhoods. Of the two, only Finland borders Russia, and this is important in itself. Moreover, these countries professed different foreign policy doctrines for most of their history, namely from 1809 to 1991. Sweden adhered to neutrality, and Finland’s policy was to manoeuvre and survive. Given the historical heritage of these two countries, Sweden has not always seen Finland as a shield. Sweden lived next to Russia when Finland was part of the Russian Empire. When the USSR attacked Finland and when Germany occupied it, Sweden remained neutral. Only in 1975 did both countries formally begin to coexist within the CSCE. Only since 1986, when Finland joined the EFTA, have the countries begun to formally be part of one economic union. And only in 2009 did they join a common military organisation. They have developed bilateral cultural, social, and political ties, but security issues have been resolved in discord for most of history. Even today, while Sweden and Finland are in the EU, the former never joined the euro area. Therefore, all the talk that Finland and Sweden are entering together does not stand up to scrutiny.

The conflict between Sweden and Turkey has yet to be resolved. Many members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is considered a terrorist organisation in Turkey as well as many NATO member states, live in Sweden. Turkey claims that Sweden has not followed the agreement regarding several extradition cases to Turkey and, therefore, refuses to ratify Sweden’s membership. The conflict between Turkey and Sweden regarding the PKK has its own long history. While Sweden’s accession to NATO did not incite this conflict, it is the latest event in the conflict. Frankly speaking, it is even to some extent advantageous for Sweden not to join NATO. Finland will join and thereby circle Sweden within NATO, similar to the geographical position of Austria. For an external enemy to attack Sweden, it must fly or pass through Finland or Norway or attack from the Baltic Sea or the Skagerrak Strait, which is unrealistic. Thus, the dream of Sweden from 1948 will come true: namely, to be under the protection of the United States but not to be indebted to the United States. If Finland is in NATO, from a military point of view, this is already enough to protect Sweden. Additionally, Sweden, without having to further compromise with Ankara, can uphold its own principles and leave its state brand as a country for political asylum and freedom of speech untouched. 

Frankly, for Russia, close relations between Finland and Sweden and NATO is not something new. Finland and Sweden have had the strongest links with NATO among its partners since 1994. Their armies operate under various Standardization Agreements (STANAGs). For Russia, Finland’s membership in NATO is not a challenge as its military infrastructure is already extremely close to NATO even without formal participation in the Alliance. The logic of the Russian Empire/USSR/Russia is clear: to keep foreign threats as distant as possible. This is in line with the psychological and historical character of Russia’s response to feelings of insecurity.[xvi] The future will show in which form and with which amendments Sweden will join NATO or not following Finland’s membership.  

About the Author

Igor Vokhmintsev is interested in Euro-Atlantic security challenges, the EU-Russia and NATO-Russia relationships, and the history of Europe. He has published two other articles in Atlantica, “NATO, Russia and PfP” and “Article 5: From the Cold War to 9/11 to Today”.

Notes

[i] “Main Outlines of Finnish History,” this is FINLAND, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, https://finland.fi/life-society/main-outlines-of-finnish-history/. 

[ii] “League of Nations Treaty Series,” WorldLII, accessed February 26, 2023, http://www.worldlii.org/int/other/LNTSer/1921/13.html.

[iii] “Treaty of non-aggression between the Soviet Union and Finland 21 January 1932,” Histordoc.net, accessed February 26, 2023, https://histdoc.net/history/nonagen1.html. 

[iv] “Main Outlines of Finnish History,” this is FINLAND.

[v] Siney Marion, “Swedish Neutrality and the Economic Warfare in World War I,” CONTENTDM, accessed February 26, 2023, https://dmr.bsu.edu/digital/collection/ConspectusH/id/396. 

[vi] Mikhail Lipkin, The Soviet Union and Integration Processes in Europe: mid-1940s–late 1960s, Cold War Book Series (Moscow: Russian Foundation for Education and Science, 2016), https://igh.ru/news/mikhail-lipkin-the-soviet-union-and-integration-processes-in-europe-mid-1940-s-late-1960-s?locale=en. 

[vii] USA Library of Congress, Country Studies series, https://countrystudies.us/finland/22.htm.   

[viii] Igor Vokhmintsev, “Article 5: From The Cold War to 9/11 to Today,” Atlantic Forum, March 13, 2022, https://www.atlantic-forum.com/atlantica/article-5-from-the-cold-war-to-911-to-today.

[ix] “Finland - The Cold War and the Treaty of 1948,” U.S. Library of Congress, accessed February 26, 2023, https://countrystudies.us/finland/24.htm. 

[x] Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO 1948: The Birth of the Transatlantic Alliance (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007).

[xi] Ibid.

[xii] Mikhail Lipkin, The Soviet Union and Integration.

[xiii] Ibid.

[xiv] Ibid.

[xv] Bengt Broms, “The Agreement on the Foundations of Relations Between the Republic of Finland and the Russian Federation,” The Finnish Yearbook of International Law (1992): 15–631.

[xvi] NSA Archives, The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, February 22, 1946, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm.