The Horizontal Risks of the Russia-Ukraine War
By Shary Mitdieri. Originally published on 12 August 2024 by Opinio Juris on its website.
Scale Up, Spill Over, Build Up, Waste Away
Introduction
Upon the Russian invasion of Ukraine, on February 24, 2022, it became clear to virtually all observers that the rules of the security game in Europe had irrevocably changed. However, the unexpected prolongation of the conflict, due to staunch Ukrainian resistance and copious support from NATO and EU members, has gradually revealed a previously hidden feature of the Russia-Ukraine war: the potential for its creeping into other regions and scenarios.
As of now, the war between Moscow and Kyiv has had reverberations in Central Asia, Sahel and, potentially, Latin America – effectively marking the welding of a conflict for the restructuring of the security architecture in Eurasia with the overarching competition for global hegemony among the great powers of the XXI century.
Starting from this assumption, the first paragraph of the present analysis will describe some practical instances in which we can see this scaling-up process at play. Parts two and three will investigate the material and immaterial challenges and threats that the enlargement of the conflict might bring about. Finally, a fourth paragraph will address possible future scenarios, taking into account comparable precedents and the available literature on post-conflict and stabilization.
Scale Up: How the Russia-Ukraine war is destabilizing other regions
Since its inception, the Russian “special operation” in Ukraine was bound to have far-reaching consequences. In its first six months, it caused a substantial surge in food and energy prices and disruptions of the global supply chains.[1] By the one-year mark, it reshuffled political alignments and security partnerships, boosting NATO’s role and pushing Moscow closer to Beijing in an uneasy and asymmetrical, yet “no limits” relationship.[2] Now, well into the third year of fighting and without any sign of dwindling resolution on either side,[3] the conflict between Russia and Ukraine has been creeping into other areas, melding with several regional crises. Arguably, this is not a simple case of spillover – usually regarding contiguous or otherwise nearby countries – but a full-blown scaling up of the conflict, whose nature is transforming from regional to global. While the ramifications of this process will be broken down in the following paragraphs, it may be useful to illustrate the issue with some practical examples.
The War in Ukraine and Terrorism in Central Asia
On March 22, 2024, armed men burst into the Crocus City Hall concert venue near Moscow, killing more than 140 people and wounding over 180.[4] The four attackers were identified as citizens of Tajikistan,[5] a former Soviet Socialist Republic. Whereas prominent media outlets such as The New York Times indicated Islamic State affiliate ISIS-K as the instigator of the attack,[6] the Kremlin was quick to place responsibility on Ukraine.[7]
In this crossfire of accusations, one thing is clear: the war in Ukraine is progressively merging with the long-standing issue of terrorism in the Caucasus and Central Asia. More specifically, ISIS-K is dead-set on striking against Russia (and China) due to their support to the rival Taliban government of Afghanistan.[8] To do so, it can count on local recruits as well as on the grievances of the Muslim population of former Soviet Republics. Furthermore, although the actual Ukrainian involvement in the Crocus City Hall attack was not proven,[9] Kyiv could leverage this antagonism to challenge Moscow in Central Asia – thereby increasing the risk of new terrorist attacks.
Clashes between Ukraine and the Wagner group in the Sahel
On July 27, 2024, Mali’s northern Tuareg rebels – organized in the Permanent Strategic Framework for Peace, Security and Development (CSP-PSD) – announced they had killed dozens between Wagner mercenaries and Mali regular troops and seized several of their armored vehicles, trucks, and tankers.[10] On the same day, an al-Qaeda affiliate said it killed 50 Russian Wagner mercenaries and 10 Malian soldiers in an ambush.[11] For Wagner, this was the major defeat since entering the conflict two years ago to prop up the Malian government. Two days later Andriy Yusov, the spokesperson for Ukraine’s military intelligence agency (GUR), declared that the rebels had received «all the information they needed, which allowed [them] to carry out their operation against the Russian war criminals»,[12] prompting Bamako to cut off diplomatic ties with Kyiv. Once again, even though Ukraine’s material implication in the ambushes is a matter of speculation, it should be clear that Wagner’s defeat indirectly benefited its cause but also empowered extremists.
Venezuela: A potential new hotbed for crises?
After the Venezuelan presidential elections on July 28, 2024, the National Electoral Council (CNE) declared Nicolás Maduro as the winner despite claims of fraud and widespread protests. Both the European Union and the US Department of State have challenged the electoral results, with the latter going as far as to congratulate Maduro’s opponent Edmundo González Urrutia on his successful campaign.[13] In the post-election chaos, members of the Wagner group have allegedly been spotted alongside Venezuelan police officers during demonstrations in Caracas;[14] a circumstance which has sparked the concern of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.[15] Should this news be confirmed, it is only legitimate to wonder when will the Ukrainian secret services make their appearance too. For Russia, meddling in the internal affairs of Latin American countries means being able to threaten and influence US politics from up close. Conversely, having Ukraine more or less covertly challenge Moscow or its acolytes could free much-needed resources and political capital for the US to spend on the Pacific chessboard.
Spill Over: The material risks of conflict enlargement
By definition, in military terms ‘spillover’ refers to “a conflict that starts in one place but then begins to spread or have an effect somewhere else.”[16] Once having established that this is exactly what is happening in the Russia-Ukraine war, it becomes necessary to assess the risks and challenges of an expansion of the conflict’s operational area. Speaking of material assistance, the US has provided approximately $55.3 billion in military aid since Russia commenced its invasion of Ukraine,[17] while the EU has made available close to $117 billion in financial, military, humanitarian, and refugee assistance.
In view of this massive inflow of military supplies, the first question that comes to mind regards the destiny and potential (mis)uses of leftover weapons during and after the conflict. To be sure, any peacebuilding and/or reconstruction plan that the international community might put in place will most certainly entail a program of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR). Yet, even as the conflict is still waging, the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime raised concerns about the potential spread of Western-supplied weapons at the hands of international criminal networks. According to Vadym Dzyubynskyi, head of criminal investigation at the Ukrainian National Police, the number of weapons currently lost or stolen amounts to 593,000 units.[18]
It goes without saying that the consequences of improper monitoring of weapons supplied to Ukraine could be dire, and include the following risks:
The guns remain in Ukraine but are improperly used by irregular formations to achieve their own ends, thereby generating political fragmentation;
The weapons are smuggled out of Ukraine and into Europe, empowering criminal and terrorist networks;
Western military equipment is sold to armed groups or militias in other regions, providing potential adversaries with the means to challenge the interests of NATO allies and EU members;
Certain categories of weapons, such as drones, could enter scenarios in which they were previously absent, changing the rules of warfighting and thus creating uncertainty.
Build Up: Training and intelligence, but for whom?
After discussing the practical risks of the spreading of the Ukraine war, this paragraph will consider more closely the intangible consequences of the conflict’s expansion, more specifically, the risk that training and intelligence practices provided by Kyiv’s Western allies to build up its defense might be improperly used or be shared with unreliable partners.
Since the first few months of the conflict, the US and other NATO allies have been training Ukrainian troops. Despite some – not wholly unjustified – claims that the Alliance is providing Ukraine with the ‘wrong’ training,[19] Western support was necessary to match Kyiv’s newly acquired capabilities with the competence to use them proficiently.[20] Additionally, Washington has gone “particularly far in bilateral intelligence sharing,”[21] significantly helping in surveillance, targeting, and the defense of critical assets. However, training and intelligence-sharing are not without cons.
First of all, Ukrainian troops and volunteer foreign fighters undergo the same training. Although the inflow of volunteers from other countries speaks volumes about the ideological grip of the Ukrainian cause, it also presents certain risks. As allegedly the ranks of the foreign legion are filled with known criminals engaging in fraud, abuse of power, and stolen valor,[22] Ukraine’s Western partners should be wary of sharing sensitive or classified information or suggesting best practices that could be then ‘exported’ to the fighters’ origin countries.
Secondly, as mentioned above, the Ukrainian military and intelligence services might be involved in training, equipping, and/or informing sympathetic armed groups in other regions. Some of these actors can be considered less than reliable. While they might indeed help out Kyiv by dividing Moscow’s resources and strategic focus, the risk is that of fostering destabilization further down the line.
Finally, Ukraine might end up establishing ties with disruptive state and non-state actors in these far-away regions. In turn, they might expect to exercise a certain influence on post-conflict Ukrainian politics – something that surely would not sit well with Kyiv’s Western donors.
Waste Away: Future Scenarios
The concept of “wasting away” refers to the tangible possibility that material and informational resources provided to Ukraine in support of its quest for independence might be squandered, misspent, or misused, with increased instability coming as a by-product of careless management. Following are some likely developments for the issues presented in this article:
Feeding into international weapons trafficking
As foreshadowed above, one of the most likely consequences of the enlargement of the conflict regards the spread of Western-supplied weapons and equipment through international criminal networks. More generally, a vast shadow market may be established, favoring the trafficking of illegal goods and undermining human security.
A comparable precedent is that of the Yugoslav wars, where the reliance on voluntary paramilitary and irregular units hindered DDR and led to the ‘disappearance’ of some 3 million light and military-grade weapons.[23] Additionally, during the post-conflict, wartime smugglers organized in so-called “peace cartels,”[24] effectively forming a predatory oligarchy capable of intercepting international aid and channeling it into political power.
Diffusion of NATO-specific information and operational planning practices
From the first day of the Ukraine war, NATO has condemned the Russian invasion and provided financial, military, and humanitarian support to Kyiv. Even more importantly, the Alliance made an existential bet on Ukraine, as demonstrated by the 2024 Washington Summit Declaration, committing to “long-term support (…) so it can prevail in its fight for freedom”.[25] Even though defending Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity might be functional to the Allies’ interests, the shortcomings of a loose approach to information security might outweigh the benefits. There are two main risks to the current NATO approach: first, intelligence-sharing with slack control over targeting inside Russia might trigger an escalation of the conflict;[26] second, information leaks to the benefit of questionable partners in various regions around the globe might create uncertainty for Kyiv as well as for its donors.
Granting citizenship to combatants: an open door for internal terrorism?
While the war in Ukraine is expanding outwards, foreign influences are also moving from the outside in. Since 2014, an influx of foreign volunteers bolstered the fight against pro-Russia separatists in Donbas. On 27 February 2022, the Ukrainian government created the Ukrainian Foreign Legion, which as of now could be up to 20,000 strong. In January 2024, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced a decree that could grant Ukrainian citizenship to foreigners.[27] Although this might pass as an act of disinterested generosity, the international legion has been the subject of heated discussion as some of its members have been accused of misconduct and abuse.
Although paramilitary or irregular units have been involved in practically every case of identity-based mass violence – usually to pursue ambitions that violate international law while maintaining plausible deniability[28] – a fitting precedent is the 1992-1995 Bosnian conflict, where foreign Muslim volunteers formed the “Bosnian mujahideen”. The permanence of former combatants on Bosnian soil, many with citizenship rights, has had an impact both on the overall security and the socio-political layout of the population. On the one hand, about 30 of them were assessed to be hard-core members of terrorist groups.[29] On the other, the stream of foreign combatants has opened the door to the influence of Muslim countries, determining a hardening of the interpretation of Islamic precepts in the Balkans.
Ukraine and the West: partners of today, but what about tomorrow?
Not knowing the political and institutional layout and allegiances of post-conflict Ukraine, it is difficult to assess just how problematic the creeping of the conflict will be in the future. In the best-case scenario, a territorially intact and politically independent Ukraine establishes more or less formal security and defense relations with NATO and the EU. In this case, heavy Western involvement in post-conflict reconstruction and institutional building might stave off the most dire consequences of the conflict’s escalation.
Unfortunately, best-case scenarios are hardly ever achieved, either at the negotiating table or on the ground. The adversaries’ grievances and requests must equally be considered – especially when the opponent is the Russian Federation. That said, international donors should carefully consider what information, best practices, knowledge, and material equipment should be shared or donated, and to whom.
Conclusion
Starting from the premise that the Russian-Ukrainian war is gradually upscaling from a regional to a global conflict, the article described the areas and modalities in which this process is taking place before pointing out its material and immaterial risks and individuating some possible future developments.
While only a small number of examples of the creeping of the Ukrainian conflict could be provided with sufficient sources, it would be appropriate to reflect on the repercussions of a further multiplication of crisis hotspots. This is particularly important in light of Russia’s own attempts to gather international support by establishing military expertise-for-ammo relations with disruptive actors such as North Korea[30] or Iran.[31] While the quest for Ukraine’s freedom, independence, and integrity is certainly a noble cause, would it warrant compromising stability or even bolstering extremist groups in the Middle East, North Africa, Central Asia, Latin America, and so on? Further, could winning the war to the detriment of internal stability be truly deemed a victory? Can a sustainable peace be built on uncertainty and fragmentation? As observers, analysts, advisors, and counselors, these are the questions that we should be asking, keeping in mind that the outcome of a conflict is perhaps just as important as the way in which that outcome is attained.
References
[1] D. SIMCHI-LEVI, P. HAREN, «How the War in Ukraine Is Further Disrupting Global Supply Chains», Harvard Business Review, 17 March 2022, https://hbr.org/2022/03/how-the-war-in-ukraine-is-further-disrupting-global-supply-chains
[2] M. KACZMARSKI, «The war in Ukraine and the future of Russia-China relations», NATO Defence College, Policy Brief, No. 08, April 2022
[3] J. WATLING, N. REYNOLDS, «Russian Military Objectives and Capacity in Ukraine Through 2024», Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), Commentary, 13 February 2024, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russian-military-objectives-and-capacity-ukraine-through-2024
[4] G. FAULCONBRIDGE, F. LIGHT, L. PAPACHRISTOU, «Moscow concert hall attack: what we know about shooting in Russia», Reuters, 26 March 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/what-we-know-about-shooting-concert-venue-near-moscow-2024-03-22/
[5] The Insider, «Four men with signs of severe beating charged with terrorism by Moscow court in Crocus City Hall case», 25 March 2024, https://theins.ru/en/news/270227
[6] E. SCHMITT, «What We Know About ISIS-K, the Group That Has Been Linked to the Moscow Attack», The New York Times, 22 March 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/22/us/politics/isis-k-moscow-attack.html
[7] V. MELKOZEROVA; «Russia ups blame-shifting for terror attack to Ukraine, brags it’s boosting recruitment», Politico, 8 April 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-ups-efforts-to-shift-blame-for-crocus-terror-attack-to-ukraine-brags-its-boosting-recruitment-for-front/
[8] A. JACKSON, «What is ISIS-K, the terror group allegedly responsible for the Moscow concert hall attack?», Politico, 26 March 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/islamic-isis-khorasan-concert-hall-attack-russia-terrorist/
[9] SpecialEurasia, «Geopolitical Report», Volume 40, Issue 9, 22 March 2024
[10] Reuters, «Mali rebels say they killed and injured dozens of soldiers, Wagner mercenaries in fighting», 28 July 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/mali-rebels-say-they-killed-injured-dozens-soldiers-wagner-mercenaries-fighting-2024-07-27/
[11] Reuters, «Al Qaeda branch says it killed 50 Russian mercenaries, 10 Malian soldiers in Mali», 30 July 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/al-qaeda-branch-says-it-killed-50-russian-mercenaries-10-malian-soldiers-mali-2024-07-30/
[12] Al Jazeera, «Mali cuts diplomatic ties with Ukraine over Wagner attack controversy», 5 August 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/8/5/mali-breaks-off-diplomatic-ties-with-ukraine
[13] U.S. Department of State, Assessing the Results of Venezuela’s Presidential Election, Press Statement by Secretary of State Anthony J. Blinken, 1 August 2024
[14] BNE Intellinews, «Russian Wagner mercenaries spotted amid Venezuela election protests», 2 August 2024, https://www.intellinews.com/russian-wagner-mercenaries-spotted-amid-venezuela-election-protests-336763/
[15] K. TYSHCHENKO, «Zelenskyy: Wagner Group presence in Venezuela is evidence of Russia meddling in other countries’ affairs», Ukrainska Pravda, 3 August 2024, https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/08/3/7468820/
[16] Collins English Dictionary, «Spillover», https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/spillover#:~:text=a%20conflict%20that%20starts%20in,to%20avoid%20a%20possible%20spillover
[17] U.S. Department of State, «U.S. Security Cooperation with Ukraine», Fact Sheet, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 29 July 2024
[18] Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, «Smoke on the horizon: Trends in arms trafficking from the conflict in Ukraine», 18 June 2024, https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/trends-arms-trafficking-conflict-ukraine-russia-monitor/ [19] J. DETTMER, «Ukraine’s forces say NATO trained them for wrong fight», Politico, 22 September 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-war-army-nato-trained-them-wrong-fight/
[20] J. GARAMONE, «Training Key to Ukrainian Advantages in Defending Nation», U.S. Department of Defense, 6 September 2022
[21] E. MURAUSKAITE, «U.S. Assistance to Ukraine in the Information Space: Intelligence, Cyber, and Signaling», Western Tools Short of War: Impact Assessment of Selected Use Cases in Ukraine, February 2023
[22] J. SCHECK, T. GIBBONS-NEFF, «Stolen Valor: The U.S. Volunteers in Ukraine Who Lie, Waste and Bicker», The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/25/world/europe/volunteers-us-ukraine-lies.html
[23] T. LEGGETT, «Crime and its impact on the Balkans and affected countries», UNODC, March 2008, https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Balkan_study.pdf
[24] K. BASSUENER, «Peace Cartels: Internationally Brokered Power-sharing and Perpetual Oligarchy in Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia», University of St Andrews, 2021
[25] NATO, Washington Summit Declaration issued by the NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C., 10 July 2024
[26] J.M. ACTON, «The United States Should Not Further Loosen Its Prohibition on Ukraine’s Using U.S.-Supplied Weapons to Strike Russia», Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 6 June 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2024/06/ukraine-prohibition-us-weapons-strike-russia?lang=en
[27] VOA News, «Decree Could Give Ukrainian Citizenship to Foreign Fighters, Nation’s Diaspora», 22 January 2024, https://www.voanews.com/a/decree-could-give-ukrainian-citizenship-to-foreign-fighters-nation-s-diaspora-/7450717.html
[28] K. FERGUSON, Architectures of Violence: The Command Structures of Modern Mass Atrocities, Hurst Publishers, London, 2020
[29] C. PYES, J. MEYER, W. C. REMPEL, «Bosnia Seen as Hospitable Base and Sanctuary for Terrorists», LA Times, 8 October 2021
[30] S.M. TERRY, S. SESTANOVICH, «Russia Struck a Defense Pact With North Korea. What Does It Mean?», Council on Foreign Relations, 19 June 2024, https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/russia-struck-defense-pact-north-korea-what-does-it-mean
[31] P. HAFEZI, J. IRISH, T. BALMFORTH, J. LANDAY, «Exclusive: Iran sends Russia hundreds of ballistic missiles», Reuters, 21 February 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/iran-sends-russia-hundreds-ballistic-missiles-sources-say-2024-02-21/
