Françafrique - The Numbers Behind the Decline
By Onur Anamur. Originally published on 12 August 2024 by Transatlantic Policy Quarterly on its website.
The recent coups in Africa show a clear loss of French influence. Belying this is lack of France-Africa trade, which is characterized by little investment and centred on raw resources. Meanwhile Africa’s well-performing trade relationships with the outside world are characterized by investment and increasing trade in manufactured goods. France’s most significant bilateral commercial with the continent also demonstrates this correlation. In turn, one deduces that France’s underperformance must be due to the weakness of its consular and on-the-ground commercial efforts.
What was Françafrique?
Since its publication in 1997, François-Xavier Verschave’s seminal and damning account of the same name, the term Françafrique has had a largely negative connotation: a textbook example of neocolonialism for the sake of exploiting poor but resource-rich countries. But when the term was coined by Ivory Coast’s first president Houphouet-Boigny, it was a most positive one. Indeed, he could have hardly been boasting about being a puppet—and often enough, France was doing the bidding of African leaders. The term rather connotes a homeliness that characterized relations. Former Gabonese President Leon Mba expressed it all when his French counterpart, the General de Gaulle, welcomed him to Paris:
Tout Gabonais a deux patries. Le Gabon, et puis, la France. Monsieur le Président de la République, lorsque vous viendrez à Libreville vous vous sentirez chez-vous, comme moi je me sens ici chez-moi.[1]
Yet this homeliness translated to politics as a mixture of readiness, licentiousness, nonchalance, and normalcy in meddling in sovereign states. French efforts to contain Communism and, above all, secure stable oil supplies are infamous. But Françafrique worked both ways. In the 2000s, French President Chirac asked his Gabonese counterpart Bongo père to have a tête-à-tête with up-and-coming French politicians. Five of the seven Bongo recommended got into the French cabinet.[2] Bongo, after all, may have been the most experienced figure in French politics, having worked with Frenchmen at the highest level since de Gaulle. It is precisely the inherent duplicity of the term which makes it so wonderful: living in the same house, we are friends, if not more, but are liable to take liberties and one of us may be wearing trousers.
Termination
French Presidents Sarkozy, Hollande[3], and Macron have all proclaimed the end of Françafrique. But the tone is frustrated rather than celebratory. Macron, for instance, has complained that, despite Francafrique being over, France is accused of having intentions she bears.[4] In truth, the end of Françafrique seems to have brought divorce rather than reform, and the French even more stuck in old ways of thinking than Africans prone to casting all objections in the context of exploitation or colonialism. The press conference held in Kinshasa between Macron and the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s President, Felix Tshisekedi, sums up relations today well.[5]
Tshisekedi spoke first. He remarked his good relations with France and French support regarding a rebel attack in Goma. Yet most of his speech was about how he welcomed the interest of French firms in Africa, hitherto largely absent from the Congo, and hoped Macron’s visit was the start of a sustained French effort to insert France into the new world of multipolar African commerce.
Macron stressed very different things. Macron spoke lengthily about the conflict in the Congo: he said France was an indefatigable ally of the Congo; disapproved of the rebels; remarked France’s financial support to the Congo; thanked, alongside Tshekedi’s, the UN Secretary-General’s, and European Commissioner for Crisis Management’s efforts for a peaceful solution. Stressing the integrity of states, Macron thanked Tshisekedi for supporting the same principle regarding Ukraine at the UN. Macron declared that the Congo’s resources should be exploited in the Congolese interests and condemned pillaging. Macron’s bottom-line was “neither pillage, nor Balkanization, nor war.” He then quoted de Gaulle: “Le Congo ne peut être le Congo sans le grandeur” and spoke about how fantastic it was that Congo was a Francophone Nigeria: the most populous Francophone nation—and in a way the standard-bearer of the French language.
He said one sentence about how the French businesspeople he had brought along were thrilled to be there. Tshekedi spoke about the Congo. Macron spoke about the world. Macron spoke about norms. Tshisekedi spoke about trade.
“It’s the economy, stupid.”
Tshisekedi has a point. Françafrique seems to have been replaced by a wholesome disengagement. Africa now represents only 2 percent[6] of French foreign trade.
Contrasting France, which is performing poorly, with China, which is performing well.
France cannot compete in Africa. According to the French credit agency Coface, in the last 20 years, France’s total market share has declined from 10.6 percent to 4.4 percent, while Türkiye’s has risen from 1 to 3.2 percent; India’s 1.9 to 5.6 percent; and China’s 3.8 to 18.8 percent.[7] In France-Africa trade over the last twenty years, in absolute terms, exports have remained stable but imports fallen by half. In 2022, total French trade with Sub-Saharan Africa was $29.07 billion: 17.31 in imports and 11.76 in exports.[8]
Whereas, in 2020, the year of the pandemic, China’s Sub-Saharan African trade—not counting a few countries—totaled $146 273 000 000.[9] French trade with Sub-Saharan Africa except the same countries roughly equals $ 25,659,796,632.12; $ 16,341,833,765.11 in imports from Africa and $ 9,317,962,867.01 to Africa,[10] representing 17.54 percent of Chinese trade. Meanwhile for Africa as a whole, trade with France amounts to 10.31 percent of that with China.[11]
Chinese trade volume has been soaring. According to a Baker and Mackenzie blog, “Data from the Chinese Ministry further revealed that over the last 20 years, China’s trade with Africa has risen 20-fold.”[12] Sub-Saharan Africa’s trade with China as a percentage of its total trade increased from 4 percent in 2001 to 25.6 percent in 2020[13] meanwhile that with the EU declined from 30.3 to 22.3 percent; and the US, from 15.5 to 5.6.[14] China’s foot is still on the gas: in 2019 China-Africa totaled 192 billion. It went down to $176 billion in 2020 with COVID but now totals $282 billion: $164.49 in Chinese exports; and $117.51, imports.[15] Admittedly, there has been a post-pandemic spike in commodity prices—yet one hardly expects them to decrease.
Granted, the French are about 4.8 percent of the Chinese. Prima faciae, it makes sense that trade with the world’s second largest economy should be more than with its seventh largest. This may even inculcate a favorable impression: that France is doing reasonably well in the light of China’s rise, one of the great global stories of our time.[16] However, China lacks France’s advantages: proximity, a common language, or monetary integration through the Franc—this last is so great an advantage that it is often denounced as exploitative.
The Peg
The most significant problem for France-Africa trade is indubitably the vast difference in prices between the two markets. Thus, the peg, despite requiring African and European assent—and overall suitability of the climate to use—is a great advantage. Adjusting it, one can cheapen the Euro in much of West Africa, rendering French goods more competitive while increasing Africans’ purchasing power. This could even be done while keeping the Euro high globally. True, French imports of Gabonese and Equatoguinean petroleum crude may become more expensive, but these represent 5.76 percent[17] of French imports from the biggest regional supplier, Nigeria. Since Nigeria does not use the West African Franc, those prices would remain unaffected. Gabon and Equatorial Guinea’s marginal loss of competitiveness could be compensated by gains elsewhere or allayed by commitments their oil, rendered acceptable for France by virtue of greater French exports thereto. Whether a good idea or not, this nevertheless shows that France’s field of manœuvre is so vast that it casts doubt on any notion that the trade discrepancy is purely the inevitable consequence of population.
Yet it does not seem the peg has been used to further French commerce. The Franc’s detractors’ main accusation is that it renders labor too expensive[18], France prioritizing keeping the Euro up and its inflation down over nurturing African exports.
Yet the monthly minimum wage in a wealthy country for West Africa, Ivory Coast, is only €114.33 (75,000 XOF).. So, for this argument to even be at play, two things must be true: the value of African exports must be largely independent of the currency—as with globally priced commodities. Secondly, African economies must be so divorced from Europe or so impoverished that even the desire to buy expensive European goods is lacking.[19]
Alas, it seems both are true. The Franc’s defenders make no dispute about that but simply remark the potential instability of an African currency without France. Thus, one can be sure that France is not a smaller actor in Africa than China just because it is less populous but that France is small fish in Africa because it does not trade with Africa.
An Odd Pattern of Exchange
Moreover, were the size difference the only cause, Chinese imports from Sub-Saharan should have been more heavily concentrated on raw resources, while the French would import more in consumer goods. The former are necessities. Demand for them is relatively inelastic and thus much more strongly correlated with population. The inelasticity and thus predictability of demand for raw resources also conduces them to more central planning—a Communist Chinese specialty. This is especially true for hydrocarbons: whatever the price of electricity, a person is liable to use only so much domestically. National grids can and do act as distributors, getting energy in bulk abroad according to statistically calculated demand, in a way one cannot do so with, say, Barbie dolls.
Meanwhile the wealthier French—in 2021, yearly French per capita income was 43,658.98 USD versus China’s 12,556.33 USD—should have been buying whatever goods Sub-Saharan Africa manufactures, many of which would be marketed to them in good French—c’est la Francophonie. Also, French investment in Sub-Saharan Africa should also have been proportionally greater than Chinese investment, the disparity in the price of labor with France being greater than that with China. The monthly minimum wage in France is €1,747.2 and in China it is €345.46 (2,690.00 Yuan).
But this is the very opposite of what is going on. Africa’s trade with France is characterized by wholesale conformity to the old pattern: importing raw materials and exporting manufactured goods. The French treasury’s bilateral relations report on West Africa[20], the bulk of yesteryear’s Françafrique—now representing 44.78[21] percent of China’s booming trade with Sub-Saharan Africa except a few countries for which statistics were not available—is quite typical: consisting of foodstuffs, hydrocarbons, minerals and not much else.[22] For France, West Africa is a backwater’s backwater[23]. France’s most important partner there is oil-rich Nigeria[24], a former British colony. France’s trade with its own former colonies is now simply unimportant. Only Senegal and Ivory Coast seem to have meaningful links. Nor is West Africa France’s sole source for the abovementioned resources. It merely allows for diversification. There was concern about uranium from Niger. Niger supplied only 15 percent of France’s uranium.[25]
Exports to France seem to have a manufacturing character only if from North or South Africa:[26] Egyptian and Moroccan industries—and Tunisian consumer goods firms, although they seem to be only middlemen—export to France. South Africa exports an inordinate volume of automotive goods to France. It is these countries which count for the most trade. Importing raw materials and foodstuffs means dealing with only a few actors—agricultural wholesalers or governments. Trade in manufactures means business-to-business deals, foreign investment, contacts and creating jobs which would otherwise not have been there. One hardly imagines young Nigeriens protesting France so avidly had they been well-paid making manufactures for the French market. One sees more trade volume whenever there is trade in manufactured goods and direct investment.[27]
China-Africa trade is also heavily centred on China’s import of natural resources, maybe even more so percentagewise. However, as mentioned, China’s population accounts for its greater needs. Nevertheless, there is a concerted effort to get more African manufactures to go to China. Whereas, no such European or French effort seems to exist—much less any to open French plants in Africa as the Chinese have done. Already 33 of the poorest jurisdictions in Africa export 97 percent of their exports to China without tariffs or customs duties.[28] China has increased imports of manufactures from countries like South Africa and pledged to import USD 300 billion of African products by 2025.[29][30]
A 2017 McKinsey report, The Dance of the Dragons and Lions, notes that foreign direct investment has grown with a “breakneck annual growth rate of 40 percent.”[31]—and trade with China has grown much since then. The report found China was Africa’s top partner in all dimensions it considered; trade, investment stock, investment growth, infrastructure financing, and aid; stating “No other country matches this depth and breadth of engagement.”[32]
Nor is China-Africa trade just about intergovernmental deals and infrastructure projects, although that is still going strong. According to The Dance of the Dragons and Lions, “[China] was the source of 25 percent of infrastructure funding in the continent in 2018 - the second highest share that year and only second to the financial commitments from national African governments.”[33] Yet China-Africa trade has transcended this level. Entire societies are now engaged in commerce, with over 10,000 private Chinese firms in Africa, oftentimes in manufacturing.[34] The relationship is marked by high private investment in Africa.[35] And a third of Chinese firms the report surveyed reported profit margins over 20 percent.
Just why?
This situation is odd. China is on a downturn but is still a growing economy. Chinese have a manifest reason to invest at home. Whereas stagflation in Europe should mean European capital should be looking outward. Africa’s abovementioned advantages should make it a prime location for investment and outsourcing—and its trade with China proves this. Yet the French are not taking advantage.
They are not blind. This paper quotes French statistics and articles. The French press interestedly discusses political developments in Africa. Macron is an investment banker dedicated to revitalizing the entrepreneurial spirit, bringing enthusiastic businesspeople to Kinshasa alongside him. That many French people have African origins should also have proven an advantage in understanding and engaging with Africa.[36]
Blaming some general malaise is also fraught. Were that the case, then Françafrique should have undergone the same process as the rest of the French economy: France should be a strained but still major player in Africa, with a recent upturn in the figures—whatever the social effects and vocal objections about how fairly the metaphorical pie was sliced. Yet France’s share of trade with Africa has fallen and fallen.
Nor are the French disengaged from Africa because they are investing in greener pastures. There is little investment in stagnant Western Europe. Lively Transatlantic commerce does not factor here, having an altogether different character. Nor is there a surge of investment and trade elsewhere in the Common Market. Even if there were, Africa is so cheap that it should remain competitive regardless—despite the Common Tarif. Romania’s minimum wage, €607.04 (3,000.00 RON), is about six times Ivory Coast’s at €114.33. European wages only approach African ones in war-torn Ukraine, whose minimum wage is ?6700 (about €168).[37]
The French themselves say Africa is a good place to invest for them: Cian’s Le Mag for 2023 considers only Mali, Central Africa, and Burkina Faso as less than promising—for the explicit reason that they have suffered coups.[38]
It has to be due to a lack of on-the-ground commercial engagement.
Conglomerates may still at times extract great concessions. EU-Africa summits between leaders happen regularly. Yet there is still no deep engagement. By deduction then, French industry is simply not getting the political support it needs, informing and assisting medium-sized businesses about investing in or developing relations with African partners. Since consulting firms may lack offices in, for instance, Timbuktu, there being no extant trading relationship for them to cater to, the discovery of markets there may require governmental support. Alack, neither the erudite articles nor the Malian advertisements for investment in Cian’s Le Mag, however many or great, help businesspeople answer the practical questions of precisely where to invest, whom to deal with, or deal with governments in these countries. A real effort to alert and advise businesspeople in Africa is needed. Such a thing existed unfairly in the heydays of Françafrique, where French corporations and the French government could liaison with African leaders through the émissaires, intermédiaires, and officines of Hollande’s speech. But the old grey eminences have not been replaced by open arrangements openly arrived at of vivacious commerce and diplomacy in the public eye.
France is not underperforming everywhere. Morocco is France’s 19th biggest trade partner, representing 1% of all French foreign trade and thus, half its African trade. Meanwhile France is Morrocco’s second biggest trade partner. The relationship is characterized by high French direct investment and Moroccan exportation of manufactured goods to France.[39] Much as Africa-China trade increasingly is.
Contrasting Models of Engagement
Economic relations are mostly the province of the French Treasury Its international branch, alongside international, particularly European, Gmacroeconomic coordination, sends trade missions abroad.[40] The one in Morocco has twelve people.[41] Clicking on the link for economic relations on the French embassy’s website brings up another page with three links.[42]: One is for the French chamber of commerce in Morocco; another, a public-private consortium, Team France Export, which appears to serve as a bulletin board for advertisements for investment.[43] The last is to Business France, a governmental organization aiming to get foreign investment to France and help French exporters.[44] It seems to primarily help businesspeople read up on a market, rather than being personalized and practical. However, one can pay to consult with their regulatory experts.
Morocco, France’s biggest African trade partner, exhibits the most developed French economic presence in Africa. There, it may make sense to put non-governmental organizations in the lead and be sufficient to assist businesspeople in general market research. Where, however, a trading relationship needs to be created in the first place, this might not be true.
In Togo, the French Treasury mission has two people.[45] The embassy website also has three links[46]. One is back to the Treasury Mission. Another is to Business France. The third is to Conseillers du Commerce Extérieur de la France au Togo—the Togo branch of a voluntary entrepreneurs’ self-help network. In small countries such as Rwanda, there may be no trade mission at all. Even the bilateral relations reports themselves are at times flawed, figures being from different years or superannuated.
Türkiye is only a little more populous than France and part of the Common Market in all save agriculture and free movement. Yet it has greatly deepened its engagement in Africa, despite being a relatively cheap manufacturer itself. Its commercial and diplomatic expansion have gone together. Between 2002 and 2022, Türkiye opened 32 embassies in Africa. Turkish missions are directly involved in opening new markets. In this regard, Türkiye’s governmental organization specially dedicated to cultivating commercial ties, DEIK, combines the roles of Business France and the Treasury missions. DEIK, however, operates directly through embassies. Unlike the French, it appears concerned with deal-brokering rather than monitoring and publicizing markets.
Alas, France is unexceptional. The West seems to be beset by a crisis in diplomatic institutions. The British Foreign Office has even fewer staff than the French, its budget being substantially less than the British Winter Fuel Allowance.[47] Global Affairs Canada has suspended its entrance examinations. Meanwhile, the Foreign Affairs Committee in the US Congress is the least popular one to serve in, not making one popular with the voters as getting tax cuts through the Budget Committee does.[48]
A state-led effort is cost-effective. It means hiring more people to work in consulates and trading offices and having them be more active in the countries they are assigned. It boils down to more in salaries and travel expenses. Diplomats are worth their salt. In markets not yet invented, even if private closers or consultants exist, a businessperson can hardly evaluate how well-connected or well-informed those he approaches are, he himself knows nothing about the market in question. Moreover, in a new market, the critical actors may be unfamiliar to even the best consultants. All this presumes that one knows and knows how to reach out to superb consultants in the first place.
That diplomats, however aloof and foreign, will be able to hold the necessary meetings is almost guaranteed. A call from a self-appointed fixer is one thing. Getting one from the representative of a sovereign state is another. There is no better letter of introduction than a letter of credence by the President of the Republic.
Notes
[1] Translation: All Gabonese have two homelands. Gabon, and then, France. Mr. President of the Republic, should you come to Libreville, you will feel yourself in your own home, just as I, here, feel myself at my own home.
[2] La Françafrique: L'Argent Roi. Directed by Patrick Benquet, Compagnie des Phares et Balises, 2010.
[3] François Hollande, “Déclaration de M. François Hollande, Président de la République, sur les relations entre la France et l'Afrique”, speech given before the Senegalese parliament on 12 October 2012, Dakar:
Le temps de ce qu’on appelait autrefois la Françafrique est révolu. Il y a la France, il y a l’Afrique, et il y a le partenariat entre la France et l’Afrique, avec des relations fondées sur le respect, sur la clarté, et sur la solidarité. La clarté c’est la simplicité dans nos rapports d’état à état. Les émissaires, les intermédiaires, les officines, trouvent désormais porte close à la présidence de la République française comme dans tous les ministères.
[4] Emmanuel Macron, One Forest Summit, Libreville, February 9, 2023:
Cet âge de la Françafrique est bien révolu, et j'ai parfois le sentiment que les mentalités n'évoluent pas au même rythme que nous quand je lis, j'entends, je vois qu'on prête encore à la France des intentions qu'elle n'a pas, qu'elle n'a plus.
[5]Emmanuel Macron and Félix Tshisekedi, joint press conference in Kinshasa, March 4, 2023, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f_AaNfPLI0I&t=661s
[6] Direction générale du Trésor, “A la Une d’Objectif Afrique?: Les Échanges commerciaux et les Investissements entre la France et les Pays d’Afrique subsaharienne En 2022,” Ministère de l’économie, des finances, et de la souveraineté industrielle et numérique, 7 June 2023, www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/Articles/2023/06/07/a-la-une-d-objectif-afrique-les-perspectives-economiques-regionales-du-fmi-pour-l-afrique-subsaharienne-en-2023-et-2024.
[7]Pascal Airault, “Nos entreprises restent bien positionnées dans l’énergie, la distribution et les télécoms mais se sont fait tailler des croupières dans la pharmacie et les infrastructures,” Le Mag Cian, Vol. 2023: Atlas économique par régions et par pays: Perspectives 2023 des entreprises internationales, 2023, p. 9.
[8] Direction générale du Trésor, “A la une d’Objectif Afrique?: Les échanges commerciaux et les investissements entre la France et les pays d’Afrique subsaharienne en 2022,” Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances, et de la Souveraineté industrielle et numérique, 7 June 2023, www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/Articles/2023/06/07/a-la-une-d-objectif-afrique-les-perspectives-economiques-regionales-du-fmi-pour-l-afrique-subsaharienne-en-2023-et-2024
[9] Amin Mohseni-Cheraghlou, “China and Sub-Saharan Africa Trade: A Case of Growing Interdependence.” Atlantic Council, 22 July 2021, www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/china-and-sub-saharan-africa-trade-a-case-of-growing-interdependence
[10]Calculated by taking figures in Direction Générale du Trésor’s A la une d’Objectif Afrique?: Les échanges commerciaux et les investissements entre la France et les pays d’Afrique subsaharienne en 2022.
(“26,7 Mds EUR, 15,9 Mds EUR d’importations et 10,8 Mds EUR d’exportations”—converted to USD on August 17th), giving France’s trade volume with all Sub-Saharan Africa.
From this was subtracted total trade volume in bilateral trade between France and those African countries for which Cheraghlou does not give data vis-à-vis their trade with China—those countries mentioned in footnote –, as set out in the Direction-Générale du Trésor’s bilateral relations reports.
[11]Calculated by dividing France’s total Africa trade—calculated by adding the figures given in ibid and those for North African countries as given in the French Treasury’s economic bilateral relations reports—then dividing them by the figures given for Chinese trade with all Africa as given in Robert Bociaga. “China-Africa Trade Soars on Spike in Commodity Prices.” Nikkei Asia. January 27, 2023. Accessed September 26, 2023. https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Trade/China-Africa-trade-soars-on-spike-in-commodity-prices#:~:text=Rising%20commodity%20prices%20and%20Beijing's,while%20imports%20reached%20%24117.51%20billion.
These figures, alongside those pertaining to footnote 9, must be taken with a grain of salt. Reports for some countries, especially those with which France does little trade, often give figures outdated by a few years. Despite this apparent lack of diligence by the French Treasury, the overall picture the reports portray is accurate. The dramatic changes, peaks, and troughs of the individual bilateral relationships are related to spikes and falls in global commodity prices—not any bilateral commercial transformation or policy decision, as Robert Bociaga’s China-Africa Trade Soars on Spike in Commodity Prices affirms—they may thus be considered as constants in the metaphorical equation, and therefore negligible.
[12] Virusha Subban, “Africa: China’s Trade Ties With the Continent Continue to Strengthen,” Global Compliance News, 14 June 2022, Africa: China's trade ties with the continent continue to strengthen - Global Compliance News
[13] Amin Mohseni-Cheraghlou, “China and Sub-Saharan Africa Trade: A Case of Growing Interdependence,” Atlantic Council, 22 July 2021, www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/china-and-sub-saharan-africa-trade-a-case-of-growing-interdependence
[14]Ibid.
[15]Virusha Subban’s Africa: China’s Trade Ties With the Continent Continue to Strengthen.
[16] Direction-Générale du Trésor, “A la une d’Objectif Afrique?: Les échanges commerciaux et les investissements entre la France et les pays d’Afrique subsaharienne en 2022,” Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances, et de la Souveraineté industrielle et numérique, 7 June 2023, www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/Articles/2023/06/07/a-la-une-d-objectif-afrique-les-perspectives-economiques-regionales-du-fmi-pour-l-afrique-subsaharienne-en-2023-et-2024
[17] Calculated using Observatory of Economic Complexity data apud:
Observatory of Economic Complexity, “France/Nigeria”, “France/Gabon,” “France/Equatorial Guinea”, Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2021, https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/fra/partner/nga
[18] Landry Signé, “How The France-backed African CFA Franc Works as an Enabler and Barrier to Development,” Brookings, 5 October 2023, www.brookings.edu/articles/how-the-france-backed-african-cfa-franc-works-as-an-enabler-and-barrier-to-development
[19] Of course, this might also be true if exports of manufactured goods are too expensive for the markets they go to. But African manufactured goods are not expensive.
[20] Defined according to the ordinary definition: all Sub-Saharan Africa west of Cameroun and Chad.
[21] Calculated using Amin Mohseni-Cheraghlou’s China and Sub-Saharan Africa Trade: A Case of Growing Interdependence. The excepted countries are: Excluding that with Mauritania, Gabon, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, as well as the Comoros, the Seychelles, Cape Verde, Mauritius, Sao Tome e Principe, and the French territories of Mayotte and Reunion. Statistics for them were unavailable.
[22] Direction-Générale du Trésor. Cote d’Ivoire: Commerce bilatéral entre la France et les pays de l’UEMOA en 2022. Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances, et de la Souveraineté industrielle et unmérique, 18 July 2023, https://www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/Pays/CI/commerce-bilateral-entre-la-france-et-les-pays-de-l-uemoa-en-2021
[23] Direction-Générale du Trésor, 18 July 2023.
[24] Direction-Générale du Trésor, 18 July 2023.
[25] Direction-Générale du Trésor, 18 July 2023.
[26] Based on country reports by the French Treasury.
[27] Loup Viallet, “Non, les entreprises françaises n’ont pas de pré carré économique en Afrique,” Les Échos, 23 February 2021, https://www.lesechos.fr/idees-debats/cercle/opinion-non-les-entreprises-francaises-nont-pas-de-pre-carre-economique-en-afrique-1292683
[28]Virusha Subban, “Africa: China’s Trade Ties With the Continent Continue to Strengthen.” Global Compliance News, 14 June 2022, www.globalcompliancenews.com/2022/06/14/africa-chinas-trade-ties-with-the-continent-continue-to-strengthen-31052022. apud The Economist Corporate Network, “BRI Beyond 2020: Embracing New Routes and Opportunities Along the Belt and Road,” (The Economist), 2019, insightplus.bakermckenzie.com/bm/attachment_dw.action?attkey=FRbANEucS95NMLRN47z%2BeeOgEFCt8EGQJsWJiCH2WAVfnLVn2ghRGJTxfQJ78xHm&nav=FRbANEucS95NMLRN47z%2BeeOgEFCt8EGQbuwypnpZjc4%3D&attdocparam=pB7HEsg%2FZ312Bk8OIuOIH1c%2BY4beLEAeqKjethEfot0%3D&fromContentView=1.
[29] Yun Sun, “FOCAC 2021: China’s Retrenchment From Africa?,” Brookings, 14 January 2020, www.brookings.edu/articles/focac-2021-chinas-retrenchment-from-africa
[30] One may count this last commitment as good as done. China has a reputation of not signing onto very much but honoring those commitments it has undertaken. Unlike in liberal democracies, the Chinese government does not have to cajole refractory and cautious markets or struggle with getting agreements through raucous parliaments. Nor are the agreements it has signed subject to the vagaries of parliamentary ratification or revision.
[31] Yuan Sun et al., “Dance of the Lions and Dragons: How Are Africa and China Engaging, and How Will the Partnership Evolve?,” (McKinsey and Company), June 2017, www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/featured%20insights/middle%20east%20and%20africa/the%20closest%20look%20yet%20at%20chinese%20economic%20engagement%20in%20africa/dance-of-the-lions-and-dragons.ashx.
[32] Yuan Sun et al., June 2017.
[33] Yuan Sun et al., June 2017.
[34] Yuan Sun et al., June 2017.
[35] Yuan Sun et al., June 2017.
[36] Whatever the problems of integration and however much assimilation may have taken place, experience demonstrates the commercial potential of immigrant communities, particularly between their country of residence and of their origin. This is a big question requiring detailed study, but if nothing else, we at least know Mirpur in Pakistani Kashmir has a demand for fish and chips it would not have otherwise had: Susie Coen, et al., “British Pakistanis Bring Fish and Chips to Kashmir’s ‘Beverly Hills,” The Telegraph, 5 December 2005, www.telegraph.co.uk/expat/expatfeedback/4198368/British-Pakistanis-bring-fish-and-chips-to-Kashmirs-Beverly-Hills.html
[37] My Letter from Brussels reflecting on the Week of the Regions attributes this to the lack of intermunicipal and commercial relations between European countries. It seems they should get chambers of commerce involved but have not done so—Onur Anamur, “A Letter From Brussels: How to Make It Real in Europe’s Regions and Cities,” European Week of Regions and Cities, 2021, www.europa.eu/regions-and-cities/letter-brussels-how-make-it-real-europes-regions-and-cities
[38] Le Mag Cian, "Les Résultats 2022 de l’enquête Cian.” Le Mag Cian: Business Avec L’Afrique?: L’heure du New Deal: Atlas Économique Par Régions Et Par Pays: Perspectives 2023 Des Entreprises Internationales, vol. 2023.
[39] Direction-Générale du Trésor, “MAROC: Relations économiques bilatérales,” Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances, et de la Souveraineté industrielle et numérique, 21 December 2020, https://www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/Pays/MA/relations-economiques-bilaterales
[40] Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances, et de la Souveraineté industrielle et numérique. “Trésor-International” Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances, et de la Souveraineté industrielle et numérique : Direction-Générale du Trésor. Retrieved 26 September 2023, from https://www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/tresor-international
[41] Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances, et de la Souveraineté industrielle et numérique. “MAROC: Notre Équipe” Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances, et de la Souveraineté industrielle et numérique : Direction-Générale du Trésor. https://www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/Pays/NotreEquipe/MA
[42]French embassy to Morocco, “Présence française : Acteurs et Partenaires économiques,” La France au Maroc. https://ma.ambafrance.org/-Acteurs-et-partenaires-economiques-
[43]Team France Export, “Team France Export,” Team France Export, https://www.teamfrance-export.fr/*
[44] Business France, “Business France,” Business France, https://www.businessfrance.fr/
[45] Direction-Générale du Trésor, “TOGO: Notre Équipe,” Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances, et de la Souveraineté industrielle et numérique, https://www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/Pays/NotreEquipe/TG
[46] French embassy to Togo. “Présence Économique” Ambassade de France à Lome. https://tg.ambafrance.org/-Presence-economique-
[47] Rory Stewart, “Ukraine, Middle East, North Africa and Security,” Rory Stewart, 10 September 2014. https://www.rorystewart.co.uk/ukraine-middle-east-north-africa-security/
[48] Alexandra Pelosi, “15 Departing Congress Members Tell the Newbies What to Expect, ” VICE News Tonight Special (HBO), YouTube, 14 January 2019, www.youtube.com/watch?v=3gQbt0h5UQk
