Opinion: From Warsaw to Brussels: NATO enhanced Forward Presence
By John Jacobs, Director Atlantic Former
This article was originally published on 8 July 2018 for the NATO Summit in Brussels.
A key addition to NATO’s toolbox in guaranteeing allies’ safety is the strengthening of deterrence and defense posture in the periphery of allied territory. Agreed on at the previous NATO Summit in Warsaw in 2016, NATO established a rotating enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) in the Baltic States and Poland; a second initiative, the Tailored Forward Presence (TFP) was developed in Bulgaria and Romania covering the south-eastern part of Alliance in the Black Sea Region.
Between September 2017 and January 2018 I had the pleasure of serving as Public Affairs Officer for the Dutch contribution to eFP in Lithuania, working together directly with host nation Lithuania and frame-work nation Germany. At the time eFP was further reinforced with contributions from Belgium, Norway, Luxemburg. Just before I left, Croatian troops had settled in and the French were just arriving, bringing the total to seven different allies integrated within the Mechanised Infantry Brigade “Iron Wolf” of the Lithuanian Army.
Building forward on the Readiness Action Plan (RAP), an agreement made at the Wales Summit in 2014, Allies took further decisions at the Warsaw Summit in 2016 and within three months came to an agreement confirming troop contributions to the four battalion-size battlegroups, with the first German and Dutch troops arriving in February and March 2017. Enhanced Forward Presence showed a remarkable feat in both political decision-making and military planning. The rapid decision and deployment is to be applauded, although the five months spent in Lithuania also revealed three areas of improvement.
Firstly, it remains unclear as to whether there had been any real military planning involved in which Troops Contribution Nation goes to which rotation of the enhanced Forward Presence, and with which capabilities. As a result, the first half of my rotation had an abundance of armor, while the second part was heavily reliant on infantry. Next to capabilities, cultural background should be taken into account in the military planning process as, some cultures (and, in particular, military cultures) match better with one another than others. In the J9 section, the Dutch cooperation with Norway, Belgium, Luxemburg and Lithuania, for example, went very well due to similar or shared strategic cultures. It is important NATO and member states have the resources and political commitment to plan out the enhanced Forward Presence on a long-term view.
Secondly, for an operation like enhanced Forward Presence, a major focus lies on engagement, the J9 (Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC)) in a military structure. It really should be equal to the affairs of J3 (Operations), the tradition part of a military staff dedicated to kinetic operations. For eFP, J9 operations are J3 and, therefore, being present in the eastern flank is crucial in today’s security environment, but if we do not communicate that to our allies, host and troop-contributing nations, and adversaries, we might as well have been going through the motions in Bergen-Hohne Training Area in Germany. The key element in providing deterrence and defense is to showcase the capabilities NATO has, both in terms of kinetic demonstrations (little compares to the shock and awe produced by a Panzerhaubitze 2000) but, more importantly, so to demonstrate the cooperation of NATO allies in different areas. Displaying unity is our strongest weapon. In this regards, strategic communications (Stratcom) is crucial to the success of the eFP.
Finally, The integration of NATO allies in the host country, and the overall engagement with both the national civilian and military is led by a NATO Forces Integration Unit (NFIU), supported by the J9 section of the frame-work nation and subsequently Public Affairs Officers and Stratcom Advisors of the TCNs. At our peak having 10 personnel full- or part-time dedicated to engagement, reinforced with 4 Lithuanian officers, we still felt we could always use more support. However, the NFIU did not always capitalize enough on existing networks, like the local ATA/YATA network, to further strengthen NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence.
Such international networks can play a pivotal role in strengthening NATOs presence and work as an amplifier in promoting transatlanticism in the eastern flank, while simultaneously engaging with the public in troop-contributing nations to help them understand why their militaries are now standing shoulder to shoulder with their allies in the Baltics.
Brussels will be the first Summit held after the decision to set up enhanced Forward Presence. Strengthening deterrence and defense remains a key item on the agenda and I look forward to the additional measures agreed upon at the Brussels summit that further strengthen eFP and our collective defense.