New Europe, New NATO? Brexit, EU Defence Policy & NATO
By Petra Cicvaric
This article was previously published in the Atlantic Voices Vol 8. Nr. 12. Editing and
republication of this article has been realized with the financial support of NATO Public Diplomacy
Division.
On June 23, 2016, 17.4 million British voters decided to completely change Europe’s future by voting
for the UK to leave the EU; but what impact will Brexit have on NATO? Until recently, the stress has
been put on the economic, political and financial fallout of the UK’s exit from the EU, but almost
nothing has been said about its geopolitical and security consequences. But, for example, risks to
operational matters such as data or data sharing have increased. Such concerns about security were
raised by former NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, and are shared by Washington.
Therefore, this essay will aim to discuss the fallout for European defence policy defence after Brexit,
and its possible impact on NATO in the light of contemporary issues. It will also evaluate the need for
the reconstruction of the NATO’s three pillars in order to make the Alliance more flexible and suited
to face the issues of 21st century. It will argue that despite Brexit, Britain will have to keep its role as
mediator between the ambitions of NATO and the EU on defence policy in order to preserve the
peace.
EU Defence: Post-Brexit Future
The post-Brexit future of the EU-NATO relationship will evolve depending on the ultimate shape taken
by Europe’s “Common Security and Defence Policy” (CSDP) programme. CSDP is an integral part of the
EU bloc's current comprehensive approach towards crisis management and draws on both civilian and
military assets. Some analysts argue that the collaboration between the EU and NATO could wither if
the CSDP means the EU evolves into the stronger independent military actor. The CSDP enables the
EU to take a leading role in peace-keeping operations, conflict prevention and in the strengthening of
international security. However, in the long run, this scenario might result in an increase of Europe's
vision of itself as independent of the present trans-Atlantic institutions.
In the shorter term in this scenario, there is already scope for an institutionally expansionist EU and
NATO to find that their activities overlap. The UK was a sceptic of European military integration outside
of NATO; European defence integration may, therefore, deepen as a consequence of the Brexit. This
risks duplication between the two organisations and straining already-stretched European defence
budgets. These are already under stress because of Brexit. The UK is one of Europe’s leading military
powers; its departure from the military institutions of the EU means the bloc is losing 20 per cent of
its overall military capabilities. By forcing EU members closer together to patch the post-Brexit holes
in their common defence against a strengthened Russia, the British may actually be teaching
Europeans how to enhance their own military cooperation and integration outside of NATO.
Conversely, Europe’s political fracturing gives a hostile Russia a chance to spread its influence in
Europe, handing it another foreign policy victory as has already happened in Syria and, to a certain
extent, Ukraine. Russia was already testing the EU and NATO by bringing difficult and potentially
divisive issues to the fore. More recently Russian exercises, deployments and rhetoric have seemed
intended to probe the depth of the EU’s and NATO’s commitment to securing their member's states’
borders. Surprisingly, this may help keep the UK engaged with Europe post-Brexit, at least through
NATO. Despite its difficulties with the EU, the UK has a very bad relationship with Russia, and NATO is
the only transnational avenue the British have left themselves to work with other Russian opponents.
Therefore, Brexit could paradoxically increase European defence integration outside of NATO, yet
strengthen British interest in the trans-Atlantic Alliance just as it weakens in Brussels. But while
political tensions caused or exacerbated by Brexit could introduce practical difficulties in terms of
economy or defence, both in the UK and within the EU, there may also be greater appetite, on both
sides, for multinational military collaboration outside of EU frameworks. Britain’s non-EU multilateral
defence commitments, including initiatives like the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), are considered
unlikely to be directly affected by Brexit, and represent a mechanism through which the UK could
continue to engage with international defence partners. Meanwhile, Europe will still need to
cooperate with the UK on issues such as the return of Islamic State fighters from Syria. Not even a
worst-case Brexit scenario like the one painted above would see the end of military cooperation
between Western nations.
How Will Brexit Affect EU Ties with NATO?
Since Brexit, two causes of concern regarding the EU arise. Firstly, Europe has in recent years
witnessed a disturbingly widespread rise of far-right nationalist parties, not only in the UK, but also in
the majority of EU member states, including France and Germany. This far-right galaxy unites not only
anti-European and anti-American views, it is also against political values shared by the majority of
NATO allies. These parties are sympathetic to Russian notions of authoritarian sovereign democracy
and would pose a threat to the Alliance’s ideological and military cohesion should they come to power.
Crucially, these types of radical views could potentially swing the politics of Europe member states
against NATO, as they have against the EU.
Secondly, the UK has always had an important role in relations between the US and the EU. Despite
the constant reassurances from London that it will be continuing in the same role post-Brexit, it is
questionable whether the UK will be able to play the same diplomatic role once it leaves the EU.
Moreover, the immediate and potential long-term economic disruption of Brexit raises new challenges
for the UK’s relevance as a military partner. Despite deep cuts in recent years, the UK remains Europe’s
largest defence spender and had planned before Brexit to further increase its spending over the
coming years. This included a commitment to increase its defence budget by 0.5 per cent annually
until 2020–21. In addition, the UK theoretically still plans to spend £178 billion over 10 years on new
military equipment, with a 1 per cent yearly rise in the procurement budget. However economic
uncertainty leaves the affordability of Britain’s plans in question. Given that new kit such as the F-35
fighter jet must be paid for in US dollars, a foreign currency, challenges are already arising from the
pre-Brexit slide in the value of the pound.
Moreover, while Brexit could provide a catalyst for more ambitious EU defence integration and
collaboration between different European states to procure military equipment in the long term (as
explained above), in the short term other European defence budgets may also be negatively affected
by Brexit, with the EU losing the UK as one of its loudest voices for increased defence spending and
also seeing Brexit-related uncertainty affect the euro. EU capitals have already responded to Brexit by
proposing new mechanisms for incentivising spending on defence, including defence bonds, tax
breaks and access to European Investment Bank funds. Undoing the damage caused to its security
policy by Brexit is going to absorb EU governments’ energies and political capital which could have
been used on NATO matters.
New Europe, New NATO?
Brexit is one of the few challenges that could seriously undermine NATO’s future cohesion. After
Brexit, NATO will need to promptly re-evaluate its role in the European security architecture. Ironically
one of the key concerns for it will be the future of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy, since
a rush by EU states to fill the vacuum left by Britain here would be extremely costly, as would its
collapse. After Brexit, a new solution has to be found in order to maintain that programme in its
current form; ideally, Britain would maintain its role under negotiated terms, albeit from outside of
the EU.
A key problem for the Alliance is that neither NATO nor Britain are what they used to be. The oncepredominant
United States, while still the only truly global power within NATO, is stretched and
finding its writ challenged, at times and in places of their choosing, by Russia and China, possibly
working in conjunction. Even if America continues to have the will to lead, Washington will need a
more active NATO than presently exists. Meanwhile, the connection which used to run from
European capitals through Britain to Washington no longer exists as strongly as before. Brexit is
another blow to the ties keeping the Allies bound together since the end of the Cold War, while
America faces a growing list of crises in parts of the world where Europe barely registers. In an age
when defence and deterrence have gone global, it is essential that a new transatlantic contract is
struck for the new times in which the West finds itself.
In practice, that will most likely mean Europeans doing far more for their own defence at home, with
the U.S. acting only as a distant guarantor; this can happen through NATO, or more problematically
through the EU. For now, the EU and its member states remain unprepared to face any such new and
daunting strategic reality. European defence still has little to do with the effective defence of Europe.
But a new Europe that wants to retain its ties with Britain and tighten them with the US could still
emerge from the shock of Brexit and seek to forge a common front in the military sphere that is being
abandoned in the political one. The best outcome for NATO is an EU that decides to redirect its
weakened post-Brexit CDSP towards a close support of NATO operations and capabilities, rather than
greeting the British departure with relief.
NATO Pillars After Brexit
With or without Brexit (should the EU-British deal to leave be put to a second referendum and
rejected, for example), the pillars of NATO need shifting to meet 21st century challenges; any future
security and defence efforts to tie Europe and the US back together inside the Alliance will work better
if Britain can be a central component of it. Brexit might change the geopolitical layout of Europe, but
it cannot change geography. Even inside an EU with a stronger military potential, the UK would still
remain the obvious bridge between the US and its EU partners on matters of common security
interest. Outside of it, the EU members states in NATO should still make working with the UK a priority,
no matter how bitter the political divisions over Brexit gets outside the military sphere. The Alliance
has to stand outside of the normal political concerns of the day if it is to act effectively around the
globe. Brexit has marked the end of Britain’s journey with the European Union, but not with Europe.
Multilateral cooperation between the EU, NATO and the UK remain crucial for sustaining world peace
and creating a strong military bloc. NATO members must ensure that all their governments do not
play politics within the Alliance, however tempting this may be in an era of almost unprecedented
inter-Western squabbling in the post-World War II era.
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