Hybrid warfare: weaponized migration on the eastern border of the EU?
By Viesturs Berzins this article was originally published in The Interdisciplinary Journal of International Studies: Crisis on April 4, 2022.
Abstract
After a forced landing of a Ryanair flight which was carrying a journalist and opposition activist highlighting the human rights violations in Belarus, the EU decided to expand the sanctions against the Belorussian regime. The sanctions have been increasing since the disputed re-election of President Alyaksandr Lukashenka. After the introduction of the last wave of sanctions, the Belarus-EU migrant crisis started. This article provides an overview of the migrant crisis on the Belorussian border with the EU, in the beginning of summer 2021. The research explores the possibility that this increase in irregular migration is an attempt to destabilize the states receiving the migrants. The theory of hybrid warfare suggests that striking a state’s weakest link is an efficient way to destabilize it. This article seeks to answer if Belarus is using tools of hybrid warfare as a response to the EU sanctions.
Keywords: Belarus; Poland; Latvia; Lithuania; European Union; Hybrid warfare; irregular migration.
Introduction
The eastern border of the European Union has been gradually shifting eastward ever since the end of the Cold War (Ikonomou et. al 2017, p. 2). The external border progressed to the east when Finland joined the alliance in 1995 and created an EU-Russia land border for the first time (ibid. p. 27). It took 9 more years until the “Eastern enlargement” pushed the border even further to the east, causing the EU to gain two new neighbors in Belarus and Ukraine (Ceka & Sojka 2016, p. 483). The 2007 enlargement saw Moldova become a neighbor of the EU as well, yet after this, more than 14 years have passed since the last shift of the eastern border of the EU. This has caused this border region to become more established and concrete, giving more opportunity both for cooperation and antagonism to the direct neighbors.
Historically, the EU has had troubled cooperation with Russia, when comparing it to the rest of the neighboring states, since it has similar ambitions in the region to the EU (Klinke 2012, p. 930). While ‘The West’ still views Russia as a threat (European Parliament 2019, p. 3), a new concern has been emerging in the last few years – Belarus. Although the state has been led by the same leader since 1984, the EU-Belarus relations have rapidly deteriorated in the last two years (Whitmore, 2021). The tensions between the sides have only been escalating since the heavily disputed 2020 presidential election of Belarus, which is widely believed to be fabricated (Simmons 2021; Bayhan 2020; Mills 2021, p. 7). Not long after the election, the EU decided to impose sanctions against Belarus, as its leader Alyaksandr Lukashenka showed no signs of stepping down or having another election that could be proven to be legitimate (Council of the European Union, 2020). As the situation after the election only worsened in Belarus, with mass riots and protests emerging all across the state, both sides took action. The EU kept increasing sanctions, while Belarus detained increasing amounts of opposition activists (Yahorava and Gadina, 2020).
The constant sanctions and condemnation of the disputed regime pushed Lukashenka even further, forcing him to show his power in unprecedented and unexpected manners. One of the ways the Belorussian leader demonstrated his capabilities was by forcing a commercial Ryanair flight to land in Belarus on the 23rd of May, 2021. The plane intended to fly from Greece to Lithuania, briefly crossing the Belorussian airspace, yet it got intercepted by a Belorussian fighter jet ordering it to land in the capital of Belarus immediately. After the forced landing of the flight, a couple were arrested and detained – a dissident journalist Roman Protasevich with his Russian girlfriend (Quemener, 2021). This was not taken lightly by the West, causing nearly all flights over Belarus to cease, as well as a new round of sanctions to occur from the EU, and other western-aligned actors like the UK, Canada, the US, and Norway (Smith et.al, 2021). Soon after this wave of Western retaliation to Lukashenka’s regime, the Belarus-EU migrant crisis started. An unprecedented amount of migrants started flowing from Belarus to Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia (Grzywaczewski, 2021).
This article will explore the reasons behind the Belarus-EU migrant crisis, how it started, and try to investigate the possible correlation between the sanctions against Belarus and the start of the crisis. To further understand the current situation, the conditions that led to the tensions between the EU and Belarus are briefly examined. Inspecting events like the disputed Belorussian presidential election, the widespread protests afterward, as well as the imprisonment of hundreds of opposition activists, are crucial for understanding the case. Using the theory of hybrid warfare, the paper intends to either affirm or deny the possibility of this being a hybrid attack from Belarus to the EU. The article relies both on qualitative and quantitative data to analyze the possible correlation between the two events.
Statistical data is used to compare the migratory trends on the borders between Belarus and the EU, while statements from Belorussian politicians are taken into consideration to determine whether or not the crisis is manmade. The hypothesis of the paper is that the Lukashenka regime has deliberately supported and made the situation opportune for a migration crisis to occur on the border to the EU as an act of revenge against the sanctions imposed on the state of Belarus. Thus, the article’s research question is the following: Has the Belorussian regime aided the development of the migration crisis in a significant way, and if it has – can this be considered hybrid warfare?
Hybrid problems call for hybrid solutions
The 21st century has seen the least amount of state-based battle-related deaths in history (Koehrsen, 2019). Conventional warfare as we know it has been eradicated almost entirely. Since World War II, there have been only a handful of conflicts where global superpowers have been involved. Conventional warfare is no longer the main form of settling disputes, as states seek new ways to influence global affairs. One of the strategies that has emerged in the 21st century is called hybrid warfare. It is believed that the term first was coined less than 15 years ago when the military strategy was described by Frank Hoffman in his “Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars” (Hoffman, 2007). Although this particular theory is very recent, others are rather similar. Concepts like asymmetric warfare, irregular warfare, or ambiguous warfare carry a similar meaning to hybrid warfare. Thus, some scholars argue that the theory is “neither new nor unusual” (Paul, 2016). Others have even gone as far as saying that hybrid warfare and asymmetric warfare are actually the same concept – two sides of the same coin (Weissmann 2019, p. 19). Albeit this theory does not lack critics, it can be useful in explaining modern and past conflicts. For this article, it is perceived that hybrid warfare and asymmetric warfare fits well.
Hoffman has stated that hybrid warfare “incorporates a range of different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder” (Hoffman 2007, p. 8). This implies that the concept of “hybrid warfare” is adaptable depending on the situation and current needs. What makes it so versatile and dangerous is that the strategy can be implemented on different frontiers at the same time, effectively striking a state’s weakest links. As this approach can be both regular and irregular, it can be hard to counter it. The Russian example of annexing Crimea demonstrated that the combination of both regular and irregular warfare methods can reap great rewards. Albeit in this particular example, it seemed like the events unfolded in an extremely short period, but it was only the tip of the iceberg. In reality, it was a carefully sculpted plan designed to strike the weakest parts of the system with varying levels of intensity, culminating in the annexation of a part of Ukrainian territory (Rusnakova, 2017).
The whole essence of hybrid warfare is to use the state’s strengths, simultaneously taking advantage of the opponent’s weaknesses. Modern-day military capabilities are vast, especially for great military powers. So, the concept explains how attacking less developed points can be beneficial, even though they are not viewed as traditional ways of offense. This strategy is especially convenient for states that are smaller, weaker, or economically less developed than the opponent, as it focuses on gradual destabilization rather than swift conquest.
The theory emerged as one of the “leading” theories of modern warfare when it was widely used to explain the Russian success in annexing Crimea in such a short period (Renz 2016, p. 284). With the majority of scholars writing about hybrid warfare in Russia, many states that have also used and are using similar elements of the strategy have been left unseen (Renz 2016; Friedman 2018; Eberle & Daniel 2019).
Common tools for hybrid warfare include cyber-attacks, as well as information warfare (Rusnakova 2017, pp. 359; 361). Usually, cyber-attacks focus on infrastructure, while information warfare is directed towards the masses. Both means are effective tools to destabilize a state. These are only a couple of examples, as theoretically there are innumerable ways to wreak chaos, thus weakening the state. The dangerous nature of hybrid warfare relies on hybridity itself – it is versatile and can adapt.
As targeting the weak spots is the focal point of the strategy, according to Dr. Viljar Veebel, controlled migration can be used as a tool of hybrid warfare (Veebel 2020, p.47). Although it is hard to prove that a state is blatantly using migrant flows as a tool to weaken another state, in theory it can be used as one of the paradigms of hybrid warfare. If a state is forced to receive numerous migrants it had not been anticipating, the system can slow down or even stop functioning. This can potentially lead to public unrest, which is one of the goals of hybrid warfare (Ibid.)
Conclusion: Hybrid warfare or basic retaliation?
This article has explored the following key arguments: Firstly, the irregular migration levels on the Eastern border of the EU have reached levels that can be compared to those of the Mediterranean migration route of 2015-2016. This is an extremely alarming fact since the migration crisis of 2015 destabilized the EU by costing the member states financially (Park, 2015). The 2015-2016 refugee crisis was addressed by the EU with the enforcement of the EU-Turkey deal. One lesson from the 2015-2016 refugee crisis would be that the EU needs to get in control and act faster. They must either adopt a stance that the migrants are not welcome and declare that they will not be accepted or the exact opposite – open the borders for the migrants to safely cross into the EU. Albeit the latter might be an improbable scenario, it would support the humanitarian narrative the EU is sculpting.
Secondly, it has been observed that Belarus is not setting any obvious obstacles while these migrants are trying to reach the EU. By relieving the issuance of visas, and its support for the migrants’ attempts to reach the border, the Belorussian regime is showing its position towards the EU and its neighbor states.
Thirdly, based on the statements from president Lukashenka, we can assume that the authoritarian leader has no intent to stop the migrants from coming to Belarus. Even though the EU member states bordering Belarus are refusing entry to the migrants, Lukashenka’s regime is still amassing more people whose target is to get to the EU. If this continues, numerous people can lose their lives, as the weather conditions in eastern-northern Europe are getting harsher by the day. If this is a deliberate attempt to destabilize the EU as a response to the sanctions, it will only benefit the Belorussian case, as the EU will be portrayed as the villain for not rescuing the migrants.
In conclusion, we have explored how the Belorussian regime is aiding the migration crisis in a significant way, thus confirming the first part of the research question. All signs point to Alyaksandr Lukashenka using this strategy to knowingly direct the migration flows towards the EU, as he witnessed what the last migration crisis did to the EU.
Analysing the connection of whether Lukashenka is waging hybrid warfare against the EU is harder. Albeit he is weaponizing the migrants, hybrid warfare is a complex strategy consisting of several streams of offense, but we have only pinpointed one. Something that does support the hypothesis is the forced landing of the Ryanair flight back in May 2021. Although it happened before the border crisis started, it was a breach of jurisdiction, causing the EU to look weak. If this is the case, then the hybrid war had started before, and the migration crisis was not the first strike. Another incident supporting the hybrid warfare argument took place recently – Lukashenka threatened to cut off the gas supply to the EU (Treeck, 2021). Currently, it might be too early to completely confirm that Lukashenka is waging hybrid warfare against the EU, but if the threats of cutting off the gas materialize – that could be a whole different story.
Endnotes
1. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), irregular migration is movement of persons that takes place outside the laws, regulations, or international agreements governing the entry into or exit from the State of origin, transit or destination.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Viesturs Bērziņš is Researcher at NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence.