Chinese Arctic Narratives: How Chinese Media is Approaching The Nordic-Arctic States

By Viesturs Bērziņš this article was originally published in NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in May, 2022.

Introduction

The world we live in is constantly changing. As Heraclitus once famously stated: ‘The only thing constant is change itself’. History has shown us that certain geographical regions can suddenly become the centre of attention. A territory that has caught international attention re- cently is the Arctic. A frozen, fairly untamed area that is mostly known for glaciers, polar bears, and endless wilderness is starting to emerge as a centrepiece of the global agenda. Minerals, vast waters for fishing and shipping, as well as strategic importance are some of the Arctic’s key points of attraction. Many states have expressed interest in extending their reach and de- velopments in the Arctic. Yet, one of the states that is actively participating in Arctic endeav- ours is attracting more scholarly attention than the others – China.1 Not only is it located nearly 1500 kilometres away from the Arctic Circle,2 it also has one of the fastest growing economies in the world.3 This has led some experts4 to wonder whether it is possible for Arctic states to remain in complete control of the contested region. China’s interest in the region has resulted in it becoming one of thirteen observer states of the Arctic Council. The organisation can be considered the de facto most important intergovernmental forum for Arctic affairs.5

Some scholars state that the Chinese interest in the Arctic is constrained and limited by not having any territory there,6 yet the appeal is certainly there. Rare-earth elements used in the production of various electric and electronic components are only one of the many reasons why China has its eyes on the Arctic. Both strategically and economically the region offers many benefits for states who have access to it. With the Arctic ‘White Paper’ published in 2018, China expressed a vision for its role in the region, and how it wished other states to see it as well, namely as a ‘Near- Arctic state’.7 With China currently in the international spotlight, it wishes to show the world that it is involved in Arctic matters and that it cares about what is happening there. To further establish its position in the region, it needs to work together with states that have already done so. This has led to increased cooperation between China and states that are part of the Arctic.8 According to Ryzhova: ‘In order to put into practice the concept of “geographical proximity of China to the Arctic”, China is actively seeking support from the Nordic countries’.9 It is believed that China is trying to increase its cooperation with these states, since they would be the receiving end of the ‘Ice Silk Road’ – connecting China and Europe.10

This paper analyses the narratives that appear in Chinese media regarding Arctic states. Given that this research is being executed under the auspices of the Nordic- Baltic project of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, it focuses on the Nordic states. This research seeks to better understand the phenomenon of China’s ‘Near Arctic’ identity. It examines how Chinese media frame China, the Nordic countries, and the relationship between them, particularly concerning the Arctic. Throughout this article we attempt to identify the narratives that China is trying to construct when engaging with Arctic states – in this case the Nordic ones (Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Iceland). From the outset, this research presumes that there are differences in China’s approach to the five Nordic countries and to their territories pertaining to the Arctic. Some of the territories located in the Arctic are autonomous parts of their respective states, for example, Greenland or the Faroe Islands of the Kingdom of Denmark. Other territories carry a special international status, such as Norway’s Svalbard. This research also assumes that the framing of the Nordic countries in Chinese media is influenced by domestic and international events that have the potential to strengthen or weaken China’s position in the Arctic. The key questions this study will attempt to answer are: What kind of discourses are Chinese media outlets constructing when they write about Nordic states? Are narratives different when these articles have an Arctic dimension? And are Finland, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, and Denmark written about in the same way? To answer these questions, the paper relies on qualitative data. A dataset was created for the particular purpose of this research. The dataset includes articles that have been published by Chinese media in the past five years, between 2017 and 2021. We have chosen some of the biggest Chinese media outlets that are publishing in English and frequently write about foreign affairs: Xinhua, South China Morning Post, Global Times, and CGTN. It is important to note that Global Times operates under the auspices of People’s Daily, yet, as it covers foreign relations more, we have chosen to include it, not People’s Daily. This allows us to identify narratives constructed primarily for international audiences rather than for Chinese internal audiences. Articles from the first three media outlets will only be examined when they mention the Arctic, while articles from CGTN will be evaluated both when mentioning the Arctic, and when talking about China and the Nordics outside of an Arctic context. This is done to assess how important the Arctic aspect is for Chinese media outlets. Since CGTN is arguably one of the two biggest Chinese media platforms communicating in English, alongside Xinhua, it was chosen as the data source for comparing articles that mention Nordic countries and articles that mention Nordic countries and the Arctic. While it would be of value to assess Xinhua as well, due to the limitations of this paper, we have chosen to use just one of the two biggest Chinese media platforms. By doing a keyword search for the Nordic states individually as well as collectively, we identify patterns in narrative frames presented by the media. The data collected is carefully sifted to highlight common narratives present in the Chinese media, as well as those that diverge.

Strategic narratives through the lens of constructivism

The narrative frames we identify in this paper are elucidated in the section ‘The ‘Near Arctic’ identity: what’s in it for China?’, yet throughout this part of the research we intend to highlight what we understand by strategic narratives, and why they matter. Whenever an event occurs, political or otherwise, there can be several interpretations of it. A good illustration of this is how different states perceive the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). While BRI is generally seen as Beijing’s attempt to establish itself as a global leader, there is nuance to how different states view and respond to the project. For instance, Kazakhstan welcomes the BRI and sees it as a positive narrative that it will benefit from. India holds a more negative view and thinks the project is undermining its ontological security.11 This example explains what a strategic narrative is: a specific interpretation of reality based on an agenda. Even though both states see BRI as benefiting China, they have completely different perceptions of it, informed by different regional and international goals.

Strategic narrative of identity

According to Miskimmon et al.:

‘‘There are three types of strategic narratives - narratives about the international system, which articulate how a political actor conceives their understanding of international order; narratives employed by political actors seeking to influence the development of policies; and strategic narratives of identity, which are central to how political actors seek to project their identity in international affairs.12’’

Even though this research focuses mainly on detecting and analysing strategic narratives of identity constructed by China, the other types of strategic narratives serve as a supporting foundation for the analysis.

Identity narratives have been used by actors to project and demonstrate how they want to be perceived and thought of by the international community. According to some scholars: ‘China sees itself as positioned on the defensive in an international system widely perceived as dominated by the West’.13 In other words, China perceives the international system as being unfair and dominated by the West. China’s narratives also often highlight its history: that China was once powerful, and that they will be powerful again.14 This also aligns with the ‘defensive’ posture China seeks to project: merely reclaiming an international position that it believes it has always been entitled to.

By shaping an ‘identity’ narrative, an entity can influence how other actors perceive it. On the world stage, it is vital for a state to not only shape how it is seen, but also define the roles and rules of international relations.15 This can create an illusion that some actors are the protagonists while others are the antagonists of a story. From an international relations point of view, it would make sense to appear friendly towards allies, and look fearsome towards enemies. This demonstrates the incentive to use strategic narratives to send a certain message.

Constructivism and identity

There have been three widely accepted theories of international relations in the 21st century – realism, liberalism, and constructivism. Constructivists believe that knowledge is socially constructed. There are no undisputable realities; everything we know is based on previous interpretations and concepts.16 Constructivism is closely related to the idea of symbolic interactionism, whereby meaning is formed based on interactions between people.17 Combining the theories of constructivism and symbolic interactionism, one might say that the perceived ‘reality’ of international affairs is shaped by interactions between states while also being strongly informed by pre-existing ideas, concepts, and frameworks of understanding. The material gives way to the ideational.

Constructivists argue that socially accepted ideas are constructs. For example, a $10 bill is worth a certain amount of money, despite it simply being a piece of paper.18 It is the perception of value that makes it worth more than the cost of paper and ink. The idea of money has been around for centuries and is well established across the world, yet there are other ideas that are only socially accepted in parts of the world. This suggests that someone from Hawaii might have a different perception of the world than someone from Algeria, because they have been exposed to different social constructs.

Viewed from a constructivist perspective, identity is a key concept in international relations. According to Miskimmon etal.: ‘In international relations theory, early constructivist literature on the role of state identity argued that state identity affects foreign policy and international relations’.19 Identities drive interests and actions; states that comply with a certain identity will be expected to act within the norms that are associated with this identity. That is why it is of immense importance for states like China to project a certain identity to the world in order to shape international relations. It also explains why some states invest heavily in constructing public perceptions of other states and their relationships with them.

Methodology

This research is a continuation of the previous two projects conducted by the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence on Arctic narratives. The first, ‘Arctic Narratives and Political Values: Russia, China, and Canada in the High North’, published in 2018, focuses on the strategic narratives of China, Russia, and Canada. The second is called ‘Arctic Narratives and Political Values: Arctic States, China, and NATO’. It was published in 2020, and expanded on the first one by analysing the strategic narratives of all eight Arctic states, as well as China and NATO. To ensure consistency, this research uses an adapted version of the same methodology as the previous two projects. The project continues to be ‘narrative driven’. We have used the term ‘narrative’ as defined in the Cambridge dictionary – ‘a particular way of explaining or understanding events’. This corresponds with the definition proposed by the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence: ‘Morals drawn from stories’.20 The project will identify narratives communicated by China and use framing theory to identify how China is shaping perceptions about the Nordic countries and its relationship with them, particularly in the context of the Arctic. Framing theory suggests that how something is presented to the audience influences the choices people make about how to process information.21 The media creates frames by introducing information with predefined and narrow contextualisation, thus enhancing understanding, or using them as cognitive shortcuts to link stories to metanarratives.

By choosing a qualitative approach, this research is more readily able to draw links between articles, identify common themes, and distinguish reoccurring narrative frames.22 According to Moen: ‘there are inevitable gaps between reality, experience, and expression’.23 This affirms that different perceptions might exist at the same time, depending on the perspective. We compiled a dataset of articles published by Chinese media that mention any or several of the Nordic states between 2016 and 2021. We only chose those articles that focus on the Nordics, disregarding the ones that onlysuperficially mention them. This was done to create a concrete dataset of articles that could be analysed to find common and differing narratives. Within this dataset, we also distinguished the articles that have an Arctic dimension to investigate how important the ‘Arcticness’ of the Nordics is to the Chinese media. We intend to find out if different narratives are being constructed when Chinese media are writing about the Nordics while mentioning the Arctic. To identify the frame, we will search for certain keywords and try to interpret the context of the article. The research will also try to identify whether the media is outlining common history as a reason for cooperation.

‘‘We have chosen to focus on these outlets as they publish in English and are either connected to the Chinese government or follow editorial policies that amplify governmental strategic messages.’’

Although the research is based on articles published by the biggest Chinese media outlets which publish in English (Xinhua, South China Morning Post, Global Times, CGTN), this paper does not analyse the official Chinese policy towards the Nordic states. We have chosen to focus on these outlets as they publish in English and are either connected to the Chinese government or follow editorial policies that amplify governmental strategic messages. Taken together, these two criteria imply two things: one, given these articles are in English they are intended for international consumption; two, the articles will have undergone an editorial process within pro-Chinese media organisations and therefore not diverge too much from official state policy. It is important to note, that even though SCMP is located in Hong Kong, and can raise eyebrows when ‘put in the same bag’ as the other outlets, Hong Kong is recognised as a special administrative region in China. Even more so, they have been asked to remove articles that Beijing does not agree with.24 Thus, even though traditionally SCMP was considered to be more independent, the past few years have proven otherwise.

We will attempt to answer the questions that this research poses with the help of constructivist theory. As we are focusing on state-sponsored media and media which follows editorial policies that amplify governmental strategic messages, we will also use the theory of strategic narratives to justify the creation of frames. Combined, these theories can draw out richer conclusions in analysing how China’s ‘Near- Arctic’ identity is framed through narratives.

Chinese relations with the Nordics

In recent years, China has increasingly cooperated with several states around the world.25 Some collaborations appear natural, even inevitable, given a common history, geographical proximity, or shared values. China’s relationship with Russia falls into this category.26 Yet, there are other instances where a greater appreciation of the wider context and a teasing out of underlying ambitions and interests is necessary to explain collaboration.

So, why has China suddenly increased its liaison with the Nordics?27 The answer to this question might lie in the Belt and Road Initiative, which is China’s attempt to establish its position as a global leader.28 Organisations such as NATO and the EU have noticed China’s attempts, and have referred to China as a competitor and on some occasions even a threat.29 Despite this antagonistic description, China keeps trying to develop its relations with the Nordics, which are all part of either the EU, NATO, or both. It could be because China views NATO and EU member states as individual states, and not through the lens of the organisations they belong to. Throughout this chapter we will briefly scrutinise China’s bilateral relations with each Nordic state and assess the nature and development of each of these relationships.

China-Iceland

Despite Iceland being the smallest of the Nordic states in terms of population, it does not necessarily get any less attention from China. In 2013, China and Iceland signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA), signalling China’s interested in further developing its relationship with Iceland. This was China’s first FTA with a Western European state.30 The relationship between these two states is also reflected in tourism statistics: over 100,000 Chinese citizens visited Iceland in 2019, roughly 10 times more than in 2010. The number decreased significantly in 2020 and 2021 due to COVID-19.31 In 2018, the Chinese Government invited Iceland to join the Belt and Road Initiative, suggests that China envisions a role for the remote Nordic. The United States, an important allyto Iceland,32 shortly thereafter responded to China’s overtures. US Vice President at the time, Mike Pence, thanked Iceland for rejecting the proposition to join the Belt and Road Initiative.33 Icelandic representatives later corrected Pence, stating that they had not yet given a definite answer to China.34 It seems that China cares about the US presence in the region, thus it is important to emphasize this aspect. This works well together with the ‘China is a friend; US is not’ frame, discussed in the analysis.

China-Norway

The Chinese-Norwegian relationship has improved drastically over the years, but it has not always been good. Perhaps themost impactful event in recent Chinese- Norwegian relations took place in 2010, when the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Chinese dissident and human rights activist Liu Xiaobo, who was imprisoned by the Chinese state at the time.35 The Chinese government did not approve the Norwegian Nobel Committee decision to honour Liu. Perceived as meddling with their internal affairs, they even warned the Norwegian government not to do so.36 For approximately the next six years the relationship stagnated, until it normalised in 2016, when Norway reiterated its support for the ‘one China policy’.37 The relationship has strengthened since then, with state officials holding several high importancemeetings throughout the years. It appears that the current diplomatic relationship is not only stable, but fruitful as well: Norway is in the final stages of FTA negotiations with China.38

China-Denmark

Nowadays, the relationship between China and Denmark can be described as complex. In recent years, several notable events have taken place that had an impact, mainly relating to human rights issues in China39 and security concerns that Denmark shares with its NATO Allies40. During recent years, Denmark like some other Nordic countries has also experienced China’s very active - and at times assertive or even confrontational public diplomacy.41 For example, China considered it offensive and demanded a public apology from a Danish newspaper in 2020, when it posted a caricature depicting China’s flag with virus symbols instead of stars.42 The Kingdom of Denmark, which includes the large self- governing island of Greenland, is an active and engaged player in the Arctic. Over the past decade, China has made attempts to increase its presence in Greenland through commercial investments or scientific research establishments.43 China is currently engaged in two separate economic projects on the island, yet the number has been fluctuating.44

China-Sweden

Of the Nordic countries, Sweden was the first to establish diplomatic ties with the People’s Republic of China, in 1950.45 China- Sweden relations have been mostly steady since then, but in recent years, negative developments have overshadowed the positive. For example, in 2016 China’s first overseas ground satellite receiving station was built in Kiruna, a town in the Swedish Arctic.46 This was viewed as a great collaborative success until 2019, when the Swedish Defence Research Agency expressed concern, stating that the satellite station might be used by the Chinese military.47 Also in 2019, Chinese ambassador Gui Congyu threatened Sweden by saying, ‘We treat our friends with fine wine, but for our enemies we use shotguns’. This came in response to Sweden awarding the Tucholsky Prize for achievements in literature to Chinese-borndissident and Swedish citizen Gui Minhai, who is still imprisoned in China.48 Relations continued to deteriorate in 2020, when several Swedish cities ceased to be twin cities of their Chinese counterparts.49 At the end of 2020 Sweden blocked two Chinese companies, Huawei and ZTE, from supplying core 5G infrastructure. As Politico puts it: ‘Sweden’s travails are of wider interest to the EU because they touch on important questions which many countries in the bloc face, namely where to draw the line between often lucrative commercial deals with China and concerns over China’s human rights record and its history of spying on Western nations’.50

Ambassador Gui Congyu threatened Sweden by saying, ‘We treat our friends with fine wine, but for our enemies we use shotguns’.

China-Finland

China seems to view its relations with Finland among its most important bilateral relations with Nordic countries.51 Trade and economic issues are at the forefront. Chinese market offers many business opportunities for Finnish companies andsignificant share of the turnover of large Finnish global companies comes from China. Finland does not participate nor commit itself politically to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.52

Relations between Beijing and Helsinki cooled briefly in 2020 when Finland suspended its extradition agreement withHong Kong in connection with the ‘Hong Kong national security law’. China warned Finland about interfering with its internal affairs,53 yet the tensions did not cause any major break in the relations. In 2021, the foreign ministers of China and Finland met and expressed their intention to deepen their cooperation.54 This suggests that China has a long-term view regarding its relations with Finland and has a keen interest in advancing the relationship in the coming years.

The ‘Near Arctic’ identity: what’s in it for China?

As globalisation continues to intensify, states often pursue interests far away from their borders. One such development is that states not located in the Arctic have been creating policies specifically for the region.55 This implies that states have agendas that they wish to implement in the Arctic. In 2018, as part of their Arctic policy, China declared itself a ‘NearArctic state’.56 By doing so, the government of China made clear that the region is important for them and that they want to play an active part in developments in the region.

To identify key themes and directions of China’s strategic narratives in the Arctic, this research has consulted scholarship that analyses general narratives put forward by Beijing. We have considered these narratives in light of China’s Arctic ambitions by synthesising existing academic studies with analysis emerging from our own research.57

‘Polar great power’

Our analysis shows that when framing the relationship with the Nordic countries and presence in the Arctic, China resorts to the frames of ‘leadership’ and ‘power’, whilst at the same time emphasising ‘partnership’ and ‘mutual benefit’.

China’s initial presence in the Arctic started in 2001 when it opened its first research station in Longyearbyen, Svalbard.According to Dams et al., the international media hardly covered the event.58 Back in 2001, China was not known to be particularly interested in the region; it is possible that the establishment of the station was disregarded as insignificant, but today it can be interpreted as China’s first attempt to establish an Arctic presence.

From today’s perspective, 2001 marks the beginning of an expanding Chinese physical and political presence in the Arctic. In 2004, China opened the ‘Arctic Yellow River Station’, a permanent research station in Svalbard. Three years later, China was accepted as a temporary observer state of the Arctic Council. In 2013 China became a permanent observer on the Council. A year later, the President of China, Xi Jinping, announced that China’s ambition to be a ‘polar great power’.59 With all these events taking place in less than 15 years, China’s Arctic presence has grown swiftly.

‘Near Arctic state’

Beijing justifies its increasing presence in the Arctic by using an environmentalist frame. More than any other region of the world, the Arctic plays a fundamental role in regulating the Earth’s climate.60 This allows any country, including China, to claim influence over developments in the region.61 However, in the case of China, its climate concerns are suspicious, since it is the world’s largest CO2 emitter, responsible for 27% of the total greenhouse gas emissions in the world.62

Natural resources, as well as new, trans-oceanic trade routes motivate Beijing to seek larger space for itself. As the region is effectively a closed one, China has to partner with regional states.

‘Beneficial to the Arctic’

China uses the framing of ‘the Arctic will benefit from China’ to promote different economic opportunities in the region and how these can benefit not only China, but other countries. This thinking goes hand-in-hand with China’s Belt and Road Initiative plans. According to Avdaliani: ‘Natural resources, as well as new, trans- oceanic trade routes motivate Beijing to seek larger space for itself. As the region is effectively a closed one, China has to partner with regional states’.63 As a part of its Belt and Road Initiative, China seeks to develop infrastructure in the region.64 These investments and attempts to develop the region have shown glimpses of being fruitful, as some Arctic states have become more open to having more Chinese presence in the region.65, 66

‘Knowledge leader’

To point to its relevance for the Arctic, China uses the frames of ‘partnership’ and ‘[knowledge] leadership’ in the context of scientific research.

Even before China’s political ambitions became apparent to the international community, its early presence in the Arcticwas framed as a scientific endeavour. Today, China has several research stations in the Arctic. The oldest is located in Svalbard, Norway, another one is in North Iceland, while China continues to eye Finland--so far without success.67 When talking about investing in science, China’s former ambassador to Iceland Jin Zhijian has stated that China ‘has spared no efforts to contribute its wisdom and fulfil its duties’.68 This implies that the Chinese government is portraying itself as a‘knowledge leader’.

‘Reliable partner’

To demonstrate its readiness to cooperate, China uses the frames of ‘partnership’ and ‘innocence’. China has placed greatimportance on maintaining the image of a country who is willing to ‘play by the rules’ in the region. According to Allan: ‘projecting the values of respect and integrity and cementing its reputation as a trustworthy, rule-abiding actor is a consistent feature of China’s Arctic communications’.69 Albeit the Arctic shipping routes are undoubtedly one of the biggest interest points for China, it has stated in its Arctic policy that it supports the existing rules of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), suggesting that it is eager to collaborate with Arctic states in the creation of the ‘Polar Silk Road’.70

‘Desirable partner’

Apart from emphasising its ability to contribute to Arctic scientific research as a ‘knowledge leader’, China also frames its Arctic relationship through using the frame that it is ‘welcome’ and of value in the region. While China may have a complicated relationship with most Arctic states, when it comes to working with these countries in the Arctic, China tries to portray itself as a valuable partner.71 Iceland already has concluded a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with China. Some years ago Norway and Finland were perceived by China as important links in the plans for its Belt and Road Initiative but most recently these projects are no longer on the bilateral agenda. All these examples highlight that partnering with China can be economically advantageous, with benefits ranging from FTAs to large infrastructure investments.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Viesturs Bērziņš is Researcher at NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence.