The Montreux Convention and NATO’s Presence in the Black Sea
By Onur Anamur
This article seeks to explain the Montreux Convention, which regulates the passage of vessels into the Black Sea, discussing its implications for both littoral and non-littoral states’ naval presence in the sea and, thereby, NATO's presence in the region. The article first sets out the ordinary prescriptions of the Convention. It then evaluates NATO’s presence in the Black Sea by examining NATO member states’ fleets in the region. The article then proceeds to evaluate the legal and practical effectiveness of vaunted loopholes in the convention, in particular the Danubian route for warships into the Black Sea, finding them, on balance, to be illusory. It then assesses how NATO’s presence in the Black Sea may be strengthened within the framework of the Convention.
What is the Montreux Convention?
The Montreux Convention of 1936 regulates the passage of ships into the Black Sea. The Convention always remains in force, notwithstanding a UN Security Council Resolution.[i] The Convention guarantees free access of civilian shipping to the Black Sea. It also allows military vessels from all nations access to the Black Sea during peacetime. There is naturally no question of any restriction on the transit of Turkish ships in the Straits since they are Turkish territorial waters. Other ships must, however, pass in due form and without lingering. Türkiye must also be notified in advance as to the dates of the transit and the composition of the force. For Black Sea coastal states, this must be eight days before the transit; for others, it can be fifteen. Littoral states are otherwise unrestricted in their access to the Black Sea. Others are severely restricted in terms of both the tonnage and duration of their presence therein.
The tonnage[ii] of all military vessels, except for fuel ships, of non-littoral powers in the Black Sea may never exceed 45,000 imperial tons.[iii] The tonnage of an individual non-littoral state may not account for more than two-thirds of this quota. In the case of humanitarian interventions, both these limits are disregarded—but the tonnage of the humanitarian intervention itself must be under 8,000 tons.[iv] Never, however, may a military vessel of a non-littoral state stay continuously in the Black Sea for more than 21 days, nor may they linger in the Straits themselves. The Convention, nevertheless, does not define what counts as lingering.
In wartime, unless the war involves Türkiye, nothing changes for states at peace. Warships of belligerent states, however, cannot transit the Straits except in two cases: to return to their home bases or within the context of “assistance rendered to a State victim of aggression in virtue of a treaty of mutual assistance binding Turkey concluded within the framework of the Covenant of the League of Nations”, i.e., a treaty binding Türkiye, conforming to the precepts of the United Nations—the League’s successor—and duly deposited therewith.[v] However, the tonnage, notice, and duration requirements still apply.
The Convention was designed in 1936 with a conflict between the Soviet Union and the West in mind. In that context the Convention meant that if Russia went to war, unless the League of Nations sanctioned it, its fleet would be imprisoned in the Black Sea, while Western fleets could maintain a presence in the Black Sea subject to the restrictions above. If, however, Russia and the West themselves were at war with each other, the Russians could not go out of the Black Sea and the West could not go into it—and the Black Sea remained outside the conflict. Yet, as stipulated in the treaty, all this relied on Türkiye being neutral.
Yet, Türkiye has not been a neutral party since joining NATO in 1952. Ever since, NATO commitments are Turkish commitments, and Montreux’s advantage for Russia has been diminished. Any document between NATO and a third party promising even only moral, as opposed to effective, support may constitute a “treaty of mutual assistance binding Turkey,” thereby leaving Russia’s fleet imprisoned in the Black Sea and its enemies free to enter it. A more substantial agreement of assistance between a victim of aggression and NATO may draw Türkiye itself into the conflict, changing the question altogether. If Türkiye is at war or under the imminent danger of it, the Convention partly suspends itself: It stipulates that Türkiye reassume full control over military traffic through the Straits. In this case, anyone Türkiye wishes to let enter the Black Sea may enter, none other. The Convention also allows Türkiye to bar civilian vessels belonging to or in any way assisting its enemies. The free access of other civilian ships remains. Therefore, a belligerent Türkiye may embargo its enemies and act against the circumvention thereof, but nothing more.
NATO’s Presence in the Black Sea
Since nobody lives in the water, navies have always been more about monitoring and projecting rather than controlling. Naval superiority may be crucial, but it is always a second-order question, ultimately a means to affect conditions on land. The abilities it confers—blockading, invading, and reconnoitring—all ultimately pertain to concerns on land. Likewise, denying naval superiority ultimately serves to safeguard concerns on land by denying the concomitant abilities to the enemy. The importance of sea power in general diminishes as enemy territory gets in range of one’s land-based monitoring and missile systems. Today’s mightiest ships, aircraft carriers, are just that: platforms for other craft to scout the enemy and, if required, attack.
A typical aircraft carrier, weighing about 100,000 tons cannot, per Montreux, enter the Black Sea—even if they could physically fit under the bridges in the Straits, which they cannot—but this does not really matter. Carrier groups are platforms for projecting power over distance. In the relatively small Black Sea, half whose coastline is occupied by NATO, land-based capabilities are stronger, and thus, they are used instead.
Those capabilities come under what is called the Integrated Air Defense System.[vi] All Allies along the Black Sea have radar stations.[vii] Radar is especially good at tracking individual vessels. However, radar projected from stationary installations is limited by topography and the Earth’s curvature. Even over-the-horizon and over-the-surface radar, which overcome the curvature problem, have maximum ranges around 400 kilometers. Russia and Ukraine inherited such systems from the Soviet Union. The Ukrainian system has a range of about 300 kilometres into the Black Sea.[viii]
So, NATO emphasises radar and monitoring from the air instead. On top of radar, there are surveillance planes, which are crucial to the whole activity.[ix] These planes are part of the vaunted Airborne and Early Warning Control Force, headquartered at Geilenkirchen, a major base in Germany. That the locations of major bases have not changed since the Cold War is misleading. There are several forward bases that belong to the country hosting them that accommodate US planes. Amari in Estonia and Campia Turzii in Transylvania in Romania stand out. These form the bulwark of the Alliance’s airborne surveillance today, and this system of radar and surveillance planes covers all of NATO’s eastern borders, including the Black Sea.[x]
Yet, always flying planes is expensive and difficult. This is where ships come in. For instance, Crimea and the coast are subject to easy surveillance from the sea. If these ships used over-the-horizon or over-the-surface radar, even the Zaporizhian frontline can come into range. It is about 200 kilometers and 12 nautical miles—the limit for coastal waters—off the flat, black soil of Kherson Oblast. The Donbass, front farther from the Black Sea, is harder to detect.[xi]
So, while it is operationally advantageous to host naval ships in the Black Sea, the need is not for great and resilient ships. It is rather for stealthy and fast vessels to reconnoitre and deploy missiles, for example, littoral combat ships. As outlined above, Montreux limits the availability of NATO ships. A typical littoral combat frigate weighs about 3,422 tons[xii]—for the newer US Constellation-class ships in this category, this figure is 7,291 tons.[xiii] Then, what about the fleets of the Black Sea Allies, whose naval presence the Convention does not circumscribe?
Türkiye’s substantial fleet is the most able. Türkiye has eight littoral combat frigates, the Yavuz[xiv] and Barbaros[xv] classes[xvi] (German-built c. 1989). Additionally, Türkiye has eight Gabya-class frigates,[xvii] acquired between 1993 and 2002—a version the US Oliver Hazard Perry-class modernised for anti-air and surveillance purposes. In 2024, Türkiye also started a new frigate class, Istif,[xviii] of which one has been built.[xix] Türkiye has many corvettes, like the four old Burak-class[xx] anti-submarine transoceanic escorts, and the newer Ada-class corvettes, which are also littoral combat ships[xxi] and resemble the US Freedom-class.[xxii] They combine littoral and transoceanic capabilities and use stealth technology. Türkiye has many rapid attack and missile vessels and patrol boats.[xxiii]
Romania and Bulgaria’s navies are small. The Romanian navy has three frigates. One was built domestically under former Romanian president Nicolae Ceausescu. It can only fire. The other two are British Type 22s (c. 1980s at the latest).[xxiv] Britain has not used this class since 2011.[xxv] This class, though designed to combat submarines, served general purposes. As for corvettes, Romania has four that were built under Ceausescu, which seemingly can only fire, and three missile corvettes of the Soviet Tarantul-class.[xxvi]
Bulgaria has four frigates: one Koni-class old Soviet anti-submarine vessel and three (c. 1978) Wielingen-class Belgian ships. These latter are escort ships with surface-to-air missiles. Seemingly designed for resilience, they can become gastight. Belgium has not used this class since 2008. Bulgaria also has one Soviet Tarantul-class corvette, one Pua-class missile corvette, one patrol corvette, three minehunters, and assorted support ships.[xxvii] Interestingly, Bulgaria contracted with Germany’s NVL group to have two small, but modern corvettes built in a Varna shipyard.[xxviii] One has been built.[xxix]
Since a Black Sea navy serves more to probe beyond frontiers than defend against imminent threats, Romanian and Bulgarian naval weakness might not matter much. However, there is concern vis-à-vis a point of principle. The Type 22 and Wielingen classes making up, respectively, the mainstay of Romania’s and Bulgaria’s navies are older escort ships, designed for resilience in accompanying aircraft carriers across the oceans, not the Black Sea’s requirements for stealth, speed, and reconnaissance. Nor is there any indication that they have been modernized to better serve their function, as with Türkiye’s Gabya-class. Romania and Bulgaria, unlike Allies on the Atlantic coast for which the Type 22 and Wielingen classes were built, do not traditionally have the role of accompanying aircraft carriers across the oceans. It would indeed be troublesome to get ships from a sea inside a sea whenever a transoceanic voyage was planned. Romania’s and Bulgaria’s geostrategic position does not call for such ships either. It stands to reason that an Alliance should act with a common strategic vision. Members of the Alliance should not procure ships unsuitable to their requirements or capabilities. Haphazard procurement is especially blameworthy somewhere as serious as defence.
Expanding Montreux through the Danube?
Should NATO’s naval presence in the Black Sea be increased? There is, as mentioned above, a distinction between detecting imminent threats and activities further beyond the frontier. A navy mostly serves the latter. The question is whether to adopt a purely defensive posture or acquire capabilities with greater range—an ultimately doctrinal and political consideration that depends on what one thinks is presently appropriate and the commitments envisioned toward non-Allies. Some may disapprove of growing the Alliance’s presence when Russia has launched an invasion with the pretext that NATO’s presence on its borders has grown too large. For others, Russian belligerence makes strengthening capabilities more pertinent. Currently, there is not a consensus among the Allies either way.
NATO’s naval presence can be strengthened in two ways: trying to work around Montreux or building up the Black Sea Allies’ strengths. Both have their problems. One idea to work around Montreux involves using the German navy, which is substantial. To decrease response time, German warships would spend 21 days in the Black Sea, enter the Danube Delta, and exit again. The ships would have to be German because while foreign warships are barred from the Danube, Germany is a riparian state.[xxx]
The Convention does not explicitly forbid this. Nonetheless, interpreting the Convention broadly—though favoring Russia—better conforms to its spirit. Despite the name, much of the Montreux Convention of the Regime of the Straits deals with the nature of non-Black Sea powers’ presence at large in the Black Sea. Suppose a British warship entered the sea but stayed more than 21 days, and Türkiye responded by banning the transit of British warships through the Straits for a time.
Montreux grants free access to the sea but prescribes no penalty for violations. Britain, a signatory to the Convention, could, perhaps rightfully, complain that Türkiye’s unilateral actions were unacceptable: that the ban was too long or that a breach did not void Britain’s right to access. If one believes in this argument and holds that Türkiye should not take unilateral actions to enforce the Convention—that actions must be taken collectively—it follows that all signatories must enforce it: Türkiye may administer the Convention in the Straits because the Straits are Turkish territory, but the Convention’s application is not limited thereto and concomitantly, all signatories are responsible for enforcing the Convention in a broader sense. It is the Montreux Convention on the Regime of the Straits, not ‘in the Straits’. That the Convention is silent as to its enforcement; that the signatories are equal parties; and that the Convention is clearly designed to partially demilitarize and neutralize the Black Sea—all this supports an interpretation as the above—under which, Romania would be responsible for upholding the Convention within its territory and not permit such a Danubian maneuver.
Yet, Russo-Romanian relations are bad today. Romania may well abjure this interpretation and argue that the Convention applies only to the Straits themselves, binding only Türkiye’s actions. Since countries remain sovereign, conventions are quid-pro-quos. A party is not expected to be bound by stipulations without reciprocation. Romania may well argue that the Convention, which cites the League of Nations, was signed in a specific context with the legal expectation that force be abjured. Today, Russia has invaded Ukraine—indeed, through intimidation, it took Bessarabia from Romania in 1940, a few years after signing the Convention. Such an argument may be forced, but Russia has used similar reasoning for a much weaker case: it does not observe the Budapest Memorandum and its commitment therein to Ukraine’s territorial integrity, arguing that they were political and should be taken in context: basically, that Russia had agreed to respect the integrity of a neutral Ukraine, not one aligned with the West. This simultaneously illustrates the importance of upholding covenants and how questions often boil down to politics: would Romania risk Russia’s ire? How would Türkiye respond to violations of the Convention?
Building up NATO’s Black Sea littoral states’ capabilities may seem more promising than making the Danube Delta anchorage for German ships. However, here, too, are problems. The fundamental one is geopolitical. Black Sea Allies, however good their ships, could never use them as freely as powers far away from the sea. In 2021, the HMS Defender entered coastal waters off Crimea. The Russians responded by dropping bombs into the ship’s path and staging mock attacks on a Dutch warship the next day. That the same occur with Romanian or Turkish ships instead would be dangerous and almost unthinkable. A mock attack on a Romanian ship may be thought of as the start of a larger Russian move. Even in the economically nonsensical and unlikely case that there were no economic or energy links between Romania and Russia, an incident may have tangible consequences, maybe concerning Moldova. Romania—and other Black Sea Allies, too—would not assert themselves as readily as Britain.
Expanding Allied Member States’ Black Sea Fleets?
There are also problems in building up the Black Sea fleet itself. Among the Black Sea Allies, only Türkiye has the potential to build up its own fleet alone through its developed shipbuilding industry. Yet, there may still be complications. That industry has been undercut by Chinese competition, and Türkiye is experiencing an economic crisis. Moreover, Turkish ships presently tend to use Turkish technology, which might not be as good as that of other Allies. Current tensions between Türkiye and its Allies may hinder the commercial and technological partnerships that would greatly upgrade naval capabilities.
Building up Romania and Bulgaria’s navies may prove even harder. Unlike Türkiye, they have no defense industry. Increasing their capabilities may well take more coordination, requiring entire ships, not just particular systems. Yet, much of shipbuilding has been outsourced. Few shipyards have been preserved within the Alliance. There are fewer places to obtain the ships and resources that must be marshalled from an increasingly bygone source, and complications may arise. Many remaining shipyards, being state-owned, may be inefficient. Projects going overbudget is common in shipbuilding anyway, especially so with specialized military ships. Expenditures may prove hard to justify. Anything spent on guns is in some sense not spent on butter.
Factories may be built in Romania or Bulgaria as subsidiaries of extant industries elsewhere—as Bulgaria recently did for those corvettes—or as fully-fledged industries themselves. Almost nowhere within the Alliance is labor cheaper—though hyperinflation has made it close in Türkiye. The prevalence of outsourcing demonstrates costs are everything in shipbuilding. In this poorer part of Europe, developing such an industrial base would create jobs and further the accomplishment of a European dream in an area in which many are still economically dissatisfied. However, justifying expenditure abroad should prove even harder than at home.[xxxi]
Assessment
The Convention, despite its accompanying problems, does not seriously jeopardize the security of the Alliance, at least in defensive terms. The Integrated Air Defence System should be capable of dealing with immediate threats. A navy brings the advantage of being able to launch short-range missiles better and detect incoming missiles earlier, since ships can get closer to enemy territory. Otherwise, NATO’s naval presence pertains more to local conflicts and NATO’s ability to help parties therein or intervene. The war in Ukraine demonstrates this. It also demonstrates that if the required arms are given to the defender to survive the onslaught and information from Allies’ satellites and the Integrated Air Defense System is handed over to be checked against the information from the defender’s and others’ ground systems, the advantage gained from naval support is real but somewhat marginal.
Montreux is a rare thing: a long-lasting demilitarization and neutralization agreement advantageous to all. Montreux does not just help Russia but the West, too. Without it, each entry and exit that Türkiye permitted or disallowed could become a point of contention. Even if Türkiye always opted in favor of its Allies therein, these could lead to escalation between NATO and others in the Black Sea. Widely accepted and honored agreements, with states seeking their interests within their frameworks, are the cornerstones of any international rules-based order.
About the Author
Onur Anamur, a citizen of Canada and Türkiye, is the editor of Atlantic Forum's Our Views and currently works as an analyst analyzing the North American energy market. A recent graduate of Middle East Technical University in Ankara, Türkiye, where he received his Bachelor of Science in Political Science and Public Administration, he is interested in global affairs and public policy, and has written in various publications. In 2021, the European Commission recognized him as one of Europe’s top journalists under 30 and invited him to report on the Week of Regions and Cities under the aegis of the Youth 4 Regions programme. He is also interested in languages. He is a native speaker of Turkish and English and has lectured in the latter. He is also fully fluent in French, and knows some Italian, Chinese, and Latin.
Notes
[i] A Security Council Resolution is the only type of UN decision carrying legal obligations, and the United Nations Charter commits member states to giving priority to UN commitments over all other treaties. Moreover, the UN is the legal successor to the League of Nations. Article 25 of the Montreux Convention itself reads: “Nothing in the present Convention shall prejudice the rights and obligations of Türkiye, or of any of the other High Contracting Parties members of the League of Nations, arising out of the Covenant of the League of Nations.”
[ii] Calculated by individual ships’ displacement.
[iii] The quota used to be 30,000 tons, but the Convention provided that whenever the largest fleet in the sea exceeded the current limit by 10,000 tons, the limit would increase by the same amount—up to a maximum of 45,000 tons, which is today’s limit.
[iv] In the case of humanitarian intervention, the notification requirements are also waived. Indeed, if the 45,000 has not been reached, Türkiye must let the intervening force pass the Straits without further ado. Alternatively, if it has, then Türkiye must ask the other littoral states and, provided they consent, then they must allow the cargo to pass.
[v] What does this mean in practical terms? Today, given the war between Russia and Ukraine, a Russian warship ordinarily based in Kaliningrad with the Baltic Fleet cannot get into the Black Sea, and a Russian ship based in Sevastopol with the Black Sea Fleet cannot get out. But if this second ship happened to be currently patrolling the Mediterranean, it could get in. Now that the war has gone on for some time, it is unlikely that there should be such a ship, but this was relevant when the invasion first began. Since all Ukrainian warships are based at a port in the Black Sea—Ukraine does not have a coast anywhere else—Ukrainian ships may also enter the sea, but they too cannot get back out. Had Türkiye, however, had a security treaty with Ukraine, promising the latter assistance of any kind, even if it be merely moral or diplomatic, Ukrainian ships would be able to go in and out as before the war—being a power aggressed upon with “treaty of mutual assistance binding Turkey”. But, if it was Ukraine that had started the war, then Ukraine would be the aggressor, and Ukrainian warships would be locked in the Black Sea in the manner mentioned previously.
[vi] “NCI Agency | Air and Missile Defence Command and Control,” NCI, NATO, n.d. https://www.ncia.nato.int/what-we-do/air-missile-defence.html.
[vii] Albeit of varying quality: Poland and Türkiye’s appear well-developed; Romania’s, mediocre; and Bulgaria’s, woeful.
[viii] Bin-Yi Liu, "HF OVER-THE-HORIZON RADAR SYSTEM PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS," Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA474069.pdf.
[ix] “Integrated Air and Missile Defence (NATO IAMD),” NATO, n.d., https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8206.htm.
[x] Information gathered from this system may, depending on the circumstances, be checked against that from today’s flagship monitoring technology, satellites, which are traditionally focused on topography and discovering positioning and larger movements. Nevertheless, great developments in resolution mean satellites are now tactically effective systems of war. However, satellites lie outside NATO’s sphere. Allies may have them, but they are not under NATO’s command.
[xi] The Sea of Azov is closed to all but Russian ships. It was considered Soviet coastal waters until Russia and Ukraine signed an agreement in 2003 that rendered the sea exclusively to Russia. Since annexing the sea’s Ukrainian coastline, Russia has monopolized the claim. Russia has closed the Kerch Strait not just to foreign military vessels but all civilian shipping, too.
[xii] Based off the USS Independence. “INDEPENDENCE (LCS 2),” accessed April 22, 2024, https://www.nvr.navy.mil/SHIPDETAILS/SHIPSDETAIL_LCS_2.HTML.
[xiii] David Larter, “Here’s the Latest on the US Navy’s New Constellation-Class Frigate,” Defense News, August 21, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/surface-navy-association/2021/01/12/heres-the-latest-on-the-us-navys-new-constellation-class-frigate/.
[xiv] “Yavuz Sınıfı,” Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Milli Savunma Bakanlığı Deniz Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı, accessed April 23, 2024, https://www.dzkk.tsk.tr/Destek/icerik/yavuz-sinifi; Two now serve as “testing and training ships.” See, “FATİH ve YAVUZ Ile Diğer Gemilere Eğitim Gemisi Statüsü,” SavunmaSanayiST, March 25, 2024, https://www.savunmasanayist.com/fatih-ve-yavuz-ile-diger-gemilere-egitim-gemisi-statusu/.
[xv] “Barbaros Sınıfı,” Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Milli Savunma Bakanlığı Deniz Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı, accessed April 23, 2024, https://www.dzkk.tsk.tr/Destek/icerik/barbaros-sinifi.
[xvi] MEKO200 ships constructed by the German shipyard Blom+Voss between 1987 and 1989.
See “BARBAROS Class Frigates Mid-Life Upgrade (MLU) Project Update,” Defence Turkey, September 25, 2021, https://www.defenceturkey.com/en/content/barbaros-class-frigates-mid-life-upgrade-mlu-project-update-4748.
[xvii] “Gabya Sınıfı,” Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Milli Savunma Bakanlığı Deniz Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı, accessed April 23, 2024, https://www.dzkk.tsk.tr/Destek/icerik/gabya-sinifi.
[xviii] “İstif Sınıfı,” Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Milli Savunma Bakanlığı Deniz Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı, accessed April 23, 2024, https://www.dzkk.tsk.tr/Destek/icerik/istif-sinifi.
[xix] Türkiye’s flagship aircraft carrier, the TCG Anadolu, is an amphibious assault ship: a carrier but for helicopters and drones. However, it thus appears designed not so much for a conventional war in the Black Sea but more for humanitarian interventions in places like Libya and Syria. The TCG Anadolu presents another example of defense industry cooperation throughout the Alliance, being based on the Juan Carlos I model of Spain’s Navantia shipyard. See “Keel Laying of Future Turkish Navy LHD TCG Anadolu,” Navy Recognition, February 2018, https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/defence-news/2018/february-2018-navy-naval-defense-news/5932-keel-laying-of-future-turkish-navy-lhd-tcg-anadolu.html.
[xx] “Burak Sınıfı,” Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Milli Savunma Bakanlığı Deniz Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı, accessed April 23, 2024, https://www.dzkk.tsk.tr/Destek/icerik/burak-sinifi. The class consists of the old French D’Estienne d’Orves-class, built in the 1970s and acquired by the Turkish navy between 2001 and 2002. Originally five, one, the TCG Bodrum, was retired in 2022. See Arda Çelik, “TCG BODRUM Korveti Envanterden Çıkartıldı,” SavunmaSanayiST, November 30, 2022, https://www.savunmasanayist.com/tcg-bodrum-korveti-envanterden-cikartildi/.
[xxi] “Ada Sınıfı,” Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Milli Savunma Bakanlığı Deniz Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı, accessed April 23, 2024, https://www.dzkk.tsk.tr/Destek/icerik/ada-sinifi.
[xxii] “Littoral Combat Ship (LCS),” Lockheed Martin, https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/products/littoral-combat-ship-lcs.html.
[xxiii] The MRTP class is the fastest patrol vessel in the world. Aybars Meriç, “YONCA ONUK MRTP 16’dan Yeni Rekor,” savunmahaber.com, July 17, 2020, https://www.savunmahaber.com/yonca-onuk-mrtp-16dan-yeni-rekor/
[xxiv] Cristian Gregoretti, “263 – VICEAMIRAL EUGENIU ROSCA,” Marinarii.Ro, September 28, 2020, https://marinarii.ro/corveta-263-viceamiral-eugeniu-rosca/
[xxv] Five were scrapped, and two sunk as targets.
[xxvi] “Naval Ships,” Romanian Navy, accessed April 22, 2024, https://www.navy.ro/despre/nave_en.php
[xxvii] “Bulgarian Naval Forces (Български Военноморски Сили),” Bulgarian Navy, accessed April 22, 2024, http://www.navy.mod.bg/?page_id=52.
[xxviii] Tiash Saha, “Multipurpose Modular Patrol Vessels (MMPV), Bulgaria,” Naval Technology, August 11, 2023,
https://www.naval-technology.com/projects/multipurpose-modular-patrol-vessels-bulgaria/.
[xxix] Dimitris Mitsopoulos, “Bulgaria’s First Modern Corvette Launched by Local Shipyard,” Naval News, August 12, 2023. https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/08/bulgarias-first-modern-corvette-launched-by-local-shipyard/,
[xxx] Lieutenant Commander Adam Aliano, “The Montreux Convention and a Black Sea Presence: Leveraging Law to Enable Operational Capabilities,” Defense Technical Information Center, Newport, Rhode Island, United States: Naval War College, February 13, 2022, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD1174860.; The Convention governs the navigable portion of the Danube river—and attendant bordering states—between Ulm and the Black Sea. See “Convention Regarding the Regime of Navigation on the Danube,” signed August 18, 1948, League of Nations Treaty Series, Volume XXVI, http://www.danubecommission.org/uploads/doc/convention-en.pdf
[xxxi] Although, truthfully, it would not likely be spent at home: the expensive dollar and euro make shipbuilding and many other industries in much of the West almost commercially preclude shipbuilding in the West.
Cover image from: https://news.usni.org/2022/02/28/turkey-closes-bosphorus-dardanelles-straits-to-warships
