Is the Black Sea Already a NATO Sea?
By Oğuz Bulut Kök and Aybars Arda Kılıçer
Since the escalation of the War in Ukraine, discussions concerning NATO’s mission and scope in the Black Sea as an increasingly significant geopolitical area have intensified. Given the significant impact that the delicate power dynamics in the Black Sea region has had on the decision-makers of the Euro-Atlantic alliance and the Russian Federation, it is pertinent to continue investigating the significance of the Black Sea for NATO. Hence, this paper aims to better comprehend NATO’s presence in the Black Sea region. This paper intends to offer policymakers valuable insights to strengthen regional stability and security in the changing geopolitical scenario, characterized by a shift towards a more multipolar environment. Furthermore, this study seeks to contribute to future discussions about the power dynamics of international waters by offering a perceptive theoretical foundation for a comprehensive understanding of the balance of power in inland seas. Therefore, it is beneficial to start our discussion with a theoretical perspective to better comprehend the broader geopolitical debates on inland sea control.
Hegemonic, Controlled, Secured, or Transitional Sea
We can categorize the four distinct forms of inland sea control based on the nation or alliance’s conventional and strategic military superiority. Discovering the profound consequences of strategic and conventional military superiority was a crucial component in arriving at these conclusions. We contend that the allocation of power along these two crucial axes determines the balance of power over an inland sea, as in the following table.
Table 1. Strategic Dynamics and Power Relations in Inland Seas
Condition
Sea Status
Implications for Rivals
Strategic and Conventional Military Superiority
Hegemonic Sea
Hostile Sea
Strategic Superiority without Conventional Military Superiority
Controlled Sea
Competitive Interaction Zone (for rivals)
Conventional Military Superiority without Strategic Superiority
Secured Sea
Stable Interaction Zone (for rivals)
Changing Dynamics Towards a Specific Actor’s Advantage
Transitional Sea
Evolving Power Dynamics Zone
Hegemonic Sea (Hostile Sea for the Rival) — Emerges when a state or alliance possesses both strategic and conventional military superiority in an inland sea. The hegemon is able to claim the sea as its own because of its twofold superiority, which gives it dominant influence and control. Unilaterally securing its interests, imposing its will, and conducting operations with little resistance are all within the hegemon’s power. An excellent illustration of this type of dominant body of water may be seen in Japan’s Seto Inland Sea, which divides the three largest islands in the country—Honshō, Shikoku, and Kyūshū. As a result of such obvious tactical and strategic military advantages, Japan enjoys an unchallenged claim to supremacy in the region.
Controlled Sea — Strategic superiority, sustained through controlling the passages of the inland sea, allows a state or alliance to enjoy being in control of any other rival factions aspiring to supply their presence in the region. It paves the way for a competitive interaction zone for the rivals because the other powers are subjected to the decisions of the power in control of such strategic passages. It is arguable that the South China Sea is a model “controlled sea,” in which China, despite not possessing absolute conventional military supremacy over the United States and its allies, has acquired significant strategic superiority through its military build-up on many islands.
Secured Sea — Conventional military superiority, reflected in terms of military vessels and other conventional means for a nation or alliance to project its defensive and aggressive capabilities, allows the establishment of a secured sea. For rivals, the sea becomes a stable interaction zone, where direct military confrontation is risky. If the holder has a conventional military edge, their rivals may try to balance this by joining alliances or using geopolitical methods. One strategically important chokepoint that Iran controls militarily is the Persian Gulf, especially the area around the Strait of Hormuz. The presence of Gulf states and other U.S. allies in the region means that Iran may not have overall strategic superiority in the region. However, its conventional military capabilities, particularly its use of asymmetric warfare tactics, make it a formidable power in the Persian Gulf.
This theoretical lens constitutes the backbone of our analyses concerning the ongoing power struggles in the Black Sea region and our broader policy recommendations for NATO and the Western alliance for a more stable and peaceful region. Therefore, throughout the article, our theory on the Black Sea as a transitional sea is demonstrated through assessing the region’s history, showing that there are multiple reasons for NATO to consolidate its presence in the region.
Firstly, as stated in NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept,[i] Russia is identified as a clear threat to the Alliance. Therefore, consolidation of power around the Black Sea is necessary to keep Russia’s expansionist policy in check. Secondly, the Black Sea has been a transit zone for many potential security issues[ii] and is a transit hub (even more so with the previous Turkish bid to be an energy hub) for energy sources in nearby regions. Therefore, the region’s stability is required to prevent global spill-over effects. Thirdly, besides being a transit region, its vicinity or the “extended” Black Sea are also of direct interest to NATO. This is the case since the European countries, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean are all direct zones of NATO’s interests. The question that remains is how this consolidation should be done. Given the importance of understanding this, it is best to start by providing a brief but comprehensive overview of the historical contexts that were crucial in generating the present situation.
From the Crimean War to the Cold War: Breaking Russian Hegemony
The Crimean War of 1853 was the first time Western and Russian interests clashed over control of the Black Sea region. At the time, the Ottoman Empire was threatened by an expansionist Russian Empire that wanted to increase its influence in the Balkans and gain access to the strategically important Mediterranean. A coalition of Western allies, including the British, the French, and Piedmont-Sardinia, rushed to aid the Ottoman Empire. Given that this was a Western alliance aimed at curbing the growing political and naval power of the Russian Empire in the region, this conflict can be regarded as a useful case study to compare with the current situation. Moreover, interestingly, because of this, this alliance was arguably the most notable example that shows similarities with NATO. It should be emphasized that at this point in time, the Black Sea was still a rather contentious area in which neither the Russian nor the Ottoman Empire had established clear dominance. Hence, one could contend that Western intervention had a pivotal role in establishing a state of equilibrium in the region, safeguarding the delicate balance from being disrupted to the benefit of Saint Petersburg.
Despite sustaining a temporary and delicate power balance, tensions in the Black Sea would soon escalate again with the outbreak of the Great War. Realizing the crucial significance of attaining naval dominance in the region, the Ottoman fleet, this time led by German officers, attacked the vital naval ports of the Russian Empire, particularly Odessa and Sevastopol.[iii] The Ottoman navy’s actions effectively restricted Russian naval activities in the region, establishing a debatable equilibrium of strength that persisted until the conclusion of the Great War in 1918. Nevertheless, the Black Sea continued to hold significant strategic importance in Russian politics during the Russian Civil War. Both the Bolshevik Red Army and the anti-revolutionary White Movement recognized the region’s value and sought to gain control of it in order to ensure future reinforcements and foreign material backing.[iv] Moscow’s fast industrialization and growing militarization of the Black Sea region during the interwar years resulted in an increase in the Soviet naval presence in the region. Furthermore, Soviet influence became even more apparent as the West’s presence in the region splintered into multiple unstable alliances, which left Moscow with ample assets to fill the void to combat the increasing Axis presence.[v] These all led the Black Sea to play a significant role in the Second World War, particularly during Nazi Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941.
Nevertheless, it is crucial to emphasize that the conclusion of the Second World War definitively demonstrated the Soviet Union’s absolute naval dominance in the region. In addition to the existing Soviet republics of Georgia, Russia, and Ukraine, Moscow expanded its dominance in the region through establishing control over puppet governments in Romania and Bulgaria, as well as its direct control over a substantial coastline. With this move, the Soviet Union finally sealed off the Black Sea on three fronts—the eastern, northern, and western ones—leaving only Türkiye out of its control. As a result, given that Türkiye was the sole independent state in the Black Sea and a vital member of NATO, it was obvious that, in the framework of the Cold War, the Black Sea would represent another significant zone of conflicting regional interests of the Warsaw Pact, which was dominated by the Soviet Union, and the Euro-Atlantic alliance.
The Cold War: NATO Controlled but Not Secured
From 1945 to 1991, as an iron curtain was established over Europe, the Black Sea would become one of the most critical fronts of the contestation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. While analysing this competition, it is important to recognize that one of the defining features of this competition was how this conflict transformed into an arms race, aimed at establishing superiority against the other side. Both sides viewed each other’s possible achievement of naval dominance in the region as a direct threat towards their own survival. This view demonstrates how this arms race was fundamentally an outcome of mutual ontological security needs of the opposing sides.
While it is true that the Euro-Atlantic alliance had a significant presence in the southern part of the Black Sea region through Türkiye, it was clear that Soviet control in the region would make it a “hostile sea” for NATO if Ankara would not have been admitted to the alliance in 1952.
Therefore, by maintaining strategic superiority through Turkish control of the Dardanelles and Bosporus Straits, effectively allowing the Alliance to muster a larger fleet in the Black Sea, if necessary, under the conditions of the Montreux Convention, NATO prevented the Soviet Union from establishing full hegemony in the Black Sea. The convention was a great asset for Turkish control of the straits as it allowed Ankara to exercise full authority over the conditions of armed vessels entering and leaving the Black Sea basin. Without Türkiye’s permission, the Warsaw Pact members had no means of bringing additional naval resources to the region. This effectively ensured that the Black Sea became a controlled sea for NATO, despite the Warsaw Pact’s superiority in terms of having the upper hand in conventional military figures.
The collapse and subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union, marking the end of the Cold War, further strengthened the Western alliance’s hand in the Black Sea. Not only did it tip the scales firmly in favour of NATO and the West, but it also limited the potential power projection of the newly formed Russian Federation to the Sea of Azov, effectively ending Russian dominance in the region. Following major changes in the international arena in the 1990s and 2000s, the Black Sea became a transitional sea, which will be analysed below.
The 1990s and Early 2000s: A Transitional Sea
Two big shifts occurred at the Cold War’s conclusion that affected the delicate power dynamic in the Black Sea: First and foremost, the breakup of the Soviet Union, which resulted in the newly formed states of Ukraine, Russia, and Georgia, sharing the former Soviet Black Sea coast. While internal strife and ethnic conflicts in Georgia rendered the Tbilisi government’s control over Black Sea ports within the country’s boundaries mostly ineffective, Georgia’s solid foothold on Batumi guaranteed its control over the Black Sea’s southern and eastern banks. On the other side, the Russian Federation was unable to maintain any kind of substantial naval presence in the region after the independence of Ukraine, which included the valuable ports of Odesa and Crimea as well as Sevastopol. At this point, the only areas still directly controlled by Russia were a portion of the Sea of Azov and the north-eastern parts of the Black Sea.
Secondly, it was clear that the western regions of the Black Sea broke free of Russian influence after the shift from communism by the governments of Bulgaria and Romania, which had previously been supported by the Soviet Union. After both nations joined the European Union and NATO, it became clear that the Western alliance’s influence and presence had grown even more in this strategically significant region. Therefore, the fall of the Soviet Union and the power vacuum caused in the Black Sea, leading to the establishment of closer ties between the Western alliance and the new regimes in the region, were two major outcomes of the Cold War. With Türkiye, Bulgaria, and Romania as full-fledged NATO members in the Black Sea, the sea transformed into a transitional sea, improving NATO’s position in the area.[vi]
One could argue that Russia, aware of its limitations in the region due to these new circumstances, reacted to these altered dynamics by invading Georgia in 2008, citing disagreements over Tbilisi’s attempts to seize control of two breakaway separatist regions in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Despite the fact that Russia has not annexed any Georgian territory as of yet, it has sought to set itself up for the ultimate taking of these regions by acknowledging their de facto independence. This move was driven by leaders in both regions who were increasingly in favour of this notion. Therefore, the Black Sea region’s situation as a transitional sea can also be seen as a driving factor for Russia’s Near Abroad policy. A further direct consequence of Russia’s invasion of Georgia was the outbreak of hostilities between Russia and the Western alliance via NATO, as both sides claimed to be attempting to gain more control over the Black Sea.[vii] This is the point at which relations between the Russian Federation and the Euro-Atlantic Alliance have become icy. However, the real schism occurred in 2014, when Russia seized Crimea from Ukraine in an internationally non-recognized referendum that set the stage for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
Russian Aggression in Ukraine and Its Implications for the Black Sea
One can argue that Russian aggression against Kyiv started as early as the non-recognized referendum in 2014 organized by Moscow to seize Crimea from Ukraine’s control. Although there has been a considerable amount of academic and diplomatic work concerning the various implications of this aggressive stance that Russia decided to take against Ukraine, the extent of work concerning the implications of this move related to the delicate balance of Black Sea power dynamics appears to be limited. Nevertheless, it is important to highlight the fact that, arguably, the most important geopolitical consequence of this move, which first erupted in the separatist regions of Ukraine, namely the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, and followed with the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, was on Black Sea security.
When Russia decided to further escalate the conflict in February 2022 by declaring a so-called “special military operation” over the remaining Ukrainian territory, it became further apparent that Moscow’s main objective was to overthrow the government in Kyiv and set up a satellite government that would prioritize cooperation with Moscow rather than seek further integration with the Euro-Atlantic alliance. However, contrary to most expectations, Ukrainian resilience has made this strategic objective for Russia untenable. This failure forced Russia to concentrate on its efforts to ensure the complete seizure of Ukrainian coastal territory in the Black Sea. This proves that Moscow aims to combat the ever-increasing NATO presence in the Black Sea by increasing the coastal control it had in the region by about 247%, with potential control over Crimea, Ukraine’s coast of Azov Sea, and Odesa.[viii] Now, Russia seems partially successful in this attempt as it occupies all of Crimea as well as Ukraine’s coast along the Sea of Azov; however, Kyiv still continues to hold the region from Kherson city centre to Odesa and beyond. Considering this, one can argue that the eventual outcome of the war in Ukraine will be fatal for the future of the Black Sea region: it can both increase the Russian presence in the region if Ukraine will make a peace favourable to Moscow, or if Ukraine will prevail with continuing Western assistance, it can put an end to any plans the Russian Federation has to make a meaningful and strategic return to the region.
So, Is the Black Sea Already a NATO Sea?
Returning to our original question, it can be argued that the Euro-Atlantic alliance has been consolidating its position as the hegemonic power in the Black Sea. This includes going beyond its historical strategic advantage, which it has enjoyed since Türkiye joined NATO in 1952, and establishing conventional military dominance in the region. This appears to be the situation at hand as the Russian Black Sea fleet has suffered devastating losses in the region due to successful Ukrainian attacks on major ships, the most famous of which being the destruction of the Moskva in April 2022. According to some accounts, since the commencement of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, Ukraine has critically damaged or destroyed approximately two dozen Russian naval vessels as of 19 February 2024.[ix]
On the other hand, NATO continues to increase its naval presence in the Black Sea while also positioning more of the alliance’s combat-ready forces in the region. Furthermore, NATO is clearly weakening Russia’s remaining conventional forces in the region by supplying additional missile systems and other materials that Kyiv has been employing to wage a naval war against the Russian fleet in the area without possessing a true navy.[x] Therefore, one can argue that now NATO has both strategic and “conventional military” superiority in the region, which as each day passes makes the Black Sea more effectively a NATO sea.
One can make an intriguing comparison of the Black Sea within this analytical framework with the Baltic Sea, another in-land sea where the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact and the Euro-Atlantic alliance competed for naval supremacy in the region. It can be argued that the power dynamic has completely turned in favor of the Euro-Atlantic alliance in the Baltic Sea since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, particularly with the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO; however, this alignment had previously favored the Euro-Atlantic alliance due to the alliance’s eastward expansion in the 1990s and early 2000s. Formerly extending from East Germany to all of the Baltic states and culminating in the strategically significant Russian port city of Leningrad (now known as St. Petersburg), the legacy of the Soviet Union’s influence in the region is now severely curtailed within what little territory is left under Russian control, namely the exclave of Kaliningrad and the port city of St. Petersburg. Though NATO had previously held control over the strategically crucial Kiel Canal and Danish Straits, this resulted in the further expansion of NATO’s presence and influence in the region. While all of these imply that one can conceptualize the Baltic Sea as a debatably hegemonic and NATO sea, further study of the Baltic Sea’s context is required in order to have a deeper grasp of the shifting dynamics of naval superiority there.
Policy Recommendations: Increasing Regional Cooperation
Although NATO cannot expand directly into the region by proposing direct membership to the remaining states (i.e., Ukraine and Georgia) in the region without causing an escalatory reaction, the member states can and should engage with the states with which they already have good relations. As a regional leader, Türkiye and its diplomatic engagement with the region can provide such rapprochement by using and extending the purpose of already existing initiatives. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) comes to mind as one existing organization that includes countries in the Black Sea region. Since these countries (except Russia) are mostly Western-oriented, the role of this alliance could further extend from solely economic cooperation to a quasi-military one that can cooperate on regional security and stability against external threats. A quasi-military alliance is what we consider an alliance of states that aims to cooperate over potential problems that can affect the region, such as the drug trade, migration, terrorism in the nearby regions, among other issues. Revitalizing attempts at military cooperation in the region, such as BLACKSEAFOR, would further help create a retaliatory force if regional security is at risk. One particular issue with this approach might be that the countries within the region are not necessarily closely tied to each other, though nearly all of them have cordial relations with Türkiye. Therefore, the Turkish government should be given the initiative to strengthen regional cooperation through such means.
These proposals should be considered in light of the “extended Black Sea.” The existence of the BSEC already shows how the Black Sea as a region is not solely composed of the countries that have a coastline within it but also the countries that are affected by the developments within the region. The neighbouring country and regions are rich in energy resources, yet open to destabilization as seen over the past three decades in the Middle East. This extended region would include the Balkans, the Turkic republics, and Mediterranean/Middle Eastern countries, with particular attention paid to Iran. Even though such cooperation would provide NATO the grounds for operation and safety in the region, such an expansion should be limited in nature to not pose a perceived threat caused by a “NATO expansion.”
Therefore, channels for direct communication should be kept with these countries, especially Iran, to prevent any unnecessary escalation and continue the already existing agreement reached by the United States and Iranian governments. This could be realized in multiple ways, ideally with the inclusion of these states in decision-making processes but pragmatically by giving them observer status. Finally, yet importantly, NATO should be careful in acting with good faith with the other powers in the region and try to maintain a constructive and proactive stance in the region in an ever increasingly multipolar world.
About the Authors
Oğuz Bulut Kök is a PhD Candidate in Political Science and International Relations at Koç University, Istanbul. He holds a BA in Political Science and International Relations from Izmir University of Economics and an MA in International Relations from Koç University. His research lies between security studies and political psychology/behaviour, especially how actors express emotions, norms, and beliefs and how they affect actors’ decision- making. He is a native Turkish speaker, in addition to being proficient in English and having some knowledge of Spanish and German.
Aybars Arda Kılıçer is a PhD Candidate in Political Science and International Relations at Koç University, Istanbul. He holds a BA in Political Science and International Relations from Boğaziçi University and an MA in International Relations from Koç University. He wrote his master’s thesis on “Assessing Regime Survivability During Civil Wars: A Comparative Analysis of the Russian (1917-22) and the Spanish (1936-39) Civil Wars”. He specializes in comparative politics, specifically interested in Balkan Studies, Caucasian Studies, Studies of Post-Soviet Sphere, and Security Studies. Since August 2022, he is the Editor-in-Chief of Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (formerly Turkish Policy Quarterly). Apart from being a native Turkish speaker, he is fluent in English and knows Russian at a pre-intermediate level.
Notes
[i] NATO, “NATO 2022 Strategic Concept,” 2022, https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/.
[ii] L. Polyakov, “New Security Threats in the Black Sea Region,” in The Black Sea Region: Cooperation and Security Building, ed. O. Pavliuk & I. Klympush-Tsintsazde (London/New York: Routledge, 2015).
[iii] David Fromkin, Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East (New York: Macmillan, 2010).
[iv] Aybars Arda Kılıçer, “Assessing Regime Survivability During Civil Wars: A Comparative Analysis of the Russian (1917-22) and the Spanish Civil Wars (1936-39),” Master’s Thesis Submitted to GSSSH, Koç University, 7 August 2023.
[v] As illustrations of the region’s fractured alliances, consider the French cordon sanitaire, which evolved into the “Little Entente,” and Türkiye’s leadership of the Balkan Pact.
[vi] Aybars Arda Kılıçer, “NATO’s Continuing Support for Ukraine in an Increasingly Multipolar World,” Atlantica 5, no. 6 (February 2024), https://www.atlantic-forum.com/atlantica/natos-continuing-support-for-ukraine-in-an-increasingly-multipolar-world.
[vii] Ian Traynor and Ian Black, “Georgian Conflict Leaves West Reeling and Russia Walking Tall,” The Guardian, 12 August 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/aug/12/georgia1.
[viii] According to the figures presented by BSNN, in “Commitment to the Black Sea”.
See, www.bsnn.org/black_sea.html.
[ix] Mike Eckel, “Ukraine Has No Navy. But It's Hammering Russia in the Black Sea,” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 19 February 2024, https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-navy-black-sea-russia/32826343.html.
[x] Evan Dyer, “NATO's Latest Moves Could Bottle Up Much of Russia's Naval Power,” CBC, 20 July 2023, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/russia-ukraine-black-sea-baltic-naval-1.6911530.
