The Future of WPS with an Enlarged Alliance: The Cases of Sweden and Finland
By Anna Franco
The Nordic countries have long been the international champions of gender equality. Since the first gender equality index was introduced by the United Nations Development Programme in 1995, the Nordics have scored highly on almost every global measurement. They support gender equality at home, at work, in public life, and in foreign affairs and international security.
In 2000, Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) was adopted by the UN Security Council, marking the very first international commitment in the field of gender and security. Since then, several supranational organizations and nations have followed the resolution and incorporated it into their own policies. The Nordic countries were among the first to develop National Action Plans (NAPs) on the implementation of WPS, and NATO was one of the first institutions to implement regulations related to Resolution 1325. In 2006, Sweden adopted its first NAP on Women, Peace and Security, while Finland adopted it in 2008. The first NATO Policy on Women, Peace and Security was adopted in December 2007. Today, however, although NATO’s newest members as well as the institution itself have strived to incorporate WPS for over a decade and half, not all NATO member states have implemented a WPS NAP, like Greece and Türkiye.
Feminist perspectives and traditional military values are often seen as confronting one another in a zero-sum game.[i] Women’s groups consistently advocate for nonviolent approaches that prioritize the preservation of human lives and overall well-being over military solutions. Their willingness to engage in conflict typically emerges when their national identity is directly threatened, rather than through alignment with military alliances. In addition, historical evidence suggests that militarization tends to exacerbate gender inequality and decrease female labour force participation.
Many questions have been raised about the compatibility of Finland and Sweden’s membership of NATO and peace mediation. Together with Austria, Cyprus, Ireland, and Malta, Finland and Sweden were recently among the EU states that were not members of NATO. The events of the second decade of the 21st century, such as increased military spending among European nations, is obviously a consequence of geopolitical changes. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is just one of the security disruptions taking place in the European continent, raising questions on the effective end of the Cold War. Although Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 rang the first alarm in Northern Europe, the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine may be the straw that breaks the camel's back.[ii]
Since May 1994, both Sweden and Finland have been active participants in NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, engaging in various military exercises such as the 2018 Trident Juncture. Additionally, they collaborate closely on cyber defence initiatives, exchanging valuable information, and contribute resources to NATO-led disaster management efforts. Hence, Finland and Sweden are ready to efficiently join NATO, but will they be able to comprise their human security commitment to defence cooperation? Is gender equality encompassed in this mission? Or will they lose their title as human rights defenders? These questions will be discussed throughout the paper.
Sweden’s and Finland’s Military Contributions to NATO
There has been a noticeable boost in efforts aimed at nudging Finnish and Swedish public sentiment toward considering NATO membership. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has undeniably played a significant role in shaping attitudes, with a growing portion of the population now expressing support for aligning with NATO. However, it is crucial to acknowledge that this shift in perspective occurs against the backdrop of elevated global tensions and a general feeling of insecurity. In both Sweden and Finland, major security policy decisions are now being accelerated. Finland officially joined NATO on 3 April 2023, while Sweden recently became member on 7 March 2024 as Sweden’s accession was finally approved by both Türkiye and Hungary.
Finland is one of Europe’s largest countries by area but has a small population. The Finnish army has one of the strongest artillery forces in Europe. However, the air force may soon become the most technologically advanced of the three military services. Although it was strongly advocated by Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari (1994–2000) almost three decades earlier, Finland officially applied to join NATO on 18 May 2022.[iii] Prior to its application, in late 2021, Finland announced its intent to purchase 64 US-built F-35A fifth-generation fighters, which brought the country to reach 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in defence spending. Moreover, due to universal male conscription, the majority of adult male citizens in Finland are not new to the military dimension, and they have first-hand experience in military training. Finland’s fully mobilized field army has around 280,000 troops. Hence, with a large reserve force and modern equipment, Finland was welcomed into NATO.
Sweden, for its part, maintains a relatively small but capable and advanced military force, supported by its large, sophisticated defence industry and by its exceptional intelligence services. For instance, the Swedish-designed Gotland diesel-electric submarine marks a ground-breaking advancement as the inaugural non-nuclear-powered submarine incorporating an air-independent propulsion system. Conscription was only reinstated in 2018 and has resulted in a reserve force of just 10,000, which will eventually be added to the almost 15,000 active-duty personnel. In the 2021–2025 defence budget, Peter Hultqvist, Defense Minister from 2014–2022, committed Sweden to one of the largest military expansions since the end of the Cold War, which includes increasing military spending by 40 percent, increasing the number of Swedish military personnel from 60,000 to 90,000, and adding a fifth submarine to its navy.[iv] Like Finland, Sweden conveyed the intent to join NATO simultaneously with Finland by submitting an official letter of application in May 2022. Conversely to Finland, the Swedish path to become an ally has encountered more opposition. Certainly, within NATO, there is a prevailing belief that Sweden's integration would bolster security in the Baltic region. However, there are notable internal obstacles to this integration. Firstly, there is ideological resistance stemming from Sweden's longstanding image as a peace mediator in global affairs. Secondly, Türkiye had impeded the enlargement process due to what it argued was Sweden’s lax counterterrorism laws and protection of Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) terrorists.
Women, Peace and Security vs. Sweden’s Feminist Foreign Policy
The theme of human rights and human security is central to this article, referring more to the WPS than military incompatibility. These two countries have high-performance rates in human rights protection and gender equality, and thus their integration into the Alliance is beneficial in terms of spill-over and good practices in human security. Sweden and Finland have always put an emphasis on civilian crisis management, advocating for Security Sector Reform (SSR), mediation, and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR).[v] Their inclusion into NATO marks a shift away from initiatives promoting a non-nuclear Baltic region and presents challenges to Finland’s and Sweden’s efforts to shape global affairs positively. This includes potential contradictions with their image as a “humanitarian superpower”, as joining NATO may necessitate alignment with policies or actions that diverge from this branding.[vi] One of these contradictions is the idea of a feminist foreign policy (FFP).
First adopted by Sweden in 2014, other EU-NATO member states such as Germany, France, Denmark, and Spain, as well as other extra-EU countries, have adopted FFPs. On the one side, FFPs differ from the WPS. Feminist foreign policies strictly include a decolonial perspective and incite disarmament, always promoting more women to take part in foreign affairs and peacekeeping discussions. On the other side, WPS Agendas and NAPs hardly address non-traditional security threats and still focus on securing women in conflict areas rather than securitizing gender issues. The adoption of feminist foreign policies, however, is thought to be contrary to the WPS agenda, and in so doing peacebuilding more broadly, to focus on the transformative aspects that are necessary for sustainable conflict management.[vii] Could a feminist foreign policy be adopted by NATO? The answer is yes, since no regulations prohibit the Alliance from adapting this. However, it is not a good solution to reaching the uncompleted objectives of WPS. In addition, foreign policies are usually national matters, and most importantly, NATO is a military organization and thus cannot give up armament to follow a fundamentally feminist foreign policy.
Women in the Finnish and Swedish Militaries
Finland has a well-established reputation and commitment to gender equality, which provides a solid foundation for further advancing this important agenda. The shared emphasis on gender equality, a longstanding trait of Nordic countries, is evident in discussions surrounding security policy and ongoing accession efforts.[viii] In Finland, the number of women in foreign affairs leadership positions is higher than that of men. Similarly, in civilian crisis management, the country has for several years maintained near gender parity in the experts it recruits, which is among the highest figures in the world.[ix] Yet, in the Government Report on Changes in the Security Environment, written after the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, neither gender, gender equality, nor women are mentioned in any section. The Report on Finland’s Accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, published in May 2022, is also gender blind, and the Government’s Defence Report does not refer to gender equality at all. Moreover, in a paper by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, it is clearly stated that “women as a social category are not at the forefront when defense and security policy is played out either as a field of politics, public administration, or civic activity.”[x] In addition, conscription in Finland is mandated for every Finnish citizen, but only men aged 18 to 60 are liable for military service. Women can apply on a voluntary basis.
Sweden ranks 1st in the EU on the 2023 Gender Equality Index,[xi] a position that it has held for years. Moreover, the Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations, the hub for knowledge on gender in military operations, is located in the Swedish Armed Forces International Centre (SWEDINT).[xii] In 2017, the Swedish government reinstated military conscription for both women and men due to challenges in filling military ranks through voluntary enlistment. This decision was prompted by immediate security concerns stemming from Russia's military rearmament and aggressive actions in Sweden’s vicinity, necessitating a reassessment of recruitment strategies.[xiii] According to the government, the inclusion of women characterized modern conscription as gender neutral. However, the same year conscription was restored, Sweden had a high-profile scandal when women in the Swedish military reported widespread sexual harassment.[xiv] Following Sweden’s September 2022 elections, a new government led by the centre-right moderates assumed power. This administration promptly set aside the feminist foreign policy implemented in 2014 by the previous centre-left government, led by the Swedish Social Democrats.
Expanding WPS in NATO
The dynamics within the national defence sector inevitably impact NATO’s efforts to promote gender diversity in leadership roles and international security forums. Across NATO member states and partner nations, there exists a noticeable gender recruitment gap within the armed forces. Within the Alliance, NATO created the role of Special Representative for Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) within its International Staff in 2012, underscoring its commitment to advancing gender equality and promoting peace. However, this office remains underfunded.[xv] Overall, poor adherents to the WPS argue that this is a significant financial commitment; however, available information does not illuminate whether these funds are secured, even for NATO.[xvi] Furthermore, when addressing a threat like Russia, there are very few details about gender perspectives in official documents, such as Action Plans. In 2022, NATO unveiled its revised Strategic Concept, which notably incorporated the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda for the first time. Despite variations among its member states, NATO strives for gender balance among principal officers, and gender considerations are increasingly integrated into mission planning and execution in conflict zones, as well as training activities within peace operations frameworks. Nevertheless, WPS implementations remain bound to a top-down approach, and gender issues are confined to such examples as Afghanistan or Iraq. For instance, organizational innovations such as Team Lioness, Female Engagement Teams (FET), Cultural Support Teams (CST), Gender Field Advisors (GFS), and Gender Focal Points (GFP) were all WPS-related initiatives introduced as a direct result of operational necessities and not as a politically correct nicety to please the women’s movement.[xvii]
The war in Ukraine is also representative of increasing gender equality in the armed forces. As of 2022, the representation of women in the Ukrainian armed forces had increased to 22 percent, surpassing the average of 12 percent seen across NATO countries. This number is particularly remarkable given that women account for 90 percent of those who have departed Ukraine since the war began. In contrast, in the case of Russia, one of the reasons the military is not progressing could be due to the lack of gender diversity.[xviii] In March 2023, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu reported 39,000 servicewomen, 5,000 of whom were officers, representing less than 4 percent of Russia’s force of 1.15 million. Moreover, a July 2023 investigative report by Meduza and Mediazona suggests that almost none of Russia’s servicewomen are fighting in Ukraine.[xix]
Sweden and Finland have been always supportive of NATO’s WPS Agenda and had already included it in their cooperation programmes. For instance, Sweden has actively sought to position itself at the centre of global efforts to implement UNSCR 1325 and, as part of this, in 2009 supported the adoption of NATO’s military concept for the implementation of UNSCR 1325.[xx] Enacted in 2018, the NATO/EAPC Policy and Action Plan is the Alliance’s means of identifying its own areas of responsibility and contributions to WPS implementation. The current version identifies three key principles to steer implementation: integration, inclusiveness, and integrity.[xxi] Furthermore, NATO’s military directive, Bi SC Directive 40-1, has operationalized 1325 for military implementation. Initially focused on battlefield success, it established gender advisor positions and described how they would work on strategic, operational, and tactical levels, and how they would advise on everything from concepts and doctrine to procedures and planning. However, the global WPS community, including NATO, should differentiate between viewing the WPS Agenda solely as a set of best practices and recognizing it as an analytical tool. This distinction is evident in the internal-external value model, which illustrates how WPS principles can be applied internally to organizations during peacetime and externally during security cooperation, exercises, and conflict, by integrating gender perspectives. While the application of best practices relies heavily on the expertise of gender advisors, the most potent tool for implementing WPS concepts lies in gender analysis and the comprehensive integration of gender perspectives. Ideally, this improvement should be done by NATO as well as member states.
Conclusion
There is no surprise in assessing that even gender equal countries like Finland and Sweden fail to combine both women representation and defence planning under the same policy. Nevertheless, concerning doubts about a possible decline in these states’ human security commitment, Norway has shown that NATO membership and peace mediation can be effectively reconciled. Similarly, the active involvement of Türkiye between Ukraine and Russia also shows that military non-alignment is not a requirement for peace mediation.[xxii] Moreover, gender consideration is a matter of attitude. Sweden and Finland, albeit more right-wing than in the past, are not extremists, and their excellent work and commitment to gender and security will not be in vain. They will continue to show and transmit their expertise to other NATO members.
Discussions about the adoption of a feminist foreign policy in NATO were advanced even before the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[xxiii] However, these principles remain unfounded. The trajectory of European countries towards increasing military expenditures and enhancing defence sector research and cooperation directly contradicts the framework of a feminist foreign policy. While Sweden acknowledged this conflict and ultimately opted for NATO membership, it is crucial to recognize that the Alliance has been actively promoting gender equality through the WPS Agenda, a fact that should not be overlooked. The pursuit and advocacy of gender equality, alongside the meaningful representation of women in security and defence, must go side by side with militarization. NATO members cannot limit their efforts to recruit more women in national armies.
NATO, national governments, and international institutions must comprehend the real scope and utility of WPS. Adding a gender perspective has the potential to transform the traditional military paradigm by including and creating an increased understanding of the importance of non-traditional security issues, which are becoming pervasive.[xxiv] Ultimately, both the WPS Agenda and NATO share the common objective of fostering peace. By striking the right balance and implementing effective gender-focused actions, NATO has the potential to serve as a catalyst for advancing gender equality within the security and defence sector. Finland and Sweden need not conform their gender attitudes to fit within an international military framework. Instead, they can lead by example, setting the standard for gender equality in security and defence.
About the Author
Anna Franco holds a bachelor’s degree in Diplomatic and International Sciences and a master’s degree in European and Global Studies. She was an intern at NATO Joint Force Command Brunssum, Gender Advisor office, where she developed a wide knowledge and interest in ‘gender and security’.
Notes
[i] Robert Egnell, “Gender Perspectives and Military Effectiveness: Implementing UNSCR 1325 and the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security,” Inclusive Security, 2016, accessed 11 March 2024, https://www.inclusivesecurity.org/publication/gender-perspectives-and-military-effectiveness/
[ii] Anna Wieslander, Eric Adamson, and Jesper Lehto, “Securing Northern Europe within NATO: Sweden and Finland as New Allies,” Northern Europe Office of the Atlantic Council, January 2023, accessed 19 February 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Securing-Northern-Europe-within-NATO.pdf
[iii] “Enlargement and Article 10,” NATO, accessed 19 February 2024, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49212.htm
[iv] Robin Forsberg and Jason C. Moyer, “Sisters But Not Twins: Prospects of Finland and Sweden’s NATO Accession,” The Wilson Center, 2 February 2022, accessed 19 February 2024, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/sisters-not-twins-prospects-finland-and-swedens-nato-accession
[v] Tarja Väyrynen, “‘The higher cause of peace’: what could and should the Nordic countries contribute to the development of conflict mediation in the EU context?,” in The Nordic Countries and the European Security and Defence Policy, edited by Alyson J.K. Bailes, Gunilla Herolf, and Bengt Sundelius, 215–233, SIPRI Publications (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/books/SIPRI06BaHeSu/SIPRI06BaHeSu12.pdf
[vi] Greg Simons, “Sweden and Finland NATO Membership and the Militarization of the Baltic Sea,” Politics Today, 12 May 2022, accessed 19 February 2024, https://politicstoday.org/sweden-finland-nato-membership-baltic-sea-militarization/
[vii] Cheryl Hendricks, “What does a feminist foreign policy mean for building peace?” Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 20 December 2023, accessed 11 March 2024, https://www.fes.de/en/themenportal-gender-jugend-senioren/gender-matters/article-page-flight-migration-integration/how-feminist-foreign-policy-approaches-could-transform-peacebuilding
[viii] Vendula Kazlauskas, “Gender equality and security policy: Inspiration from Finland and Sweden at the first meeting of the Women’s Network in 2023,” Association for International Affairs, 7 March 2023, accessed 19 February 2024, https://www.amo.cz/en/women-in-czech-foreign-european-and-security-policy/gender-equality-and-security-policy-in/spiration-from-finland-and-sweden-at-the-first-meeting-of-the-womens-network-in-2023/
[ix] Leena Vastapuu and Minna Lyytikäinen, “Gender Equality in Finnish Foreign Affairs, from 2019 to 2022,” Independent study commissioned by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2022, accessed 19 February 2024, https://um.fi/documents/35732/0/Gender+equality+in+foreign+affairs_Vastapuu_Lyytikainen.pdf/4aef250d-4d89-41cd-d390-6059951d4aa9?t=1668426670061
[x] Ibid.
[xi] “Gender Equality Index, Sweden 2023,” EIGE, accessed 19 February 2024, https://eige.europa.eu/gender-equality-index/2023/country/SE
[xii] “Relations with Sweden,” NATO, accessed 19 February 2024, https://www.nato.int/cps/ru/natohq/topics_52535.htm?selectedLocale=en
[xiii] Sanna Strand, “The Reactivation and Reimagination of Military Conscription in Sweden,” Armed Forces & Society (2023), https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X231164740.
[xiv] Ellen Haring, “Gender and Military Organizations,” in The Gender and Security Agenda, edited by Chantal De Jonge Oudraat and Michael E. Brown, 90–112 (New York/London: Routledge, 2020).
[xv] Stéfanie von Hlatky, “The Women, Peace and Security Agenda at NATO in Light of the War in Ukraine,” Network for Strategic Analysis, 4 September 2023, accessed 19 February 2024 at https://ras-nsa.ca/women-peace-security-agenda-nato/
[xvi] “Financing Women, Peace and Security, A Review of WPS National Action Plans from 2005 to 2022,” Our Secure Future, April 26, 2023, last accessed 13 March 2024, https://oursecurefuture.org/sites/default/files/2023-05/OSF-NAP-InfographicCompanion-April26-2023.pdf
[xvii] Egnell, “Gender Perspectives and Military Effectiveness.”
[xviii] “Deep Dive Recap: Intelligence and the Gender Perspective,” NATO, 16 May 2023, accessed 19 February 2024, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_215300.htm?selected Locale=en
[xix] Jessica Trisko Darden, “Gender Norms Keep Russian, Ukrainian Servicewomen From Combat,” Russia Matters, Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 22 November 2023, accessed 11 March 2024, https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/gender-norms-keep-russian-ukrainian-servicewomen-combat#:~:text=Russian%20Defense%20Minister%20Sergei%20Shoigu,efforts%20to%20expand%20the%20military.
[xx] Kathrine A. Wright, “NATO’S adoption of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security: Making the agenda a reality,” International Political Science Review 37, no. 3 (2016): 350–361.
[xxi] Lisa A. Aronsson, “NATO Partnerships for Women, Peace, and Security,” Atlantic Council, March 2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NATO-WPS-Report-Aronsson-Final.pdf , 8–10.
[xxii] Janne Taalas, Jouni Hemberg, and Rolf Steffansson, “Finland in NATO must continue to work for peace,” CMI, 9 June 2022 (originally published in Turun Sanomat), accessed 11 March 2024, https://cmi.fi/2022/06/09/finland-in-nato-must-continue-to-work-for-peace/.
[xxiii] Gabriela R. A. Doyle, Madeline Olden, Leah Sheunemann, and Christopher Skaluba, “Why NATO should adopt a feminist foreign policy,” New Atlanticist, Atlantic Council, 9 March 2021, accessed 19 February 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/why-nato-should-adopt-a-feminist-foreign-policy/
[xxiv] Egnell, “Gender Perspectives and Military Effectiveness.”
Cover image retrieved from: https://shape.nato.int/stde24/newsroom/news-/behind-the-uniform-meet-finnish-major-hanne-maria-kiiskinen
