Strategic Moves in the EU Chessboard: A Game Theory Overview of Serbia and Kosovo’s European Integration
By Antonia-Laura Pup. Originally published in the January 2024 issue of the magazine of the Latvian Association of Political Scientists.
Abstract
In the context of an increasingly complex European agenda for Western Balkan enlargement, this essay addresses the intricate tensions between Serbia and Kosovo. Focused on avoiding biased foreign policy analyses, the research explores the motivations of the involved actors, categorizing them into divergent and converging interests. The study’s primary objective is to leverage game theory to analyze the cooperation dynamics between Serbia and Kosovo in their pursuit of EU accession.
The essay aims to bridge a literature gap by portraying the contemporary relationship not just as a conflict but also as a potential avenue for cooperation. Following a contextual overview, a literature review, and a comprehensive case study, the research contributes to a more nuanced debate on how interactions between the two entities may impact their EU accession prospects.
Keywords: Serbia, Kosovo, EU, Western Balkans, game theory, enlargement.
Introduction
The complexity of the tensions between Serbia and Kosovo, even more so in the context of a more articulated than ever European agenda for enlargement in the Western Balkans, imposes a pressing need for a more comprehensive method to analyze the motivations of the actors involved and how these motivations can be grouped into divergent and converging ones. Such a framework is needed because a deeper understanding of the strategies that actors are considering could help us avoid mirror imagining, whereby we 86 Antonia-Laura Pup project our own biases into foreign policy analyses. The dynamics between the two actors become even more interesting to analyze today when Europe is facing the biggest security crisis since World War II and civil society in the former Yugoslav space is looking for a more grounded perspective on the materialization of its European ambitions. Against this mosaic of opportunity, the research objective of this essay is to identify how game theory can help us to draw up an analysis of the cooperation between Serbia and Kosovo towards their accession to the European Union. Generally, game theory represents a mathematical and economic branch that studies the strategic interaction between rational decision-makers. In the international relations context, game theory can represent a useful methodology for understanding the motivations and conflicts of the states. While it is irrational to believe that through a game theory analysis, we can achieve more accurate conclusions regarding the decision-making process than through other theoretical frameworks, game theory can be a useful conceptual framework through which we highlight the tensions and conflicting interests of the states. In this essay, we will tackle the relationship between Serbia and Kosovo, two states that have a complicated recent history and several border issues since Kosovo gained independence, both have the same ambitions – to be part of the EU community – but cannot pursue this endeavour without cooperation. Moreover, this essay aims to bridge an identified gap in the literature and portray the contemporary relationship as not only a game of conflict but also as a game of cooperation. The argument will unfold starting from a brief overview of factors leading to the current context, followed by a case study, from which conclusions will be derived, aimed at contributing to a more consistent debate on how interactions between Serbia and Kosovo can accelerate or, conversely, hinder the accession of both states to the European Union in the next decade.
Context—the Conflict
The conflictual dimension of the interaction between the two states, Serbia, and Kosovo, is marked by a tense heritage of geopolitical considerations. The Yugoslav architecture of the Serbian Republic and the political unrest following Tito’s disappearance created a complicated equation to be navigated by both sides of the aisle. In the aftermath of the 1999 war, a decade of complex political and administrative turmoil followed, leading to a complicated landscape of developments which culminated with Kosovo’s independence movement of 2008. Despite the relative progress made by actors to accelerate integration into the European area, the diplomatic avenues were unable to provide a solid perspective of conflict resolution. The widespread social uprising in Kosovo in 2008 was the moment that led to the adoption of the Declaration of Independence on 17 February 2008, an opportunity that was used by the Belgrade authorities to amplify their anti-Albanian discourse. Moreover, Kosovar Serbs at the time opposed that scenario and boycotted the action by refusing to recognize the central government in Pristina, subsequently seeking to control critical infrastructure to block the movement. Thus, the conflictual pattern was amplified by the competitive nationalism [1] mainstreamed on both sides of the conflict.
Following these tense years, a sense of reconciliation was motivated by the process of normalizing relations which began in March 2011 in the form of a dialogue overseen by the European Union. In fact, the EU institutions used Serbia and Kosovo’s ambitions for membership to resolve these regional issues, offering the prospect of advancing the integration dossier in return. [2] In 2013, following the signing of the Brussels Agreement and 33 subsequent agreements, Belgrade and Pristina agreed not to jeopardize their progress towards EU membership, [3] evidenced by the fact that for the first time since the declaration of independence, Serbs in northern Kosovo were able to hold elections. The adoption of the agreements showed the premises for cooperation between the two actors, which can also be attributed to their willingness to subordinate themselves to the higher project, the European Union, and the historic nature of the dialogue. [4]
Even though in the immediate aftermath, actions indicating a normalization of relations were also implemented under EU coordination, such as the signing of Kosovo’s Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) and the opening of accession negotiations with Serbia, the state of relations between the two actors continued to be dominated by conflictual interactions. This state of conflict has translated into continued denial of central authority, with Kosovar Serbs continuing to look to Belgrade rather than Pristina for protection and the non-recognition by Kosovar authorities of Serbian-language educational institutions. The conflict that erupted in 2022 over Serbian car plates unrecognized by the Kosovo authorities and suspicions of local election fraud have led to this tense situation.
The prospect of cooperation and the role of the EU
In the current horizon, the accession of Serbia and Kosovo to the European Union is the only tangible incentive for these states to enter a process of normalization of relations. [5] This incentive is also applicable to the European Union, intending to stabilize its borders and politically achieve the unification of the European continent, which is one of the organization’s objectives. In this conflict game between Serbia and Kosovo during the period after the fall of Yugoslavia, we can speak of the existence of a consensus that shows the European Union’s vocation as a mediator to de-escalate the conflict, since such international institutions can generate repeated disincentives for aggression.[6] Other, more pessimistic, views argue the failure of multilateralism in the Serbian-Kosovar issue and indicate that this game of cooperation is not sustainable if institutional actors continue to practice constructivist realism, the language of force and a projection of their own national and selfish interests.[7] However, the rhetoric of the actors in the game shows that if EU membership continues to be a desire of Serbian and Kosovar societies, this incentive to reduce aggression will exist, which could create the premises for a game of cooperation.
The academic literature seems, consequently, to delve into the descriptive nature of the relations between Serbia and Kosovo rather than in the horizon of theoretical frameworks allowing for a more systematic, structural understanding of these two actors’ interaction. To cover this existing literature gap, my research project proposes an understanding of the conflict under the tutelage of game theory, a solid framework allowing for a comprehensive navigation of the existing dynamics between Serbia and Kosovo. The cooperation scenario is the most beneficial for the future of Serbian and Kosovar societies, although it is also the most difficult to achieve, as it requires, among other things, a more extensive peace-building process, and a clarification of the independence of Kosovo [8], especially the disputed territories and the status of the minorities.
Case study. Modelling the Serbia-Kosovo dynamics as a Stag Hunt game
The Stag Hunt Game. Stag = cooperation (both countries decide to cooperate to join the European Union and resolve their differences), Hare = defection (each country chooses an individual strategy of their own, which will ultimately lead to the failure of both in terms of EU accession ambitions)
Kosovo
Stag Hare
Serbia Stag 5.5 0.3
Hare 3.0 1.1
While in a prisoner’s dilemma [9] game defection is the dominant strategy, in a stag-hunt game the dominant strategy depends on the interdependent evaluation of each player [10]. Thus, the stage hunt becomes a game based on trust [9] Hare Stag 5,5 0,3 Hare 3,0 1,1 Kosovo Serbia and fear, in which cooperation constitutes the Nash equilibrium, [11] suggesting that the players have a strong incentive to cooperate and not such a strong incentive to betray, which applies in this case, since cooperation between the two countries and mutual recognition of authority is a precondition without which accession to the European Union is impossible. The participation of Serbia and Kosovo in the dialogue formats already established under EU or US mediation in 2011, 2013 and, more recently, in 2020 and 2022, has demonstrated that the prerequisites for cooperation exist, and when there is a belief that the other will cooperate, the player will be led to choose cooperation even at the cost of exposing considerable risk, [12] such as political capital. However, we must bear in mind that these conclusions derived from the application of the game theory model to the conflict and/or cooperation between Serbia and Kosovo in the perspective of EU membership, in the chaotic environment of international relations, have certain limitations. This is because such a system is especially sensitive to initial conditions, while in this conflict several dynamics and repetitive natures of systemic chaos intervene that can alter the best possible strategies. For instance, changing the rules of the EU accession in the middle of the game or the change of the power balance in the European Union in favour of the nationalist populists (considering that in the next year Hungary, an ally of Serbia, is about the chair the EU presidency and exert influence over its agenda) are relevant elements that could alter the current matrix.
To model a cooperative game between Serbia and Kosovo, the stake being their accession to the European Union as an immediate priority of the next European Commission, I chose the matrix of the Stag Hunt game, as it is an optimal game to illustrate the dynamics between the two states and the competition between national and collective interests. In such a game, both states can choose to cooperate to join the European Union, or they can try to follow independent paths towards the realization of European aspirations and continue with the ongoing territorial disputes. Belgrade would have a considerable incentive to try to follow an independent path to the EU, banking on the fact that Kosovo is not recognized by most EU member states.[13]
Game theory and conflict: an experimental approach
If both players choose it, cooperation is the most advantageous path, as it would mean putting the Brussels Agreements into practice and accelerating the way to EU accession. Working towards a peaceful solution under the European umbrella would also prove that the pressing concerns of the major European institutions, such as the European Parliament, are heard.14 In such a scenario, the fragmentation of the European Union into blocs supporting Serbia versus blocs supporting Kosovo would also be avoided. Mutually beneficial cooperation is enhanced by EU intervention, also described as “the ability to use contractual relations with the countries in conflict as a channel to incentivize them to achieve progress in mediation processes”.[15] Belgrade’s recent behavior remains ambivalent, but with a preference for rational decision-making and cooperation, as demonstrated by the fact that in the most recent negotiations under the umbrella of the European Union: the Serbian government did not oppose the involvement of Pristina in the Berlin Process and finally abandoned the use of the names of the capitals[16] of the cities in the written agreements, instead of the names of the countries to describe the parties to the conflict.
While membership in the European Union is a powerful stake for both countries, non-economic factors such as identity and national interest remain powerful forces in the game[17] that can lead to betrayal of the common cause. If one player chooses to defect and another to cooperate, the defector is likely to gain some short-term benefits. For example, if Belgrade refuses to recognize Kosovo’s independence, this could bring some immediate benefits to the ruling party, such as winning elections by banking on an extreme nationalist narrative and Yugonostalgia. Yugo-nostalgia continues to be an effective political tool in Serbia today, defined as a dramatic yearning for identity, a demonstration of Yugoslav exceptionalism and a shelter for voters [18], which makes it a relevant element in the evaluation of possible strategies for the Belgrade government. Furthermore, given the political importance that the European Commission has given to the enlargement process, a scenario in which Belgrade prioritizes national interest over cooperation could provide a bargaining chip in its relationship with Brussels. The independent path could also potentially allow the Serbian government to pursue an agenda in which the populist Yugonostalgic narrative co-exists with the pro-European discourse.
The cooperating side would thus lose prospects of EU membership, but this would not dramatically change the status quo. Thus, according to the matrix, defection on the part of one or both players leads to sub-optimal outcomes for both actors, translated into reality such as delayed or non-accession to the European Union, internal social conflicts, and lack of opportunities to access EU pre-accession funds.
How does game theory help us gain a deeper understanding of the current Serbia-Kosovo dynamics?
This representation of the Serbia-Kosovo dynamic in the broader conversation of the EU accession using a Stag Hunt game highlighted two core arguments that support the initial assumption that game theory helps us to have a more coherent approach and understanding regarding current events in the international debate. First, this matrix represents a useful antidote that can prevent policymakers from having the myth of “rational-at-all costs” cloud their judgement when assessing the behaviour of the states. While it is true that cooperation from both of the players leads to the best possible outcome, and in this particular case, it is a conditionality of Serbia and Kosovo joining the European Union, one cannot afford not to take into account the temptation of deferral, especially since when it comes to the problem of recognition of Kosovo by Serbia, the nature of the national and common interest seems rather divergent.
Second, the representation highlights the utmost importance of trust in maximizing the payoff of the players in a cooperative game. The success of the scenario in which both Serbia and Kosovo decide not to follow distinct and competitive paths (although, especially in the case of Serbia, it can be a tempting one) ultimately depends on trust, which can be enforced by a more articulated presentation of the benefits (incentivization) and the credibility of the mediator instance. More frequent dialogue and having information about the other state is another constant that needs to be considered for cooperation to work. In this equation, the transparency of the players about their preferences is even more important, since, in the case of a stag hunt game, trust can only become an issue when one player is uncertain about the other's preferences.[19]
Conclusion
The game theory analysis of the Serbia and Kosovo complex dynamics in the context of enlargement in the Western Balkans portrayed through a Stag Hunt game, shows that the optimal strategy of the state actors is to cooperate under the EU umbrella and abandon partially their national narratives for the greater good, which is the European integration. However, this is the best strategy only when both governments decide to cooperate, as when only one actor is willing to cooperate can lead to massive electoral costs for the other one and a fertile ground for the extremists, national but anti-European narratives.
Unlike other theories, promising a pragmatic methodology rather than a universal solution for problems, game theory provides an effective framework for outlining the main strategies that actors with both competing and converging interests may undergo in each setting. In the general conversation about what advancement of the EU enlargement dossier in the Western Balkans might look like, game theory can also be used as a normative tool for assessing the effectiveness of various prospective public policies,20 although it has important limitations when it comes to the analysis of possibilities and foresight endeavours.
Due to the complex nature of international relations, there are few events in which we do not find instances of both divergent and convergent interests. In this respect, using game theory as a lens to visualize the behaviour of Serbia and Kosovo in the European Union's enlargement dossier in the Western Balkans has a strategic and political value, because it allows us to analyze the optimal strategy for each actor involved, but also an academic one, because it moves us away from the superficiality of believing that cooperation, even if mutually beneficial, is a given.
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The prisoner’s dilemma is a concept in game theory. The dilemma involves two individuals who are arrested and accused of a crime, but the authorities lack sufficient evidence to convict them on the main charge. The dilemma arises when each prisoner must decide whether to cooperate by remaining silent or betray the other by confessing. The possible outcomes, measured in terms of prison sentences, create a situation where each prisoner faces a conflict between personal interest and cooperation.
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