Lessons Learned: An Interview with Former NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer

By Roger Hilton, This article was previously published in the Atlantic Voices Vol 7. Nr. 11. Editing and republication of this article has been realized with the financial support of NATO Public Diplomacy Division.

For this issue of Atlantic Voices on NATO’s Secretaries General, I had the pleasure to interview former NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer. Continuing a proud heritage of Dutch civilian leadership at NATO he was the 11th Secretary General, serving from January 2004 till August 2009. In our conversation, we discussed the ebbs and flows throughout his tenure as the civilian leader of the Alliance. Specifically, what were the major issues for NATO when he was Secretary General, and how did he deal with them? What was the biggest challenge he faced? Additionally, how did he perceive the role of the Secretary General? Looking towards the future, what advice does he have for the current and future Secretaries General?

Upon taking up the role of NATO Secretary General on January 5, 2004 Mr. de Hoop Scheffer immediately had his work cut out for him providing, him little opportunity to quietly settle into his new role. He inherited an Alliance deeply divided over the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which pitted diametrical opposing policy positions of the U.S. and the UK on one side against France and Germany and many allies on the other. This policy schism could not have arrived at a more inopportune moment, as NATO had assumed responsibility for a major out-of-area mission only just four months earlier: namely, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, mandated by the United Nations. At its peak, the ISAF consisted of more than 130,000 troops from 51 NATO and partner countries. Managing the political process of such a massive mission is never an easy task, let alone when the largest NATO member states are in fundamental disaccord.

NATO in Crisis

In the run-up to the American invasion of Iraq, that started on March 20, 2003, some of the U.S’ NATO Allies were among the fiercest opponents of this military intervention. French President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder vehemently opposed the Bush Administration’s plans to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein, who claimed that his regime possessed weapons of mass destruction. Evidently, this allegation had a great impact on the functioning of NATO, as demonstrated by a vote on Turkey’s invoking of Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty in February of 2003. As the only NATO member state bordering Iraq, Turkey requested NATO assistance in the event of a pre-emptive attack by Iraq. This request was refused by France, Germany and Belgium, leading then U.S. Ambassador to NATO Nicholas Burns, to state that ‘because of their actions, NATO is now facing a crisis of credibility’. Ultimately, NATO did implement some limited precautionary measures to protect Turkey from an Iraqi attack, but the episode spoke volumes about the political climate within NATO at the time. Considering that NATO decisions are made by consensus and that any Secretary General must therefore be appointed unanimously, it was clear from the outset that being able to build bridges while not being too politically outspoken, were indispensable skills that the new Secretary General had to possess. In the words of Mr. de Hoop Scheffer: ‘I think that one of the reasons that both the Americans, so the Bush Administration including Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and others agreed to my candidacy, as did Gerhard Schröder and Jacques Chirac, was that the Dutch position on the Iraq invasion was to support it politically, but not militarily. I also had a good relation with German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, and a good enough relation – probably aided by my ability to speak fluent French – with French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin to convince them to agree to my candidacy. The fact that I took a middle-of-the-road position, and me coming from a smaller country, probably helped a lot too.’ When asked what motivated him to become the next Secretary General, Mr. de Hoop Scheffer stated: ‘That is not a very easy question to answer. At some point, consensus just started building around my candidacy. I had worked for NATO as a young Dutch diplomat and always possessed an Atlanticist world view. Despite my Prime Minister telling me that I was needed at home, when this train stopped in front of me, I did not hesitate to board it and the PM agreed.’ He continued by saying: ‘My entry into NATO was first and foremost to heal wounds. That was the message I got from both sides. And there were deep wounds, I can tell you, as I was Foreign Minister of the Netherlands before and had seen the effects of the spat both within NATO, as well as in the EU. So, I spent the good part of my first year on mending the fences, and seeing that the Iraqi spat would not lead to the unwillingness to address the Afghan theater. That was the relationship between Iraq and Afghanistan. I must admit to a certain extent to my surprise, I – or rather NATO – succeeded relatively quickly in overcoming those differences. NATO has not suffered for a very long time from the consequences of the huge divisions concerning the Iraqi invasion.’

Iraq vs. Afghanistan

As previously established, maintaining NATO’s focus and mission objectives in Afghanistan while avoiding distraction amidst the Iraq controversy represented Mr. de Hoop Scheffer’s biggest challenge throughout his tenure. Although succeeding in keeping all Allies engaged in Afghanistan – to varying degrees – politically overseeing the largest NATO military operation to date was no easy feat. ‘When I look back at the ISAF mission, there was a major challenge to keep the necessary political oversight it. The military were doing very well. Not only were they performing their military tasks, but they were also performing many extremely necessary civilian tasks, such as building schools and drilling waterholes. Keeping political oversight, and keeping the NAC [North Atlantic Council] at the helm of the whole operation in the political sense was rather challenging, I think, because the Allies around the table – apart from the different caveats they had regarding their contributions to the mission – did not always see eye to eye as far as the main goal of the mission was concerned. There was always that tension between ISAF and what the Americans were doing in the framework of Operation Enduring Freedom. Were we there to fight the Taliban including to prevent them from harvesting poppy, or were we only there for nation-building? The word COIN was out of bounds for many Allies. Countering insurgency was something the Americans did, not something that NATO should be doing. In some nations and national parliaments, including in my home country, the ISAF mission was initially sold as a peacebuilding and reconstruction operation, and the word “war” was out of bounds. This led to a “jungle of caveats”, which made the life of the military commanders not easy.’

Relations with Russia

One feature that did alleviate Mr. de Hoop Scheffer’s burden was the relatively positive and functional relationship between NATO and Russia at the time. Coordinating the logistics for the mission in Afghanistan would have been significantly more difficult without Russian consent for moving supplies across Central Asia. Their historical presence throughout the region has led Moscow to regard it as their backyard, installing skepticism in the Kremlin when it came to endorsing NATO supplies to pass through. ‘Russian assistance on the logistics aspect was very welcome, especially because the only alternative was to go through the Khyber Pass in Pakistan, and it was never fully clear if Pakistan was part of the problem or part of the solution in Afghanistan. This is still the case in 2017, I believe. We preferred to also go through the Central Asian states, and I have paid a lot of attention to those countries. When I started in 2004, the NATO-Russian relationship was quite good. The first sign of this changing was when President Putin decided to nominate Dmitry Rogozin as the Russian Ambassador to NATO. Mr. Rogozin was a man with political ambitions in Russia itself, and was considered a hardliner. That’s when I thought, well, that things might not develop as well as I had expected initially. Then, due to a number of issues, the relationship with Russia deteriorated over time, missile defense being an important factor.’

NATO and Turkey

Speaking of relations that seemed better back then; the same “nostalgia” today could be applied in regards to the current problematic state of affairs between NATO and one of its oldest members: Turkey. ‘The NATO-Turkey relationship is at a low ebb, but there is a “But” (with a capital B); NATO cannot afford to see Turkey drifting away from it. I see a lot of reason to criticize President Erdogan, and for example the purchase of the Russian S-400 missile system [that is not compatible with NATO systems] sends the wrong signal, but geography matters in international relations. Much more than people tend to think. I think that, deep in his heart, President Erdogan is convinced that Turkey should remain firmly anchored within NATO. However, this will require sophisticated diplomacy, and I’m not sure if we can expect this from the current U.S. Administration. “Foggy Bottom” seems to be rather empty these days given the fact that Secretary Tillerson does not give the impression to have much confidence in his diplomatic service officers.’

All for Nothing?

As stated earlier, Mr. de Hoop Scheffer devoted ample time and energy to keeping the Alliance and its partners engaged in Afghanistan. I pressed him about the results of the mission, and recent roll-backs by the Taliban of past achievements by the coalition, as well as their continuing ability to wreak havoc on the Afghan society. In hindsight, if given the chance to have done something differently what would it be? ‘The question of what I or rather the Allies should have done differently is easy to answer: Stay longer! But democracies, as you know, are always out of breath. Democracies are always in a hurry, because they have to deal with the phenomenon we call elections and that is what we like about democracies. Autocracies do not have that problem. Russia and China do not have that problem, but NATO does. So, my answer to your question is definitely that we should have stayed longer. [NATO forces started to hand over the responsibility for the security in Afghanistan to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) gradually from 2011 onwards. This process was completed in 2014. A new, smaller non-combat mission (“Resolute Support”) was launched on January 1, 2015 to provide further training, advice and assistance to the ANSF.] I made that plea on several occasions, but you know and I both know what happened. NATO de facto and basically withdrew the forces, and left it to the Americans and the ANSF. What I have learned is that it is: a) much harder than we thought to “export democracy”, and to export values; and b) that if you go, be there for the long run, but that is very difficult to combine with the functioning of democracy where public opinion gets tired of this kind of faraway military deployments, and so we left.’ It is worth recognizing in this article that in early November of 2017, NATO announced to expand its Afghanistan presence by 3,000 troops (half of which American troops) bringing the total of NATO's training and support mission to roughly 16,000 soldiers. Additionally, after months-long interagency review on America’s Afghanistan strategy by the Trump Administration, the President stated that Washington would send more troops to Afghanistan while refusing to give a timetable for withdrawal, vowing to uphold a conditions-based approach to the war.

More Lessons Learned

As Mr. de hoop Scheffer reflected on his distinguished career, he stressed the benefits and utility of personal relations, ‘In my opinion and experience, as a diplomat and in many responsibilities, it is absolutely necessary to build up personal relationships with the main actors. I first had to build up credibility, because not everybody knew me, but that is of course your responsibility as NATO Secretary General, to get that credibility and to build those relationships – and I always tell my students this – by trying to get one notch over the professional; what makes people tick? What is their personal narrative?’ While in office, to get his agenda accomplished Mr. De Hoop Scheffer recognized the limitations of his power. When asked what other qualities or skills a NATO Secretary General should possess, Mr. de Hoop Scheffer responded that ‘you can’t pretend to have a ton of formal power; the member states won’t let you develop into an “imperial” Secretary General. [As a NATO Secretary General] you don’t have much formal power, but that is not what you need. You need trust, confidence, and building authority. The latter is a keyword, people should respect your authority. But still, you do have some relevant tools. You prepare the documents. You hold the prerogative of the pen, which can make the difference. If you look at recent history, I was the last Foreign Minister to become Secretary General. After me came two Prime Ministers. Political leaders want to see their peers in this position of responsibility. You also see that happening in the EU now. What is important is that they are consensus-builders. Given the volatile, unpredictable world right now, you don’t need big ego’s or transformational leaders. You need a consensus-builder; someone who can guide the discussions and navigate the interests of now 29 NATO member states.’ Moving forward when faced with the potential of a crisis, if there are some words of wisdom to take away from Mr. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer never discount the power of personal relations, be pragmatic and look for a middle ground. His success in applying these features is a testament to his personal success as Secretary General and one for which NATO and its members states are truly indebted.