Canada’s Future Involvement with Op UNIFIER and Ukraine

By Alexander Landry, P.Eng, PMP and Andrew D. McNaughton this article was originally published in the Royal Canadian Military Institute’s (RCMI), in September 2022.

Introduction

Had you stated this time last year that Ukraine could have withstood a multi-pronged military invasion by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (AFRF), while keeping the regional power at bay in the East, and repelling direct attacks on its capital, you would have been hard pressed to find many people, let alone experts, who would have agreed with you. However, more than six months into the current Russian invasion of Ukraine, the resolve of our NATO partners remains undeniably strong. With strong leadership from President Volodomyr Zelenski, who chose to remain in Kyiv, combined with the resilient Security Forces of Ukraine (SFU), and renewed commitment from Western nations, Ukraine’s battle has seemingly only just begun, with renewed offensive phases by the SFU to reclaim many of the previously captured regions dating back to 2015.

In most respects, what is currently playing out in Ukraine is indicative of the country’s resolve and strength—its unwillingness to bend to the will of its neighbor and former master—now as a sovereign country rapidly embracing rapprochement with the Western world. In another respect, it is also indicative of Western support, and how the greater community of nations can come together when faced with unjust existential threats for members, such as is occurring right now in Eastern Europe. When speaking to Europe and NATO’s support for Ukraine, much can be said to the sanctions imposed on Russia, the quick provision of supplies to Ukraine, and the overall condemnation of Russian actions since February 24th, 2022. Conversely, although there are certainly larger implications diplomatically and geopolitically for this conflict within Europe and NATO, the limits of data right now for analysis begin and end with the outcomes on the ground, which is what the article seeks to outline.

Specifically, when speaking of provision of tactical level training and guidance from NATO allies to the SFU under the umbrella of Security Force Capacity Building (SFCB), efforts have been ongoing for the better part of two decades. While the SFU have gained much from these NATO and bilateral endeavors, they were only possible due to the evolution and alignment of contributing nation’s individual efforts. This process, however, must still take place as further efficiencies can be found that will not only strengthen NATOs efforts in Ukraine but will further enable the SFUs battlefield success. Accordingly, as Canada seeks to renew its commitment to Ukraine through Operation UNIFIER, now on British soil, we will seek to outline here what has worked, what still needs work, and an opportunity to create symbiosis with NATO efforts towards the overall goal of interoperability.

Op UNIFIER: 2015 to 2021

In early 2014, the Canadian government, and its armed forces, had their attention elsewhere. Operations in Afghanistan and Libya had finished relatively recently, and the rise of ISIS in Iraq threatened whatever small progress the western coalitions had made regionally in the previous decade or so. Accordingly, a return to conflict in Europe happened quickly, with Russia’s conventional invasion of Crimea, the south-eastern peninsula of Ukraine which has been an area of contention between the two states since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the “hybrid” invasion of the Donbas region to the Northeast—like- ly quicker than many expected at the time.

Canada’s response came in several forms, both individually as a nation, and as part of its collective alliances. For example, on April 16, 2014, NATO agreed to refocus its collec- tive defense concept and demonstrate its resolve as a cooperative security alliance, leading to a Canadian contribution under the aegis of Operation REASSURANCE. This operation has taken different forms over the years, beginning with the deployment of an air task force comprised of CF-188 Hornets to police the air space above Central and Eastern Europe, to successive HMC Ships in maritime task forces deployed in the waters around Europe. Land forces have been sent to Poland, and Latvia, where the current main effort for this operation lies.

But it was the commitment done on an individual national basis, or rather bilaterally, with Ukraine in parallel with fellow willing nations, that Canada shouldered up to Ukraine in a direct commitment to its cause. As such, several nations agreed to form training oper- ations not for NATOs defense in case of a horizontal escalation of the conflict, but rather directly in support of Ukraine and the SFU. Beginning with a two-year commitment of 200 troops, the Government of Canada announced the creation of Operation UNIFIER in April of 2014. By September, the training mission was underway and coordinated with Lithuania, the United States, and the United Kingdom—under the Joint Multinational Training Group—Ukraine (JMTG-U)—in the town of Starychi near Lviv. The soldiers of Op Unifier were tasked with building up the capacity of the SFU, and were aligned with wider government goals of development, security, democracy, and humanitarian aid. Specifically, the operation focused on small team training, explosive ordnance disposal, training of the military police, introduction to Canada’s Flight Safety program, basic English language training, combat medical training, and modernizing the SFUs logistical system. These initial years and objectives were very focused at the tactical level, especially those of the small team training courses. With basic tasks ranging from individual weapons training, small unit tactics, and how to coordinate first aid and casualty evacuation, soldiers were individually prepared, then enhanced with a dose of collective training for rotations through into the eastern area of the country in what had become a stagnant conflict zone.

In 2017, towards the end of the original commitment, the operation was extended for another two years with the same mandate. However, it was in September of that same year, that analysis from the end-of-tour reports indicated a need to produce more enduring effects, as the direct training conducted had seemingly reached its limit in disruptive change of the SFU. The focus on Small Teams Training had enabled individuals to increase their soldering proficiency, but the structure of the current operation, in combination with the attrition rate of the Ukrainian forces in the conflict, meant that this assistance was not reaching the whole armed forces.

Consequently, by 2018, Canadian Joint Operations Command began shifting Op Unifier’s training mandate from a primarily centralized nature to a much more dispersed structure. Canadian soldiers were sent further afield, from the Combat Training Center— Yavoriv, to other field units and schools. Immediately, this dispersal had several impacts. First, it led to the requirement for a systems level approach vice the previous individual one. The focus became training structures no longer simply to put soldiers into the field, but rather, for leadership and professional development of the middle and senior leaders of the Ukrainian forces. Second, the various nations at work in Ukraine were brought together under the alliance’s Defense Education Enhancement Program, which allowed for far greater reach of effort than the previous silo structure of training programs seen within the auspices of JMTG-U. This enabled a greater uptake of the core elements of Western forces that, according to one former Op Unifier commander, are “taken for granted.” These include elements such as modern teaching methodologies, non-commissioned officers’ education, cross-pollination of professional military thought and education from other nations, as well as the assistance to establish and adopt Western military education and academic structures.

In May 2021, the Canadian headquarters was shifted to Kyiv, the capital of the nation, as the operation only grew in scope with what seemed to be a growing appetite on both the Canadian and Ukrainian accounts for continued professionalization of the SFU. Despite restrictions from the pandemic, the mandate remained in place and training continued as it could. As the ARFR troop buildup on the border over the Christmas period progressed, Canada stood with its partner in announcing its extension of the operation until March 2025. It would only be on February 12th, twelve days prior to the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine, that Canada would fully pause training and relocate its troops outside of the country, watching as Ukraine began a fight for its sovereignty, and hoping to see the previous seven years of SFCB put to good use.

Op UNIFIER’s Return: Renewal in the United Kingdom

As it was, fate had it that Ukraine would hold on, surprising the Russians in repelling them from Kyiv, and certainly limiting their military operations to the eastern portion of the country. Following a hiatus of six months that began with the relocation of Op UNIFIER members outside of Ukraine, Canada announced in early August the intent to resume training efforts for SFU members. This constitutes a resumption of Op UNIFIER, notably under the British-led Op INTERFLEX, a bold new program announced by outgoing British Prime Minister Boris Johnson as part of a mid-June commitment while meeting with his Ukrainian counterpart, President Volodomyr Zelenski in Kyiv.

With up to ten thousand SFU members expected within the United Kingdom for both basic and specialist military training in five-week tranches, just over 160 CAF members arrived in the U.K. on August 15th in preparation of supporting the renewed training efforts. These efforts, slated to take place at a military base in the Southeast part of England, will focus primarily on a curriculum loosely based on individual battle skills, such as weapons handling, combat first aid, general fieldcraft, and patrol tactics. Although similar to the initial overview concerning Small Teams Training at the tactical level, the renewed curriculum will almost certainly be of a more basic and generic makeup considering the likely inexperience of the recruits arriving, not to mention the fact that they will not be cycling through the training location with their vehicles and logistical support systems as they had previously done as formed combat units in Yavoriv.

As such, the initial Canadian deployment is expected to last up to four months, likely with renewals on a recurring basis considering the British intent to repeat the program over the next several months. With the current administration in the United Kingdom clearly committed to the long term cause in Ukraine, it has repeatedly underlined the goal of training tens of thousands of fresh soldiers as to maintain the support to Ukrainian sovereignty operations, particularly considering now Russia’s commitment to the conflict with the full brunt of its military forces. To this effect, experts such as Walter Dorn, professor of Defense Studies at both the Royal Military College of Canada and the Canadian Forces College, have underlined the need for a prolonged engagement, specifically questioning how much a recruit is able to absorb over the course of five weeks of training. Considering Basic Military Qualification (BMQ) in the Canadian Armed Forces is already ten weeks long, that it covers basic first aid, not combat first aid, and that we do not send fresh BMQ-qualified recruits to face the AFRF, the thoughts of necessary extensions of such a training deployment remain valid.

Length of training aside, it remains to be seen however how much value the training itself is qualitatively bringing to the table in Ukraine’s fight for maintained sovereignty. Having trained more than 33,000 SFU candidates over the course of the previous Operation UNIFIER serials, and considering what Ukraine was able to pull off in repelling the ARFR advance, there is little doubt that SFCB did provide some value. The fickle task now, however, is to ascertain how much value it provides, where the focus should lie with the training efforts, and determine in which manner to carry out the training on such a short timeline for these recruits.

Accordingly, as a result of the conflict in Ukraine, the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre conducted its first of many Lessons Identified sessions earlier this year, outlining conclusions from the war in Ukraine and how Canadian efforts may have impacted SFU performance. Key takeaways included understanding of a delineation between common soldier skills and equipment-specific skills (mostly based on the provision of Western equipment to the SFU) and, more importantly, the need to continue integrating capabilities across combined arms operations moving forward.

Thus, Op UNIFIER is presented quite the challenge. It must look now at providing basic soldiering skills to these recruits, couple it with equipment-specific training on new weapons and technology to be used against the AFRF and conclude with some sort of collective training that allows for integration across the combined arms—all this on a shortened timeline than what was previously available in Yavoriv of course! It is for this reason that experts such as Walter Dorn underline the need for combat instruction extending beyond the four-month deployment. Moreover, it is ironically in one of his comments that the solution can be found, understanding that “this is a crash course for Ukrainian personnel to get on to NATO’s standards, and certainly they’ll be needing this for years to come.”

UNIFIER Moving Forward—NATO’s Part to Play

What Ukraine has been striving for in the first place has been accession to the EU, and potentially NATO, as it began undertaking its campaign towards embracing the ideals of democracy early in the twenty-first century both with the Orange Revolution and most recent Revolution of Dignity. As part of this campaign, NATO has welcomed Ukraine’s application for the most part, though outlining needs for the SFU to modernize as to adhere to the interoperability facets of the Cooperative Security core task of the Alliance. Luckily, such a tool exists to formalize this standardization, created exactly for the task of welcoming new members to the Alliance.

To this effect, the Operational Capabilities Concept Evaluation and Feedback (OCC E&F) program has been used to develop and train partner forces to meet NATO standards since its endorsement at the Washington Summit of 1999. Using a rigorous process and NATO-led instructor evaluations, it sees partner nations able to move towards interoperability, therefore ready to work with NATO and Allied forces once deployed. Although some partners leverage the OCC E&F program as a strategic tool to enhance their defense forces, the OCC has also seen a number of partner nations subsequently provide soldiers as troop contributing nations in support of NATO operations. Such is the case with Ukraine.

As a participating nation in the OCC program under the auspices of the NATO “Partnership for Peace” program since 2004, the Ukraine Military Committee was established on a national basis, seeking to achieve military criteria required for NATO membership, promote reform and professionalization of the SFU, and ensure participation of the SFU in NATO-led operations, including as part of the NATO Response Force. Consequently, Ukraine has previously provided troops to NATO’s International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, has been a key provider of heavy airlift capabilities to NATO for the better part of two decades, and only recently removed their large contingent of troops from the Kosovo NATO operation in order to leverage these soldiers for defense of their own country.

To this effect, substantial contribution, and successful progress in the reform of the SFU saw Ukraine recognized as an Enhanced Opportunity Partner in June 2020. With this status enabling further cooperation with the Alliance regarding information exchange, training, and exercises, it only underlined the relative success of the OCC program for the SFU. This included the conduct of Allied Land Command’s recent Land Staff Talks with the SFU only last year, intending to provide several OCC opportunities through 2021 and 2022 in support of interoperability efforts, only to be postponed now indefinitely since the invasion in February 2022.

As such, with Operation INTERFLEX (and consequently Operation UNIFIER) being conducted outside the borders of Ukraine, there exists potential for synchronization with the OCC without the risk of NATO directly becoming involved more than its already apparent provision of equipment and support. With Op UNIFIER continuing to provide the basic soldier skills and equipment-specific skills needed for soldiers at the tactical level, the OCC could be leveraged as part of the overall effort to integrate the combined arms context, thus enabling Ukraine to reinforce their operational capabilities and mount tailored force packages for continued operations against the AFRF.

Conclusion

Overall, if anything is to be taken away from the results of Operation UNIFIER since its inception in 2015, it is that SFCB does provide value. Although it is difficult to establish this value in a quantitative assessment, be it through efforts such as the OCC E&F, or the efforts of Op UNIFIER within JMTG-U, the reality is that the tactics coupled with the Western-provided equipment now being leveraged by the SFU are reflective of the training they have received over the past seven years. The Western world is seeing both these tactics and their equipment employed on a daily basis in the fight for the sovereignty of the nation, and most recent reports indicate that the situation seems to be improving.

This being said, as the lofty goal of cycling ten thousand recruits through the training program in the United Kingdom is presented, we must remember now that these troops are no longer preparing to cycle through the JFO area for protracted trench-style standoffs with separatist troops as they once were with previous iterations of Op UNIFIER. Rather, these volunteers are now being prepared for the brutal realities of direct conflict with a regional power’s military that has been actively engaged in military operations for the better part of a year. Accordingly, Canada in its partnership with the British-led Op INTERFLEX must seek to ensure that the value remains present within the training provided via SFCB, if only because the stakes are now that much higher. Through alignment of Op UNIFIER goals with already existing NATO programs, the SFU can continue to train for its ongoing conflict, while steadily seeking interoperability for its overarching goal of joining the Alliance.

What is certain is that Canada has a long-standing history of commitment to Ukraine, and that NATO stands by its partner in this difficult time. Accordingly, as Ukraine continues to act as the lynchpin for the values NATO represents on the Eastern Flank in resisting illicit aggression from outside forces, Canada and NATO must continue to support the nation where it can. If that were not enough to consider, with the political considerations stemming from the energy security situation as winter looms just months away, Canada must also seek to stay committed to the conflict in Ukraine in the public eye, particularly as many European nations’ resilience will be tested over the months to come by Russia’s use of gas provisions as a political tool.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Alexander Landry, P.Eng, PMP is a 2016 graduate of the Royal Military College with a B.Eng. in Chemical Engineering, and the Valedictorian of the University of Fredericton’s Class of 2020, having graduated with an MBA specializing in Global Leadership. He currently serves as a staff officer at NATO Allied Land Command. Previously having served on an expeditionary mission in Ukraine towards enhanced NATO interoperability, he has also deployed domestically within Canada for disaster assistance.

Andrew D. McNaughton is a 2015 graduate of the Royal Military College with a BA in Military and Strategic Studies, and a 2020 graduate of King’s College London with a MA in War Studies. He currently serves as a CH-147 Chinook pilot at 450 Tactical Helicopter Squadron in Petawawa, ON, and has deployed air operations experience with the United Nations Mission in South Sudan.