Beyond the Emergency Problematique. How Do Security IOs Respond to Crises – A Case Study of NATO Response to COVID-19

By Cornelia Baciu this article was originally published in the Journal of Transatlantic Studies in June, 2021.

Abstract

This article explores the discourses and strategies of security international organisa-tions (IOs) during the COVID-19 pandemic, applying NATO as a case study. Tobuild the argument, the article analyses speeches and public interventions by theSG and DSG coded in NVivo. First, the results of the empirical analysis suggestthat during the crisis NATO discourse focussed on its ability to perform core func-tions, on constructing identity, generating “positive” legitimacy, or on increasingthe relevance of military capital. Second, the findings show that the main elementsof the organisation’s COVID-19 crisis management strategy were: proactiveness,continuous review and planning ahead, stepping-up activities and efficiency, les-sons learned, adaptability, solidarity and civil-military cooperation. Third, a logic ofIO exceptionalism and ‘emergency problematique’, underpinned by mission creep,could not be conclusively confirmed based on the analysed sample. The article addsa theoretical distinction to the literature on global governance in times of emergency.It demonstrates that security IOs might not always seek explicit authority leapsthrough lowering checks and balances (horizonal) or reducing the legal protection ofsubjects (vertical), due to risks of sanctioning.

Introduction

“Can we talk about the Coronavirus?” a journalist asked NATO Secretary General(SG), Jens Stoltenberg, during the doorstep statement a day before the Munich Security Conference 2020. The question was lost in the multitude of queries and remained unanswered. While NATO began implementing preventive measures in January2020,1 it was not until 6 March 2020 that NATO took an official position towardsCOVID-19. To find out what NATO has been doing during the pandemic, why it hasbeen doing so, and how it has fared in so doing, I examined all public interventionsby the NATO SG and Deputy Secretary General (DSG), in the period between 06March and 06 May 2020,2 capturing the immediate NATO response to the COVID-19 crisis. The statements and public intervention data are complemented by pressreleases and other relevant strategic documents, announcements and reports. I coded the transcripts of statements or talks in NVivo, applying an inductive methodological approach and emerging coding.3 This involved a two-step analysis. First, paragraphs or sentences (units) were coded, one by one, to themes, i.e. meaningful categories that emerged during the coding process. Throughout the analysis, coding units were assigned to those emerging themes, and new categories were established as needed. In a second step, after having coded the entire material, the categories that emergedwere classified into meta-themes reflected in the next two sections.

The next two sections present the major thematic clusters as they emerged fromthe data. The fourth section discusses the results from the perspective of the emergency problematique theory and international organisations’ (IOs) exceptionalism4 in times of crises, and compares the findings to NATO responses to previous crisessuch as in Ukraine or Kosovo. The fifth section concludes this article by gauging the implications for the academic and policy communities and by suggesting avenues for future research.

NATO as crisis manager: ensuring continuity of operative coreresponsibilities and performing emergency‑specific tasks

One main meta-theme to emerge from the analysis of speeches and transcripts isthe dimension of NATO as a crisis manager, while simultaneously continuing the implementation of core tasks, such as deterrence and collective defence and existing missions. During public interventions and statements, both the SG Jens Stoltenbergand DSG Mircea Geoana emphasised crisis management as the ontological purpose of NATO. They also underscored the Alliance’s track record—in terms of institutional shared command, control structure and operational capacity—for supporting,coordinating and mobilising civilian efforts. “NATO was created to deal with crises”, it was said at a press conference,5 a statement reiterated on many subsequent occasions. NATO as crisis manager was central in the analysed discourse. The IO’scrisis management mandate thus deserves a closer look.

Crisis management is not mentioned per se in the Washington Treaty of 04 April 1949. However, Article 3 of the Treaty stipulates that member states shall “separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid,... maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity”.6 Crisis management is a core task of NATO, along with collective defence (Article 5) and cooperative security, as defined in the 2010 Strategic Concept. The question is whether the pandemic response fits within that framework and, if so, to what extent a logic of exceptionalism was embraced. Article 5 was not invoked during the pandemic. Public mentions of the scenario of invoking Article 5 to “combat the pandemic” were rather isolated.7 In the press conference following the virtual meeting of the NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs on 03 April and the North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers’ session on 15 April 2020, Secretary General Stoltenberg provided a summary of the content discussed during those meetings. Article 5 was not mentioned in his remarks delivered to the press. Neither was Article 4 invoked as a direct response to the pandemic. When Article 4 (the consultation procedure)—which makes it possible for member states to table issues for debate at the North Atlantic Council—was invoked during the pandemic, it was by Turkey on 28 February 2020 with regard to developments in Syria not causally linked to COVID-19. Thus, as the analysed transcripts demonstrated, during the period under consideration it was Article 3 that emerged to be central to NATO’s COVID-19 narrative. Article 3 was repeatedly cited in the context of NATO’s mandate to ensure resilience and civil preparedness in times of crises.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the NATO SG and DSG highlighted the security IO’s ability to perform “core” missions and activities to ensure the continuity of ongoing operations and its capacity to take on new, crisis-related, emergent tasks,such as the rapid transport and coordination of medical equipment, as one of theirchief messages. Nearly every public statement provides re-assurance of NATO’s operational readiness and capacity to defend and perform its core responsibilities.

“[O]ur operational readiness remains undiminished. And our forces remain ready, vigilant and prepared to respond to any threat... we can deploy troops, forces if needed”, declared the SG.9 Delivery of operative core responsibilities was perceived as a basic premise to maintain NATO posture and as a precondition for assumingadditional tasks (emergency-specific) in a credible manner. The delivery of operative core tasks was usually operationalized “to make sure that we deliver credible deterrence and defence every day and that our forces stay ready and that we are ableto act if needed”. 10 Other recurrent expressions attributed to NATO core responsibilities were “to make sure that this health crisis does not become a security crisis”11 and to protect and preserve security for “almost one billion people”12 (mentioned by both SG and DSG).

During speeches, public interventions and Q&A sessions in the studied period,eight tasks were highlighted as referring to core NATO responsibilities ongoing atthe time of the COVID-19 crisis outbreak: (1) providing re-assurance in relation tothe Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan; (2) continuing NATO counterterrorism training operations in Iraq; (3) providing re-assurance, support and commitment to Turkey in response to the consultation procedure (Art. 4) that Turkey activated in the aftermath of the Idlib escalation; (4) remaining committed to the partnership with Georgia and Ukraine, both beneficiaries of international assistance under the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC); (5) upholdingoperational readiness and vigilance through air policing, patrolling, maritime opera-tions or an increased “presence in the Black Sea Region on land with the TailoredPresence in Romania”13; (6) maintaining the four multinational battlegroups onthe Eastern flank in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland; (7) countering hybrid warfare that has intensified with the exponential surge in disinformation and cyber-attacks in Europe and the USA since the pandemic began14; and, (8) continuing the NATO mission in Kosovo. The SG and DSG explained that all operative core tasks continued and were successfully fulfilled during the crisis, albeit with some limitations or at lower intensities. Arguably, a position of non-fulfilment of the mandate could have had dramatic effects for NATO’s future existence. Maintaining all elements of the mandate was perceived as a precondition for the IO’s resilience andfor projecting effectiveness. As the DSG stated, it was “proof of the capability of NATO to withstand any pressure, any stress, even in such a complicated moment like this”.

Emergency‑specific tasks: strategic airlift, crisis preparednessand countering disinformation

In addition to the eight operative core tasks ongoing at the beginning of the COVID-19 crisis, NATO’s pandemic discourse was also related to its performance of twoother major emergency-specific tasks within its mandate of maintaining readiness to respond to crises: strategic airlift and transport of essential medical equipmentor patients, and assistance to member states to enhance preparedness at whole-governmental level. Resilience was perceived to be essential for the continuity of government and essential works, especially in the context of an unfolding geostrategic environment. Article 3 of the 1949 Washington Treaty was invoked as pertaining to NATO’s responsibility to maintain national resilience of members. When NATO was established, in the context of the World War II, the major threat was that of an armed attack by the USSR. As NATO continues to function on the legal foundation of the 1949 Treaty, Article 3 does not mention the word “national resilience” perse, but refers to the “continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid” and maintenance and development of the collective capacity of members. 16 In concrete terms, as it was explained during the statements, this meant providing member states with baseline requirements guidelines 17 that NATO “developed over decades” 18 related to infrastructure, health, mass casualties, the ability to move, communication, deci-sion-making and other critical areas. Crisis response constitutes an area in which NATO has many years of demonstrable experience and training. As it was specified by the SG in relation to the newest NATO member, North Macedonia: “over the lastfew years, NATO has trained more than 500 first responders in North Macedonia to improve their ability to respond to major incidents such as this”.19 In the past, NATO has conducted major multinational medical exercises, for instance, Vigorous Warrior organised by the NATO Military Medicine Centre of Excellence in 2019. In the context of large-scale shocks and a rapidly evolving geostrategic environment, resilience needs to be permanently evaluated and updated. One dimension often mentioned in relation to ensuring Allies’ resilience was the necessity for permanent review, as well as for updating and incorporating new dimensions linked to anticipated and evolving risks like the need to protect and assure critical infrastructure and supply chains. Thus, resilience also pertained to the collective capacity to prevent cyber-attacks and disinformation campaigns carried out by actors aiming to destabilise the society or the government apparatus to enhance their competitive advantage.

A second crisis-specific dimension to emerge from the data is related to strategic airlift of essential medical equipment such as masks, protective equipment andother medical supplies. More than 100 missions of strategic airlift and transport ofpatients and essential medical equipment, for example, from Italy to Germany, were conducted based on requests by NATO member states or partner countries in the period March–June 2020. This demonstrates the members and partners’ readiness to participate in this solidarity and mutual help mechanism. As of 02 July 2020, seven NATO members (Spain, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Italy, Albania, the Republic of North Macedonia and Slovenia) and nine partner countries (Ukraine, Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Colombia, Tunisia, Afghanistan,Mongolia and Iraq) had requested international assistance via NATO EADRCC.20 In addition to strategic airlift, NATO also helped build more than 25 field hospitals, and 4,000 military medical personnel joined the efforts of civilian medical staff. Public communication and speeches emphasised that the COVID-19 pandemic was at the top of the NATO agenda and that its focus was “to help the civilian authorities, the healthcare systems to combat the virus, to deal with the consequences of the COVID-19 crisis”.21 In their public speeches, the SG and DSG frequently spoke of“saving lives”, an overarching goal also referred to in the NATO Foreign Ministers Declaration of 2 April 2020. Strategic airlift, coordinated in conjunction with the NATO Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC), was identified and highly prioritised as a concrete solution to address specific needs on the ground. The NATO SAC was established in 2008 to fill a defence capability gap. It comprises an operational unit, the Heavy Airlift Wing (which is outside of the NATO Force Structure as opera-tions are coordinated via NSPA, the NATO Support and Procurement Agency), and the NATO Airlift Management Programme based in Hungary. Operationally, NATO SAC relies on three Boeing C-17 Globemaster III (under the Hungarian flag) and 150 military, 60 civilian and 60 Boeing maintenance contractors.22 One drawback of the SAC is that it relies on commercial suppliers, which raises the questions of dependence and whether NATO states should acquire more C-17 aircrafts of theirown. SAC has already completed over 2,500 missions, for example, providing strategic airlift to Haiti after the 2010 earthquake and to Pakistan during the 2010 flooding, and logistical support in the search for Malaysia Airlines flight MH370.23

To sum up, in its public COVID-19 discourse NATO highlighted as most important the endurance of core tasks that were ongoing at the time of the pandemic out-break, and the fulfilment of two additional emergency-specific tasks: strategic airlift,and assisting states to maintain resilience by providing crisis preparedness guidelines and by countering disinformation in conjunction with the EU. NATO proved its utility during the crisis by providing strategic assets that were urgently needed by member states and partners, thus filling a vacuum that other actors or IOs would not have had sufficient capabilities to fill to the same extent. NATO’s past experience incrises and crisis-specific tasks, such as strategic airlift, proved beneficial. The following section discusses the main elements of NATO’s approach to the pandemic, as they emerged from the data.

The main elements of NATO’s discourse on crisis management strategy

The analysis of the NATO discourse unveiled seven major elements in the organisation’s COVID-19 pandemic strategy: proactiveness, continuous review and planning ahead, stepping-up activities and efficiency, lessons learned, adaptability, solidarity and civil-military cooperation.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dr. Cornelia Baciu is a Researcher at the Department of Political Science and Centre for Military Studies, University of Copenhagen. She specialised in international security organizations and conflict research. She is developing a research agenda that seeks to introduce the notion of ‘order’ understood as the interplay and governance processes between state institutions, everyday power relations, and the international organization. She also specialized in meta-science, where she focuses on epistemological pluralism and research methods. Cornelia Baciu is Deputy Convener of the BISA Foreign Policy Working Group and founding Director of the Research Network 'European Security and Strategy'.