AUKUS: A Brief Discussion on Provisions for Indo-Pacific Security
By Alexander Fremis and Alexander Landry this article was originally published in the Journal of The Royal Canadian Military Institute in March, 2022.
“The Government of China ... is pursuing a strategy for geopolitical advantage on all fronts - economic, technological, political, and military and using all elements of state power to carry out activities that are a direct threat to our national security and sovereignty.”
—David Vigneault, CSIS Director
Introduction—Shifting Geopolitics in Key Regions
The past two decades have seen arguably the most significant evolutions in threats faced by the West. With February’s Russian invasion of Ukraine, this notion has only culminated for the time being, still leaving much room for further geopolitical issues for Europe and NATO moving forward. That being said, although much attention is currently given to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) remains a significant threat to Western interests. This includes threats of incursions into the territories of Taiwan or Hong Kong in eerily similar fashion to that of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Accordingly, as geopolitical tectonic plates shift in Europe, the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region may also be shifting, as the PRC may seek to take advantage of the West’s distraction to solidify its geopolitical position in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
In September 2021, as a result of these security concerns in the Indo-Pacific Region, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States announced a trilateral security agreement—coined AUKUS. Although the listed purpose of the alliance is to share technology and deliver submarine capital projects, many experts are pointing to its underlying purpose of countering the PRC’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific region. In the immediate aftermath of the pact, much attention was given to the absence of certain nations within the agreement, including fellow members of the Five Eyes community. Furthermore, questions arose on what it meant for future relations between various nations or entities such as NATO, and the AUKUS members. Closer to home, the glaring absence is that of Canada, a security and economic partner to all AUKUS nations to varying degrees within the Five Eyes, Commonwealth, and NATO. As Canada continues to grow its navy and implicate itself in the Indo-Pacific region, one would think that participation in such agreements would be crucial.
As such, this article briefly seeks to explore why Canada was omitted from such a significant security agreement. Moreover, considering the currently changing geopolitical situation based on renewed great power competition, it will also discuss Canada’s way forward outside of AUKUS.
AUKUS—an answer to Strategic Gaps
Bearing in mind the analysis of Canada’s exclusion from AUKUS, the pact itself must first be framed to understand where Canada could have played its part. Officially titled the “Agreement between the Government of the United States of America, the Government of Australia, and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information”, the agreement itself is colloquially referred to as “AUKUS”, an amalgamation of national abbreviations. Moreover, despite the agreement listing the exchange of specific information as its central tenet, it actually holds these areas of strategic importance: (1) information and technology sharing; (2) the integration of security and defense-related science, technology, industrial bases, and supply chains; and (3) cooperation on a range of security and defense capabilities.
To this effect, following an initial consultation period between the nations, an optimal pathway will be designed concerning nuclear stewardship that will see Australia become the seventh nation to operate nuclear-powered submarines. Corollary to the technical details of the submarine procurement itself, the pact signifies a significant shifting of resources towards integration of supply chains and industry between the three nations. This could result in further cooperation specifically between the three nations outside of other committed alliances. This could come in many forms, be they diplomatic, economic, or technological. Regardless, AUKUS signifies further commitment to security in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly on the part of the United States and United Kingdom’s accounts considering Australia’s geographical state.
What this agreement does not do is replace current standing commitments to other organizations or military alliances such as NATO. The signatories to AUKUS have made clear their continued commitments to various entities such as NATO, the UN, and others. This is of specific importance as the US and UK lead the conversation within NATO faced with the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Conversely, what it does do is address some gaps in capabilities and focus for these nations that exist within NATO, particularly considering the aforementioned present situation in Eastern Europe. To this effect, with eyes averted elsewhere for the better part of the year, China has seemingly recommitted to an imminent takeover of Taiwan, maritime expansion in the South China Sea, and rising intimidation tactics in the already oppressed area of Hong Kong. Accordingly, as NATO was originally designed as a Euro-Atlantic alliance, (as it is the North Atlantic Treaty), AUKUS fills a need for expansion of outreach and collaboration in face of heightened tensions as well as a potential growth in Sino-Russian relations.
Consequently, with such a strategic importance attributed to areas of focus already present in the Five Eyes community, Canada’s exclusion does bring some questions to mind. As Canada continues to signal an intent to play a significant role on the world stage, even amidst an overhaul of its professional military culture at home, not being included in potential cooperation in key areas is damaging both diplomatically and strategically. To date, the United States has only previously shared nuclear submarine technology with the United Kingdom. Moreover, only the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and India operate nuclear submarines. Yet, Canada is positioned as the United States’ closest geographical ally, operates conventional submarines, and has continued making efforts to play a larger part in the UN Security Council itself. Considering these contradictory facts, Canada’s absence from AUKUS is only made more glaring.
Why was Canada omitted?
Thus, the question remains, why was Canada excluded from what at first glance appears to be a natural security pact to take part in? While there is still some disagreement in available literature on the subject, many sources suggest that Canada was excluded due to two overarching areas of concern: A demonstrated lack of political will to meaningfully address the PRC, and a lack of resources and capabilities to contribute to the pact. By exploring these different yet interrelated factors, one can gain a better understanding of why Canada was not included in this security agreement.
Politically, the Government of Canada (GoC) has been hesitant to meaningfully respond to strategic threats posed by the PRC to Canadian interests across several areas. Being effectively designed to counter the PRC’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific, this undoubtedly influenced Canada’s exclusion from AUKUS. As an example, Canada remains the only Five Eyes nation to not ban Huawei from its national 5G network - a decision which is almost universally described as a no-brainer from security researchers. Moreover, this decision is only aggravated by the Prime Minister and his entire cabinet’s decision to abstain from voting to declare the PRC’s ongoing genocide against Uighurs as such, despite the motion passing in the House of Commons nonetheless. Together, these and other weak and indecisive actions give the impression that the GoC is not meaningfully addressing challenges posed by the PRC. It is thus perhaps not surprising that Canada is excluded from partnerships and initiatives aimed at countering the PRC as our allies look to cooperate elsewhere.
Speaking to the mechanics of the agreement itself, exasperating this exclusion is the arguably little resources Canada possesses to contribute to AUKUS. As previously mentioned, AUKUS is a multifaceted agreement to share technology, information, and contribute to cooperative defense and security initiatives in the region. It is unfortunately difficult to imagine how Canada could contribute to such an agreement with its current military and security capabilities. This is reflected in Canada’s measly 3 diesel powered submarines (two of which being generally fit for operations), limited air power, and insubstantial capability to force project without significant assistance. Furthermore, being a longstanding Five Eyes nation, Canada already contributes intelligence to Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Again, the question remains - What extra value could Canada actually add to AUKUS? Sadly, available evidence suggests that AUKUS members simply have nothing to lose by not including Canada and only risk including a partner that might hinder the pact’s strategic goals.
In this sense, Canada’s lack of resources to contribute to AUKUS is symptomatic of larger strategic problems in the Canadian security and defense sector—lack of political will. Not being included in alliances such as this is a hard pill to swallow for Canada. Yet, this current state of affairs does not need to be the case. In fact, there exists some relatively simple short-term actions the GoC could pursue to ameliorate the situation.
Moving Forward
As such, considering AUKUS, where does the GoC go from here? As suggested above, Canada being excluded from AUKUS is not an isolated problem but is symptomatic of long-standing issues in Canadian defense and security. That is to say, Canada’s exclusion from AUKUS is a result of longstanding lack of seriousness from the GoC towards matters of security and defense. Perhaps best illustrated by Senator Raoul Dandurand when, in 1924, he famously conceptualized Canada’s foreign and defense strategy as being a “fire- proof house, far from inflammable materials.” While the events from then until now have proved this to be laughably false, the ghosts of such thinking have continued to haunt Canada’s foreign and defense policy to varying degrees over time.
That being said, some short term, concrete steps that the GoC could take to address its exclusion from AUKUS include the following:
The GoC needs to decisively declare that it cares about the threats posed to its interests by the PRC. This could be accomplished by openly acknowledging the wrongdoings of the PRC as well as stating what Canada’s strategic goals are in the Indo-Pacific. Doing so would signal to our allies and the international community as a whole that Canada is ready to begin contributing to Western strategic goals in the Indo-Pacific region.
Following this, there are areas for improvement in Canadian domestic affairs with regards to the PRC. This includes increasing measures aimed at preventing, detecting, and combating clandestine foreign influence and theft of intellectual property, both of which are two areas where the PRC has been significantly active. Banning Huawei from Canada’s national 5G infrastructure would be one obvious way of improving Canada’s response to both.
Internationally, the GoC must contribute more to Western security goals in the Indo-Pacific region. This could be accomplished through increasing freedom of navigation operations in contested maritime spaces such as the South China Sea. The GoC could also seek to integrate Royal Canadian Navy ships into existing Australian, US, and UK maritime task forces. Doing so would allow Canada to meaningfully contribute to ongoing allied efforts in the region while simultaneously eliminating Canada’s force projection difficulties by piggybacking on allied logistics support.
Together, these short-term actions would allow the GoC to start changing its course on its response to the PRC. That being said, many of the shortcomings in Canada’s response to challenges posed by the PRC have little to do with the PRC and much more to do with long-standing issues in Canadian defense and security policy. Ameliorating these long-term deficiencies inherently requires long term strategic changes to Canadian foreign and defense policy.
Conclusion
Recognizing the importance of AUKUS, particularly in the face of shifting geopolitical environments, Canada has a decision to make—how does it want to be involved in the Indo-Pacific region? Within the vein of discussion of AUKUS, one can draw the conclusion that the exclusion from this pact is actually symptomatic of larger, long-standing issues in Canadian defense and security. However, with the rising tensions now in the Indo-Pacific region, as well as the Russia-Ukraine conflict ongoing in Europe, Canada is faced with an opportunity to reassert itself on the international stage, participate in the international community, and pursue its interests.
The 20th century proved that Senator Raoul Dandurand’s famous statement that “Canada is a fire-proof house, far removed from flammable materials’’ is decidedly
false. With the Russian invasion of Ukraine, some of the world’s worst fears regarding long-standing geopolitical balance made possible by the rules based international order
are coming to fruition. Moreover, the conflict’s consequences are evidently having an effect on international affairs of all nations, Canada included. Now, as the PRC sits poised in the shadow of this conflict to make moves of their own, Canada must realize that the previous geopolitical state is now an idea of the past and that the rules of the old game are shifting. Churchill famously stated that one should “never let a good crisis go to waste”. Accordingly, Canada may have metaphorically missed the boat on AUKUS, but it now has the opportunity to rectify such an exclusion and reassert itself within the international community.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Alexander Fremis, PMP graduated in 2017 from the Regular Officer Training Program at the Royal Military College of Canada with a BA Psychology and a Minor in Politics. He is currently a graduate student at Wilfrid Laurier University pursuing a Master’s of Public Safety specializing in National Security.
Alexander Landry, P. Eng, PMP, is a 2016 graduate of the Royal Military College with a B.Eng. in Chemical Engineering, and a 2020 graduate of the University of Fredericton with an MBA specializing in Global Leadership. He currently serves as a staff officer at NATO Allied Land Command. Previously having served on an expeditionary mission in Ukraine towards enhanced NATO interoperability, he has also deployed domestically within Canada for disaster assistance.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute or its members.