Of Discernment and Restraint: Proliferation, Iran, and Lessons for the West’s China Policy

By Onur Anamur

Though the Western military alliance par excellence, NATO, was historically designed for the European theatre, it is often discussed what NATO’s China policy should be or even whether it should have one at all. China portrays itself as a noninterventionist abroad, complementing its own understanding of sovereignty and hoping to assuage Western concerns. In Europe, China is often still thought of as an investment destination. Yet, in Beijing and Washington, the question now is whether differences in interest and ideology condemn the two to hostility.

This paper argues that even if we must be tough on China, we cannot be too tough. Though the West can hurt China more than the inverse, it cannot forcibly neutralise China’s hard power—except perhaps by subterfuge, but that is hard to assess without classified information.

To this end, Western powers, including NATO, should adopt a policy of discernment differentiating truly threatening aspects of China’s rise and behaviour from others. China’s policy on Iran is an example of such a policy. Meanwhile, the history of proliferation demonstrates how cooperation may be far more fruitful and effective at keeping that most fearsome security threat of all, nuclear weapons, in check.

One small reason for dovishness is the possible utility of Chinese cooperation in non-proliferation vis-à-vis Iran. There is also a bigger reason. While we laud NATO's solidarity vis-a-vis Ukraine, it equally follows that if it is true that we live in a dichotomous world, in US President Joe Biden's terms, between ‘democracy’ and ‘autocracy’, that one side may prompt the other side to coalesce. NATO owes its existence to the drawing of the Iron Curtain but so did its late nemesis: NATO's very own birth led to the creation of the Warsaw Pact. Indeed, the truer the president's dichotomy is, the likelier a coming together of illiberal powers, including China and Iran. 

One step forward in adopting a discerning policy, safeguarding against threats without needlessly increasing tensions, would be establishing direct communications between NATO and militaries in the Far East and launching a NATO-wide general cybersecurity strategy.

This paper, surveying the history of proliferation, concludes that threats can often be kept in check through non-coercive means. It then notes how China has diplomatically benefited from such a policy vis-à-vis Iran and how cooperation with China on Iran is important. It then asserts that it is cooperation with China—in the form of its economic integration with the West—that placates it, imagining that China should grow more aggressive and draw closer to the West’s rivals if it were isolated commercially.

Carrots or Sticks? A Study of Proliferation 

Nuclear weapons are the ultimate deterrent. Realists argue that the way to avoid proliferation is through great powers collaborating to thwart others from acquiring nuclear weapons.[i] However, the more numerous and fractious the great powers, the likelier proliferation is.

Yet, non-proliferation’s general success during the Cold War was more by dissuasion and diplomacy than chastisement. Only four powers went nuclear during the Cold War, discounting the Soviets, who developed theirs in response to the Americans as well as the French and British, who acquired them in concert and alliance with the US—this three-power nuclear-sharing is a fundamental characteristic of NATO. Yet, proliferators were few despite the relative impunity, although the great powers had huge capacities to punish if they wished: physical, economic, and diplomatic. With all permanent Security Council members as signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the worldwide nuclear fear, one imagines that the great powers could have arrived at a common strategy to punish any proliferator quite easily had they sought.

Only Pakistan imposed sanctions on India after its nuclearization that were not directly related to nuclear materials or capabilities by closing its airspace to Indian planes. Pakistan itself was subjected to much more stringent nuclear-related sanctions, but these have been intermittent and incomparably moderate to those on Iran.[ii] Pakistan is the only instance of the domino effect, having gone nuclear in response to India. India and Israel acquired nuclear weapons in response to conventional threats; the Chinese, for diplomatic reasons, among them prestige, but largely due to doubts about whether they were covered under the Soviet umbrella.[iii]

Whereas since the Cold War, North Korea, once under the Soviet umbrella but now subject to the most stringent sanctions, has developed a nuclear weapon, and beleaguered Iran is on the verge of development. Both share in being pariahs not covered by others’ nuclear umbrellas.

NATO—The Best Example of Non-Proliferation?

The West stands out for its lack of proliferation. The only American ally to go nuclear, besides the initial nuclearizations of France and Britain, is Israel—which is not a member of NATO. Within NATO, member states have remarkably entrusted their protection to a system actively managed by only three members for the past seven decades.

Communist China did not trust Communist Russia enough to not get the bomb, nor in turn did Chinese-allied North Korea trust enough in China to refrain from going nuclear. Trust in these matters is critical.[iv] North Korea is much closer geographically to China than Japan or Turkey to the US and imaginably more important for Chinese security. Yet, while North Korea did not rely on China to go nuclear, Japan, a major non-NATO ally of the United States, famous for its technological ingenuity and facing considerable geopolitical challenges, could relatively easily produce a bomb, but it did not. It trusts in the US umbrella instead.

While the realist argument still holds true, the boon of a nuclear deterrent no longer outweighs non-proliferation—which also moderately benefits from having world public opinion on its side[v]—at least when countries have no considerable deterring to do. Mearsheimer may be right that countries will acquire the bomb ceteris paribus—but all too often, they acquire it ceteris non paribus.

Iran’s Nuclear Program and China

China has been absent from the Iran nuclear talks. It has little reason to intervene. Iran does not threaten China nor does China care about the regime’s domestic beneficence or maleficence.

China has been silent on Iran since 2012, when Chinese premier Wen Jiabao stated that China “adamantly opposes Iran developing and possessing nuclear weapons” and warned against closing the Strait of Hormuz. He defended Chinese business deals with Iran as separate from this debate.

The Dragon Benefits from Moderation

Yet, China vis-à-vis Iran’s nuclear program demonstrates commitment to the rules-based order: it faithfully follows the NPT, denounces breachers, and has the smallest nuclear arsenal. Nor does it throw its weight around in negotiations.

Simultaneously, Iran sees China as the sole benign major power: China preserves its commercial relationship, abjuring American sanctions. China recently became Iran’s top trading partner and energy purchaser. China’s sheer demand makes it a great customer.[vi] China, however, can also buy elsewhere, like Russia or Indonesia. This and its substantial investments deepen its leverage. China is far more influential in Iran than Russia, which played an active role in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran nuclear deal.[vii] China’s relations with Iran go beyond business:

the two engage in periodic military exchanges, joint exercises, and port calls. In January…11 Iranian vessels joined three Russian… and two Chinese…in…joint tactical and artillery drills…Likewise, China actively supports Iran’s cruise and ballistic missile programs, providing it with technology…used against U.S. forces in neighboring Iraq as recently as 2020.[viii]

Nor has China lost much vis-à-vis relations with others in the region: its relations with Saudi Arabia are even closer.[ix]

Opportunities and Dangers of Accord and Discord with China

In Proliferation[x]

In non-proliferation, China must be a partner. Take, for example, Li Fangwei, a Chinese citizen, prosecuted in 2014 for selling ballistic missile technology to Iran by the US and sanctioned by it for dealings with Iran—himself since 2006 and his company since 2009. Mr. Li defended himself in the Financial Times, saying he sold “common products.”[xi] Both parties may have well been right. Centrifuges are not common products, but gasifying uranium is simple enough.

Any effective non-proliferation regime requires collaboration. Mr. Li is free and was only prosecuted in the US for breaching US sanctions. Not having imposed any sanctions, China is not obliged to help beyond the strictures of the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA), whose inspections concentrate more on facilities than equipment shipments. Activities illegal in the US may be legal in China or even Europe.[xii] This multiplicity hinders any effective coordinated thwarting mechanism.[xiii] Beyond bilateral diplomacy is only the UN Security Council—where China can veto. Meanwhile, trafficking through Afghanistan is likelier with the West gone and the quaestuary Taliban there.

Inversely, nothing can be done if China comes to support Iran. If China made a secret deal with Iran whereby in the case of a likely American military intervention against Iran, China would help Iran acquire a nuclear weapon, and there is little that can be done. China can easily pretend to build a bomb for itself and give it secretly to Iran.  Admittedly, were the Chinese pro-Iranian, Iran might go under the Chinese nuclear umbrella. Counterintuitively, then Iran would be less pressed to get a bomb. The hypothetical problem of an attack on Israel would be gone, too. Any comprehensive China-Iran nuclear agreement can change everything, for better or worse. The West’s options are few: its influence in Iran pales in comparison to China’s.

In General: An Unholy Alliance?

            Like Iran and Russia, China is also characterised by ideological variance from and resultant tensions with the West. The coalescence of illiberal powers, then, makes eminent sense. Andrew Erhardt writes:

‘An international order is not a thing bestowed upon by nature, but is a matter of refined thought, careful contrivance, and elaborate artifice’[xiv]…concepts, once articulated and implemented, often develop into new, unique, and unrecognisable forms.

One way of ordering our thinking…is to begin by identifying the models to which we are averse. Beijing, Moscow, and perhaps other capitals, might one day seek to construct a ‘modern Holy Alliance’…to preserve their forms of governance, ensure their security, and attract foreign countries to their side.[xv]

Yet, China’s economic integration with the West impedes any such attempt.

The Communist commitment to development renders internal order and prosperity a—or the—factor in the regime’s legitimacy. Filling bellies, putting rooves over heads, and keeping the Chinese working override almost all else. Since China is a Western market producer,  goods are manufactured inland, and then shipped West. The diplomatic ramification of this commitment is that China becomes, as oft-said,[xvi] a status-quo power. China must sell its labour and is beholden to its consumers.

Transitioning to a more autarkic orientation means turning the country on its head, despite the size of its internal market.[xvii] China’s lack of natural resources makes this even harder.

Yet, that economic system’s undoing would mean the Party could no longer legitimise itself through development. This may occasion more national socialism in China, as already happening somewhat: nationalism, not development, becoming more and more the legitimating argument and foreigners being blamed for privations. Then, China will be prompted more and more to take what it can no longer buy, fueling what should prove, for ideological and practical reasons, a nastier expansionism. Isolation would prompt it further to turn to Russia for food and metals, in which Russia abounds.[xviii] Depriving China of technology may even be more dangerous when necessity is the mother of invention, and those microchips are produced on a nearby island China claims as its own.

The severance  of commerce with the West would be worse for China than for us. Yet, it would still be terrible. China’s dockyards, factories, and manpower will remain at the Chinese Communist Party’s behest, whatever China’s pecuniary woes. Aggressive containment would increase disaffection but might also rally people around the flag: it does not guarantee revolution. Even if the Iran regime fell tomorrow, we may only remark that sanctions might contribute to taking down a regime in fifty years’ time.

Containing China geopolitically is understandable, but overall commercial containment means cutting its cord to the West: rendering China impoverished but chloric: aggressive and free-floating. We should rightfully beware of the effects of Chinese commercial influence on democracy and human rights. Nevertheless, being led by Sinophobic pessimism or Wilsonian optimism to approaches like general commercial containment to affect political change—as applied to Russia now—is dangerous. The West enjoys great technological superiority, which we wisely do not it for granted and cultivate, but hostility with the world’s most populous country is no light thing. Dovishness has risks: division within, further nurturing power of differing mores, and even making a future conflict less favourable. Yet, hawkishness may expedite conflict and render it more manifest and terrible. Geopolitics is about thinking tragically to avoid tragedy.[xix] One should not feed snakes but not attack anacondas either. The West’s greatest and primary advantage is that getting along with it pays astoundingly well. It should not spoil that.

Member states’ China policies must discern true threats from benign manifestations of economic prowess. Such discernment[xx] has allowed China to enjoy its good relations with and influence in Iran while not antagonising others and honouring their non-proliferation commitments. China has differentiated between the different aspects of policy: the political from the diplomatic, the diplomatic from the economic, and the economic from security questions—and most importantly: the serious from the unserious.

What NATO Might Do

This is exactly NATO’s area: to assess. Smaller Allies already heavily rely on NATO to formulate strategy. Thus, NATO should be informed about developments in the Far East, not so much to execute policies but ensure that NATO and the Allies clearly understand China and thereby offset future threats.

Military Analysis Should Serve Diplomatic Decision-making: Partners in the Far East Should be in Direct Communication with NATO

The Nature of the Chinese Threat

In the primary point of contention, the Taiwanese question, the military and diplomatic are inextricable. A conflict over Taiwan is like Ukraine in inverse. Russia’s military superiority over Ukraine was a fact—though in hindsight Russian victory was not. Thus, Russia felt comfortable invading without much regard for opinions, getting the only international support it sought: Third World ambivalence. In contrast, an all-out invasion of Taiwan is well-nigh impossible, taking about six to nine hours for an invasion fleet to do the crossing[xxi]; its detection is almost guaranteed. Yet, China’s casus is stronger than Russia’s, Taiwan is de jure China. We, officially, only differ from China in that we think that reunification should necessarily be peaceful. If peaceful reunification happens, likely through some coup de grace, legally, we cannot but abandon those factories with the manuals and blueprints in the cupboards—so much for commercial containment.

 As such, the People’s Liberation Army really has two uses: in wider political or diplomatic crises, or likelier, to exacerbate or prompt them. The physical forces to respond to China are already present: The US Pacific Fleet, Earth’s largest, approximately numbers some 200 ships and some 1,500 aircraft. The entire Chinese air force numbers approximately 4,000 aircraft; the entire Chinese Navy, 535 ships and 600 aircraft. No need to mention others’ forces or America’s technological superiority. Security in Asia is not neglected.

However, information therefrom should be communicated accurately and comprehensively to the Allies, especially in crises: suppose a Chinese naval exercise approaches Taiwan. Whether it is an invasion force or not is decided based on general military-strategic analysis: the number, course, location of ships and planes; radio signals in the area; decryption... Whereas the conclusions drawn therefrom are anything but purely military.

Even Iceland[xxii] must know how to respond diplomatically. A miscalculation by some or all Allies may have grave consequences. Too weak a response, China, which may have just been probing, may go further, concluding that the West has little appetite for confrontation or that America’s Allies do not back it on Taiwan—and Allies might not be with the US if they are in the dark. Inversely, one can imagine China launching a peaceful but massive show of force, say if Congresswoman Pelosi’s visit comes at a time of even higher tensions. If Allies start threatening fire and fury, the Chinese might misperceive this as the Alliance creating an opportunity for a pre-emptive strike. They may then decide to be proactive. Crises often happen in the margins. Take last year: Russia did not invade the Baltic States; instead, a rocket fell in Poland, bethought possibly Russian. The North Atlantic Council met and discounted this possibility. What danger would there be if some Allies had been in the dark! What if the decision had not been made collectively? What if some country had independently declared its conclusion that the rocket was Russian? NATO, with its collective information-sharing and decision-making, renders it improbable that we should suffer such disunity in Europe. Yet, there is no such safeguard in Asia.

Recommendations

Diplomacy is not just at the start of conflicts. Diplomacy and discussion in Europe may have been superseded by the ultima ratio regum; but elsewhere, as in Asia, a diplomatic struggle continues, influencing in turn the physical conflict in Ukraine. We see UN votes mattering even in wartime. To both guard against overzealousness and ensure solidarity when needed, Allies should and deserve to have the most and the best information available to determine NATO’s collective interest.

NATO departments tasked with strategic planning, defence contracts, and diplomacy between the Allies should have good access to military intelligence, even from Asia. They fundamentally include the North Atlantic Council and the Military Committee but also probably portions of the NATO Office of Security (NOS), Division of Political Affairs and Security Policy, and the Division of Defence Investment. For the best picture, there should be direct communication between NATO and Allies’ forces there—under NATO command or not—and non-NATO forces like the Japanese. Presently, Japan is a partner. This provides a forum for dialogue and through the Partnership Interoperability Initiative, bestows some degree of interoperability so that Japan can join NATO missions or exercises from time to time. It does not, however, translate to an integrated system of communications.[xxiii]

Allies would best come to know what is happening in the Pacific by getting involved. Expansion would also remove the fundamental unfairness that that vigilance is mostly funded by the American taxpayer.[xxiv] Nevertheless:

1. Other Allies’ joining operations in the Far East would improve relatively little in technical capacity.

2. NATO’s formal expansion there would certainly increase tensions, as the Chinese have expressed.[xxv]

3. It seems few Allies would want to directly pay much for defence in the Far East. The war in Ukraine may have impressed Allies of the need for defence but foremost its need in Europe, where most Allies are.

So, expansion is not a very good idea.

However, those points do not apply in NATO’s newest area of operations: cyberspace. Cyberthreats are not territorially defined like conventional threats; securing computer systems is not provocative like deploying tanks and planes is but cyberthreats are equally dangerous everywhere. Cyberattacks may happen in Allies’ home countries and hurt civilians as much as militaries. Civilian systems may indeed be even more vulnerable.

Thus, cyber a very good area for EU-NATO cooperation. Currently, NATO’s Cybersecurity Centre seems to guard against most threats to military infrastructure. While it cooperates with the EU, it does not appear to be integrated with it.[xxvi] Whereas often cyberthreats threaten cities. Cities are already developing their cyber-resilience. The Hague has hackers annually compete to hack it to bolster its security. Work on this has also been done in the US. We should apply these practices across the board and consider a general NATO cyber-resilience plan.[xxvii] It makes sense to involve the EU in this. The EU’s Committee of the Regions is the largest inter-municipal organisation throughout the Alliance. Also, Commercial and IT regulations in most of the Alliance are subject to EU legislation. Too often, as in the case of Abdel-Kader Khan, regulations have been amended in response to security threats post factum. It makes sense at that those drafting and applying regulations should have the threats in mind ab initio. Indeed, safeguarding against the construction of nuclear facilities may entail collecting military, diplomatic, and regulatory intelligence and applying military, diplomatic, and regulatory solutions in tandem. NATO-EU cooperation may also be necessary, not just beneficial.

NATO epitomises an integrative approach to security that testifies to its effectiveness, despite over-departmentalization—avoiding which is the purpose of these suggestions. NATO always has one advantage over China: policies and regulations, whatever the benightedness in which they are made, can nonetheless be reviewed, commented over, and refined through the collective deliberations of the North Atlantic Council. The very messiness of collective decision-making and consultation, the weighing of considerations from sometimes 30 very different perspectives, prompt us to more sober and incisive judgements than China can make. All member states suffer from formulating clear and comprehensive China policies: we should offer them as wholesome and comprehensive information as possible, be that the US or Slovakia. All Allies must deal with China at least commercially.

About the Author

Onur Anamur is a recent graduate of Middle East Technical University in Ankara, Turkey, where he received his Bachelor of Science in Political Science and Public Administration. He is a citizen of Canada and Turkey. He is interested in global affairs and public policy and previously wrote for university publications. In 2021, the European Commission recognized him as one of Europe’s top journalists under 30 and invited him to report on the Week of Regions and Cities under the aegis of the Youth 4 Regions programme. He has also recently started to write for the European Student Think Tank. He is also interested in languages and attended the 25th International Conference on Historical Linguistics at the University of Oxford. He speaks English, French, and Turkish and knows some Italian, Chinese, and Latin.

Notes

[i] Bilkent IR, “Will Iran Get the Bomb? with John Mearsheimer, Tytti Erasto, Mahsa Rouhi,” YouTube, March 17, 2022, accessed January 29, 2023, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=71hOYfE8sSI.

[ii] There have been sanctions on the export of nuclear expertise and materiel, arms, and at the very worst, cutting off U.S. economic and military aid from 1977 until 1979 and intermittently throughout the 1990s.

[iii] One may say, however, that China’s proliferation succeeded, because the Americans made a strategic trade-off between catalysing its split with the Soviet Union through generating Chinese nuclear autonomy and chose to prioritize American diplomatic interests rather than thwarting a proliferator.

[iv] Henry Kissinger remarked that the essential challenge to North Korean denuclearization negotiations is that however much the United States declares that it does not seek regime change in North Korea, the United States clearly would not mourn the regime if the regime fell. This implies that had the North Korean regime been a trustworthy international partner standing by its side against domestic discontent, it would not have as strongly felt the impetus to nuclearize. See, Henry Kissinger, interview by Charlie Rose, August 17, 2017, https://charlierose.com/videos/30895.

[v] As testified by almost all countries having subscribed to the NPT. The Simons Foundation found that 79% of 6,000 randomly surveyed people from the US, UK, Germany, Israel, Italy, and France thought nuclear weapons made the world more dangerous. It is curious that three of the aforementioned six states are nuclear powers, and a fourth, Israel, has many security challenges of its own. See “2007 Global Public Opinion Poll on Attitudes Toward Nuclear Weapons,” The Simons Foundation Canada, https://www.thesimonsfoundation.ca/projects/2007-global-public-opinion-poll-attitudes-towards-nuclear-weapons.

[vi] Li Fangwei argued that a US court may have not had the authority to try him. Jamil Anderlini, “Chinese exporter denies Iran dealings,” Financial Times, April 8, 2009, accessed January 29, 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/e2f46812-2409-11de-9a01-00144feabdc0.

[vii] Iran’s enriched stocks were sequestered in Russia.

[viii] Craig Singleton, “How Beijing Benefits From a New Iran Deal: The nuclear agreement could unleash Chinese activity in the Gulf and complicate U.S. goals in the Indo-Pacific,” Foreign Policy, September 7, 2022, accessed January 29, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/09/07/iran-nuclear-deal-china-us-geopolitics-middle-east-asia-gulf-sanctions-belt-road/.

[ix] Whereas the Iran-Chinese relationship is mainly at the ambassadorial level, higher level exchanges have taken place between the Saudis and China.

[x]  “It is also clearly in Washington’s interest to cooperate or work in complementary ways with China in certain areas and to maintain a beneficial economic relationship with the world’s second-largest economy.” Henry M. Paulson, “America’s China Policy Is Not Working: The Dangers of a Broad Decoupling,” Foreign Affairs, January 26, 2023, accessed January 29, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/americas-china-policy-not-working?utm_medium=newsletters&utm_source=fatoday&utm_campaign=America%E2%80%99s%20China%20Policy%20Is%20Not%20Working&utm_content=20230126&utm_term=FA%20Today%20-%20112017.

[xi] Anderlini, “Chinese exporter denies Iran dealings.”

[xii] The European Commission famously tried to protect European companies dealing with Iran from the reimposition of sanctions under US President Donald Trump. Effective communication about threats may also help Europe and the US get on the same page.

[xiii] US prosecutors seized USD 6.8 million of assets from what they deemed were front companies in the United States. Similarly, those eight Chinese companies are only under US sanctions; they are not sanctioned anywhere else.

[xiv] Herbert Butterfield and Michael Bentley, The Life and Thought of Herbert Butterfield (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Andrew Apud Ehrhardt, "Alternative international orders: A modern Holy Alliance for the twenty-first century,” Engelsberg Ideas, June 17, 2022, accessed January 29, 2023, https://engelsbergideas.com/essays/alternative-international-orders-a-modern-holy-alliance-for-the-twenty-first-century/.

[xv] Ehrhardt, “Alternative international orders.”

[xvi] Ian Taylor and Zhangxi Cheng, “China as a ‘rising power’: Why the status quo matters,” Third World Quarterly 43, no. 1 (2022): 244–258, DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2021.2005462.

[xvii] See George Freidman, “China’s Economic Crisis and Its Foreign Policy,” Geopolitical Futures, October 15, 2021, accessed January 29, 2023, https://geopoliticalfutures.com/chinas-economic-crisis-and-its-foreign-policy/. While I do not necessarily subscribe to the notion that developing countries can necessarily be crippled by low demand for their exports, perhaps they may have a broken leg for some time. However, I see no reason for China not to eventually develop into an economy underpinned by domestic consumption like many other places, rendering it into possibly even a more fearsome opponent in the future. Yet, strong domestic consumption would also mean that China, being thus less sensitive to the global market, can afford to be less concerned with foreign policy and thus less aggressive, whereas punitive measures prompt China to both reduce its dependency on the West and to be angrier with us.

[xviii] The Russians might have to sell for cheaper, but with the restrictions placed on them, both directly and indirectly, in exporting to wealthier Western markets, they may simply have to just sell at a cheaper price. Indeed, Russia has demonstrated a willingness to reduce its profits from exports of primary resources for geopolitical advantage. Supporting China against the West is truly to the Kremlin’s advantage.

[xix] “The wisest among us are full of fear, which is future-oriented. This is especially true of those in power, who decide about war and peace. Wise leaders are those who know that they must think tragically in order to avoid tragedy. Vladimir Putin never learned this lesson or else he would have never invaded Ukraine.” Robert D. Kaplan, The Tragic Mind: Fear Fate and the Burden of Power (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2022).

[xx] Philosophically, it has been argued that enlightenment constitutes the distinction of different elements in a given phenomenon. See, Karl Leonhard Reinhold, “Thoughts on Enlightenment,” in What Is Enlightenment?: Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth-Century Questions, edited by James Schmidt 65–77 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), https://doi.org/10.1525/9780520916890-006.

[xxi] U.S. Naval Institute, “The Decline of Russia and China,” by George Freidman, YouTube, October 30, 2022, accessed January 29, 2023, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lOBNfKGxULM.

[xxii] Iceland, despite being a NATO ally, only has a coast guard and no standing army.

[xxiii] “Cyber defence,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, March 23, 2022, accessed January 29, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm.

[xxiv] The counterargument is, of course, that while Far Eastern questions concern everybody, they concern the United States much more: the US being, alongside Canada, the sole ally on the Pacific, discounting French territories. Overall, though, the American argument has considerable merit.

[xxv] Riyaz ul Khaliq, “NATO’s expansion sowed seed of conflict: China tells UN,” Anadolu Agency, June 29, 2022, accessed January 29, 2023, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/nato-s-expansion-sowed-seed-of-conflict-china-tells-un/2625734.

[xxvi] “NATO and the EU share information between cyber response teams and exchange best practices. Cooperation is also being enhanced on training, research and exercises with tangible results in countering cyber threats.” See “Cyber defence,” NATO.

[xxvii] Eleri Jones et al., “For the public sector, cyber resilience has never been more important,” World Economic Forum, July 18, 2022, accessed January 29, 2023, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/07/how-do-you-safeguard-a-city-from-cyber-attacks/.

Image: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/photos_207291.htm