NATO and Kosovo
NATO’s presence in Kosovo in the form of Kosvo Force (KFOR) has undoubtedly served as an integral force for peaceful cohabitation and stability in the region. We have seen that this presence has taken on a multitude of roles, from riot control, to explosion defusion, to working on the ground with locals in order to gain an understanding of overwhelmingly complex social issues. However, despite these incremental achievements, to celebrate the efforts of NATO in the region too early would almost certainly be naive and counter-productive. This paper provides insight into the emergence of conflict in Kosovo, NATO’s successes in the country, the social dynamics in the region today, and the challenges that lie ahead for a peaceful and secure Kosovo. This paper argues that it is vital to cautiously anticipate the events of the next two decades in Kosovo, giving consideration to the existing cultural, economic, and political tensions that overwhelmingly remain.
By Nina Jensen
The emergence of conflict in Kosovo
Located in the Western Balkans, Kosovo is home to diverse ethnic groups, including Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs. While the two groups share a geographical location, they speak different languages and practice different religions. Today, it can be said that these groups live side by side in a relative state of peace, but just over two decades ago, the situation could not have been more different. In 1998, open conflict between Serbian military and police forces and Kosovo Albanian forces broke out, resulting in thousands of deaths. The outbreak culminated as a result of long-standing tensions arising from repressive policies imposed by the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Slobodan MiloŠević, against the Kosovo Albanians. These policies led to appalling human rights abuses in Kosovo. Further, MiloŠević’s policy of ethnic cleansing also deplaced hundreds of thousands of Kosovo Albanians.[i]
In 1999, NATO decided to intervene in Yugoslavia, launching an air campaign in an effort to halt the disaster unfolding in Kosovo after numerous attempts to solve the conflict through diplomatic means. Due to MiloŠević’s refusal to cooperate, and an ever-growing humanitarian crisis that threatened the stability of the region, NATO’s involvement was deemed as integral.[ii] The conflict finally ended in June 1999, and in a bid to maintain peace and stability in the area, a NATO-led force of 50,000 was deployed, marking the birth of Kosovo Force (KFOR). After the break-up of violence, the situation between Serbia and Kosovo remained in a state of political deadlock, with both sides determinedly defending their positions.
According to Serbia, Kosovo always was, is, and always will be a part of Serbia, and according to Kosovo, Serbia lost any legitimacy over the territory when implementing its systematic regime of ethnic cleansing.[iii] However, following negotiations and recommendations made in 2007 with the help of UN special envoy to Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari, Kosovo declared its independence on 17 February 2008. This declaration was founded on the premise that Kosovo could never unite with the state of Albania, and since 2008 around half of all nations have recognised its independence, including all NATO member countries. On the contrary, Serbia, Russia, China, and numerous other countries have not.
Today, under the presence of KFOR, the violence in Kosovo has ended, and the situation has improved markedly. However, there are still huge challenges that lie ahead, and the future risk of another conflict has not been eliminated.
The role of KFOR: then and now
Although the involvement of NATO within Kosovo was never universally supported, undeniable achievements in the area have been made. For one, the presence of NATO in the form of KFOR has decreased dramatically in size over the past two decades, from an initial 50,000 troops to just 3,500. This obviously indicates a decrease in immediate tensions and, therefore, reliance upon military force, at least intermittently. Another success can be seen in the early involvement of Russia as a part of KFOR,[iv] as such action is not only relevant in relation to Kosovo itself, but as a means of furthering the NATO-Russia relationship for establishing peace more generally.
While a clear reduction in KFOR’s presence is evident, the mandate of KFOR remains unchanged to this day: that is, to provide an impartial, stable, and peaceful environment in Kosovo—and to guarantee freedom of movement for all its inhabitants. Nevertheless, the question of how to effectively implement this has required KFOR to adapt to the ever-changing needs of a society different to that of what it was two decades ago.
Today, KFOR remains prepared for the possibility of an emergency response by regularly carrying out CRC (Crowd and Riot Control) training. Although KFOR has not been called to quell a case of civil unrest since 2011, there are other risks that pose a threat to the population and require KFOR’s expertise. Explosion disposal has also been a key role of KFOR, as remnants of war still remain scattered throughout Kosovo.[v] Such unexploded devices have the potential to cause serious injury or death if handled incorrectly. Therefore, KFOR explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams have proved crucial in clearing large areas of old explosives, including mines and unexploded ordnance (UXOs) such as mortars, projectiles, and submunitions, just to name a few. KFOR EOD teams also maintain close cooperation with the Kosovo police, so that when they work together on active operations, they are familiar with each other’s procedural methods.
Also crucial, if not more so, has been KFOR’s responsibility to monitor the population and respond to the needs of its various ethnic groups.[vi] Liaison and monitoring teams from different nations carry out pulse patrols across Kosovo, interacting with the local people and providing KFOR with situational awareness on the ground.
Finally, since the conflict ended in 1999, KFOR has worked with both the UN and the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) in order to help the Kosovo authorities build an integrated police force that adequately reflects the society it polices.[vii] Today, the Kosovo police is a fully functional force and the first to respond in an emergency. This operation has been especially valuable in establishing a greater sense of independence and identity for the Kosovo people.
Relationship between KFOR and the communities of Kosovo
Today, Kosovo’s diverse ethnicities often live together in mixed communities. The presence of NATO-led KFOR has always been viewed differently by the varying ethnic groups in Kosovo. This is of course inevitable with a defiant minority Serbian population, many of whom adamantly reject the notion of Kosovo as an entity distinct from Serbia and view NATO’s presence in Kosovo as the persecution of the Serbian people by the West. Estimates vary widely, but as many as 125,000 of the approximately 200,000 Serbs who lived in Kosovo prior to the NATO-led bombing campaign either fled or were driven out of the country.[viii] Today, Serbians’ identity in Kosovo is further complicated by social pressures, and the new generation of Serbs who support an independent Kosovo are often ostracized from their own communities. For example, even the head of the Serbian Orthodox Church has stated that recognition of Kosovo as an independent country is to be regarded as a sin.[ix]
Many Albanians also resent the NATO operation, which killed around 7,000 civilians during the bombings, and towards NATO more generally for curbing violent and nationalistic Albanian mobs targeting Serbian civilians and peacekeepers. In addition, there is some resentment from Albanians who reject the notion that Kosovo still needs the protective guard of NATO after two decades and its independence.[x]
Despite this, there is undeniable support from Albanians and many Serbs within Kosovo for the role KFOR has achieved in cementing peace between the various ethnic groups for future generations.[xi] Whatever the previous actions of KFOR, both communities can agree that having a middle-man has been essential in quelling more extreme individuals promoting the continuation of vengeance culture. Therefore, while the atrocities experienced on both sides of the fence will not likely be forgotten anytime soon, if ever, there is clear recognition of the need for a practical and effective solution, at least for now. This is especially so while Kosovo continues to go through the process of defining itself as a state, with institutions and laws that need to serve all inhabitants equally.
Remaining challenges
Despite the milestones achieved, fundamental obstacles still remain. The overwhelmingly obvious issue that pertains to the problem of division within Kosovo is the culture of “us” versus “them”.[xii] Nowhere is this more evident than in the town of Mitrovica, where the city divides the Serb and Albanian populations on two sides of the river. This geography holds great significance in highlighting the ongoing hostilities between the groups and the struggle to achieve harmonious integration. In addition, much of the Serbian minority population has found itself in a relative state of isolation compared to the majority of Albanians, and the government has struggled with the issue of how to effectively protect the rights of the minority, including welfare, health, and education.[xiii] This will be a crucial issue to tackle, as the more Serbs are driven to feel isolated and eternally “punished” by their home society, the more division and nationalistic tendencies arise.
Linked to this is the overriding issue of poverty and unemployment prevalent across ethnic groups, which has resulted in restlessness and protests, particularly among youth. Many families have chosen to shutter their homes and relocate to either Serbia or Albania as a result, or attempt to find illegal work in the West.[xiv] This is detrimental for both communities, as Serbs face further isolation and fear over their rights as a minority group, and deported Albanians face shame and rejection from their communities upon return, making it even more difficult for them to secure work.[xv] Factors such as these are especially concerning in light of the fact they can exacerbate nationalism and even extremism within both Serb and Albanian groups, which has the potential to spark further violence in the future. The present struggle is to ensure greater protection of the notion of democracy in Kosovo and a fight against corruption.
The role of the international community is also a pivotal discussion in relation to Kosovo’s recognition as a legitimate state and, therefore, to its future development. With only roughly half of all world states recognising Kosovo as an independent country at present, progress is difficult both within the region itself and in relation to its external communications. One interpretation of this lack of support for recognition lies in concerns over the legitimacy of the NATO-led mission in intervening in the East in the first place.[xvi] The prima facie lack of UN authorisation of the operation, and the lack of consideration for proportionality, effectiveness, and adherence to international humanitarian law has undeniably created resentment in part towards the overall NATO mission, especially taking into consideration the number of civilian lives lost, i.e., “collateral damage”.[xvii] While those in Kosovo have overwhelmingly come to accept the interference from the West in the name of a “greater good” in securing peace and receiving support from other states on the grounds of humanitarian intervention, many still do not believe that NATO’s actions were grounded in international law; therefore, Kosovo’s independence is rendered illegitimate. Despite the International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion on Kosovo in 2010, which declared that Kosovo’s declaration of independence did not violate international law,[xviii] future discussions will be crucial to achieving widespread recognition. Despite this, however, evidence of strong support has emerged from autonomous regions, including (inter alia) the Basque Government, East Turkestan, and the Mejelis of the Crimean Tatar People, as well as from International Organisations such as the European Broadcasting Union and the International Olympic Committee.[xix] Such acknowledgment indicates that recognition is not solely a legal matter but is multi-dimensional and should not be disregarded in the importance of the future definition of Kosovo.
Finally, the Kosovo-Albania relationship proves fundamentally difficult in considering a NATO withdrawal from KFOR due to the inevitable opposition that would come from Albania should an exit plan be proposed. Due to the requirement of decision-making at the North Atlantic Council to be unanimous, even a vote of rejection from Albania alone would render NATO’s exit impossible. Considering this significant issue, there is an inescapable concern over the future role of NATO in Kosovo, and whether KFOR will face a similar “never-ending mission” as experienced with the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus.[xx]
Conclusion
NATO’s presence in Kosovo in the form of KFOR has undoubtedly served as an integral force for peaceful cohabitation and stability in the region. We have seen that this presence has taken on a multitude of roles, from riot control, to explosion defusion, to working on the ground with locals in order to gain an understanding of overwhelmingly complex social issues. The undeniable success of the operation has further led to a significant reduction in the presence of troops, from an initial 50,000-member force to a modest 3,500, allowing a greater sense of independence and normality for Kosovo than was ever initially envisaged.
Despite these incremental achievements, to celebrate the efforts of NATO too early in the region would almost certainly be naive and counter-productive. Therefore, while the progress made should not be overlooked, it is vital to cautiously anticipate the events of the next two decades, giving consideration to the existing cultural, economic, and political tensions that overwhelmingly remain. This will inevitably be affected by the interaction between Kosovo and Serbia, as well as other third-party states and international organisations such as the UN and the EU. However, fundamentally, the ultimate success of Kosovo’s future is to be determined by the local population: ethnic Albanians and Serbs alike. Therefore, more should be done to further integrate these separate populations, especially among young people, in the form of various initiatives that focus on solving shared problems such as unemployment, healthcare, and corruption.
About the Author
Nina Jensen works as a content writer for Scandinavia’s largest educational platform for finance and investing, Female Invest, which aims to fix the financial gender gap worldwide. She is an LLM graduate from the University of Manchester in the field of international law and human rights. As the Secretary-General of DanMUN, last year she planned and implemented an international conference that centred on the issue of the Iran Nuclear Deal following the US withdrawal of the JCPOA. Nina is originally from the UK.
Notes
[i] Ved P. Nanda, “NATO’s Armed Intervention in Kosovo and International Law,” United States Air Force Academy Journal of Legal Studies 10 (2000): 4.
[ii] Ibid., 7.
[iii] Ibid., 16.
[iv] Javier Solana, “NATO’s Success in Kosovo,” Foreign Affairs 78, no. 6 (November/December 1999): 119.
[v] C Jura, “Observations on the Intervention of NATO in Kosovo,” AGORA International Journal of Juridical Sciences 2013, no. 2 (2013): 118.
[vi] Ibid., 118.
[vii] Ibid., 118.
[viii] Ved P. Nanda, “NATO’s Armed Intervention,” United States Air Force Academy Journal of Legal Studies 10 (2000): 15.
[ix] Ibid., 15.
[x] Ibid., 16.
[xi] Solana, “NATO’s Success in Kosovo,” 118.
[xii] Nanda, “NATO’s Armed Intervention,” 15.
[xiii] David Rohde, “Kosovo Seething,” Foreign Affairs 79, no. 3 (May/June 2000): 71.
[xiv] Ibid., 68.
[xv] Ibid., 69.
[xvi] Nico Schrijver, “NATO in Kosovo: Humanitarian Intervention turns into Von Clausewitz War,” International Law FORUM Du Droit International 1, no. 3 (September 1999): 157.
[xvii] Nanda, “NATO’s Armed Intervention,” 9.
[xviii] “Advisory Opinion of the ICJ on The Unilateral Declaration of Independence in respect of Kosovo,” July 22 2010, 122.
[xix] Cedric Ryngaert, “Recognition of States: International Law or Realpolitik? The Practice of Recognition in the Wake of Kosovo, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia,” Leiden Journal of International Law 24 (2011): 9.
[xx] Frank Hoffmeister, “The European Union and the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes,” Chinese Journal of International Law 11, no. 1 (2012): 14.