Mapping the Kremlin's hostile information operations against NATO in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic
The COVID-19 pandemic has provided hostile actors with a multitude of possibilities to spread and amplify disinformation. Several narratives have revitalized long-running campaigns aimed at weakening adversaries and are not directly health-related. The Kremlin has seized the opportunity to target the EU and NATO, as well as aspiring member states, in order to polarize societies and foment hostility within these alliances. NATO has faced disinformation attacks particularly in the Baltic states, where the Alliance has been portrayed as an unreliable partner, malign actor aiming to misuse the pandemic for Washington’s goals, and a hotspot of COVID-19. Accompanying narratives have highlighted a positive image of Russia, largely relying on the points Moscow scored after delivering humanitarian aid to a number of states.
These narratives are prominently seen in Georgia and Ukraine, which have seen cross-coordinated campaigns promoting conspiracy theories identifying COVID-19 as an American bioweapon—yet another revitalization of older rhetoric. These campaigns are excessively seen in the occupied territories of both these states, where anti-NATO sentiment is consistently identified as an external threat, a narrative that is heavily utilized by Moscow. Both states have also been targeted with messages aimed to subvert their potential accession to the Alliance.
In promoting anti-NATO disinformation, the Kremlin relies on a complex communication system that far exceeds the reach of state-controlled TV and exploits local outlets as well as pro-Russian agents of influence. The long-established nature of this sophisticated system—along with the key narratives it disseminates—has provided ample opportunities for NATO and its member states to design an adequate response over the years. Such a response would require proactive positions, diversification of communication channels, and specifically targeting groups vulnerable to disinformation.
By Oleksandra Tsekhanovska
The novel coronavirus (COVID-19) has presented the international community with a set of challenges that expands far beyond the healthcare field. From legislative aspects of introducing lockdown measures to restructuring education processes, these issues are aggravated by the flow of mis- and disinformation, which has itself long been a threat to democracies, the well-being of their citizens, and international cooperation. The situation has been widely evaluated as an “infodemic”, which not only has immediate, real-life effects but will also influence the future of our communications systems.
The danger of healthcare-related mis- and disinformation cannot be underestimated as it constitutes a direct threat to human lives. From more than 700 dead and severely poisoned people in Iran, who believed methanol would cure them from coronavirus,[i] to those admitted to Georgian hospitals with burns after consuming extremely hot water for the same purpose,[ii] the importance of the problem is evident. However, not all mis- and disinformation flooding the media space against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic is directly health-related—and not all of it is domestic in nature. Additionally, homegrown misinformation may also be amplified by foreign actors to enhance internal destabilization.
The European Union's External Action Service has concluded that hostile actors have utilized the pandemic to spread and amplify disinformation in order to “exacerbate confusion, panic, and fear.”[iii] The People’s Republic of China and Russian Federation are the vanguards of such campaigns, which have, among other things, demonstrated the evolution of Chinese disinformation. COVID-19 has made Chinese information manipulations more aggressive, often involving anti-Western conspiracy theories— and demonstrating unprecedented alignment with efforts from Moscow.
Unlike China, Putin’s regime in Russia remains more consistent in its efforts. Monitoring Russian disinformation as well as observations of the Kremlin’s information and psychological operations abroad highlights that the pandemic, while creating some new windows of opportunity, has largely served as a basis for the revitalization and remodeling of previously established narratives. These narratives vary depending on the target audience and subject of discussion (e.g., historical revisionism constitutes a specific bloc within the ecosystem of the Kremlin’s disinformation operations). In regard to COVID-19, the key overarching narratives are as follows:
1) “The EU and NATO will collapse under the pressure of pandemic and economic crisis.”
2) “The EU and NATO are unreliable allies, unlike Russia and China.”
3) “Western states are less effective in countering the pandemic than Russia and China.”
4) “The pandemic has demonstrated that Western values are artificial and obsolete.”
Among the many conspiracy theories promoted by the Kremlin abroad, the one that has gained the most traction and was amplified not only by proxies online but also directly by state-controlled television (including the TV channel “Zvezda”, which is directly affiliated with the Russian Ministry of Defense[iv]) was the notion of COVID-19 as an American biological weapon.
The leading characteristic of these narratives is the implicit anti-Western sentiment behind them. The Kremlin remains dedicated to weakening and polarizing Western democracies—and to undermining their unity and solidarity within the framework of established alliances such as NATO and the EU. While the Kremlin perceives both entities as adversaries, NATO, given its military component and key strategic component with the leading role of the US, raises particular concerns in Moscow. It comes as no surprise then that the COVID-19 pandemic was exploited as a basis for attacks against the Alliance and became the subject of twofold (dis)information operations—simultaneously aimed at destabilizing member states and lowering the support for potential ascension from among aspiring countries such Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova.
Level 1: NATO as an unreliable partner
Since the beginning of the pandemic, Moscow has deployed its substantial media resources to portray Western democracies as incapable of effectively dealing with COVID-19 and its repercussions. Both the spread of the disease and its death toll as well as the economic consequences of lockdowns were highlighted in contrast to the domestic situation in Russia, where state-controlled media focused on the effectiveness of Russian authorities and their support for local businesses.
Leading Russian television channels such as “Russia 1”, “Channel 1”, “NTV”, “REN TV”, and “Zvezda” paid a disproportionate amount of attention to European hardships, which fit the framework of the traditional meta-narrative on the “horrors of life” in the West.[v] When a number of leading Western media outlets such as The New York Times and local independent outlets such as Novaya Gazeta concluded that Russia’s official statistics on COVID-19 were not transparent, it threatened to undermine Moscow’s carefully built dichotomy of “successful Russia vs. the unsuccessful West.” The accusation was vehemently denied by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and accompanied by a smear campaign in the media, which blamed those who questioned the statistics at home for destabilizing the situation at the behest of the Western lobby. Criticism of insufficient governmental support was ridiculed and/or silenced; new legislation on countering fake news[vi] was employed less to counter mis- and disinformation and more to conveniently model a beneficial information climate for the Kremlin.
Showcasing the problems of European states and the US served as a stepping stone for the next stage of narrative development. Positioned as incapable of dealing with the pandemic on their own, Western democracies were portrayed in desperate need of external assistance. Russian media heavily targeted the European Union and NATO as ineffective in providing such assistance and ignoring the needs of member states. Essentially, Moscow used the pandemic to reinforce its predominant narrative that states that are, in their essence, self-serving and that long-lasting strategic alliances based on common liberal values are doomed to fail in the face of crisis due to their artificial nature—and that liberalism is, as Vladimir Putin insisted in his interview with Financial Times, “obsolete”.[vii]
Promoting the idea that NATO did not take any measures to support its member states, Russian media questioned the necessity of alliances that demand substantial financial contributions and impose obligations, which are seen as undermining the sovereignty of member states. To maintain this picture, Russian media avoided mentioning the assistance NATO (and the EU) later supplied. Instead, emphasis was put on Moscow’s humanitarian efforts and its aid to the US, Italy, and Serbia. The questionable quality of this aid[viii] was either ignored or denied, and so were the speculations that Russia’s humanitarian campaign was a tool to push for lifting sanctions—which was later confirmed when Italian parliamentarian Vito Petrocelli received a letter from Russian MP Leonid Slutsky with a request to put pressure on Brussels to lift the sanctions imposed on Moscow.[ix]
Much of the information on NATO’s assistance during the pandemic is available in English. Additionally, official sources such as NATO’s website, including the corresponding data about NATO’s assistance during the pandemic, are available in Russian. NATO, however, presumably does not enjoy a high level of trust among Russian citizens given the generally negative attitude towards the Alliance in the country—52% of Russians believe there is a reason to be wary of NATO member states.[x] Therefore, Russia’s success in promoting the image of NATO as an unreliable partner abroad, which is yet to be measured, was mostly based on two factors:
- Russia’s speed of providing humanitarian aid and communications;
- Availability of information and the Kremlin’s targeted approach.
In addition to the image of NATO as an unreliable partner, Kremlin-linked media actively pursued the narrative on the crippling effect that the pandemic allegedly had on the Alliance itself. This direction was mostly centered on the Cold Response military exercise in Norway, which ended earlier than initially scheduled due to the epidemiological situation.[xi] A vast array of Russian outlets celebrated this decision, insisting that the coronavirus had ultimately undermined NATO’s military capabilities[xii]—a claim that was debunked by Secretary General Stoltenberg.
Level 2: NATO as a threat
The next step in fomenting hostility towards NATO after portraying it as an unreliable ally was to present it as a threat, for which the pandemic provided an apt opportunity. The most widespread tactic used by Kremlin in this regard was to claim that battlegroups in Europe, particularly in the Baltic states, were hotspots for the disease. In April, the Canadian-led battlegroup in Latvia was reported to have “a high number” of coronavirus cases—this information was simultaneously released by Russia-linked outlets in Eastern Europe and amplified in the Russian media. Debunked by the commander of the Latvian Task Force, this accusation was a clear example of a disinformation attack with a carefully selected timing, as the reports were released just before the scheduled NATO exercise in the Baltics.
An article by Baltnews Latvia, a Russian-language outlet posing as a local source for Russian-speaking Latvians, took the attack further, claiming that NATO leadership conceals the actual COVID-19 statistics, thus questioning the Alliance’s integrity.[xiii] It also insisted that a military exercise was taking place despite the dire epidemiological situation and that security measures were not observed, despite the 45.7-million euro provided to the Latvian Ministry of Defense, which was pictured as a waste of taxpayers’ money, and thus further escalated tensions.
The financial aspect of NATO membership is essential in any given disinformation campaign. Anti-NATO rhetoric facilitated by Russia abroad has persistently claimed that membership obligations are too heavy of a burden on national budgets, that expenditures are misplaced, and that the US is the only state to profit. This pattern demonstrates how Russian disinformation adapts to reach different target audiences: for example, those that are not persuaded by the alleged Russophobia and “imperialism” of the Alliance are approached with a seemingly more sensible proposition to revisit the way governments spend taxpayers’ money. Using COVID-19 to revitalize and remodel some of the older narratives, Russian media insisted that instead of “wasting” funds on NATO-related needs, member states should focus on their healthcare systems, which were under the strain of the pandemic. It is essential that Russian disinformation is traditionally focused on amplifying those grievances that already are rooted in target societies, which allows for a façade of credibility and is useful in further promoting the message within the local media ecosystem by those who agree with it.
A similar sentiment is observed in regard to Estonia, where Baltnews Estonia writes that the country is “welcoming coronavirus hosts from NATO”.[xiv] It is worthwhile to note that this article was published at the beginning of September, which is evidence of not only a centralized but also a long-running campaign in different states. Lithuania was targeted in a different way—in addition to vastly amplifying the news on 20 soldiers contracting the disease, to which outlets such as Baltnews and Spuntik contributed, active measures were used. In particular, the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs warned that “malign actors cynically exploit #COVID19 to sow discord within NATO”,[xv] commenting on how the fake letter allegedly sent by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg claimed that NATO was pulling its troops out of the country.[xvi] The letter in question was sent directly to the local media, and some of them had it published.
This was not the first time that this tactic was employed to sow chaos and distrust during COVID-19: a similar pattern was observed in Ukraine. In February 2020, on the same day that 45 Ukrainians and 27 foreign nationals were evacuated from China to the village of Novy Sanzhary, Ukraine, an e-mail allegedly sent from the Ukrainian Ministry of Healthcare was disseminated that claimed there were five confirmed COVID-19 cases in Ukraine (which was not true at the moment) and encouraged citizens to share this information.[xvii] Ukraine’s security services linked this information operation to the Kremlin. Along with the fake messages and calls for protests that the locals of Novy Sanzhary received via messengers such as Viber, the Kremlin facilitated aggressive protests against the evacuees. The protests were later widely broadcasted on Russian state television, which contributed to the negative image of Ukraine.
While the Baltic states have already attained NATO membership and are targeted by Russian disinformation mostly via Russian-speaking local minorities in order to undermine nationwide support for the Alliance, prospective member states have been attacked in a different way. In Georgia, the most widespread conspiracy theory on COVID-19—that the virus is an American biological weapon—fit into the framework of older disinformation patterns centering on the Lugar Center. Lugar, a lab based within the National Center for Disease Control and Public Health, has been a target of disinformation attacks for years and has been accused of conducting human experiments and weaponizing various diseases with malicious goals of either subduing the Georgian population or serving as a base for biological attacks against Russia.[xviii] In the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, this conspiracy was reframed and revitalized once more, which further underlined the tendency of the Kremlin’s disinformation to recycle familiar patterns. Lugar lab was accused of spreading coronavirus in Georgia, and disinformation took a particular toll on the Russian-occupied territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia: occupying authorities discouraged the locals from seeking medical assistance on Tbilisi-controlled territories, threatening them with the possibility of being deliberately infected with COVID-19 at the Lugar Center.[xix]
Ukraine was targeted in a similar manner. The Lugar Lab was used as a disinformation template for a cross-coordinated campaign upheld both by Russian television and local agents of influence. A pro-Russian “Opposition Platform – For Life” (OPFL) party launched a campaign demanding an investigation into the activities of “American military biolabs” in Ukraine against the backdrop of the coronavirus outbreak.[xx] OPFL politicians and media linked to the leader of the party and Putin’s personal friend, Viktor Medvedchuk, promoted conspiracy theories on the artificial creation of COVID-19 and its spread from these labs. The story was debunked by the US Embassy in Ukraine,[xxi] but it kept receiving traction regardless and was repeatedly aired on Medvedchuk-linked media months after the initial inquiry and debunking. Furthermore, the conspiracy received a development of its own in the Russia-occupied territories of Eastern Ukraine, where occupying authorities insisted COVID-19 was developed in “CIA-controlled” labs in Kyiv-controlled territories. Both claims were picked up by Russian state-controlled television and broadcasted as alleged proof of Washington’s hostility as well as its “external governance” over Ukraine. The private television channel “Tsargrad” linked to media oligarch Konstantin Malofeev, who took part in financing Russian hybrid aggression in Ukraine during 2014 and 2015, was a particularly active contributor. Yet another old narrative, that NATO will not accept Ukraine as a member state, was also reinforced—with both Russian and local pro-Russia media insisting that the pandemic revealed a number of internal problems that make the Alliance too preoccupied to even consider accepting new members.
It should be noted that while these cases may not mention NATO directly, they still constitute a threat towards the local level of support for the Alliance. They fit into a broader disinformation ecosystem in which NATO has been repeatedly equated with the US, and all other member states are typically disregarded as having no influence over decisions Washington allegedly imposes on them.[xxii] Moreover, hostility towards the West has mounted repeatedly, and OPFL pours a substantial amount of resources into establishing and amplifying anti-Western sentiment, for which NATO is one of the key targets.
In general, the creation of NATO’s negative image against the backdrop of the pandemic was implemented both by Russian state-controlled television and local outlets linked to the Kremlin. This combination exposes the target audiences both at home and abroad to coordinated campaigns, and it also enhances the speed and spread of disinformation. Having immediate access to the local population via resources that appear as independent media facilitates the Kremlin’s messaging, especially if it is additionally amplified by inauthentic online behavior on social media platforms. As a result, anti-NATO disinformation has a faster speed and deeper level of societal penetration than official information provided by NATO itself in states with significant Russian-speaking minorities that are directly and en masse targeted by disinformation campaigns. Russian media followed two main co-dependent directions in portraying the Alliance as an unreliable ally first and as a potential threat second. This campaign pursued the following narratives:
1) NATO cannot provide assistance to its member states, and Russia is a more reliable partner.
2) Membership imposes financial obligations that should be redirected to healthcare.
3) The pandemic has undermined NATO’s military capabilities.
4) NATO battlegroups in Europe are a hotspot of the virus.
5) NATO is linked to the development of COVID-19 as a biological weapon.
All of these messages have been addressed by NATO leadership, but their debunking has demonstrated two crucial faults: NATO has been reactive instead of being proactive, and it has addressed, first and foremost, audiences that were not targeted by Russian disinformation and thus did not need to be persuaded in the first place.
Recommendations
The most important lesson learned for NATO is that maintaining its information security requires a proactive position. Given that Russian information operations typically rely on the revitalization of already established narratives, active defense strategies should consistently address these narratives. It is important that NATO communicate its specific acts of support in a concise and timely manner, without giving malign actors the opportunity to take the lead in (dis)information campaigns.
Fomenting hostility towards NATO is often based on portraying the Alliance as a hostile military actor under exclusive control of the United States. To dismantle this complex narrative, it is essential to underline not only the military cooperation component, but also the economic, political, and humanitarian benefits of membership. It is also crucial to tailor this approach to a specific state, emphasizing that its contributions to the prosperity and success of the Alliance are recognized and appreciated.
Developing strategic media campaigns and utilizing suitable channels of communication for their amplification is vital. When reaching out to the audiences that the Kremlin targets to sow discord, relying on Russian language is crucial, since Russian minorities are the primary consumers of anti-NATO disinformation and typically prefer sources in Russian before those in the national language or in English. It is of the utmost importance to monitor the regular hotspots of disinformation and debunk false information swiftly, in a language and manner with which the target audience is most familiar. While doing so, one must not exclude social media and messenger applications, which agents of disinformation use progressively. Prioritizing particular platforms depends on their popularity levels in the relevant states—e.g., the popularity of Viber in Ukraine, where it is a top messaging app, is not necessarily shared in the Baltics.
It is also important to remember that many target societies have been exposed to anti-Western, including anti-NATO, rhetoric for a substantial period of time, which diminishes the likelihood of using official NATO-affiliated sources and undermines trust in them, even if they are available in Russian. One of the most efficient ways to diversify communication is to involve local civil society, which often enjoys a significant level of trust. For example, as in the case of Ukraine, the general public trusts civil society more than governmental institutions. It also has extensive knowledge of particular local vulnerabilities and the most efficient ways to address them as well as an understanding of how communication strategies should be adapted to different regions of the same state.
About the Author
Oleksandra Tsekhanovska is a Kyiv-based information security expert with a focus on Russia. She is an alumnus of the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy and Beijing Foreign Studies University. She is currently a senior analyst at the Hybrid Warfare Analytical Group of the Ukraine Crisis Media Center.
Notes
[i] “Iran: Over 700 dead after drinking alcohol to cure coronavirus”, Al Jazeera, April 27, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/iran-700-dead-drinking-alcohol-cu....
[ii] “In order to prevent coronavirus, several people burned their mouths with boiled water – Kashibadze”, NetGazeti, April 16, 2020, https://netgazeti.ge/news/443978/?fbclid=IwAR3WWm3YnewUEaQgcxYWybuWlM8RM....
[iii] James Frater, Mary Ilyushina, and Hadas Gold, “EU says pro-Kremlin media trying to sow 'panic and fear' with coronavirus disinformation”, CNN, March 18, 2020, https://edition.cnn.com/2020/03/18/europe/eu-kremlin-disinformation-coro....
[iv] “Zvezda spreads conspiracies about bio-weapons”, Ukraine Crisis Media Center, April 28, 2020, https://uacrisis.org/en/zvezda-spreads-conspiracies-about-bio-weapons.
[v] “Image of European countries on Russian TV”, Ukraine Crisis Media Center, last modified April 28, 2020, https://uacrisis.org/en/image-of-european-countries-on-russian-tv.
[vi] “New ‘fake news’ law stifles independent reporting in Russia on COVID-19”, International Press Institute, May 8, 2020, https://ipi.media/new-fake-news-law-stifles-independent-reporting-in-rus....
[vii] Lionel Barber, Henry Foy, and Alex Barker, “Vladimir Putin says liberalism has ‘become obsolete’”, Financial Times, June 28, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/670039ec-98f3-11e9-9573-ee5cbb98ed36.
[viii] Jacopo Iacoponi, “Coronavirus: the Conte-Putin phone call agitates the government: "More than aid, Russian military arrives in Italy", La Stampa, March 25, 2020, https://www.lastampa.it/topnews/primo-piano/2020/03/25/news/coronavirus-....
[ix] “Russia asks Italy for a favor in return for coronavirus aid”, UAWire, May 2, 2020, https://uawire.org/russia-asks-italy-for-a-favor-in-return-for-coronavir....
[x] “Attitude to the Conutries”, Levada Center, February 18, 2020, https://www.levada.ru/2020/02/18/otnoshenie-k-stranam-6/.
[xi] Cold Response 2020, Norwegian Armed Forces, https://forsvaret.no/en/coldresponse.
[xii] “Coronavirus has undermined NATO military capacity”, Reporter, March 20, 2020, https://topcor.ru/13705-koronavirus-podorval-boesposobnost-nato.html?utm....
[xiii] “How coronavirus delivers a blow to NATO – this time in Latvia”, Baltnews, April 24, 2020, https://lv.baltnews.com/nato/20200424/1023858133/Kak-koronavirus-nanosit....
[xiv] ““Welcome, dear guests”. Estonia welcomes coronavirus “hosts” from NATO”, Baltnews, September 7, 2020, https://baltnews.ee/nato/20200907/1018836825/Zakhodite-gosti-dorogie-Est....
[xv] LT MFA StratCom, April 22, 2020, https://twitter.com/LT_MFA_Stratcom/status/1252836694664949762?s=20.
[xvi] “'Malign actor' poses as NATO chief, emails Lithuania saying troops are pulling out”, Deutsche Welle, April 22, 2020, https://www.dw.com/en/malign-actor-poses-as-nato-chief-emails-lithuania-....
[xvii] In the name of the Ministry of Healthcare, a fake report was sent out on coronavirus in Ukraine , Livyi Bereh, February 20, 2020, https://lb.ua/society/2020/02/20/450472_imeni_minzdrava_razoslali_feyk.html.
[xviii] “Who’s the afraid of the brown stink bug?” EUvsDisinfo, November 18, 2019, https://euvsdisinfo.eu/whos-afraid-of-the-brown-stink-bug/.
[xix] Eto Buziashvili, “Experts on Disinfo: RU hybrid influence in Georgia”, Ukraine Crisis Media Center, video, 1:20, https://uacrisis.org/en/experts-on-disinfo-ru-hybrid-influence-in-georgia.
[xx] Renat Kuzmin, “Deputies of OPFL party will demand establishing a temporary investigation committee on investigation of activities of American military bacteriological laboratories in Ukraine”, 112, April 27, 2020, https://112.ua/mnenie/deputaty-frakcii-opzzh-budut-trebovat-sozdaniya-vs....
[xxi] Announcement, U.S. Embassy Kyiv Ukraine, Facebook, April 22, 2020, https://www.facebook.com/notes/us-embassy-kyiv-ukraine/%D0%B7%D0%B0%D1%8....
[xxii] “How Russian media foments hostility towards the West”, Ukraine Crisis Media Center, last modified September 19, 2018, 66, https://uacrisis.org/en/how-russian-media-foments-hostility-towards-the-....