18 Years of NATO in Afghanistan

The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, the start of the war in Afghanistan, and NATO’s initial involvement are now 18 years behind us. NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan has shaped the alliance over the course of nearly two decades. From the first and only invocation of Article 5, to taking command of the International Security Assistance Forces in 2004 and the start of the Resolute Support Mission, NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan has been an era of adaptation for the alliance. However, young people who are reaching the age they go to university or the military and vote are mostly unaware of the war in Afghanistan, its origins, its objective, and its operation. This article analyses the defining moments in the Alliance’s longest military operation, calling for NATO to clarify its mission in Afghanistan for the benefit of both younger generations and NATO’s public outreach.

By John Jacobs

On 7 October 2001, 18 years ago, 12 Special Forces soldiers from America’s 5th Special Forces Group (ODA 595) landed in Afghanistan. The American war drama 12 Strong (Fuglsig, 2018), a movie adaptation of the book Horse Soldiers by Doug Stanton, shows the exploits of ODA 595. The story shows how a team, led by Captain Mitch Nelson (portrayed by Australian actor Chris Hemsworth), joins forces with the Northern Alliance. Together with then warlord, now Vice President of Afghanistan Abdul Rashid Dostum, they win their first battle against the Taliban in Mazar-i-Sharif.

Few people know that there was no mass armour invasion of Afghanistan, in contrast to the 150,000 or so troops needed to conquer Iraq in 2003. It took only about 300 US Special Forces and 2,000 Uzbek horsemen to overthrow the Taliban within three months. While conquering Afghanistan was perhaps easy, keeping Afghanistan is a whole other race, requiring the involvement of some fifty countries and a yearly average presence of 50,000 troops[1]. The most considerable troop contribution came from NATO allies and partners, following the invocation of NATO Article 5 under US President George W Bush after the 9/11 attacks.

The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, the start of the war in Afghanistan, and NATO’s initial involvement are now 18 years behind us. Young people who are reaching the age they go to university or the military and vote are mostly unaware of the war in Afghanistan, its origins, its objective, and its operation. In this article, I seek to give a brief overview of the longest war in NATO history: A war that has lasted for 18 out of 70 years of NATO’s existence. The involvement in the war in Afghanistan has continued through the leadership of four NATO Secretaries General. As such, I divide NATO’s efforts in Afghanistan into four eras, named after the respective Secretaries General: Robertson, de Hoop Scheffer, Rasmussen, and Stoltenberg. For each, I analyse what defining reactions to events and proactive decisions shaped NATO’s involvement in the 18-year war.

George Robertson (2001–2003)

Less than 24 hours after al-Qaeda’s attack on the World Trade Towers in New York, NATO allies invoked Article 5. Then NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson subsequently informed the Secretary General of the United Nations of the Alliance's decision. 12 September 2001 marked the first, and to date only, invocation of Article 5[2]. Not only did NATO allies respond in kind, so did NATO partners through the ANZUS treaty[3]. US troops defeated the Taliban within three months before NATO allies and partners could mobilise.

After the defeat of the Taliban in December 2001, 25 prominent Afghans met under UN auspices in Bonn, Germany, to decide on a plan for governing the country. The warlords of four Afghan alliances were invited to incorporate, rather than alienate, these non-state actors. One of the sections of the Bonn Agreement envisaged the establishment of the assistance force. The United Kingdom took the initiative and requested the United Nations Security Council organize and command an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). On 20 December 2001, the United Nations Security Council honoured the request from the United Kingdom and mandated the creation of ISAF in Resolution 1386. ISAF’s primary purpose was to train the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and assist Afghanistan in rebuilding key government institutions, but it was also engaged in the war against the Taliban insurgency. Part of the US troops from Operation Enduring Freedom were placed under ISAF command, leading to a 2:1 ratio of US to non-US soldiers in Afghanistan for most of ISAF’s duration.

A common misconception is that ISAF is a NATO mission. It is not. The mission was a UN-mandated assistance operation to Afghanistan. Initially, there was no role envisioned for NATO. Instead, four individual countries took turns in leading the operational control centre of the mission. ISAF-1 deployed under UK command in December 2001 in and around Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan. Turkey assumed command of ISAF-2 in June 2002. A combined Netherlands-German Corps was planning to take over for ISAF-3. On 6 November 2002 Germany and the Netherlands asked NATO to support the binational command of ISAF-3 by coordinating the force generation process, allowing the use of NATO’s intelligence capability and disseminating routine information to non-NATO countries. During the 2002 NATO summit in Prague the alliance agreed to support ISAF-3. NATO’s assistance with force generation was particularly well received. NATO’s formal involvement was also deemed useful for political reasons. Together these developments were the first step in the process that led to handing over command of the whole ISAF operation to NATO in August 2003 when the alliance formally took command of ISAF-4.

ISAF became the platform for what today may seem like an unlikely ally. Eighteen years ago, the Russian Federation stood side by side with the United States as it declared the War on Terror. Under Lord Robertson, a NATO-Russia summit was held in Rome 2002, which led to the creation of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC)[4]. One of the main areas of cooperation between NATO and Russia was counter-narcotics.

Preparing and commanding ISAF allowed NATO to test and refine its command structures. At the Prague Summit NATO also endorsed the concept of the NATO Response Force (NRF). In November 2002, the Netherlands-Germany Corps (1GNC) became a “High Readiness Forces (Land) Headquarters” (HRF(L) HQ) as part of NATO's Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). The first deployment within the HRF(L) framework took place between February and August 2003 when the corps operated as ISAF-3's headquarters in Afghanistan. Today, we find the NRF enhanced by the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), in which 1GNC, again, plays a significant role as Land Headquarters. It was during 1GNC’s deployment that the Taliban proclaimed that they were back, regrouped, rearmed, and ready for guerrilla war to expel US and allied forces from Afghanistan.

Following the joint Dutch-German commanded ISAF-3, NATO took command of ISAF on 11 August 2003. By then, ISAF consisted of 5,000 troops from more than 30 countries, of which around 90 per cent were from NATO nations. By far the largest single contingents in ISAF were Canadian and German, made up of roughly 2,000 troops each, while the US had roughly double the amount of troops in Operation Enduring Freedom than NATO had in ISAF, bringing the total NATO allied troops in Afghanistan to 15,000.

When NATO took control of ISAF in Afghanistan, Secretary General Robertson created the office of the Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) to support the NATO mission. The SCR is the principal point of contact for neighbouring countries as well as with various political actors, representatives of Afghan civil society, and representatives of international non-governmental organisations. The representative mandate is limited in time and renewable in light of political developments in Afghanistan. To date, nine ambassadors have served as NATO’s Senior Civilian Representative.

In December 2003, the North Atlantic Council authorised the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, General James Jones, to initiate the expansion of ISAF by taking over command of the German-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kunduz. Set up in early 2002, the PRTs were small joint civil-military units set up under ISAF to achieve three objectives: improve security, extend the authority of the Afghan central government, and facilitate reconstruction. The other eight PRTs operating in Afghanistan in 2003 remained under US command outside of the NATO structure.

de Hoop Scheffer (2004–2008)

Secretary General Robertson was halfway into his mandate when ISAF was formed, and by the time the Taliban had announced their resurgence in 2003, he was on his way out. His successor, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer from the Netherlands, was in charge of NATO during the four phases of ISAF’s expansion to all of Afghanistan. Six months into his term, during the NATO Summit in Istanbul, the North Atlantic Council announced it would expand the PRT pilot.

Under de Hoop Scheffer NATO saw increased cooperation with non-NATO allies. In 2004, Georgia joined ISAF as a non-NATO partner, eventually growing to become one of the largest per capita troop contributors to ISAF in 2012. During the 2005 ministerial meetings in Brussels, NATO initiated the NATO Russia Council Pilot Project on Counter-Narcotics Training for Afghan and Central Asian Personnel. At the same ministerial meetings, ISAF’s operation and tactics were further defined. The North Atlantic Council endorsed an operational plan that allowed for the continued expansion of ISAF following four phases, with the Provincial Reconstruction Teams taking on the leading role in the NATO effort, supported by military capabilities whenever the situation on the ground required it to do so.

The effectiveness of ISAF suffered under hybrid Principal-Agent issues. Troops contributed to ISAF adhered to at least two Principals, the North Atlantic Council and the national government of the troop-contributing nation, each with its own delegation contract to the agent. The problem in this relation is that as members of the North Atlantic Council the latter is also part of the former. Despite NATO having faced this issue during the intervention in Kosovo[5], the alliance had not been able to adjust to these lessons learned. The hybrid Principal-Agent issue caused havoc during the force generation for phase 4 of ISAF. The troop generation required for the increase in NATO presence was a key priority during the North Atlantic Council meeting at the 2006 Riga Summit. France, Germany, Spain, and Italy (single Principals) were reluctant to send troops to southern Afghanistan, despite agreeing to expand ISAF into phase 4 as collective Principal (The North Atlantic Council)[6].

From January 2006 onwards, the UK, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, and the Netherlands formed the core of ISAF. Estonia had only recently joined the Alliance in 2004 and quickly demonstrated it joined not only for a security guarantee but also to contribute to international security. In this period the contribution from non-US troops and US troops was equal.

NATO not only contributed its fair share of troops in Afghanistan but also international aid. In 2007 NATO created the Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund. The ANA fund provided a mechanism to support the transportation and installation of donated equipment, to purchase equipment and services for ANA engineering projects, and to support in- and out-of-country training. It is one of three funding streams used by the international community to channel its financial support.

Despite financial contributions to Afghanistan’s security forces and institutions, the war dragged on with tactical victories on both sides but little strategic gain. During the summer of 2007, NATO forces achieved tactical victories at the Battle of Chora (Uruzgan), where Dutch and Australian ISAF forces were deployed. Slowly, the newly trained Afghan forces started to take over the principal role in combat with their victory in the Battle of Musa Qala (Helmand), with UK troops providing support. Successes in Helmand saw NATO bringing electricity to the region, while the successful Taliban raid on the Sarposa Prison and raids on supply convoys in Pakistan were significant setbacks for the allies.

The 2008 Bucharest Summit launched a strategic vision for Afghanistan based on four guiding principles: (1) Long-term Commitment; (2) Afghan Leadership; (3) Comprehensive Approach; and (4) Regional Engagement. These guiding principles were not new and had been growing organically as part of the Afghanistan strategy for the past years. In addition to these principles, the outcomes of the summit led to three new initiatives for Afghanistan that have ultimately shaped NATO’s operations and organizations.

Firstly, the summit saw the launch of Strategic Communication and the NATO TV Channel. A close cooperation between the NATO Public Diplomacy Division and the Danish Government, the NATO TV Channel aims to improve understanding of the Alliance’s roles, operation, and missions. Today, NATO TV operates from Riga and is a significant player in the coverage of the eFP and the #WeAreNATO campaign.

Secondly, NATO leaders introduced an action plan for civil-military cooperation through a comprehensive approach for Afghanistan. Today, the Action Plan covers four key areas: planning and conduct of operations; lessons learned, training, education, and exercises; cooperation with external actors; and strategic communications.

The third new initiative was the “Partners around the globe”. Through this partnership, NATO works closely with Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, and Mongolia on shared security challenges. These countries’ efforts toward stabilising Afghanistan have been an important focus of cooperation in recent years.

Rasmussen (2009–2014)

Both de Hoop Scheffer and George W Bush left office in 2009, leading to a new era of leadership for both the US and NATO troops in Afghanistan. Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer was succeeded by former Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, while the US was now led by the Democrats under President Barack Obama. Obama campaigned on the promise to win the war in Afghanistan and mandated a troop surge. Between 2009 and 2011, the troop contribution shifted from the 1:1 balance it had gained in 2008 back to a 2:1 ratio between US and non-US troops.

During the 2009 Strasbourg-Kiel summit celebrating NATO’s 60th anniversary, the North Atlantic Council published a dedicated Summit Declaration on Afghanistan. NATO agreed to establish a NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A) and work with European institutional partners to help train the Afghan National Police. The ANA Trust Fund was also expanded.

On 15 June 2009, General Stanley A. McChrystal, US Army, assumed command of ISAF forces in Afghanistan. McCrystal’s focus on counterinsurgency led to the creation of the Afghanistan Mission Network (AMN) in 2010. The AMN became the primary information-sharing platform for all troops in Afghanistan and showed the need for the United States to share information with allies when conducting large operations together with them. The AMN became the blueprint for the NATO Federated Mission Networking (FMN) concept, which was endorsed by the NATO Military Committee on 21 November 2012. The FMN is currently being developed for NATO’s presence on the Eastern Flank. With better information-sharing and renewed counter-insurgency tactics, the war in Afghanistan shifted in NATO’s favour. During the 2010 Lisbon Summit, NATO leaders discussed handing over ownership of the operation to the Afghan government.

With the death of Al-Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden in May 2011 at the hands of Seal Team Six and increased stability in Afghanistan, leaders of NATO member countries endorsed an exit strategy for ISAF. During the Chicago Summit, they agreed that NATO would reiterate their long-term commitment to Afghanistan, but that the era of NATO-led ISAF would end. Their goal was to hand over the command of all combat missions to Afghan forces by the middle of 2013 while continuing the focus on advising, training, and assisting Afghan security forces.

The Chicago Summit also saw the creation of NATO 1325: NATO’s follow-up on the 12-year-old UN resolution on women, peace, and security. The integration of women’s voices into peace and security has been a focal point in NATO’s efforts in Afghanistan ever since.

To remain true to their long-term commitment, NATO decided at the Chicago Summit to initiate a follow-up, NATO-led non-combat mission in Afghanistan. Jointly agreed between allies and partners with the Afghan government, the new mission would continue supporting the development of the Afghan security forces after the end of ISAF’s mission in December 2014.

Stoltenberg (2014–Present)

One of the first things Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg did was continue the legacy of his Scandinavian colleague, Rasmussen. Taking office two months before the end of ISAF, Secretary General Stoltenberg shepherded the transition of the NATO-led ISAF mission to the new non-combat mission. Under the Resolute Support Mission (RSM), NATO launched a new training mission on 1 January 2015. The goal of the Resolute Support Mission, which is still ongoing, is to provide further training, advice, and assistance for the Afghan security forces and institutions. The US mission Operation Enduring Freedom also came to an end and was succeeded by Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS). Unlike its predecessor, OFS is officially part of the Resolute Support Mission. At the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, allied leaders decided to extend the presence of RSM beyond 2016.

RSM operates with one central hub (in Kabul/Bagram) and four spokes in Mazar-e Sharif, Herat, Kandahar, and Laghman. It focuses primarily on training, advice, and assistance activities at the security-related ministries, in the country’s institutions, and among the senior ranks of the army and police. RSM works closely with different elements of the Afghan army, police, and air force.

During the US election campaign, Trump routinely promised not to involve the United States in wars that it could not win. However, as president, Trump has reversed course, following instead the path of his predecessors, Bush and Obama. In August 2017, he approved the deployment of several thousand more troops to Afghanistan, adding to the 8,500 US troops already stationed in-country, leading a total of 14,000 US troops presently in Afghanistan. Added to this were some 7,000 allied troops as part of RSM. The New Surge made less use of militias than earlier counterinsurgency (COIN) tactics employed in Afghanistan under McCrystal’s NATO-led effort. In addition, it seemed at odds with the Afghan National Army Territorial Force being trained by RSM, which supported Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s creation of a 20,000-strong militia. Trump’s New Surge aimed to force the Taliban to the negotiation table to broker a peace deal. At the Brussels Summit in July 2018, NATO committed to sustaining its mission in Afghanistan until conditions indicate change is appropriate. Despite this, non-US troop contribution to NATO’s mission in Afghanistan is one-fifth of what it was in 2015.

In contrast to past Secretary Generals’ central focus on Afghanistan during their tenure, Stoltenberg’s greatest challenge is the current shift in the Alliance’s focus. While the first decade of NATO’s presence in Afghanistan matched the Alliance’s desire to focus on expeditionary operations, changes in the political sphere have allies focusing on activities closer to home. NATO’s eFP, for example, draws attention and capabilities (4,700 troops) from member states, as well as the troops needed to rebuild and be ready for the VJTF/NRI. Many NATO allies, who do not meet the Article 3 criteria of the NATO treaty (commonly referred to as the 2% agreement), face trouble with meeting all commitments the Alliance asks of them. They are unable to contribute to expeditionary operations like RSM and the NATO Mission in Iraq (NMI), or to eFP/VJTF/NRI, making a possible withdraw from Afghanistan a welcomed development for troop-contributing nations. Like the troop generation for ISAF, NATO has trouble dealing with the hybrid Principal-Agent relationship between national governments and their representation in the North Atlantic Council.

Conclusion

NATO has been involved in the War in Afghanistan for nearly eighteen years. Even if a peace deal is achieved, NATO has committed to continue providing political and financial support to the Afghan army and security forces with training and funding. Beyond the Train, Advice, Assist mission, allies and partner countries are committed to the broader international community’s support for the long-term financial sustainment of the Afghan security forces until the end of 2020.

NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan removed the opportunities for violent non-state actors to exploit the lawless Taliban-ruled country and helped foster a stronger democratic Afghanistan. Not only has Afghanistan benefitted from the NATO-led ISAF mission, but so did NATO. Under Secretary General Robertson, the resilience and unquestionable support for Article 5 of the treaty was tested, and progressive developments were made in NATO’s civilian and civilian-military initiatives. Under de Hoop Scheffer, NATO expanded its work with partners, both close to home and far away, including, for a brief moment, practical cooperation with the Russian Federation. Between de Hoop Scheffer and Rasmussen, great strides were made in improving NATO’s public communication. Under Rasmussen’s term NATO improved information-sharing strategies between allies, which are still used today.

The effectiveness of ISAF suffered under the hybrid Principal-Agent challenge. Despite nearly twenty years of experience with this issue, NATO remains haunted by it today, with the enhanced Forward Presence and the 2% debate being the most prominent examples.

Today, NATO remains active in Afghanistan in three ways. First, the ANA Trust fund will remain active until at least 2024, assuring financial support to the Afghan government and Afghan National Army. Secondly, independent of the outcome from the US-Taliban talks, NATO has committed to the Resolute Support Mission and potentially will remain to support the Afghan government if the US withdraws with Operation Freedom’s Sentinel. Third, independent from a possible peace deal, the work of the NATO Senior Civilian Representative’s office will continue.

At the 2018 Brussels Summit, allies and partners agreed to extend their commitment to financially supporting the Afghan security forces through 2024. It remains an essential task for NATO to educate the public of its member states on the reason why NATO got involved and why it is still in Afghanistan. In particular for its younger citizens, NATO should explain why it will remain involved for at least five more years. Just as the events on 11 September are only vaguely remembered by Generation Z, it will be equally difficult to explain to the next generation what NATO did and does in Afghanistan, with 9/11 and the NATO-led ISAF disappearing in the collective memory as time passes. As the Alliance’s focus has shifted East under Stoltenberg’s tenure, a renewed focus to remember NATO’s sacrifices in Afghanistan is essential.

About the Author

Capt. John G.L.J. Jacobs is one of the founders of the Atlantic Forum, a grassroots start-up NGO promoting NATO and the transatlantic values of the Washington Treaty. The Atlantic Forum focuses on students and young professionals, ages 18 to 35. Through this role John is frequently in contact with the NATO Public Diplomacy Division. Between 2016 and 2018, he was the president of the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association (YATA), and between 2017 and 2019 he was a board member of the Dutch-based Atlantische Commissie (Atlantic Commission). He is currently working at the Netherlands Army Headquarters as a planner (future ops), with a focus on NATO missions. John is currently working on a master’s degree from Radboud University, Netherlands, in Social Geography. He previously studied at King’s College London.

Notes

[1] N. Wadhams, “Afghanistan’s War”, Bloomberg, 1 February 2019. Data taken from US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR).

[2] https://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm.

[3] The Anzus treaty is a defence pact between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. Australia and New Zealand are part of NATO’s Partners Around the Globe.

[4] Following renewed aggression against Estonia (2007), Georgia (2008), and Ukraine (2014), the NATO-Russia Council’s cooperation was suspended in 2014. To this day NATO keeps the dialogue open.

[5] During the Kosovo Intervention US General Wesley Clark’s authority was derived from both the US president (as U.S. European Command) and the North Atlantic Council (as SACEUR).

[6] For a deeper analysis of the principal-agent theory, see David P. Auerswald and Stephen M. Saideman, NATO in Afghanistan, Fighting Together, Fighting Alone (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2014).