This paper examines modes of cooperation between the EU and NATO that were established in 2016 by using the multi-level analysis approach to inter-organisational relations. Such an approach provides a ‘reality check’ for the dynamics and dysfunctions of EU-NATO cooperation at different levels of collaboration, from the international and member state levels, to individual, bureaucracy, and inter-secretariat levels. Among the five levels that are explored, four prove to strengthen EU-NATO cooperation. The enhancement of EU-NATO relations since 2016 has certainly been driven by exogenous crises, as well as overlapping membership and resources, which define the international system level. Due to the Turkey-Cyprus political deadlock, the member state level has proven to hinder EU-NATO cooperation. In contrast, political deadlock also stimulated the development of informal ties between the EU and NATO. This is clearly visible at the individual level, where fruitful relationships between the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and NATO’s Secretary General, as well as their respective cabinets, have contributed to promoting greater EU-NATO cooperation. Furthermore, interactions between military staff in operational theatres proved to be more successful than the efforts of the NAC and PSC ambassadors in overcoming, to the extent possible, member state-level political deadlock. The bureaucracy level ensured the functionality of EU-NATO cooperation that lead to the creation of a common culture between both organisations. Finally, the inter-secretariat level move EU-NATO cooperation from ‘ad hoc-ism’ towards strategic advancement, as national consent is required for formalisation.
By Sofiia Shevchuk
“Today, the Euro-Atlantic community is facing unprecedented challenges emanating from the South and East”, states the Joint Declaration signed in 2016 between the EU and NATO.[i] The ongoing crisis in Ukraine, a mass refugee crisis, terrorism attacks, as well as cyber and hybrid threats together have necessitated a more coherent and comprehensive European response. Security challenges coming from both Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods, combined with military and non-military problem sets, have made it even more crucial to enhance the strategic partnership between the EU and NATO. As neither the EU nor NATO possess the required tools to address these widespread and varied threats, it is only together that both organisations can become “a formidable force” through working “not just side-by-side, but hand-in-hand”.[ii]
This article analyses factors that have improved or hindered EU-NATO cooperation since 2016. For this, a multi-level analysis approach to inter-organisational relations developed by Joachim Koops is used. Koops defines EU-NATO relations through five levels: the international system level, the state level, the individual level, the bureaucratic level, and the inter-secretariat level.
In this article, first, the international system level is explained, which refers to “processes, dynamics, events (such as major crises), ideas, opportunities and power shifts” that affect both the EU and NATO. Second, the member state level focuses on national governments’ interests. Third, the individual level mentions key officials and decision-makers. Fourth, the bureaucratic level refers to crucial actors within key administrative structures and hierarchies. Lastly, the inter-secretariat level relies on jointly established structures and processes between the two organisations that aim to facilitate relations.
Potential overlap: Cooperation vs. rivalry
To begin with, the real momentum for deepening EU-NATO cooperation—and particularly for reconsidering security and defence in Europe—stemmed from the crisis in Ukraine.[iv] The ultimate response from the EU and NATO was a combination of two sets of decisions. Particularly, the EU created the Normandy Format, adopted economic sanctions, and deployed a reform-mandated mission within the civilian security sector.[v] In contrast, NATO focused on providing security and deterrence to the Allies bordering Ukraine through improving its defence and deterrence military posture.[vi] However, despite the fact that the crisis led both organisations to act, there was limited coordination with regard to achieving a “common strategic purpose”.[vii] Thus, the need to do more together in order to reach more strategic results in the future became evident.
Both the EU and NATO share members, resources, and even mandates to some extent. Both organisations deal with European security in the area of crisis management. NATO engages in the full spectrum of crisis management “where possible and when necessary, to prevent crises, manage crises, stabilise post-conflict situations and support reconstruction”.[viii] Similarly, in the Petersberg Declaration, the EU outlined the range of tasks that cover different areas of crisis management, such as humanitarian assistance, peace-keeping, peace-making, and post-conflict stabilisation.[ix] Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has understood security in broader terms by including unconventional threats such as “terrorism, drug trafficking, energy security, climate change, health risks, and water scarcity”.[x] However, NATO possesses limited means to address civilian-type crisis management. Thus, such partners as the EU contribute to NATO’s success in addressing the abovementioned threats, as defined in the Strategic Concept.
When it comes to shared resources, it is necessary to mention overlapping membership, which is explained below, as well as ‘one set of forces’ and ‘one set of taxpayers’.[xi] The latter two aspects affect the capability development on both sides. Considering that ‘capabilities gaps’ are predominantly the same on both sides, as they come mostly from European countries, there should be EU-NATO coordination when it comes to capabilities development.
The Implementation on the Joint Agreement stresses the “coherence between the EU Capability Development Plan (CDP) and the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP)”.[xii] Emphasis is put on staff-to-staff meetings, directing mainly EU staff to attend the NDPP and NATO’s Planning and Review Process (PARP) meetings. Members of the EU staff have been invited to the PARP, and consequently, the revision of the CDP in 2018 benefited from the shared interaction and information gathered.[xiii] Moreover, being at the centre of European capability development, the European Defence Agency (EDA) has stated that “since the CDP is already defining European capability priorities beyond the needs of CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy), it is not too difficult to synchronise capability development with the NDPP”.[xiv]
Debates on whether EU-NATO relations is demand-driven, caused by a particular situation on the ground, or supply-driven, based on common goals—or the combination of both—are still ongoing. What is sure is that 2014 opened a window of opportunity to further develop EU-NATO cooperation. Ultimately, it was the international system level that forced both the EU and NATO to cooperate more.
Key decision-making powers
Considering the intergovernmental nature of both organisations when it comes to security and defence, the degree of relations between the EU and NATO is largely dependent upon member state governments. As the EU and NATO share 21 common member states, it is crucial to analyse member states’ interests as “the rubric of EU and NATO membership may continue to hinder cooperation”.[xv] As the role of states in EU-NATO relations is “greater than that of the leaders of the organisations or their bureaucracy”.[xvi]
At the outset, the UK and Germany were unhappy with the so-called ‘status quo’ in EU-NATO relations and thus have tried to work around it without modifying the internal consensus rule.[xvii] For example, the two countries organised informal “Transatlantic Dinners” that avoided formal agendas or formal decisions in order to allow all NATO Allies and EU member states to talk. The UK has also made clear that European defence structures are not enough to control the threats that are undermining the ‘rules-based international system’, and thus, it is important to have such NATO Allies as the US and Canada on board.[xviii] The UK is supportive of EU-NATO cooperation as it acknowledges that the EU is doing more and, therefore, is becoming more imperative and harmonious with NATO.[xix] Similarly, Germany desires for Europe to be a provider of security within the whole security network, as a combined European effort within NATO.[xx] From the EU side, even non-NATO members, such as Finland and Sweden, want to push the EU-NATO agenda forward.[xxi] In addition, an informal “group of friends of NATO-EU cooperation” within NATO was created in the wake of the Warsaw Summit in 2016.[xxii] There have been no official meetings of the group; rather, the group is designed so that one Ally takes the initiative to organise an informal meeting and propose ideas for enhancing cooperation.[xxiii]
When it comes to the perspectives of non-EU Allies, such as the US, Canada, and Norway, those countries tend to support EU-NATO cooperation if the EU is complementing and not duplicating NATO’s operations.[xxiv] What helped to enhance EU-NATO cooperation was the fact that non-EU Allies contributed to Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP missions) and EU Battlegroups, in which Canada, Norway, and Turkey enhanced these groups’ performance. Another example is when the EU and NATO agreed in February 2016 that the latter should engage with the EU’s border management agency, Frontex, to address illegal trafficking and illegal migration in the Aegean Sea.
The first issue when it comes to states creating obstacles for EU-NATO cooperation is the relationship between Turkey and Cyprus. Turkey, a NATO Ally, is not in the EU, whereas Cyprus is in the EU but does not have any cooperation agreement with NATO. Thus, when Turkey asked for more influence in CSDP, it was blocked by Cyprus.[xxv] Conversely, Turkey vetoed information-sharing between Cyprus and NATO as well as potential Cypriot membership in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme and, consequently, access to official EU-NATO meetings.[xxvi] This political impasse has created an obstacle for deeper cooperation between the EU and NATO. Particularly, any formal discussions on missions where both the EU and NATO work side-by-side, such as in Afghanistan, Kosovo, or Somalia, are officially blocked.[xxvii] However, as explained later in this article, the Turkey-Cyprus deadlock often “serves as a cover for national interests” and “hides other reservations about strategic compatibility of the two bodies”.[xxviii]
Another member state that impedes EU-NATO cooperation is Austria. Austria not only has strained relations with Turkey, which blocks the country’s cooperation with NATO, but it also creates obstacles for one of the key EU-NATO cooperation projects—military mobility. Despite the fact that Austria possesses a “challenging geography” and serves as a transit state for a number of “strategic corridors”, it is hesitant to “adjust its infrastructure for military purposes”.[xxix]
In addition, another key state that can potentially create obstacles for deeper EU-NATO cooperation is France.[xxx] France is particularly concerned about the EU’s dependency on NATO. President Macron’s warnings towards Europe about the fact that “NATO is becoming brain-dead” do not support the context of further EU-NATO cooperation.[xxxi]
Despite many friends of EU-NATO cooperation, the political deadlock created by the Turkey-Cyprus issue, as well as present and potential problems posed by Austria and France, overshadows these efforts. Full complementarity between the EU and NATO is only possible when members of both organisations share an equal degree of transparency and involvement.[xxxii]
Leadership cooperation: Killing the ghost of the past
When it comes to the individual level, it is a shared practice at the headquarters level that the NATO Secretary-General (SG) and the EU High Representative/Vice President (HR/VP) meet frequently in order to exchange vital information and discuss emerging crises.[xxxiii] HR/VP Federica Mogherini and NATO SG Jens Stoltenberg were no exception to this rule; moreover, their personalities played a key role in promoting EU-NATO cooperation. The work of Mogherini is currently continued by HR/VP Josep Borrell, who met SG Stoltenberg during Borrell’s first week in the office, underlining the importance of EU-NATO cooperation.
Cross-invitations between the NATO SG and the EU HR/VP for the ministerial meetings and summits is a common practice for both organisations. In this respect, Stoltenberg has been invited to the EU Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) meetings on defence, and likewise Mogherini has been invited to NATO ministerial meetings. Even though such cooperation is not new, there has recently been a more positive tone underlining the meetings, as “Jens Stoltenberg got an applause at the FAC; and Mogherini spoke to uniformed personnel”—both of which have never happened before.[xxxiv] Mogherini confirmed that they “have managed to kill the ghost of the past”, meaning a move away from ideology, reaching the current level of cooperation based on trust-building.[xxxv]
Special attention should also be paid to cabinet-to-cabinet meetings, which have been fruitful in terms of the variety of the issues discussed.[xxxvi] The main idea of these meetings was to understand what is happening within each organisation, even without necessarily agreeing on everything. There have also been many discussions between Mogherini and Stoltenberg explaining the benefits of such initiatives as PESCO and the EDF, and their potential contribution towards burden-sharing within NATO.[xxxvii] Finally, in his address to the European Parliament, Stoltenberg confirmed that EU-NATO “cooperation is now the norm, not the exception”, welcoming the EU’s contributions to fair burden-sharing.[xxxviii]
Ésprit de corps
Other important interlocutors are operational commanders and staff members. This informal track contributes to community-building and the emergence of trust, which is absolutely crucial for EU-NATO cooperation. In general, one can observe that the number of meetings between different officials from both NATO and the EU began to increase in 2016.
When it comes to joint NAC-PSC meetings, there is a “loose formula” of having two informal meetings for every formal one.[xxxix] According to the ‘Berlin Plus’ agreement, formal NAC-PSC meetings should officially be scheduled to take place once a month; however, the meetings are often short or are cancelled.[xl] The number of informal meetings increased after the illegal annexation of Crimea, when a NAC-PSC meeting was organised within 24 hours to informally discuss the developments in Ukraine and demonstrate unity.[xli] In fact, informal meetings today work better, because the topics at hand, such as Afghanistan, Mali, Libya, the Mediterranean, and COVID-19, require the attention of both organisations and a joint response.[xlii]
During the informal meetings, the level of exchange is the same as during the formal meetings, but what differs is the legal status of the outcome. It is crucial to mention that Cyprus is present only during the informal NAC-PSC meetings. Thus, Turkey usually pushes for more formal meetings without Cyprus, while the EU, in line with its ‘inclusivity principle’ pushes for more informal meetings. However, even if the Turkey-Cyprus issue is solved, there will be other difficulties emerging from informal meetings that would prevent the NAC and the PSC from making actionable decisions as there are no formal rules of procedure or the authority to take decisions in that format.[xliii]
Overcoming the deadlock: Developing modus operandi
The concept of operational cooperation is one of the oldest areas of cooperation between the EU and NATO. Firstly, it is crucial to note that the EU and NATO Military Committees, which provide advice to the PSC and the NAC, respectively, meet four times a year. Before 2014, the meetings were short, and their agenda was thin, which since has changed.[xliv] There would usually be no disagreement between Chairs of the Military Committees, but they are still duty-bound to keep their respective organisations going in their own directions. Cooperation at the lower level between the EU Military Staff and the EU cell in SHAPE is smoother and more frequent, ranging from official meetings every month to daily exchanges if required.[xlv] What helps at this level is that the organisations share 21 member states, and while the staff is different, at the Military Representative level, these are the same individuals for both the EU and NATO.
On the tactical level there is a modus operandi developed by staff members that allows for some complementarity even with detached operations.[xlvi] When it comes to operations, there are constant comparisons of notes in order to better understand the situation, especially concerning operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, and the Mediterranean.[xlvii] For example, cooperation in the Mediterranean was established between NATO’s Operation Sea Guardian and the EU NAVFOR Mediterranean-led Operation Sophia through “information sharing, logistical support and through practical interaction”, which over time also started including the refuelling of vessels.[xlviii] Cooperation at the operational level works well, unless there is a need to exchange classified information; but even then, the fact that there are 21 shared member states helps. For instance, a member state representative working for the EU can go to another member state representative working at the same level for NATO and share the information in a way that cannot be done officially at the organisational level.
Another recently established practice between the EU and NATO is the Parallel and Coordinated Exercise (PACE). NATO and the EU exercise together to respond, for example, to a hybrid scenario.[xlix] Additionally, there are reciprocal educational exchanges taking place between the EU Military Staff and the NATO International Military Staff to include the NATO School Oberammergau and the European Security Defence College.[l] However, even here, Turkey is blocking Cypriot officers from attending the NATO School Oberammergau, even if an officer from Cyprus would participate on the ‘EU ticket’.[li]
In such a way, it is easy to observe the positive relationships between executive heads and military staffs of both organisations. Once EU and NATO personnel are in the same theatre of operation, they are naturally part of the same community.[lii] Even though NAC-PSC relations are not yet that successful, primarily because of the dependency on member states, the informal format of the NAC-PSC meetings has improved. Informal cooperation is crucial for the enhancement of EU-NATO relations as it permits the discovery of creative ways within both organisations to overcome existing obstacles and deepen cooperation. Overall, it is the individual level that has enhanced EU-NATO cooperation.
Staff-to-staff interaction: Creation of a common culture
The Joint Declaration lists the EEAS, NATO International Staff, and EU Commission services as the “appropriate” bodies to “develop concrete options for implementation, including appropriate staff coordination mechanisms”. In fact, regular informal staff-to-staff interaction has ensured steady progress in this regard. This concept works due to the fact that 71 out of 74 agreed projects require staff-to-staff interaction without state involvement.[liii] The three exceptions to this are the abovementioned NAC-PSC meetings, PACEs, and cross-briefings.
In order to ensure the steady progress of EU-NATO relations, there are three inter-locking layers created that control the process: (1) action officers, who are experts from both organisations; (2) an intermediate layer, which ensures coordination and consistency; and (3) a principals layer (see Figure 1).[liv] Approximately 200 action officers across NATO, the EEAS, EDA, and the Commission are responsible for the actual implementation of topics within their portfolios.[lv] The intermediate layer consists of a small coordination group, responsible for monitoring and preparation of the Progress Reports.[lvi] Lastly, the principals layer oversees implementation and provides strategic guidance.[lvii]
Figure 1 Three inter-locking layers that control the process of EU-NATO cooperation
Source: compiled by the author based on EU & NATO, "Third progress report"; Interview 2.
From organisational culture to common culture
In addition, organisational culture is something that is worth mentioning here. There are strong organisational cultures on both sides that are very different and, thus, create a challenge to working together.[lviii] However, once the two organisations started to increase joint operations, their understanding of each other also improved. Consequently, the differences in organisational cultures are bridged through more practice, and this can in turn lead to the creation of a common culture.
Reality check: Effectiveness and progress
The Joint Declaration of 2016 was a political intention expressed by institutional leaders and did not commit member state governments to its implementation. Only later, in December 2016, did the respective Councils within both organisations adopt conclusions to implement the Joint Declaration. Following the first Joint Declaration, there was a second Joint Declaration signed in 2018.[lix]
As to its further development, the Councils within the EU and NATO endorsed a common set of 42 proposals in order to implement the Joint Declaration. In 2017, the two Councils endorsed a common set of an additional 32 proposals. In total these projects are grouped in seven areas of cooperation between the EU and NATO: countering hybrid threats, operational cooperation, cyber security and defence, defence capabilities, defence industry and research, exercises, as well as defence and security capacity-building, with political dialogue added later.[lx] As a part of political dialogue, there was a new practice for EU-NATO cooperation established in the form of cross-briefing reports. These reports have been noted as a positive transparency measurement that also increases trust-building. It is interesting to observe that the number of EU-NATO cross-briefings increased steadily from seven in 2016 to more than 30 in 2019.[lxi]
Hence, the enhancement of EU-NATO cooperation started from the Joint Declaration, which served as a symbol of political will that was later endorsed by member states, followed by the outlined seven areas of cooperation. EU-NATO cooperation has moved from a state of ‘ad hoc-ism’ to a certain level of formalisation, where mutual reinforcement and deepened partnership has been observed.
At the interorganisational level, common crises and shared membership and resources have driven cooperation between the EU and NATO. When it comes to the member state level, it is important not to underestimate the successes that have emerged as a result of individual member state efforts such as those of the UK and Germany. However, on the other side of the coin, unless problems between other member states, such as the Turkey-Cyprus issue, are solved, EU-NATO cooperation will most likely remain predominantly informal.
Due to this informality, a clear focus on staff-to-staff cooperation has been observed since 2016, which is one way to overcome the political difficulties. The EU and NATO staff have successfully practised informal types of interaction at different stages on a regular basis. At the individual level, reinforcement is observed, not only due to close relationships between organisational leaders but also due to developed modus operandi between the military officials on the ground. Similarly, at the bureaucratic level, the enhancement of EU-NATO cooperation is supported by the establishment of three inter-locking layers that control the progress of partnership. Moreover, the practice of working together contributes to the creation of a common culture.
Lastly, one of the biggest successes of EU-NATO cooperation since 2016 are the 74 proposals for cooperation, which confirm a shared will to coordinate activities. At the inter-secretariat level, EU-NATO cooperation has moved from being merely ad hoc towards becoming more strategic, even if merely informal. However, if cooperation between the EU and NATO were to be formalised there would be an endless negotiation on rules, operational procedures, and standards. For now, the achieved informal interactions, based on experience, cooperation, and collegiality, work largely because they are informal.
To conclude, EU-NATO cooperation has been strengthened by the international system and progresses at the individual, bureaucratic, and inter-secretariat levels; meanwhile, it has been hindered by impasses at the member state level.
About the Author
Sofiia Shevchuk is the Database Team Coordinator at the Brussels Binder and a Research Assistant at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly*. Sofiia recently graduated from the College of Europe’s EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies program, where she wrote her thesis on European strategic autonomy and EU-NATO cooperation under the supervision of Professor Federica Mogherini. Considering her interests in women’s participation in security and defence policies, Sofiia is a member of the WIIS Brussels. Prior to this, she worked for the Security and Defence programme at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, Brussels office. Before, she was also working for Visegrad Insight magazine, covering Central European security and foreign policy. Sofiia also gained professional experience in the Casimir Pulaski Foundation and the Embassy of Ukraine to the Republic of Poland.
*The article primarily draws on Ms Shevchuk's master's thesis submitted at the College of Europe before joining the NATO PA in July 2020. The views expressed in the article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly or any of its members.
[i] “Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, and the Secretary General of NATO, Jens Stoltenberg,” Warsaw, 8 July 2016, [hereafter “Joint Declaration 2016”].
[ii] Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission, and Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General, “Inauguration of Hybrid Centre of Excellence”, Helsinki, Hybrid Centre of Excellence, 2 October 2017.
[iii] Joachim A. Koops, “Inter-Organizationalism in International Relations: A Multilevel Framework of Analysis”, in Palgrave Handbook of Inter-Organizational Relations in World Politics, ed. Rafael Biermann & Joachim A. Koops, 191–207 (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).
[iv] Interview 3 with NATO official, Political Affairs, via phone, 30 March 2020; Interview 4 with Military Official, Permanent Representation of Germany, via phone, 31 March 2020; Interview 8 with Gabriel Barnier, Deputy Director in the Office of Secretary General, NATO, via phone, 16 April 2020. (The interviews cited in this article were carried out as part of thesis project at the College of Europe.)
[v] S. Duke and S. Vanhoonacker, “EU-NATO relations”, in The EU, Strategy and Security Policy, ed. L. Chappell et al., 162–163 (London, Routledge, 2016).
[viii] North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, “NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement: Analysis and Recommendations of The Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept For NATO”, Brussels, 17 May 2010, p. 21.
[ix] WEU, Petersberg Tasks, Petersberg, June 1992.
[x] S. Kochut, “Inter(b)locking institutions: NATO, the EU, the OSCE and inter-organizational European security governance”, in Inter-Organisational Relations in International Security, ed. S. Aris et al., 79 (London, Routledge, 2018).
[xii] North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, “Statement on the implementation of the Joint Declaration signed by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization”, Brussels, 6 December 2016, retrieved 21 April 2020, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_138829.htm.
[xiii] European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, “Second progress report on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by NATO and EU Councils on 6 December 2016”, Brussels, 29 November 2017.
[xiv] European Defence Agency, “2018 CDP Revision: The EU Capability Development Priorities”, Brussels, 2018.
[xv] Daniel Fiott, “The EU, NATO and the European defence market: do institutional responses to defence globalisation matter?” European Security 26, no. 3 (2017): 398–414.
[xvi] H. Ojanen, The EU’s Power in Inter-Organisational Relations (London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 14–15.
[xvii] Rafael Biermann, “Designing Cooperation among International Organizations: The Quest for Autonomy, the Dual-Consensus Rule, and Cooperation Failure”, Journal of International Organization Studies 6, no. 2 (2015): 45–66.
[xviii] Interview 1 with British Defence Staff, UK Mission to the EU, via phone, 20 March 2020.
[xx] Interview 4 with a Military official, Permanent Representation of the Federal Republic of Germany, via phone, 31 March.
[xxi] Interview 2 with a European External Action Service official, Security and Defence Policy Directorate, via phone, 20 March 2020.
[xxii] Interview 7 with a French official, Représentation permanente de la France auprès de l‘Organisation du Traite de l’Atlantique Nord, via email, 15 April 2020.
[xxiv] D. Angel, Canada’s Ambassador to NAC, lecture, College of Europe, Bruges, 26 February 2020.
[xxv] Nina Græger, “European security as practice: EU–NATO communities of practice in the making?” European Security 25, no. 4 (2016): 478–501.
[xxvii] Biermann, “Designing Cooperation among International Organizations”, 53.
[xxviii] Græger, “European Security”, 482.; Duke and Vanhoonacker, “EU-NATO relations”, 154.
[xxix] Margriet Drent, Kimberley Kruijver, and Dick Zandee, “Military Mobility and the EU-NATO Conundrum”, Clingendael Report, the Hague, July 2019.
[xxx] Interview 1.
[xxxi] “Emmanuel Macron warns Europe: NATO is becoming brain-dead”, The Economist, 7 November 2019, retrieved 2 May 2020, https://www.economist.com/europe/2019/11/07/emmanuel-macron-warns-europe....
[xxxii] NATO, “NATO 2020”, 24.
[xxxiii] Biermann, “Designing Cooperation among International Organizations”, 54.
[xxxiv] Græger, “European Security”, 483.
[xxxvi] Interview 8 with Gabriel Bernier, Deputy Director in the Office of Secretary General, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, via phone, 16 April 2020.
[xxxvii] Interview 5 with a high-ranking European External Action Service official, Secretariat-General, Inter-institutional relation, policy coordination and public diplomacy, via phone, 8 April 2020.
[xxxviii] North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, “Remarks by NATO SG Jens Stoltenberg at the European Parliament”, Brussels, 3 May 2017, retrieved 2 May 2020, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_143405.htm?selectedLocale=en.
[xxxix] Simon J. Smith, Nikola Tomic, and Carmen Gebhard, “The Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost: a Grounded Theory approach to the comparative study of decision-making in the NAC and PSC”, European Security 26, no. 3: 359–378.
[xl] Græger, “European Security”, 483.
[xli] Interview 9 with NATO official (2012-2019), Political Affairs, via phone, 17 April 2020.
[xlii] Interview 4.
[xliii] Smith, Tomic, and Gebhard, “The Father”, 367.
[xliv] Græger, “European Security”, 484.
[xlvi] Duke and Vanhoonacker, “EU-NATO relations”, 160.
[xlvii] Interview 8.
[xlviii] NATO, “Statement on the Implementation”; EU & NATO, “Second progress report”.
[xlix] European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, “Fourth progress report on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by NATO and EU Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017”, Brussels, 17 June 2019.
[li] Interview 4.
[lii] Interview 3.
[liii] Interview 2.
[liv] EU & NATO, “Third progress report”.
[lv] Interview 2.
[lviii] Interview 3.
[lix] “Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, and the Secretary General of NATO, Jens Stoltenberg”, Brussels, 10 July 2018 [hereafter “Joint Declaration 2018”].